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This thesis examines official cultural policy in Indonesia, focussing on the cultural policy 
of the national governments from 1950 until 2003. Drawing on Michel Foucault’s 
writings about government and debates about cultural policy in Cultural Studies, the 
study proposes that the features of cultural policy in Indonesia are primarily determined 
by the changing ways that the state has put culture to work in its versions of modern 
governance. 
 
Part I of the thesis provides a history of official cultural policy, including a background 
chapter on the late colonial era and the Japanese occupation. Although contemporary 
cultural policy was first articulated within Western liberal democracies to shape self-
governing national citizens, the Dutch colonial cultural policy differed in that it assumed 
indigenous subjects had reduced capacities and focussed on managing ethnic populations. 
The cultural policies of subsequent governments maintained the twin imperatives of 
‘improving’ individuals and managing populations, but with different understandings of 
both imperatives. While a more autonomous subject was assumed during Constitutional 
Democracy, Guided Democracy exercised greater state guidance as part of Sukarno’s 
mobilisation of the population behind his political program. Cultural policy during the 
New Order era rejected Sukarno’s ‘politicisation’ of culture, replaced ‘improvement’ 
with ‘development’ and further strengthened the role of the state in providing cultural 
guidance, a move justified by designating Indonesians backward by modern standards. 
The Japanese administration was the first government to address a national population. 
Relations among indigenous ethnic populations and between ethnicity and the nation 
were addressed in cultural policy from 1956 and were central to cultural policy 
throughout the New Order era. Part II of the thesis consists of two case studies of cultural 
programs in the New Order and Reform eras: (1) the arts councils and cultural parks and 
(2) a cultural research project. It explores New Order centralism, demonstrating the 
heterogeneity between different levels of the state and how governmental goals imbued 
particular practices and objects with special significance and meaning by constructing 
them as culture.  
 
Cultural policy in the post-Suharto period is addressed in both Parts I and II. While the 
practices of the New Order era are generally continuing, decentralisation created the 
possibility of a plurality of cultural policies across Indonesia, as lower levels of 
government are responsible for administering cultural policy. Decentralisation could 
result in a more participatory cultural policy as more cultural practices are addressed or a 
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Two sets of experiences helped me clarify the direction of my research. When I was on 
fieldwork in Sumatra, two people in different provinces who were actively involved in 
the arts said independently to me that they did not know what Indonesian culture 
(kebudayaan Indonsia) was. They felt it was something alien, talked about by, and used 
to justify the actions of a far-away central government. While most other Indonesians 
with whom I talked did not hold this view, there was a widespread confusion over the 
purpose of cultural policy and dismay at the effects of centrally generated policy on local 
practices. While at a seminar in Australia, after discovering that I was researching 
Indonesian cultural policy a senior academic asked, with a roguish smile, whether 
Indonesia had a cultural policy. While this was a dig from a political economist, it also 
indicated that while it had been established that other countries had cultural policies, this 
was not the case for Indonesia. These experiences identified cultural policy as a puzzling, 
blurry space within two disparate communities.  
 
My understanding of what I was doing grew from the question of how best to explore and 
map this space. I do not view my research as charting the linear stages of development of 
cultural policy. Instead, I have endeavoured to write about the contingency of the present 
condition of cultural policy – a history of what Michael Shapiro calls ‘what we are now’:  
This ‘what we are now’ is not meant as a simple description of the current state of 
things. Rather, it is an attempt to show that the ‘now’ is an unstable victory won at 
the expense of other possible nows. (Shapiro, 1992, p. 12)  
I have tried to write about cultural policy in a way that allows for different possibilities 
and choices, both in Indonesia and abroad. My goal has been to contribute to the debate, 
in particular in Indonesia, about the state’s role and relationship to culture in its myriad 
forms. This thesis in many ways arises from the long discussions with numerous friends 
and colleagues in Indonesia who have an interest in cultural policy. I hope that my 
research can clarify issues and assist reflection about future directions.  
 
Modern Indonesian spelling is used in the body of the text. Where names and titles use 




the modern Indonesian spelling for Pujangga Baru and Balai Pustaka,1 as this has 
become the convention after considerable contemporary research. I adopt the English-
language convention of citing an author’s last name in this thesis because many 
Indonesian authors publish in English as well as Indonesian, and I have applied this 
convention to Indonesian publications for consistency. In the case of articles from the 
Indonesian daily newspaper Kompas, I have used the journalists’ abbreviated names, as 
the difficulty of associating abbreviated names with full names makes the abbreviated 
names the easiest way of tracking down the original articles. All of the translations in the 
text are mine except when otherwise indicated. The reference system I have used is the 
American Psychological Association (APA) citation system.  
 
                                                 






Culture, Politics and Power in Indonesian Studies 
The goal of a state is to provide a reasonable, humane existence for all its 
populace, and a state only can prosper if the culture there is virtuous and of a high 
standard.  
Tujuan negara ialah untuk memberi penghidupan yang layak bagi manusia 
segenap penduduknya, dan negara hanya bisa hidup apabila kebudayaan disitu 
baik dan mempunyai tingkat yang tinggi.  
Vice President Hatta in his opening address to the Cultural Congress I, 20 August 
1948.1 
 
I hope that the congress this time results in agreements that society can use as a 
guide and can be implemented within culture in everyday life. So, no abstract 
concepts, but policies and strategies that are able to be internalised as values in an 
effort to clarify the self-respect of the nation, including values connected to 
character, morals and ethics.  
Saya berharap kongres kali ini menghasilkan kesepakatan-kesepakatan yang bisa 
dipedomani oleh masyarakat untuk bisa diimplementasikan pada kebudayaan 
dalam kehidupan sehari-hari. Jadi, bukan konsepsi yang abstrak, tetapi sebagai 
kebijakan dan strategi yang dapat diinternalisasikan sebagai nilai-nilai dalam 
upaya mempertegas jati diri bangsa, termasuk yang berkaitan dengan akhlak, 
moral, dan etika.  
State Minister for Culture and Tourism I Gede Ardika in his opening address to 
the Cultural Congress V, 20 October 2003.2 
 
This thesis is the first extended historical study concerned with the cultural policy of 
successive Indonesian governments. I analyse what practices the state deemed ‘cultural’ 
and how they were used to shape a ‘national culture’. The bulk of the thesis explores the 
cultural policies of the national governments that have administered Indonesia in the 
second half of the twentieth century. Analysis of these governments’ cultural policies 
requires some consideration of the policies of their forerunners. I argue that culture’s 
contemporary use within methods of governance was established during the late Dutch 
colonial and Japanese occupying administrations and has not been challenged within the 
                                                 
1 (Hatta, 1950, p. 16). The proceedings of the Conference were published in 1950.  




different articulations of modern governance in Indonesia since 1950. Understanding the 
form that these articulations took between 1950 and 2003 is the main task of this thesis.  
 
In one of the few articles to be focussed exclusively on cultural policy in Southeast Asia, 
Indonesia expert Jennifer Lindsay argues that the continued presence of traditional 
cultural practices is the primary determinant of the features of cultural policy in the 
region (1995). There are two key points in Lindsay’s article. Firstly, she argues that in 
Southeast Asia, ‘state cultural agencies act as patrons bestowing project funds and 
rewards rather than as service organisations’ (1995, p. 661). Artists are ‘clients’ within 
this ‘system of patronage’ that began in pre-nationalist Southeast Asia and continues to 
be ‘perpetuated in a modern setting’ (1995, p. 663). Lindsay writes:  
From the performers’ point of view, then, the context of employment ... is not 
essentially different from a pre-national context. ... The government acts in the 
way a patron is traditionally expected to act – nominating the kind of 
performance, choosing the performers, vetting undesirable elements, favouring 
those whose performance pleases, and rejecting from favour those whose 
performance offends. (1995, pp. 664-5)  
According to Lindsay, the continued centrality of the patron-client relationship to the role 
of government in cultural life differentiates cultural policy in Southeast Asia from 
cultural policy in the West, where the state commissions artists and audiences pay to view 
performances in a commercial context where demand influences content.  
 
The second point is that Southeast Asian governments, as ‘the most significant sources of 
... patronage’ (1995, p. 664), have introduced new concerns ‘with ideas of national 
identity, acceptability and image’ (1995, p. 663). They use their status as patrons to 
enforce a particular set of standards appropriate for the nation. Lindsay lists the 
governments’ requirements as ‘brevity and formality’, ‘accessibility’ and ‘dignified and 
entertaining’ display (1995, p. 666). She writes: ‘It is important that the performance is 
not offensive to other ethnic and religious sensibilities, or to a sense of official decorum 
and respectability’ (1995, p. 666). The patron-client relationship places these government 
concerns in the forefront of the artists’ considerations in contrast to the West, where, 
Lindsay contends, artists both comply less with government considerations and are more 





Lindsay’s article provides two important signposts for this thesis. Firstly, it can be used to 
assess the desirability of focusing on the patron-client relationship, which Lindsay uses to 
explain how Southeast Asian governments exercise control over artists. However, placing 
the patron-client relationship at the centre of cultural policy analysis also skews the 
argument in a way that both leaves important areas unaddressed and leads to misleading 
characterisations of cultural policy in Southeast Asia. First, Lindsay attributes the 
characteristics of Southeast Asian cultural policy to the desires of governments without 
interrogating what shapes those desires. Although government desire is a plausible cause, 
her reasoning does not provide great insight into why and how Southeast Asian 
governments chose particular cultural policy content. Second, emphasising the continuity 
of the patron-client relationship both across space and time neglects important breaks 
both between nations3 and, more importantly for this thesis, within nations. Lindsay does 
not explore the cultural policy differences among different political regimes in Indonesia 
nor the extent to which institutions and policies were inherited from or influenced by the 
Dutch colonial and the Japanese occupying administrations. A third issue is her reliance 
on a divide between cultural policy in Western nations and Southeast Asia. Governments 
in all locations attempt to bring about particular outcomes when they formulate and 
implement cultural policies (see, for instance, Bennett, 1998, pp. 87-164). The reasons 
Lindsay herself gives for subsidies in Australia, Europe and the United States (culture’s 
‘educative, moral, heritage, aesthetic or ... spiritual value to society’) are not all that 
different to her reasons for subsidy in Southeast Asia (‘national identity, protection of 
moral and religious values, or protection of indigenous cultural heritage’, 1995, p. 668).  
 
The second signpost in Lindsay’s article points towards an alternative focus for 
Indonesian cultural policy analysis. While noting that culture is commonly linked to 
education in many Southeast Asian nations, Lindsay writes that in Indonesia, ‘the 
educative value of culture itself as a civilising agent of human behaviour’ was never 
questioned in nationalist debates about culture. The links between culture and education 
(and the project of civilisation) suggest that alternative histories exist that predate the 
Indonesian nationalists. Culture has long been used in Europe as a method of civilising 
unruly elements of society (Bennett, 1998, pp. 87-106) and putting to use its civilising 
function was a central concern in the creation and regulation of public libraries, art 
                                                 
3 For instance, the cultural policy of a right-wing, USA-aligned dictatorship like the New Order regime is 




galleries and museums in Britain in the eighteenth century (Bennett, 1998, pp. 107-134). 
Additionally, the Dutch colonial administration implemented its own programs that at 
times encapsulated a civilising mission aimed at the colony’s indigenous inhabitants.4  
 
The quotations at the beginning of this chapter, from prominent Indonesian politicians 
separated by over fifty years, indicate a similar concern with shaping the behaviours of 
Indonesians. Both of the quotations construct culture in a similar way: ‘culture’ refers to 
national culture, shared by all Indonesians, and encompasses behaviours and values 
(‘virtuous and of a high standard’ and ‘values connected to character, morals and ethics’). 
The two politicians share the assumption that if a nation has the right culture, it will 
prosper and that the cultivation of culture was a concern of the state.  
 
While this thesis shares Lindsay’s focus on official cultural policies, I argue that 
investigating cultural policy’s connections to modern forms of governance in Indonesia 
provides a more productive and insightful analysis than an emphasis on how the state 
functioned as a traditional patron. The recurring emphasis on the task of civilising 
subjects suggests the relationship between Indonesian, colonial and Western cultural 
policy is close, complex and cannot be ignored in analysis of cultural policy in Indonesia. 
Highlighting governance shifts attention towards the content of cultural policy programs 
and policies, highlighting changes in how culture was conceived and used in different 
locations and times.  
 
Differentiating my perspective from Lindsay’s also distances this thesis from an 
influential interpretation of Indonesian politics and society that emphasises ongoing 
patron-client relationships that are sustained by reference to an unchanging culture. I 
argue that Lindsay’s approach conflates different historical eras that have different social, 
political and cultural relations. The alternative perspective pursued here, following the 
methods of Michel Foucault, attempts to identify and account for changes in cultural 
policy content and practice. It asks about Indonesian cultural policy: what has been 
retained, what has been lost and why has this happened? Taking this perspective requires 
an engagement with unresolved debates about culture and power in Indonesian Studies.  
 
                                                 




As such, this thesis focuses on the policies and institutions of the key official state 
apparatus concerned with regulating culture in Indonesia, in particular the institution 
responsible during the post-independence period, the Cultural Office, which in 1964 was 
renamed the Directorate of Culture. However, this is not the only way of defining cultural 
policy. If the definition of culture as ‘a way of life’ were used, as it now is in many 
academic fields, cultural policy would be any policy that affects everyday life (what I call 
the broad definition of cultural policy). Another issue, dealt with in detail in the 
methodology section that follows, is defining the limits of the thesis as official cultural 
policy. I begin with the premise that the state is the most important, but not the only 
cultural institution nor is it isolated from other Indonesian or international institutions. 
The state has been present in research about Indonesian culture, and it is rare now to find 
research that identifies its subject matter as ‘cultural’ that does not include a 
consideration of state policy and actions.5 Additionally, cultural policy in the narrow 
sense is often used, as researchers have identified (Bennett, 1989b, p. 6), to attempt to 
alter the ‘way of life’ of particular groups. All of these relationships and fields are 
considered where they impact on, or are implicated in, official Indonesian cultural policy.  
 
1. Culture and the State in Indonesian Studies 
There is no single concept of culture in Indonesian Studies. A multiplicity of concepts 
and categories has resulted from the diverse academic background of researchers on 
Indonesia and the tendency to include a cultural component in many different kinds of 
analysis. In this section, I briefly review the four most common research approaches to 
culture in Indonesian Studies with a focus on their characterisation of the state’s 
relationship to culture.  
 
The first approach is located in political analysis. Analysts of Indonesian politics have 
attempted to use culture to explain political occurrences. There are two concerns 
regarding this formulation. Firstly, certain texts (in particular, texts which have used the 
notion of political culture) have separated political and economic causes from cultural 
                                                 
5 For instance, Anna Tsing’s research into a marginal ethnic group living in a remote mountain range in 
South Kalimantan demonstrates that cultural issues are not dictated by an internal community logic but are 
always under negotiation both within the community and externally with other communities and 
institutions (1993, pp. 8-9). According to Tsing, the most powerful institution that received the most 




factors in seeking to explain Indonesian politics. Once separated as a variable, culture is 
often then defined as a set of values or attributes.6 Such an approach results in multiple 
problems: culture is represented as static and unchanging both across time and in 
different social contexts; rather than being mediated by culture, political and economic 
categories are considered generalisable across space and time rather than specific to a 
time and place; cultural traits are often generalised across communities, ignoring other 
divisions such as class, ethnicity and gender; activities defined as cultural are excluded 
from political analysis (Philpott, 2000, pp. 72-3);7 and the possibility of change is 
circumvented by static cultural attributes, which are viewed as the foundations of the 
political system.8  
 
However, the more pressing concern is the way that culture has been used as an 
explanatory tool without interrogation of its construction in both Indonesia and 
Indonesian Studies. Simon Philpott, in Rethinking Indonesia: Postcolonial Theory, 
Authoritarianism and Identity, is critical of the conceptualisation of culture in the study 
of Indonesian politics. He critiques both how cultural metaphors are used to frame 
political studies (2000, pp. ix-xii) and cultural explanations of behaviour (2000, pp. 76-
87). In the same vein, Ken Young comments:  
[Political science research about Southeast Asia] stresses culture as an 
explanatory variable above all others, yet it contributes so little to the study of 
culture itself, preferring to use it as a catch-all which tidies up all the otherwise 
inexplicable connections between the State and civil society. (1991, p. 99)  
Culture often acquires explanatory force without attention to the relations of power that 
shape its usage, the multiple ways it is deployed and the ways it changes in different 
contexts. I return to this issue in the discussion in the following section regarding the 
construction of Javanese culture in the patrimonial approach to Indonesian politics.  
 
While political research can threaten to impoverish culture, cultural research has political 
hazards. In his study of the construction of the Javanese subject and the functions of 
cultural tradition in New Order Indonesia, John Pemberton notes the convergence 
‘between anthropological disciplinary interests in culture and repressive interests like 
                                                 
6 See, for instance, the work of Lucian Pye (1965, p. 8) and Sidney Verba (1965, p. 551). 
7 See also the articles in Stivens (1991) for analysis regarding gender in Southeast Asian Studies including 
Indonesia.  
8 For instance Karl Jackson, one of the key proponents of political culture in the study of Indonesian 
politics, wrote in 1978, ‘A political earthquake ... can briefly level the distribution of power in the country, 




those manifested under New Order conditions’ (1994a, p. 9). Pemberton argues that any 
research that posits a general cultural order independent of political interests can 
reinforce the political order in the name of culture. He writes: ‘What appears to remain is 
a purely tradisional culture free of political and historical implication, a culture dedicated 
to, as if by nature, its own celebration’9 (1994a, p. 15). Pemberton attempts to avoid 
affirming the political order of the New Order regime through writing histories of the 
development and changes of practices that have been labelled cultural. He demonstrates 
the importance of the New Order regime’s use of its version of Javanese culture to 
confirm and strengthen the regime’s political authority and critiques the regime’s 
argument that its form of rule was culturally appropriate for Indonesia.  
 
Most contemporary practitioners of anthropological research have recognised the 
relationship between political power and cultural praxis and address the state’s 
relationship to their subject matter (Acciaioli, 2002; Tsing, 1993, pp. 22-26).10 By 
recognising that cultural and community practices are formed in negotiation with state 
discourses and that the community has the power to subvert and appropriate state policy 
and programs, many researchers avoid confirming the cultural/political divide critiqued 
by Pemberton. The state’s attempts to influence cultural practices are now generally 
included in anthropological research. For instance, Carol Warren (1995) researches 
policies that exert impact on community practices, such as law reform, land tenure and 
local governance and how these policies are negotiated within community structures and 
understandings. Lyn Parker (2003, p. 265) takes a similar position that ‘the New Order ... 
has reached into all aspects of village life – agriculture, education, health, transport, 
housing, food, clothing, cultural and religious life, health and reproduction, employment 
– and transformed them all.’ 
 
A third approach to culture in Indonesian Studies has focussed more explicitly still on the 
state’s conceptualisation of culture and its impact in Indonesia. Research into cultural 
expression has been forced into a more direct engagement due to the state’s numerous 
interventions and the political commentary of many cultural forms. Virginia Matheson 
Hooker and Howard Dick’s broad introduction to the edited collection of articles Culture 
                                                 
9 Pemberton uses the Indonesian spelling for traditional. 
10 Tom Boellstorff comments that anthropological study in Indonesia has been ‘responsive to the 




and Society in New Order Indonesia, assesses the state’s impact on culture from a 
number of different vantage points (1993). This is one of a number of works that reflect 
on the New Order regime’s impact on cultural expression and cultural developments in 
Indonesia, through both its economic and cultural policies (Hatley, 1994; Zurbuchen, 
1990). Hooker and Dick and Mary Zurbuchen move between a very broad definition of 
culture11 to a focus on culture as the performing and creative arts, indicating the links 
between how Indonesians’ live and behave and what they consider to be their culture. 
More focussed research on topics, such as Indonesian literature (Foley & Sumandhi, 
1994; Foulcher, 1980; 1986; 1993b; Maier, 1987; 1993; Tickell, 1982), fine arts (Suaedy, 
2002; Supangkat, 1990; 1994) and the popular performing arts (Effendi, 1998; Hefner, 
1987; Suanda, 1995; Widodo, 1995; Yampolsky, 1995), also explore the role of politics 
and the state in shaping cultural forms. The field of research about cultural expression 
helps reveal the complex and diverse ways that culture was used and impacted by official 
and non-official institutions and forms an important body of secondary sources for this 
thesis.  
 
The final approach encompasses research into cultural institutions and industries. This 
research also indicates the importance of the state’s conceptualisations of culture to how 
these industries were regulated and the resulting cultural products. For instance, Phillip 
Kitley argues that the regime’s ‘national cultural project’ was central to the creation and 
regulation of Indonesian television (2000, pp. 3-4). Krishna Sen’s account of New Order 
cinema also demonstrates the importance of the regime’s regulation of Indonesians to its 
regulation of cinema, in particular the representation of the nation in film (1994, pp. 79-
104). Similarly, the state’s conceptualisation of national culture has played a vital role in 
arts educational institutions (Hellman, 1999; Hough, 2000), regulating cultural tourism 
(Picard, 1997; 1999; Vickers, 1989; Volkman, 1990) and in museums and theme parks 
(Acciaioli, 2001; Taylor, 1994; Wrath, 1997). In contrast to the focus on cultural texts 
and symbolism in research into cultural expression, research into cultural institutions and 
industries concerns itself with the pressures on institutions and their effects on cultural 
products and everyday experience. The concerns of this thesis with cultural regulation by 
                                                 
11 Hooker and Dick (1993, p. 2) define culture broadly as embracing ‘spiritual life, values, morality, 
education, and political processes’ before focussing on a more narrow definition based around ‘cultural 
expression’. Mary Zurbuchen makes a similar distinction (1990, p. 137), whereas Barbara Hatley limits her 
discussion to ‘symbolic forms’ (1994, p. 216) including discussions about the impact of broader changes on 




state cultural institutions link it most closely to the cultural institutions and industries 
perspective.  
 
2. Constructing the Relationship between the Indonesian State and Culture 
Analysis of Indonesian cultural policy is fragmented because it has developed through the 
publication of a number of short articles emphasising a small number of themes, 
hindering the emergence of a more coherent understanding.12 Below I outline the four 
most common perspectives on official Indonesian cultural policy.13  
 
a. Impacts On Local Community Practices and Performing Arts 
 
The area of research that has most often addressed official cultural policy is analysis of 
the state’s influence on community practices and the popular performing arts. Much of 
the historical research about cultural policy has been written in response to the impact of 
official cultural policy on local community practices that have commonly been 
understood as rituals connected to ways of life.14 In this research, the state’s interventions 
have been interpreted as bringing a different understanding of cultural practices into a 
community or, in the words of Greg Acciaioli in one of the first articles to address this 
issue, ‘culture has become art’ due to the policies of the state (1985, p. 162). After giving 
a general overview of the effects of state intervention and a few accounts of specific 
interventions, Acciaioli accuses the state of seeking to ‘emasculate’ regional community 
practices15 through bringing its ‘true Culture based in the political philosophy of the 
Pancasila16 and the civic religion that undergirds it’ to bear on the communities it 
                                                 
12 An exception is the mammoth edited book Kebijakan Kebudayaan di Masa Orde Baru (Cultural Policy 
in the New Order Era, Tirtosudarmo, 2001) that covers six subject areas in 1404 pages.  
Although a fantastic resource for information about cultural administrative structures and policy 
documents, Kebijakan Kebudayaan suffers from a lack of coherence and clear themes and a 
characterisation of all cultural policy as repressive that is mirrored by the larger field of Indonesian cultural 
policy analysis. Another expansive piece of research that avoids these problems is Michel Picard’s 
excellent analysis of the impact of changing forms of governance on Balinese life, religion and culture 
across the twentieth century (1997). My study is more limited in that it only examines cultural policy and 
more encompassing in that it tackles the national policies in much more detail.  
13 It should be noted that these characterisations are often combined (see, for instance, Foulcher, 1990, pp. 
302-6). They are separated here due to the need to clearly engage with each of the four ideas.  
14 Such assessments have generally been heavily influenced by anthropological understandings of culture. 
Greg Acciaioli (1985, p. 152) uses Pierre Bourdieu’s idea of doxa (1977, p. 164) where the natural and the 
social world correspond.  
15 Acciaioli uses the Indonesian word adat to refer to regional community practices that are based on local 
traditions.  
16 The Pancasila is a group of five principles elaborated by Sukarno in 1945 as the basis of the Indonesian 




governs (1985, p. 161). The result is an increasing divide between communities and their 
rituals as the state seeks to transform these into markers of state-administered national 
and regional identity.  
 
Philip Yampolsky’s assessment of the state’s impact on regional performing arts provides 
a more detailed analysis of official cultural policy (1995). Yampolsky writes a general 
history of the official cultural policy before focussing on the New Order era. He also 
gives a description of the state’s interventions, but frames the issue as interventions into 
the regional performing arts.17 Although he rejects the notion that there was a 
Machiavellian strategy behind the New Order regime’s cultural policies,18 Yampolsky 
agrees with Acciaioli’s assessment that state intervention breaks the links between 
regional communities and their community arts due to the ‘redesigning’ of art forms for 
‘external consumption’ (1995, p. 714). However, he also provides examples of different 
forms of resistance to government policy.19 The existence of resistance leaves open the 
possibility of individuals, working either inside or outside of the bureaucracy, using 
government policies in ways that reinforce the links between communities and their arts 
(1995, p. 721).  
 
While the negative effects of official cultural policy were immense, a few researchers 
have noted there were some positive effects. For instance, Kathy Foley writes about the 
introduction of state-sponsored arts festivals:  
The change of context, however, is the most striking modification. Arts festivals 
expand the horizons of the arts. In traditional Southeast Asian society the arts 
were often used to enhance life-cycle ceremonies, aristocratic endeavours, or 
religious festivals. The tables are turned when the arts themselves become the 
festival ... [Removing arts] from a religious festival setting emphasizes their 
secular proclivity. Clearly the majority of the presentations are in the ‘secular 
entertainment’ category, and all are juxtaposed against performances from abroad. 
The time, place, and context of the Bali Arts Festival have allowed it, by virtue of 
                                                 
17 Yampolsky also pays more attention to the rationale behind the state’s interventions into the arts with 
particular attention to the bureaucrats that implemented arts policy (1995, pp. 707-714). Widodo’s article 
on Tayuban similarly interrogates the interventions of arts bureaucrats into regional performing arts, but in 
a specific case study and with more local detail (1995).  
18 This is possibly a reference to Anderson’s assessment of minority groups in Indonesia where he states 
that ‘what was publicly presented as a prominority policy in fact represented a Machiavellian policy of 
divide and rule’ (1987b, p. 77).  
19 Yampolsky notes that some communities were resisting such changes, that there were possibilities for 
subversion even if the state ‘co-opted’ regional arts, that there has been a significant deal of criticism within 
Indonesia, and that the government’s approach to the arts includes a great deal of confusion and 




its emphasis on secular arts, to become a significant forum for modern 
experimentation and development. (1994, p. 276)20  
Foley’s comments can be linked to a broader observation about the application of power, 
including centrally driven policy: it very rarely has completely negative effects. Parker 
has also noted the productive effects of the state’s moves to spread and strengthen a sense 
of national community. In her book about Balinese village life, Parker argues ‘against the 
assumed opposition of society and state and shows that we can only understand the 
longevity of the Suharto regime by understanding that villagers wanted to participate in 
the version of modernity offered by the Indonesian nation-state’ (2003, p. 1).  
 
This field of research, in particular the work of Acciaioli and Yampolsky, is one of the 
points of departure for this thesis. Yampolsky’s brief history of official cultural policy, 
with its focus on the constitutional debates and the New Order regime’s Five Year 
Development Plans (Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun – Repelita), touches on 
important aspects of New Order era cultural policy. This thesis seeks to supplement his 
history through including the political and social circumstances that informed the 
bureaucratic developments at particular times. This thesis also offers an alternative 
perspective through adopting a different framework to the regional performing arts. 
Assessments of cultural policy focussed on the regional performing arts with only a few 
exceptions give an extremely negative appraisal of official Indonesian cultural policy. An 
analysis framed by the state’s use of culture to shape a national community with a 
broader definition of what constitutes cultural policy would view the impact of state 
policy on regional performing arts as a negative aspect of a larger set of policies which 
had a much wider array of impacts across a number of different areas.  
 
b. Indonesian culture as a version of Javanese culture 
 
There are two related arguments regarding the representation of Indonesian culture as a 
version of Javanese culture. The first is a controversial but common notion regarding the 
structural causes of the political system and political behaviour in Indonesia. An example 
of this position is Karl Jackson, who, drawing from Benedict Anderson’s analysis of the 
                                                 
20 Lindsay’s assessment of the performing arts in Southeast Asia also rejects the portrayal of cultural policy 
as completely ‘top-down, with the imposition from above of undesirable requirements forcing undesirable 
changes’ (1995: 657), but comes from a different perspective to Foley. The connection Lindsay makes with 
pre-existing cultural practices allows her to claim that there are continuities with pre-existing systems. 
However, this overlooks the many connections between cultural policy and governance which I discuss 




idea of power in Javanese culture (1990b), posits that the Indonesian political system is 
based on Javanese concepts of power and social organization (Jackson, 1978b, p. 34). 
According to this view (which provides a model for Lindsay’s analysis of cultural 
policy), culturally determined patrimonial relationships between patrons and clients 
persist in Indonesia from pre-colonial Java and continue to shape the Indonesian political 
and social structure. Richard Robison has critiqued the patrimonial model from a Marxist 
perspective as ignoring the ‘specific development of forms and relations of production’ 
that provide a more concrete explanation regarding the shape of the Indonesian polity 
(1982a, p. 139). Philpott also rejects the patrimonial model and critiques its prominence 
as an explanation for Indonesian politics and society.21 Philpott notes that although such 
explanations demonstrate the ‘pervasiveness of Javanese culture in New Order 
discourses’ (2000, p. 94), they also rely on academy-approved cultural discourses rarely 
interrogated by analysts.  
 
The second argument is located amongst cultural researchers rather than in political 
studies. While acknowledging that Javanese culture is a construction that has been shaped 
by a number of influences including political power, many researchers hold that the New 
Order’s understanding of culture was still Java-centric.22 Pemberton’s book, The Subject 
of Java (1994a), is the most prominent text about the construction of Javanese culture and 
its use by the New Order regime. The focus of The Subject of Java is an exploration and 
critique of ‘the remarkable extent to which a rhetoric of culture enframes political will, 
delineates horizons of power’ in New Order Indonesia (1994a, p. 9). Pemberton firstly 
argues that the particular relations of power, connected to indirect methods of rule, 
between the Dutch colonisers and the Javanese courts constructed both Java and the 
Javanese subject. One of the effects of Dutch interventions and political power was the 
construction of Javanese customs and traditions in the courtly texts as a way of excluding 
and domesticating the Dutch. The New Order regime drew on the constructed tradition of 
                                                 
21 Philpott argues that Javanese cultural performances have been used to frame Indonesian politics (2000, 
pp. xii-xiii) and notions of a ‘Javanese sultan’ and ‘Javanese values’ have been used to explain Suharto’s 
style of rule (2000, pp. 78-82). See also Philpott (2000, pp. 184,fn 43&44). It is also relevant to note that 
other cultural clichés have been employed as explanatory devices in the analysis of Indonesian politics. For 
instance, the killings of 1965-6 were portrayed in books and newspapers as Malays running amok (See 
excerpts in Sulistyo, 2000, p. 133). Sulistyo argues against this generalised, cultural explanation for the 
killings.  
22 For instance, Tsing, drawing on the work of Pemberton and patrimonial conceptions of political culture, 
argues that a constructed notion of Javanese culture dominated the cultural politics of the New Order 




the Javanese courts in order to legitimise itself by presenting its authority as cultural and 
its use of ritual to represent Javanese society as inherently stable and ordered (1994a, pp. 
148-196). Thus, Pemberton’s account of the changing use of practices deemed culturally 
Javanese demonstrates how state power has transformed Javanese tradition, ritual and 
culture, firstly during the colonial period, and then during the New Order period.  
 
In The Subject of Java, Pemberton skips the 1942-65 period because it constitutes a 
period of ‘discontinuity’ between eras where Java was constructed as based in tradition 
and ritual.23 He states that those years ‘trouble the virtual identity one might now read 
into ‘Java’’ (1994a, p. 26). The 1942-65 period was highly politicised and involved a 
number of struggles and debates between competing institutions over the constitution and 
use of Indonesian culture. Although certain perspectives on culture were systematically 
excluded after 1965, there were other constructions of Indonesia and Indonesian culture 
that also informed the New Order regime. For instance, the New Order regime borrowed 
and reconfigured ideas from both Sukarno (Bourchier, 1996, pp. 157-8) and artists 
influenced by Western liberalism (Supartono, Rasih, Agung, Roosa, & Razif, 2000, pp. 
5-6). Most research that has touched in some way on cultural policy has been focussed on 
the New Order era, raising the issue of continuities and breaks with the cultural policies 
of previous eras.24  
 
Pemberton’s careful historical research before 1945 and attention to the state’s 
constructions of Javanese culture after 1965 demonstrates historically specific, changing 
and contested notions of culture and tradition that are intimately tied to political power 
and social change. The thrust of his argument about the New Order regime’s construction 
of culture is well supported by Keith Foulcher in a much quoted article, where he writes 
that there is ‘an increasing tendency to align ‘Indonesia’ with a redefined priyayi Java’ 
(1990, p. 303). However this does not equate to either the essentialist assertion that 
Javanese concepts of power shape and hold together the political power structure or to the 
assertion that official cultural policy is based on a version of Javanese culture. Despite the 
                                                 
23 This is not to say he argues that tradition and ritual were the same in both periods – he argues that there 
were significant differences. Vickers makes a similar criticism of the absence of the 1942-1965 period in 
The Subject of Java (1997, p. 178). Although Pemberton’s emphasis on rural resistance to a degree ignores 
urban resistance, he is overt in his reasons for skipping the 1942-1965 period.  
24 Bali is an exception due to the number of assessments regarding its cultural history, which is quite 
different to the other provinces (Picard, 1997; Vickers, 1989). Another exception is the work into cultural 




New Order regime’s use of the ceremonies and traditions from its version of Javanese 
culture, Indonesian culture is not simply a redefined version of Javanese culture. 
Foulcher, for instance, also acknowledges continuities with the nationalism of the 
Sukarno period within the construction of culture during the New Order era (1990, p. 
303), while Ruth McVey highlights a continuity in the drive to modernise the most 
symbolically Javanese of art forms, wayang, among early nationalists, the Indonesian 
Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia – PKI) and the army-dominated New Order 
regime and a shared desire to improve the indigenous population (1986).  
 
c. The Growth of Consumption and Indigenous Values  
 
The third group of theories about the Indonesian state’s relationship to culture situates 
Indonesia in the context of global and regional economic and social change and how 
these changes have impacted Indonesians’ ‘ways of life’. There are two elements of New 
Order era policy within this argument. First is the adoption of capitalist economic policy, 
which relates to the growth of consumer culture in Indonesia through an increasingly 
deregulated marketplace. Second is the Indonesian government’s response to the growth 
of consumption of goods and lifestyles generally perceived to be Western within 
Indonesia. Since these are global and regional trends, I review both the broader trends 
and their specific operation within Indonesia to generate a complete picture of the forces 
at work.  
 
The social phenomenon of modern consumption was first noted around the turn of the 
century in America (Veblen, 1953)25 and Western Europe (Simmel, 1971)26as a result of 
changing economic and social patterns. The important difference between the twentieth 
century and the preceding years was not the existence of symbolic consumption, but its 
spread to a much larger proportion of the population, particularly after World War II 
(Bocock, 1992, p. 132). Symbolic consumption began to grow in Asia following the 
expansion of globalised capitalism in the 1970s and the search for new markets by 
international capital (Chua, 2000a, p. 3). Sociologists, such as Pierre Bourdieu (1984; 
1989), have observed that consumption has become an important method of establishing 
and maintaining differences between groups, as well as an important tool of social 
                                                 
25 First published 1899.  




mobility. Although not as widespread in many parts of Asia compared to Western 
countries (Chua, 2000a, p. 8), amongst a growing proportion of Asians, it has become an 
important method of identity formation.  
 
The spread of culture through consumption in the marketplace in liberal democracies 
such as America has regularly been depicted by agents of the state as operating 
independently of the state (Miller & Yudice, 2002, pp. 35-6). At a UNESCO roundtable 
in 1969, the United States, for instance, famously claimed to ‘have no cultural policy’ 
(Kammen, 1996, pp. 795,798), reflecting the idea that culture should be as free as 
possible from state intervention. However, as Miller and Yudice demonstrate in their 
discussion of the United States, the state has always exercised considerable influence on 
the production and distribution of cultural goods (2002, pp. 35-71). If, for instance, going 
to see a film is a cultural experience, then policies related to funding, free trade, 
classification, and the regulation of the film industry become part of the regulatory 
framework of culture.  
 
Discussion of the growth of capitalism and related consumption habits in Indonesian 
Studies has centred on the issue of the Indonesian new rich.27 The first publication to 
recognise the significance of the growth of the new rich in Indonesia was the February 
1984 issue of the Indonesian journal Prisma. English language research soon followed 
(Dick, 1985; Lev, 1990; Robison, 1986) and, from 1996, The New Rich in Asia series of 
books has continued to pursue analysis of these groups (Chua, 2000b; Pinches, 1999; 
Robison & Goodman, 1996; Sen & Stivens, 1998). A major problem with research into 
the new rich has been the variety of groups which fall into the category (see, for instance, 
Heryanto, 1999b, pp. 164, fn. 6; and, in the context of the Asia region, Robison & 
Goodman, 1996). If the category is divided by religion, ethnicity and political affiliations, 
it begins to lose its theoretical usefulness. However, a few traits run across all of the 
groups: their lives have been transformed by the economic growth of the New Order 
period (see Heryanto, 1999b, pp. 176-8; Robison, 1996, pp. 80-81) and they all partake in 
the consumption of middle class lifestyles (Dick, 1985, p. 74).  
 
                                                 
27 New rich is another way of referring to what others, such as Dick (1985), have termed the middle class, 
while avoiding confusion over the more specific meaning given to the term by other researchers such as 




Ariel Heryanto’s analysis of the ‘new rich’ in Indonesia demonstrates the centrality of 
consumption to the cultural construction and contestation of the identity of the groups 
identified as ‘middle class’ (1999b, p. 159). Heryanto identifies an increase in 
conspicuous consumption in the 1990s (1999b, pp. 163,167-8) and interactions between 
consumerism and constructions of both ‘West’ and ‘East’ (1999b, pp. 168-71), attitudes 
towards Chinese (1999b, pp. 171-3) and Islam (1999b, pp. 173-6). He argues that 
consumption and consumerism increasingly played an important role in contemporary 
Indonesian cultural politics. Other research into both consumption (Gerke, 2000, pp. 146-
7) and the urban poor (Murray, 1991, p. 138) indicate that the consumerism of the new 
rich has begun to influence the habits of the urban poor and lower middle class. In the 
case of the growth of consumption, the state’s economic policies were the cause of 
significant changes in Indonesian culture broadly defined. These changes were important 
to official cultural policy because they evoked a response from the New Order regime.  
 
In the Southeast Asia region, the spread of consumer culture and the increasingly rapid 
movement of information associated with capitalist goods and services created some 
consternation amongst the regional governments. The governments of Singapore, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, China and Burma (Birch, 1998a; Bourchier, 1998, p. 203) opposed 
the cultural changes and the related political and social messages brought by international 
capitalism with a discourse of ‘Asian values’ which emphasised hard work, family 
values, respect for authority, social responsibility, discipline and support of leaders.28 
David Birch argues that the government discourses about Asian values were a way of 
asserting government control over a nation (1998a, p. 183). In the name of preserving 
Asian values, governments consolidated their political power through populist opposition 
to the bogeyman of negative Western values and maintained their political control 
through the rejection of press freedom and human rights by labelling them ‘Western’ and 
therefore incompatible with an Asian way of life (Birch, 1998a; 1998b).29 However, the 
Asianisation of Asia should not be viewed as only repressing the lives of those packaged 
as Asian. For instance, Chua Beng Huat demonstrates the productive effects of ‘re-
indigenisation’ on fashion in Singapore (2003, pp. 76-92). Similarly, the Indonesian state 
was a patron of some indigenous Indonesian cultural forms and even repressive measures 
                                                 
28 See, for instance, the list provided by Singapore’s Senior Minister of State for Community Development, 
Ching Jit Koon (quoted in Birch, 1998a, p. 184).  
29 Chua Beng Huat identifies the primary motivation of anti-Westernism in Asia as ‘political’ and based 




had some productive effects. For instance, the existence of a repressive state encouraged 
the emergence of on-line papers and magazines that operated outside of the Indonesian 
state’s constraining regulatory framework and the growth of an on-line readership (Birch, 
1998b, p. 338; Sen & Hill, 2000, pp. 200-2). 
 
The New Order regime similarly employed a version of Asian values in its attempts to 
influence the habits of its populace (Birch, 1998a; Bourchier, 1998; Vickers & Fisher, 
1999). Adrian Vickers and Lyn Fisher, for instance, write:  
All the elements of ‘Asian values’ can be found in the way the New Order 
attempted to clarify and institutionalise ‘Indonesian values’. The ideals of family 
and authority were there, as was a construction of a Western ‘Other’. (1999, p. 
398) 
An important feature of the Indonesian values discourse30 has been the political 
justification of a more authoritarian political system against criticisms from advocates of 
liberal-democratic models and associated individual rights (Bourchier, 1998, p. 207; 
Vickers & Fisher, 1999, p. 398).31 However, there was also a more widespread and 
pervasive use. Indonesian values also functioned as a form of control over cultural 
practices associated with the nation. The regime used the official state ideology of the 
Pancasila and associated programs to instil a model of conduct into the population 
through education in schools and the workplace (Bourchier, 1998, pp. 207-8). In this 
regard, David Birch’s comment about Asian values could also apply to Indonesia:  
What we need to understand is that new realities, new definitions and new 
structures are being determined by powerful forces within the Asian region, 
driven by powerful economic capital and, aligned to that, the developing cultural 
capital of what constitutes the public cultures of ‘Asianness’. (1998a, p. 198)  
Indonesian values discourses, as noted by Bourchier, also had a ‘proactive aspect’ in its 
creation of Indonesian citizens (1998, p. 207). While the regime’s cultural policy 
response to greater integration with the outside world and growing consumption is 
examined in chapters three and four, other research has also noted the proactive elements 
and results of the regime’s use of Indonesian values discourse. Researchers have assessed 
how it has been used in the construction of Indonesian citizens through education (Leigh, 
1991; Parker, 1992), through alternative readings of government discourses such as the 
                                                 
30 Vickers and Fisher use the term ‘Indonesian values’ (1999, p. 382) whereas Bourchier uses ‘indigenous 
values’ (1998, p. 204).  
31 It should be noted that the ‘Indonesian values’ discourse strengthened pre-existing discourses about 
Indonesian identity. Thus was not a new phenomenon as much as a strengthening of a conservative 




Pancasila to argue in favour of democratic reforms (Ramage, 1995, pp. 45-74,156-83) 
and also through opposition to official discourse, such as opposition to the regime’s 
assertion that individual rights are not important to being Indonesian (Bourchier, 1998, 
pp. 209-11; Vickers & Fisher, 1999, pp. 396-8). Carol Warren’s account of the different 
readings of terms and concepts common in New Order Indonesia and the contests over 
meanings that they involve also indicates how New Order concepts and language shaped 
political action (1990).  
 
d. New Order National Culture as Military Culture 
 
A fourth concept of the New Order regime’s cultural policy which has not yet received 
much critical attention from English-language researchers has begun to be articulated by 
emerging Indonesian left-wing critics. One of the forums for left-wing criticism of the 
cultural policy of Indonesian governments from the late 1990s has been the magazine 
Media Kerja Budaya, published by cultural workers in Jakarta.32 The position of Media 
Kerja Budaya on national culture is that it should be diverse, inclusive (particularly of 
Indonesian urban and rural working class cultural practices), and promote involvement of 
diverse groups and people in cultural work (Supartono et al., 2000, pp. 5-6,15). 
According to this analysis, the New Order regime nurtured ‘a military culture’ that was 
homogenising and limited. A group of writers calling themselves the ‘Media Kerja 
Budaya Team’ are critical of the impact of the New Order regime on culture: 
What triumphantly surfaced was a military culture! Ceremonies and drills, P433 
indoctrination, the standardisation of curriculum, the sole foundation [Pancasila] 
in politics, the banning of art activities are only several examples from the 
strength of the spirit of militarism in our culture for the last three decades. 
(Supartono et al., 2000, p. 15) 
Yang muncul berjaya adalah kebudayaan militer! Upacara dan baris-berbaris, 
indoktrinasi P4, penyeragaman kurikulum, asas tunggal dalam politik, 
pelarangan kegiatan kesenian hanyalah beberapa contoh dari kuatnya semangat 
militerisme dalam kebudayaan kita selama tiga dekade terakhir.  
The background of the New Order leadership, particularly in its early years, to some 
degree supports the above statement. When the New Order regime came to power, its 
leaders had generally received a military education and many had been influenced by 
                                                 
32 Although most of my information here comes from this magazine, it has been supplemented with 
interviews and discussions in Indonesia. 
33 P4 is the acronym for Pedoman, Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila (Orientation in Life and the 
Implementation of the Principles of the Pancasila), the New Order regime’s civic education program that 




their training under the Japanese, experiences during the revolution and their political 
conflict with the PKI, including its bloody resolution (Crouch, 1978, pp. 24-42).34  
 
The emphasis on the authoritarianism of the New Order serves here as a reminder of the 
political outlook of groups within the New Order elite and the kinds of pressures they put 
on cultural policy. However, the discussion of culture and the state in the preceding 
sections demonstrates that a single perspective never determined how policy related to 
culture and neither was the resulting cultural policy purely oppressive in either intention 
or results. Instead, the work of the emerging Indonesian left should be viewed as a 
reminder of the negative elements of the New Order government35 and should also be 
read alongside accounts of the more productive elements of state policy.  
 
A second issue is the characterisation of the New Order state as having a single rationale. 
There is a tendency in much research about the New Order regime and culture to present 
the state as a homogenous entity. For instance, Pemberton’s research does not 
acknowledge differences within the state itself, particularly between the national 
government and the provincial and local governments, leading Vickers to write that 
Pemberton’s homogenisation of the New Order state is ‘an essentialised explanatory key 
to different kinds of changes in ceremonial action and representation’ within his research 
(1997, p. 178). Similarly, Acciaioli’s focus on state interventions from the perspective of 
marginal communities presents the state as a singular external force that seeks to impose 
its understanding of cultural practices on the community (1985). This representation has 
been compounded by a tendency within Indonesian Studies to represent the state as a 
single entity and operating independently of the international context and non-state 
institutions (see van Klinken, 2001b). In this thesis, the Indonesian state is considered far 
from unified and including diverse opinions and perspectives that differ significantly 
between different levels of the state36 and, as I argue in the chapters that follow, multiple 
discourses about national culture.  
 
                                                 
34 Adam makes a similar criticism of officially-sanctioned New Order era historiography when he 
summarised its impact as ‘the militarization of history and nationalism’ (2005, p. 272).  
35 Particularly impressive is the Jaringan Kerja Budaya’s research into book bans during the New Order era 
(1999).  
36 See Schiller’s research into state formation in Jepara, Java, where he notes the changing relationship 




A final question that applies to the vast majority of cultural policy research, conducted as 
it was before the fall of Suharto, is the extent to which it remains applicable in post-New 
Order Indonesia. The economic crisis that began in late 1997 and the subsequent 
resignation of Suharto on 21 May 1998 preceded a period of rapid political and social 
change. Now the post-Suharto state’s cultural policies need to be analysed with reference 
to both broad global and regional trends and internal changes within Indonesia. The need 
for new assessments is made more pressing by the length of the New Order regime and 
the existence of certain continuities within its cultural policies since the early 1970s. 
Even if there is a high degree of continuity across the periods, the impact of the political 
and social changes on pre-existing cultural policies needs to be assessed.  
 
3. Thesis Objectives  
Arising from the previous discussion, my first objective is:  
To analyse the cultural policies of Indonesian governments in a way that identifies 
continuities and breaks within and between different governments and 
interrogates their interaction. In particular, the thesis will address changes that 
have occurred between the Suharto and post-Suharto governments.  
 
My second objective is:  
To examine the application of the cultural policies of Indonesian governments in 
state sponsored cultural institutions and how those institutions understood and 
targeted the attributes and behaviours of Indonesians during the New Order and 
the Reform eras.37  
 
The singular pursuit of the first objective would come close to representing the 
Indonesian state as monolithic. As Gerry van Klinken has argued, there is a pressing need 
to include analysis of the lower levels of government as they have their own political 
conflicts, dynamics and histories which have become increasingly important in post-New 
Order Indonesia (2001c, pp. 2-4,23-4). It is not enough to analyse the broad changes in 
policy and discourse. Through the second objective, I give attention to the actual 
application of cultural policy through programs and activities. I argue that the 
homogenous representations of Indonesia produced by the bureaucrats in Jakarta were far 
from the diverse and negotiated situation that existed at the lower levels of government.  
 
                                                 





Designing an appropriate methodology for analysis of cultural policy in Indonesia hinges 
on two areas of debate within two different academic communities: debates over 
Indonesian political analysis conducted within Indonesian Studies and debates over 
cultural policy analysis within Cultural Studies. Recent debates about Indonesian political 
analysis have highlighted the need for a rethink of the conceptualisation of the state in 
Indonesia and its relationship to society and social groups beyond the political elite. 
Developing a method of analysis that clarifies the operations of the Indonesian state 
connects with debates over the state’s relationship with cultural practices, which have 
been conducted in Cultural Studies, as both revolve around analysis of the state/society 
relationship. Despite differences in subject matters, similar methodological moves are 
required now in political studies about Indonesia as were made in Cultural Studies 
perspectives on cultural policy in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Below I critically 
review different perspectives about the state in Indonesian political studies before 
exploring the options for a perspective that better recognises the links between the 
Indonesian state and society. Then I turn to different methods of cultural policy analysis 
and debates within Cultural Studies over the most appropriate method for tackling policy 
issues before reflecting on these issues in the context of research into Indonesian culture. 
My analysis suggests that the writings of Foucault and his concept of governmentality, 
which have already been canvassed in both fields, is possibly the best available method 
for linking culture and government policy in Indonesia.  
 
State, Society and Culture in the Study of Indonesian Politics  
a. Understanding the Indonesian State 
 
The study of Indonesian politics has been shaped by the conditions of its emergence 
following World War II and the subsequent events. Particularly relevant is the 
institutionalisation of certain liberal assumptions as a result of the spread of American 
influence and decline of European influence throughout Southeast Asia (Anderson, 1982, 
p. 70; Philpott, 2000, pp. 46-55). In an article reflecting on the dominant methodologies 
of the early years of Indonesian Studies, Anderson identifies the two dominant 
perspectives in Indonesian Studies of the 1950 to 1965 period, despite significant 




political institutions and generally share a commitment to the spread of liberal 
democracy.38  
 
Analysis of the New Order years generated greater debate about methodological 
approaches to Indonesian politics and in particular the New Order state. Andrew 
MacIntyre identifies six perspectives about the Indonesian state (1990, pp. 6-21): state-
qua-state;39 bureaucratic polity and patrimonial cluster;40 bureaucratic pluralism;41 
bureaucratic authoritarianism;42 structuralist approach;43 and restricted pluralism.44 Mark 
Berger’s account of trends in the study of Indonesian politics consolidates MacIntyre’s 
six perspectives into three approaches: liberal state-society approaches that developed out 
of revisions of modernisation theory (which groups together bureaucratic polity and 
patrimonial cluster, bureaucratic pluralism, bureaucratic authoritarianism and restricted 
pluralism); Marxist analysis (labelled structuralist by MacIntyre); and state-qua-state. Of 
the ‘liberal state-society’ approaches, the most used has been patrimonialism (drawn in 
particular from the work of Harold Crouch45), which emphasises patron-client 
relationships between rulers and political and business elite, with different patron-client 
cartels competing for rewards dispersed by the ruler.46 In this model, politics is 
characterised by conflicts over resources rather than being driven by ideological 
differences or policy issues.  
 
The Marxist approach to Indonesian politics grew out of a critical review of dependency 
theory which was in vogue in the 1970s and a critique of the ‘liberal state-society 
                                                 
38 See Anderson (1982, pp. 71-83). Anderson labels the approaches (1) anticolonial liberalism and the 
historical method, which centred around George Kahin and dominated the beginning and middle of the 
1950s, and (2) imperial liberalism and the comparative method which came to the fore at the end of the 
1950s and was reliant on the doctrine of modernisation and related universalist assumptions about political 
systems and societies (1982, p. 75). As such, modernisation theory assisted the spread of American capital 
and institutions across Asia. Some scholars, including Pauker and Pye, accepted the demise of the liberal 
constitutional order as the agent of modernisation and argued that military regimes would be adequate 
substitutes. See their chapters in Johnson (1962).  
39 MacIntyre cites Anderson (1990c). I discuss the state-qua-state approach later in this section.  
40 He cites Jackson (1978a) on the bureaucratic polity and Crouch (1979; 1980; 1984) on patrimonialism.  
41 This is a reference to Emmerson’s argument that there is more plurality within the bureaucracy than 
recognised by Anderson and that policy debate is more widespread than recognised by researchers in the 
bureaucratic polity and patrimonialism perspective (1983).  
42 MacIntyre cites King (1982) and refers to his use of corporatism to understand how the New Order 
regime prevented dissent by structuring interest representation through regime-controlled groups.  
43 MacIntyre cites Robison (1978; 1982b; 1985; 1986; 1988), whose approach I discuss below.  
44 MacIntyre cites Liddle (1985; 1987).  
45 See the citations in footnote 40.  
46 Both MacIntyre (1990, p. 8) and Berger (1997, p. 325) identify patrimonialism as the most used or 




approach’. The most well-known proponent of a Marxist approach is Richard Robison, 
whose analysis hinges on identifying class tensions within Indonesian society created by 
the changing capitalist system and analysis of how these were managed through the 
corporatist strategies of the New Order regime (1986). The state-qua-state perspective has 
its basis in a single article by Anderson (1990c). Anderson argues that the state and the 
nation are separate entities and characterises different periods in Indonesian history by 
the strength of one relative to the other. MacIntyre writes that ‘Anderson’s argument is 
perhaps most usefully interpreted as a response to instrumentalist Marxist views of the 
state as a tool of the capitalist class’ (1990, p. 7). Anderson emphasises the complicated 
dynamics of historical change in accounting for the rise of the New Order state.  
 
My purpose in reviewing the different perspectives is to identify the possibilities they 
raise for analysis of cultural policy. Two issues are of concern. The first has been touched 
on earlier, in particular in regards to the idea of patrimonialism: the use of culture as an 
explanatory tool in Indonesian Studies without any interrogation of the relations of power 
which shape its features and limit how it is able to be used. Researchers following the 
‘liberal state-society’ methodology in particular have resorted to culture as an explanatory 
device.47 Philpott also notes that Robison, after claiming that Anderson’s state-qua-state 
perspective relied on culturalist assumptions,48 ‘falls back on categories such as ethnicity, 
culture, and ‘history’, none of which enter into his critical calculations’ (2000, pp. 74-
6,84-7). Of the perspectives, Anderson’s state-qua-state offers the most promise as its 
emphasis on historical specificity in the constitution of the Indonesian state and nation 
does not allow culture to become an ahistorical, universal category.  
 
The second issue relates not to culture but to policy. Research into Indonesian politics has 
separated the state and civil society and focussed its attentions almost exclusively on the 
state. MacIntyre, for instance, asserts that while there is disagreement about explanations 
for the system of governance in Indonesia, ‘it remains inescapable that there is an 
underlying consensus centring on the idea that the state is largely unfettered by societal 
interests in the determination of policy’ (1990, p. 17). Young argues that the narrow focus 
on the state is a problem not just for studies of Indonesian politics (echoed in van 
                                                 
47 On the use of culture in the work of Crouch and an influential article by Macintyre and Jamie Mackie see 
Philpott (2000, pp. 78-84).  
48 Robison writes that ‘the New Order state cannot be understood as some ahistorical, universal Javanese 




Klinken’s work a decade later, 2001b) but Southeast Asian political studies and that 
certain issues are excluded from political analysis as a result. He writes:  
Research into political trends in Southeast Asia takes place in a theoretical and 
institutional context which cleaves firmly to the discipline’s origins which were 
concerned with institutional analyses focused above all else on the government, 
the state and the ruling elite. (1991, p. 100)  
The problem the state-society division causes for the study of policy in Indonesia is that it 
ignores how the New Order’s sustained authoritarian rule relied on particular 
constructions of the Indonesian subject in policy as well as the use of coercive force and 
how these constructions had effects on behaviours and subjectivities. Philpott writes:  
A striking feature of the discourse of Indonesian politics is that it ignores the full 
range of practices lumped together under the rubric of the state’s other, civil 
society. ... Practitioners of the discourse of Indonesian politics have commonly 
asserted, explicitly or otherwise, that the Indonesian state had distinct interests 
and, in that sense, is autonomous of civil society. However, the specific ways in 
which the New Order’s will to govern was realized in civil society have been 
neglected. (2000, pp. 144-5) 
The study of the relationship between the state and culture needs a methodology that 
brings into focus the more complex and indirect forms of power that exist in addition to 
the direct application of state power for the protection and furtherment of state and ruling 
elites’ interests.  
 
b. Power, the State and Foucault 
 
Although not overly concerned with legitimacy and consent, the limits of Indonesian 
politics drawn by post-World War II social science cause it to adhere to the focus of the 
kind of ‘political theory’ criticised by Foucault because of its narrow scope. Foucault 
stated in an interview in 1977:  
What we need, however, is a political philosophy that isn’t erected around the 
problem of sovereignty, nor therefore around the problems of law and prohibition. 
We need to cut off the King’s head: in political theory that has still to be done. 
(1980, p. 121) 
Foucault’s move to broaden political theory hinges on a revision of the concept of power. 
Analysis of Indonesian politics has generally viewed power negatively. Philpott writes: 
‘Power is almost exclusively understood as militarised, violent, repressive, and 
censorious’ (2000, p. 147). Foucault, on the other hand, labels this kind of power 
relations ‘domination’ and considers it to be one of many structures of power. Foucault’s 




most basic level, ‘designates relationships between partners’ which refers to ‘an ensemble 
of actions which induce others and follow from one another’ (1982, p. 217). As such, 
power is inherently unstable, ambiguous, reversible and is dispersed throughout the 
network of human relations rather than just the possession of the powerful.  
 
Between domination (where there is little room for resistance) and the flowing, easily 
reversible type of power described above,49 Foucault identifies the category of power 
relations which is the chief concern of this thesis: government. Foucault outlined his ideas 
about government in a lecture titled ‘Governmentality’ given in 1978 (1991b). 
Government is defined as ‘the conduct of conduct’ or the regulation of the ways people 
regulate their own behaviour. In the lecture, Foucault traces the emergence of 
increasingly complicated forms of government since the sixteenth century around the 
changing answers to questions concerned with the best possible forms of governance not 
just of states and nations but also of the individual and of families. However, the 
dissemination of new forms of government throughout a population is linked to a 
particular form of government: the type of government concerned with managing the 
nation-state as a whole, the ‘art of the state’ (1991b, p. 90). The state became increasingly 
concerned with the correct management of individuals, people and goods, rendering the 
state’s use of domination far less important than the use of government. It is in this sense 
that Foucault referred to the ‘governmentalisation of the state’ (1991b, pp. 102-3). Within 
this formulation, the task of regulating conduct is not just that of the state. Instead, the 
agencies of the state are one set of instruments of government amongst others, leading 
Foucault to write that ‘maybe, after all, the state is no more than a composite reality and a 
mythicised abstraction, whose importance is a lot more limited than many of us think. 
Maybe what is really important for our modernity [is the] governmentalisation of the 
state’ (1991b, p. 103).  
 
Central to Foucault’s research into governance is a recognition of the importance of the 
particular rationalities of government (which he termed governmentalities) – the 
discourses that construct the logic of governmental powers – at work in any given 
situation. Discourses, in Foucault’s work, are the building blocks of knowledge and 
power. Discourses are not just ways of speaking, but also ways of thinking and acting that 
                                                 




are held together by a particular set of relations (1972, pp. 44-5). Hence Foucault talks of 
discourses not ‘as groups of signs ... but as practices that systematically form the objects 
of which they speak’ (1972, p. 49).50 Discourses then do not describe pre-existing objects, 
but imbue objects with meaning and purpose. Through the concept of discourse, Foucault 
attempts to disrupt the groupings that ‘purport to be natural, immediate, universal unities’ 
(1972, p. 29) by describing the specific operations of a statement or practice in a 
particular historical moment in order to engage with the set of relations that regulates its 
operation.  
 
Foucault writes that ‘a discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but 
also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an 
opposing strategy’ (1990, p. 101). Meaning, in other words, is socially constructed across 
a number of sites through discourses. Rationalities of government are discursive 
formations – combinations of discourses held together by sets of relations that produce a 
certain network of material relations. However, as Foucault notes, discourses within 
discursive formations can contradict and oppose as well as reinforce, and can form the 
basis for opposition. The use of ‘strategy’ in the previous quote from Foucault deserves 
some attention. Discourses and rationalities of government do not presuppose a 
consciousness of a contest over meaning. A strategy, however, includes an element of 
choice in the designation of means, actions or procedures in order to come up with 
winning solutions (1982, pp. 224-5). Discourses can be strategically deployed in power-
games in a calculated effort to overcome resistance.  
 
Despite the array of governmental rationalities that operate in modern society 
independently of the state, Foucault still views the state as important and as having 
become more important recently. Foucault writes: ‘power relations have been 
progressively governmentalised, that is to say, elaborated, rationalised, and centralised in 
the form of, or under the auspices of, state institutions’ (1982, p. 224). The different areas 
which have come under state surveillance have become increasingly diversified and, even 
though the state is not seeking to dominate many fields of possible intervention, it has 
greatly increased its regulatory role and become increasingly reliant on non-state 
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rationalities of government. The state is therefore still worthy of attention as an important 
and large set of institutions in the web of governmental power relations that underwrite 
social institutions and subjectivities. However, for Foucault societal institutions are also 
superstructural to the state and form an element of the tactics through which the 
continued existence of the state is made possible. Thus, Foucault writes that ‘the state can 
only be understood in its survival and its limits on the basis of the general tactics of 
governmentality’ (1991b, p. 103).  
 
The state as a whole would be an unwieldy unit of analysis within a Foucaultian 
framework. It is too large, too fragmented and caught in so many relations of power that 
detailed analysis would be rendered near impossible. Instead, Foucault suggests that 
analysing power relations is best done by ‘focussing on carefully defined institutions’ 
(1982, p. 222). Institutions are the sites at which governmental rationalities meet, 
intertwine, disagree, are translated into technologies and applied to subjects. Translated 
back into policy terms, focusing on a particular institution provides an insight into how 
the development and application of policy is contingent on the operations of a particular 
combination of power relations in that institution and links those relations together with 
broader historical movements.  
 
Foucault’s research methods and ideas about power, government and the state have been 
developed by a number of scholars and have become known as the governmentality 
perspective. This perspective became more widely known through an edited book that 
included Foucault’s ‘Governmentality’ lecture along with a number of other pieces 
analysing and applying his ideas (Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991). It has since spread 
amongst researchers due to the insights it gives into the ways we are governed and related 
operations of power. Andrew Barry, Thomas Osbourne and Nikolas Rose’s comment on 
the governmental studies in Foucault and Political Reason can be generalised more 
broadly to understand the appeal of governmental analysis:  
These perspectives on governmentalities deliver, we think, real and immediate 
gains, conferring a new kind of intelligibility upon the strategies that seek to 
govern us, and the ways in which we have come to understand, embrace or 
contest such strategies. (1996, p. 16)  
Governmental analysis has been particularly used in research about liberal democracies 




been applied in many other areas including psychology (Rose, 1996b) and cultural policy 
(Barnett, 2001; Miller & Yudice, 2002).  
 
c. Governmentality and the New Order Regime 
 
Foucault’s theories on power and the state provide possible solutions for some of the 
limitations within studies about Indonesian politics referred to earlier. Foucault provides 
a broadened definition of power that recognises its productive and restrictive effects. 
Indonesian political studies concerns with elite politics and the state can be supplemented 
with research into the techniques through which governmental rationalities are inscribed 
into the everyday practices of a populace, the resistances they meet and their responses 
and changes. Political power, in such a formulation, exists beyond the state.  
 
Another important contribution would be Foucault’s challenge to the structural soundness 
of the state-civil society divide in studies of Indonesian politics. The state/civil society 
divide is itself a construction of particular governmental rationalities, as are the limits of 
state action which were adopted by the New Order regime. To borrow from Foucault 
again:  
It is the tactics of government which make possible the continual definition and 
redefinition of what is within the competence of the state and what is not, the 
public versus the private, and so on. (1991b, p. 108)  
Within Foucault’s research, the state-civil society divide itself is contingent on the 
particular rationality of government being employed and can hide the full extent of the 
operations of power in civil society. In this framework, institutions and policy become 
recognised as central to the functioning of the state and their results become contingent in 
that their strategic deployment of discourses can be resisted or coopted.  
 
Foucault’s own work was focussed on Western Europe and most of the Governmentality 
literature is focussed on Western liberal democracies. However, Foucault’s concepts have 
been used in Asian and Latin American contexts.51 In Rethinking Indonesia, Philpott 
begins the methodological work of considering how Governmentality would operate in 
the Indonesian context. Philpott argues that Indonesians were not just subject to 
domination while being under the New Order regime, although this form of power was 
                                                 




more widely used than in Western liberal democracies, but were also subject to 
governmental relations of power. He writes:  
[The] New Order regime also attempted to regulate, both directly and indirectly, 
the behaviour of citizens. This regulation sought the realisation of certain aims, 
desires and goals, suggesting that the New Order’s practices manifested more than 
a simple desire for domination ... The bodies of Indonesians are targets of 
particular technologies and strategies that seek to construct productive, regulated, 
controlled, adapted and ultimately, ‘governed’ subjects. (2000, p. 150)  
Philpott suggests that an ‘authoritarian governmentality’ (2000, pp. 167-177) existed in 
Indonesia with its own specific rationality and effects. The New Order ‘authoritarian 
governmentality’ was defined partly in opposition to liberalism and explicitly rejected the 
separation of state and society (2000, pp. 150-1) and is indebted to a ‘development’ 
discourse (2000, p. 173).52  
 
Recent writings on governmentality have explored the connection between liberal and 
authoritarian governmentalities through examining their shared understandings regarding 
what constitutes government. Mitchell Dean (1999, pp. 98-102) argues that central to 
liberalism is the understanding that government is the task of regulating naturally 
occurring processes in society through the measurement of populations. Although 
liberalism is generally associated with freedom, the operation of government in liberal 
societies has incorporated elements of what Barry Hindess has termed ‘unfreedom’ or 
‘authoritarian rule’ (2001, p. 94). Liberal rationalities of government are based on the 
assumption that freedom is the ideal condition for individuals to make rational decisions 
(Hindess, 2001, pp. 98-100). However, this raises the problem of ensuring that 
individuals have the appropriate capacity for ‘autonomous’ action, or in other words, 
make their choices rationally where their ‘rationality’ concurs with the logic of the state. 
The result has been that large populations (by far the majority of subjects of liberal rule 
before 1945) have been excluded from full liberal citizenship. Hindess identifies three 
categories of response within liberal thought to these populations: extermination, such as 
John Locke’s suggestions about the native inhabitants of America, (Hindess, 2001, p. 
101); compulsion of these populations to acquire the required capacities through the 
imposition of discipline; and, in the case of ‘relatively civilised populations’, government 
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(2000, p. 176). Culture, within a governmental formulation, is constituted within a discursive formation 




facilitation of their development through providing a ‘benign and supportive 
environment’, such as welfare distribution (Hindess, 2001, p. 99). Colonised peoples, 
such as the indigenous populations of India and also Indonesia, fit into the second 
category. According to John Stuart Mill, these populations benefit from continued 
enslavement since they are not sufficiently advanced ‘to be fitted for representative 
government’ (Mill, 1977, p. 567 in Hindess, 2001, p. 105).53 
 
While the measurement of processes and populations, best exemplified in the sciences of 
economics and demography, was essential to the birth of liberalism, they have also 
become essential to other forms of government. From early in the nineteenth century, 
identifying and managing populations and processes has become the principal concern of 
most contemporary methods of governance. Dean argues: 
the governmentalisation of the state occurs according to a line of modification 
along which [previous conceptions of government are] supplemented, and to some 
degree displaced and reinscribed, by a government through particular and 
specifiable processes, at once opaque to rulers but rendered knowable by definite 
forms of knowledge. In this regard, liberal, social democratic, and even 
authoritarian and statist forms of rule can be understood as variations on the 
consequences of such a line of modification. (1999, p. 102)  
While liberal rationalities of government limited the extent that state control could be 
exercised over at least a portion of a nation’s citizens due to a concern with the freedom 
of citizens (Dean, 1999, pp. 98-112), non-liberal rationalities of government have shown 
less restraint. In Indonesia, the Family Planning program (Keluarga Berencana) 
undertaken by the New Order regime conflated ‘the interests of the family and the health 
of the nation-state’s economy’ (Newland, 2001, p. 22). Lynda Newlands’ assessment of 
Family Planning, which included ‘military’ style strategies (2001, pp. 35,27), indicates a 
more paternalistic style with an emphasis on reaching quotas rather than women’s health 
(2001, p. 42) and greater intrusion and intervention than generally the case in Western 
health programs (2001, p. 44).  
 
Rather than developing an account of the rationalities of government present in New 
Order Indonesia, Philpott’s analysis is more focussed on demonstrating how a 
governmental perspective might address some of the shortcomings of the mainstream 
forms of analysis in Indonesian political studies. Other research into specific institutions 
                                                 




and industries in Indonesia has demonstrated that the subject of New Order Indonesia is 
constituted by relations of power that emanate from the official apparatus such as 
educational institutions (Leigh, 1991; Parker, 1992) and family planning (Newland, 2001; 
Sullivan, 1991), as well as non-state institutions including the media (Kitley, 2001; Sen & 
Hill, 2000) and labour migration companies (Rudnyckyj, 2004) and Islam (Hefner, 
1998a). In this research, the subject is not just constituted through these discourses but 
through resistance to and the interaction of these discourses, demonstrating that there is 
much existing Indonesian Studies research that can be drawn on in a governmental 
analysis.  
 
A governmental perspective addresses some of the methodological concerns raised 
previously. It recognises that power is productive and moves beyond the conception that 
power is limited to political power. A governmental perspective also provides the 
analytical tools to differentiate between different discourses within the state and 
recognises that the state is heterogeneous. Most importantly, it recognises that 
government exists beyond the state and begins to move beyond the state-society divide in 
seeking to understand how people are governed. It focuses attention towards the 
discourses, strategies, rationalities and institutions that are implicated in forming 
Indonesians and the continued existence of the nation-state. Culture, within this 
framework, is of strategic importance as an element of social life that is closely related to 
group and individual identity. It offers a means for the state and other institutions to 
target populations and as such is a form of governmentality that can be analysed through 
the discursive structure that gives it meaning.  
 
Researching Cultural Policy 
The discussion of Foucault’s conceptions of power provides a broad methodology for 
analysing cultural policy. However, a more detailed methodology is needed if the features 
and characteristics of Indonesian cultural policies are to be explained. My search for an 
appropriate methodology in cultural policy research led, once again, to Foucault. Before 
revisiting the debates in Cultural Studies around cultural policy research, there is a need 
to sketch the cultural policy field to locate the perspective I take amongst a diverse and 
growing body of work and assess its suitability when compared to other perspectives. My 




linkages between society and state were theorised in this debate and introduce the key 
positions of this methodology. These debates inform the next section where I analyse the 
resulting cultural policy practice to fashion an appropriate methodology for Indonesia.  
 
a. Different Analytical Perspectives on Cultural Policy 
 
The use of culture by the state has long been a concern of intellectuals and visionaries. 
Matthew Arnold’s Culture and Anarchy (1994)54 deals extensively with the state’s use of 
culture to create a model society. Arnold takes an aesthetic view of culture that limits it to 
a narrow selection of practices which he considers to be close to human perfection (1994, 
p. 39). Writings about culture and the state by Marxist theorists also privileged the role of 
a few experts in identifying cultural quality and perfection (for instance, Adorno, 1991) 
forming a general point of agreement across the political spectrum. In the 50s, 60s and 
70s, more pluralistic conceptions of culture began to challenge the cultural elitism of 
older theories particularly in the research relating to popular and working class culture 
(for instance, Hoggart, 1972; Thompson, 1963; Williams, 1965) and writings about race 
and colonialism (Fanon, 1963; 1967).  
 
Also in the 1970s, social scientists began to bring new forms of analysis to culture and 
the arts in particular. Some of the current trends in cultural policy research hark back to 
this time: ‘Cultural Policy Studies’ was named and undertaken through the creation of the 
Association of Cultural Economics and the Center for Urban Studies at the University of 
Akron; Herbert Gans published his work on ‘taste cultures’ (1974); and social science 
journals such as the Journal of Arts Management, Law and Society (est. 1969), and the 
Journal of Cultural Economics (est. 1973) began ongoing publication.55 Although 
beginning at the same time as the changes in other disciplines, this body of research was 
oriented towards the needs of states, which were involved in their own processes of 
cultural policy reform. Previously, many Western countries had limited cultural policy to 
arts funding, which was generally directed to activities considered to be elements of high 
culture. From the 1970s until the present, the scope of cultural policy in Western 
countries has expanded to include a widening variety of practices and objects along with 
a broader set of objectives. Cultural policy research in the West has a reciprocal 
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relationship with the changing scope and priorities of states whose policies and 
institutions generally are the research topic.  
 
Three broad directions in the analysis of cultural policy have developed in the last thirty 
years. The first perspective is cultural economics which brought economic theory to the 
field of cultural activities. This method began with the publication of William Baumol 
and William Bowen’s book Performing Arts: the Economic Dilemma (1968) and the 
founding of The Journal of Cultural Economics five years later. Many in the field of 
cultural economics, like Bruno Frey, hold that the tenets of cultural economics are the 
methodological devices of individualism and rational choice. Rather than judging what 
constitutes good and bad art, cultural economists leave these decisions up to the market 
(Frey, 2000). Cultural economics holds that if institutions, including cultural institutions 
and the market, take into account the rational economic choices of individuals, culture 
will flourish.  
 
The second perspective I term the regeneration-through-culture perspective. Rather than 
understanding policy as being directed at the field of cultural activities, ‘cultural 
regeneration’ recognises culture’s utility as a tool of the state. The definition of culture is 
expanded to include the cultural industries (such as media, fashion, leisure and tourism), 
the activities of community groups, lifestyles and heritage along with the arts.56 Culture 
became a means for generating jobs and income as well as a tool for building community 
and increasing the quality of life of the populace. Franco Biancini’s research into urban 
regeneration through cultural policy provides an example of this research genre and how 
it has developed in tandem with changes in how governments use and administer culture 
(1987; 1993). Biancini notes the changes in the strategic objectives of cultural policies in 
Western European cities between the 1970s concerns with social and political issues to 
the 1980s focus on economic and urban development (1993, p. 2). A key difference 
between the cultural regeneration perspective and the cultural economics perspective is 
the inclusion of a political dimension in critiquing and understanding the development of 
cultural policy, allowing the inclusion of issues connected to citizenship and democracy. 
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Cultural regeneration can be applied at various levels from cities to nations as well as 
specific cultural industries and institutions.57 It is beginning to be applied in Asia (Kong, 
2000) as Asian states have begun to realise the economic and social advantages of vibrant 
cultural industries.  
 
The third perspective on cultural policy takes a wider and more critical view of what 
cultural policy is and what it does. It focuses on issues of identity formation and power 
that inhabit the cultural connections between institutions and people. This perspective 
broadens the scope of cultural policy beyond the current cultural policy developments 
and regeneration strategies to focus, in the words of Toby Miller and George Yudice in 
their book Cultural Policy, on ‘those cultural knowledges and practices that determine the 
formation and governance of subjects’ (2002, p. 2). The critical perspective includes a 
broader range of policies and asks more detailed questions about how culture is used by 
institutions to exert impact on groups and individuals. Finally, the critical perspective 
brings a rich understanding to the history of cultural policy and historicises its current 
developments. It recognises that the language and race policies of colonial powers are as 
much cultural policies as urban regeneration strategies in Europe. Similarly, the present 
cultural policy moment is understood as the product of a particular historical junction and 
holds within it the mechanisms, inequalities and assumptions of present and past times 
and projected futures.  
 
A brief survey of some of the key proponents that fall into this category will help clarify 
the forms of analysis that it includes. The researcher whose work has been central to the 
critical position is Tony Bennett, whose arguments I look at in detail in the next section. 
It is sufficient here to note his extensive research on both cultural policy and museums 
and his focus on the changing use of cultural institutions in attempts to govern people and 
groups (1992; 1995; 1998). Alison Beale’s feminist research into cultural policy also falls 
into this category of research due to her questioning of the gender bias that inhabits the 
market mechanisms of employment and consumption which have become key elements 
of the cultural sector (1999). The critical perspective has been used to analyse a range of 
different topics from institutions such as museums (Bennett, 1989c; 1995) to the cultural 
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policies of nation-states58 to international institutions (Barnett, 2001; Miller & Yudice, 
2002, pp. 165-84).  
 
A problem when applying contemporary cultural policy analysis to a postcolonial setting 
like Indonesia is the underlying assumption of a Western setting. Clive Barnett’s criticism 
of the critical cultural policy perspective is perhaps even more apt for the other two 
perspectives:  
cultural policy studies ... assumes the existence of the characteristic institutional 
arrangements of liberal, representative democracy, and the existence of an 
elaborate public sphere of cultural institutions mediating the relationship between 
nation-state and citizenry. (1999, p. 374)  
All three perspectives outlined above have grown out of debates in the Western academy 
and have largely focussed on cultural policy developments in the West. Virginia 
Dominguez and Sasha Welland, in their introduction to an edited book about national 
cultural policies in East and Southeast Asia, make the point that ‘contemporary 
culturalism is not regionally restricted, not primarily European, and not simply a case of 
mimicry by Europe’s former colonies’ (1998, p. 5). Additionally, as Anne Stoler 
demonstrates in her research into race and culture, the work of culture for the colonial 
administrations used the same logic as Western nation-states but with different purposes 
and results (1995a; 1996). Cultural policy was put to work in different ways in Indonesia 
than the West, and thus requires a methodology that is capable of reflecting on its own 
assumptions and histories.  
 
Governmentality presents itself as a methodological solution to this problem for two 
reasons. Firstly, as was demonstrated previously, governmentality provides a method for 
assessing the complex relationship between Western, colonial and authoritarian regimes 
that is necessary for an analysis of cultural policy history in a postcolonial setting. 
Secondly, previous cultural policy research in Asia has successfully employed 
Foucaultian tools to analyse how culture has been constructed as a discursive formation 
due to its location within different governmental discourses. Chua Beng Huat and Eddie 
Kuo’s analysis of cultural policy in Singapore identifies Singaporean national identity 
and Singaporeans as the results of discursive practices with ‘temporally changing 
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characters’ that are ‘‘called into existence’ by statements that circulate in different 
discourses, in different spheres of social practices’ (1998, p. 37). By recognising 
Singaporean culture as discursively constructed rather than an object with determined 
features, Chua and Kuo are able to map changes to official Singaporean culture due to 
changes in government policies and strategies.59 The critical cultural policy perspective, 
with its links to governmental analysis, is best equipped for analysis of Indonesia.  
 
b. The Cultural Policy Debate in Cultural Studies 
 
Having identified critical cultural policy perspectives as the field of study most able to 
construct an appropriate framework for the analysis of Indonesian cultural policy, the 
next step is to explore the key debates and positions within this perspective. A way of 
moving towards a deeper understanding of the critical cultural policy field is to return to 
the early debates that surrounded its emergence in Cultural Studies. As has been 
mentioned previously, a key proponent of the cultural policy perspective in Cultural 
Studies is Tony Bennett. He was one of the founding members of the Institute of Cultural 
Policy Research in Queensland,60 his writings provided a basis for much contemporary 
cultural policy research (Barnett, 2001; Whitcomb, 2003), and his research has been 
consistently cited as a key example of cultural policy analysis (See During, 1993, pp. 16-
7; O’Regan, 1992b, p. 518). Bennett’s framework for ‘putting policy into cultural studies’ 
(1992, p. 23) is outlined below, followed by a brief summary of critiques of his ideas by 
other Cultural Studies researchers and finally Bennett’s reply.61  
 
Bennett’s early texts about cultural policy served as both an outline for a future research 
direction and a challenge to certain shared understandings amongst Cultural Studies 
practitioners. The key text that outlined his project is ‘Putting Policy into Cultural 
Studies,’ which was presented at the Cultural Studies Conference in Illinois in 1990 and 
printed as part of the proceedings (1992). Other texts produced before this time give a 
shorter outline of the same project (see, for instance, Bennett, 1989a) and are analysed 
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alongside ‘Putting Policy into Cultural Studies’ to review how Bennett envisaged cultural 
policy in the early 1990s. 
 
Bennett began his paper with a criticism of the kinds of cultural politics that were 
prevalent in Cultural Studies and their preoccupation with ‘a view of culture which sees it 
as, chiefly, the domain of signifying practices’ (1992, p. 25). This was the first move of 
an important element of Bennett’s argument that took Cultural Studies to task for its 
tendency to forego engagement with cultural institutions, including the state, in favour of 
criticism that ‘transforms cultural artefacts ... into vehicles for the elaboration and 
transmission of a generalised form of social criticism’ (1989a, p. 7). Bennett argued that 
Cultural Studies needed to pay more attention to the institutional conditions that regulated 
different fields of culture. Bennett turned to this task through reviewing Raymond 
William’s definitions of culture which are the most important single influence on how 
culture has been understood in Cultural Studies. Bennett argued that Williams and most 
Cultural Studies research privileged two of his definitions – culture as ‘a way of life’ and 
as ‘works and practices of intellectual and especially artistic activity’ – over William’s 
other definition – ‘the independent and abstract noun which describes a general process 
of intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic development’ (Williams, 1983, p. 90).  
 
The effect of overlooking the latter aspect of culture’s usage was that Williams and much 
of Cultural Studies miss ‘one of the most distinctive aspects of the late eighteenth and 
nineteenth century transformations in which the changing and conflicting semantic 
destinies of ‘culture’ are implicated’ (1992, p. 26). This moment was when culture was 
put to work within emerging fields of social management. Culture was figured as both 
object – or target as it refers to the morals, manners and ways of life of a populace – and 
instrument – in that in its more restricted sense culture refers to the domain of artistic and 
intellectual activities which can be put to work in governmental programs intervening in 
and regulating behaviours and attributes of target populations. Initially, artistic and 
intellectual practices were focussed on the symbolic exclusion of the vast mass of the 
population from inter-elite communication or, as in the case of Elizabethan theatre, used 
to disseminate lessons about monarchical power. Through and after the Enlightenment, 
artistic and intellectual practices came to be understood as capable of improving the 
mental and behavioural attributes of the general population and were put to work in 




or regions of subject formation in different ways depending on the prevailing notions of a 
particular historical period. Within Bennett’s formulation, the semiotic properties of 
cultural practices take a back seat to the ‘programmatic, institutional, and governmental 
conditions in which cultural practice are inscribed – in short, the network of relations that 
fall under a properly theoretical understanding of policy’ (1992, p. 28) because it is the 
latter that determine how practices are connected with different parts of life and function 
to achieve specific effects.  
 
Bennett’s focus on the governmental, programmatic and instrumental conditions that give 
rise to cultural practices clearly informed his definition of culture:  
Culture is more cogently conceived, I want to suggest, when thought of as a 
historically specific set of institutionally embedded relations of government in 
which the forms of thought and conduct of extended populations are targeted for 
transformation – in part via the extension through the social body of the forms, 
techniques, and regimens of aesthetic and intellectual culture. (1992, p. 26)  
Bennett further elaborated on this definition when he stated that culture should be thought 
of as:  
a historically produced surface of social regulation whose distinctiveness is to be 
identified and accounted for in terms of (i) the specific types of attributes and 
forms of conduct that are established as its targets, (ii) the techniques that are 
proposed for the maintenance or transformation of such attributes or forms of 
conduct, (iii) the assembly of such techniques into particular programs of 
government, and (iv) the inscription of such programs into the operative 
procedures of specific cultural technologies. (1992, p. 27)  
Culture, in this formulation, was clearly bound up with the relations of power that 
permeate society and the state and determine the conditions of its operation within 
governmental programs.  
 
Bennett adopted a Foucaultian perspective. His reasons for choosing Foucault over the 
theorist who had the most influence over Cultural Studies in the 1970s and 1980s, 
Antonio Gramsci, were twofold.62 First, Gramsci commits analysis to an ‘automatic’ 
politics which assumes that cultural activities conducted through cultural institutions are 
bound into the struggle to achieve hegemony, generally for the ruling classes while 
opposing flows of counter hegemonic ideologies rise out of the subordinate classes (1992, 
p. 29). Foucault, on the other hand, views power relations as inherently unstable, 
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pursuing multiple ends and dispersed. For Foucault, the development of modern forms of 
government ‘goes beyond the problematic of political obedience to replace it with a 
concern with knowing, regulating and changing the conditions of the population in 
potentially limitless ways’ (Bennett, 1998, p. 70). The focus of Foucault’s analysis 
therefore is on the exercise of power in programs, technologies and practices of cultural 
institutions, making it a more useful framework for revealing what is actually happening.  
 
Second, Bennett argued that the Gramscian search for a unified class, people or race that 
will act as a social agent is misguided and has hindered the development of ‘more 
specific and immediate forms of political calculation and action’ that would attempt to 
influence the agendas and procedures of those groups that regularly input into decisions 
within cultural fields (1992, p. 29). Bennett argued that Cultural Studies needs to move 
away from such a perspective and instead connect to the requirements and concerns of 
people working within cultural institutions and government, as those agents influence the 
institutional conditions that produce culture. Foucault’s insights provided a way of 
reorienting Cultural Studies because they encourage attention to be paid to the detailed 
routines and operating procedures of cultural institutions and enable intellectuals ‘to 
connect with the debates and practices through which reformist adjustments to the 
administration of culture are actually brought about’ (1998, p. 61).  
 
Bennett’s ideas about the future direction of Cultural Studies were strongly refuted by 
some of its practitioners. The main thrust of Bennett’s critics was that moving towards a 
position at ease with engagement with institutions (state institutions in particular) was at 
odds with the critical vocation of Cultural Studies and compromised its independence 
(Curthoys, 1991; During, 1993, p. 17; Grace, 1991; Jameson, 1993, p. 29; McGuigan, 
1996, pp. 12-29). In reply, cultural policy researchers connected Bennett’s advocacy of a 
greater engagement with policy to a particular political moment in Australia while the 
centre-left Labour government was in power (S. Cunningham, 1992b; Miller, 1998, p. 
46). Other critics, such as Meaghan Morris and Tom O’Regan, took issue with the 
structure of the debate itself which constructed a hierarchy between cultural criticism and 
cultural policy (Morris, 1992; O’Regan, 1992a). O’Regan, for instance, argued that 
cultural criticism is in fact a necessary element of the policy process and indeed exists in 
a symbiotic relationship with cultural policy (1992a, p. 418). Bennett responded by 




Bennett argued that dividing cultural criticism from cultural policy (or, in O’Regan’s 
terminology, bottom-up from top-down approaches) hid the extent to which the cultural 
politics and practices that are the subject of cultural criticism are dependent on cultural 
policies (Bennett, 1998, pp. 200-3). Bennett used James Clifford’s advocacy of a 
community perspective in contemporary museum practice to demonstrate that 
transforming museums into ‘contact zones’ for ‘communities’ is in fact a reconfiguration 
of relations of government and culture and not a radical departure from past museum 
practice (1998, pp. 200-13).  
 
Clive Barnett makes a separate criticism of Bennett’s formulation of cultural policy in 
regards to his use of Foucault. Barnett suggests that Bennett’s cultural policy research has 
‘conflated’ discipline and government (1999, p. 381) due to its focus on institutions with 
well-defined spatial boundaries. He writes that ‘authoritative accounts’ such as Bennett’s 
research into museums, ‘tend to construct the deployment of culture in terms of a 
monitorial disciplinary regime which inculcates new ethical practices of self-formation in 
distinctive spatio-temporal locales’ (1999, p. 378). Such research, according to Barnett, 
suffers from two related deficiencies. Firstly, it overstates the efficacy of the disciplinary 
regimes in cultural institutions (a) because it ignores both how those institutions are 
generally more ‘open’ than the ‘enclosed spaces of containment’ examined by Foucault 
(1991a) and (b) because of the way that subjects move between locales with different 
disciplinary regimes. Secondly, the focus on discipline ignores the broader operation of 
Foucault’s concept of biopower with its mode of operation at the level of populations. 
Barnett suggests that more attention needs to be paid to other forms of regulation such as 
‘discourses of the subject’ and ‘practices of individual self-regulation’ in addition to 
‘disciplining the conduct of bodies’ (1999, p. 383-4).  
 
However, Barnett may be selling Bennett’s version of cultural policy analysis short 
through reading analysis of the functioning of museums as analysis of all cultural 
institutions. In a slight revision of his method in 1997, Bennett writes that it is not 
sufficient to ‘define the concerns of Cultural Policy Studies’ as being with the ways that 
government shapes the characteristics of populations (which is already broader than the 
focus on individual bodies that Barnett attributes to him). Instead, Bennett writes:  
what analysis most needs to concern itself with in any policy context is precisely 




which cultural and intellectual resources are produced and circulated (ranging 
from associational forms of community production through to the cultural 
industries), in view of the role that these play in shaping both particular ways of 
life and the relationships between ways of life. (1997, p. 171) 
Within this formulation, culture is implicated in a much broader set of governmental 
relations than the disciplining of bodies. It encompasses the twin domains of disciplining 
the body (in cultural institutions) and managing populations as it is concerned with ‘ways 
of life and the relations between ways of life’.63  
 
Positions and Issues for Analysis of Indonesian Cultural Policy 
This thesis is located at the intersection between the expansion of governmental and 
Foucaultian analysis of Indonesia and debates about governmental analysis of cultural 
policy. The key contention, borrowed from the critical cultural policy perspective, is that 
culture is constructed by governmental discourses and the power relations that shape the 
conditions of its use in any given situation determine its content. Bringing together the 
two fields to research Indonesian cultural policy raises four issues.  
 
The first issue involves a criticism of governmentality is that it overestimates the 
effectiveness of policy. James Donald writes that practitioners of governmentality tend to 
present the ‘souls’ of citizens as being regulated and controlled by governmental 
practices by positing ‘a preformed self as the necessary target on which the machinery [of 
government] works’ (1992, p. 93). Barnett writes that there has been a similar tendency in 
the case of cultural policy analysis that has taken a governmental perspective. He writes 
that the ‘cultural-policy studies literature tends to assume a high degree of fit between the 
political rationalities of institutions and actual processes of subject-formation’ (1999, p. 
377).64 The assumption of effectiveness could, in the case of analysis about official 
cultural policy like this thesis, represent the state as determining the features of either 
culture or cultural subjectivity.  
 
In order to combat such representations, two positions need to be established from the 
outset. Firstly, my analysis needs to recognise the heterogeneity of discourse and 
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Foucault’s concept of ‘power-games’. Discourse are constantly negotiated, 
misunderstood and used in unexpected ways.65 Grounding cultural policy analysis in 
concrete historical research involves understanding the wider political and historical 
processes that contribute to generating policy and how those policies have operated in 
specific institutions and instances. Secondly, the state needs to be understood as the 
largest and most influential set of institutions that seek to utilise culture, but not as either 
the only institution or as a single, unified entity. Although the responsibility for 
regulating culture is often in the hands of non-state institutions, the uses of culture are 
increasingly under the purview of the state, whether directly or indirectly.66 The state is 
addressed here as a dispersed and at times conflicting range of institutions and the limits 
of its control are understood as constantly contested and shifting.  
 
The second issue is the relationship between broad and narrow definitions of cultural 
policy. Bennett notes culture’s importance ‘as a set of artistic and intellectual forms’ 
because of its ability to act on and influence the attributes and behaviours (ways of life) 
of particular populations and the relations between them (1989b, p. 6). The deployment 
of ‘culture’ in a narrow sense was therefore the instrument for transformation of culture 
in a broad sense as ‘ways of life’. Bennett traces the process of this now widespread 
splitting back to the emergence of ‘liberal forms of government’ in the nineteenth century 
where the deployment of culture would ‘help cultivate a capacity for voluntary self-
regulation in the general population’ (1998, p. 110). The deployment of artistic and 
intellectual forms through institutions and programs is, as suggested by the literature on 
Indonesian cultural policy and in the chapters that follow, an important cultural strategy 
of government and part of the governmental conditions that produce culture. Although 
this thesis focuses on cultural policy in its narrow sense, interactions with both broad 
definitions of culture and cultural policy are important elements of how cultural policy is 
devised and deployed.  
 
The third issue is the question of how to engage with the state in post-Suharto Indonesia. 
Criticism of Bennett’s critical cultural perspective has, as I explored in the previous 
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section, centred on his call for greater engagement with institutions and in particular the 
state. Bennett and other advocates of greater engagement have been taken ‘to task for 
overstating the case for a ‘useful knowledge’ of an involvement in governmental 
practices over the cultivation and deployment of a critical knowledge’ (Yudice, 1999, p. 
2). In contrast to Bennett’s model of engagement, much Foucaultian research has been 
aimed at upsetting rather than working with the structures of intelligibility that organise 
practices, identities and institutions. Michael Shapiro writes that Foucault’s genealogical 
method is one of disrupting and defamiliarising the familiar (1992, p. 2). He writes:  
the genealogical imagination construes all systems of intelligibility as ... false 
arrests, as the arbitrary fixings of the momentary results of struggles among 
contending forces, struggles that could have produced other possible systems of 
intelligibility and the orders they support. (1992, p. 2)  
The end of the Suharto era has been a time of review and change, which is where a 
critical Foucaultian perspective can contribute. I hope to present a historical analysis of 
contemporary practices, indicating and exploring the struggles and choices and opening 
up new narratives and histories for exploration in the area of cultural policy. The timing 
is right for critical disruptions of the present given the current political climate and the 
openings that have emerged in Indonesia since 1999.  
 
Finally, an important issue for cultural policy analysis that recurs throughout this thesis is 
the issue of aesthetics or taste. Contemporary academic understandings about aesthetics 
have revolved around the writings of Bourdieu. Bourdieu rejected the Kantian notion of 
disinterested judgement (Kant, 1987, p. 228), instead preferring to understand aesthetics 
as a product of education, family and the social trajectories of economic class and status 
(Bourdieu, 1984, pp. 3-6). Bourdieu’s analysis has been used in two ways in writings 
about aesthetics: to relativise the value distinctions made between high and low cultural 
forms, arguing for equivalence (Fiske, 1992; Rowse, 1985); or arguing that sociological 
research should not obliterate but reshape divisions of value (McGuigan, 1996; Street, 
2000).67 Aesthetics as a category for this thesis is not dependent on the outcome of this 
debate, but around the question of how taste relates to politics. John Street writes:  
judgement is not simply a product of ... discourses; it is also the legitimation of 
these discourses and the processes which include or exclude particular forms of 
discourse. Aesthetic judgement is the product of a process in which authority is 
assigned and legitimated. (2000, p. 48)  
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Aesthetics therefore can function in a normative system designed to reinforce existing 
power structures or can be used to resist such normative systems.  
 
An important aspect of cultural policy is how it seeks to educate the citizenry into a set of 
tastes or aesthetics. The citizen who internalises the correct set of tastes and morals is 
more likely to monitor their own behaviour according to state-defined norms. Taste 
provides an alternative value register to ethnicity and religion, both of which the state 
views as problematic in Indonesia due to their diversity and their potential for evoking 
deep divisions. Miller and Yudice write:  
An aesthetic of truth and beauty is, as per Kant, the internal monitor within each 
person that provides a collective, national, categorical imperative. Its very ethos 
of singular appreciation becomes, ironically, a connecting chord of national 
harmony, binding individual goals to an implied national unity. (2002, p. 10) 
Aesthetics has the potential to both transcend class and ethnicity (and manage them) 
through the internalisation of knowledge of what is desirable and ‘normal’.  
 
5. Thesis Outline 
In this thesis, I make use of the periodisation of Indonesian history by political regimes 
that has become standard in most Indonesian history texts that encompass the twentieth 
century (see, for instance, Cribb & Brown, 1995; Ricklefs, 2001). The use of political 
regimes to mark eras is fitting here because the governmental changes brought by new 
political regimes are considered the key generators of cultural policy change. However, 
my use of political eras does not assume that policy change naturally occurs with regime 
change. Considerable attention is given to the reasons for cultural policy changes and 
continuities, both between and within political eras.  
 
This thesis is divided into two parts that correspond to the two thesis objectives (see p. 
20) which were derived from the current state of cultural policy analysis in Indonesian 
Studies. It makes use of a variety of primary and secondary sources, including interviews, 
previously unexamined archival material from the 1950s and 1960s and New Order 
cultural policy documents. Part I provides a historical account of how cultural policy has 
been constituted in Indonesia from the late colonial period to the post-New Order 
‘Reformasi’ era. The first five chapters demonstrate how technologies of government 




time due to both internal and external circumstances. This requires analysis of the 
changing governmental rationalities in Indonesia across the twentieth century and their 
implications for cultural policy and the conditions that constitute culture. Chapter one 
provides important historical information about the foundations of post-independence 
cultural policy that can be found in the cultural policies of the late colonial and occupying 
Japanese administrations while the following chapters, with the partial exception of 
chapter three, make use of more substantive data to analyse the cultural policy of the 
post-independence era.  
 
The five chapters are chronological and follow a similar pattern. They begin with a 
discussion of how culture was formulated in governmental discourse before moving to 
the details of official cultural policy in order to identify the distinctive features of the 
cultural policy of particular eras. The exceptions to this method are chapters three and 
four that analyse the New Order era. Chapter three provides important background 
information through presenting an account of the causes of the changing articulation of 
culture in governmental discourses while chapter four analyses the impact of these 
changes on official cultural policy, thus replicating the pattern across two chapters.  
 
My emphasis in Part I is on official policies and the discourses that informed them, rather 
than the activities and criticisms of non-state individuals and groups. I seek to explore the 
changing ways the state used culture and include the activities and writings of non-state 
actors only where they intersected with cultural policy programs or changes in cultural 
policy. Focussing on official cultural policies that were applied across Indonesia excludes 
two noteworthy categories. These are Chinese Indonesians, who have been subject to 
state policies that at different times have aimed to differentiate them from and assimilate 
them into the indigenous population (Suryadinata, 1993) and were rarely addressed in 
cultural policy, and Bali, which has been granted a special status as a culturally-rich 
‘living museum’ since the Dutch conquest of Bali in 1908 (Picard, 1997, p. 185). The 
treatment of Chinese Indonesians and Bali require more extensive analysis than is 
possible here and have both been the subject of considerable scholarly attention.68  
 
                                                 
68 On the forces that shaped Balinese cultural identity including governance during the colonial and 
independence periods, see Picard (1997; 1999), Schulte Nordholt (1986) and Vickers (1989). On Chinese 
Indonesians, see, Coppell (1983; 2002), Godley and Lloyd (2001), Heryanto (1998), Mackie (1976) and 




Part II consists of two case studies of cultural programs run by the Directorate of Culture. 
The chapters explore the links between cultural programs and governmental rationalities 
as well as demonstrating how different discourses combined in different ways in different 
institutional locations to alter the operation of cultural policies. They focus on the 
technologies and techniques of cultural institutions that were inscribed into cultural 
programs, how these were spread across Indonesia and how the broader political and 
social changes since 1998 have influenced the actual operations of cultural policy. Instead 
of assuming uniform outcomes generated by a centralised, singular state, the case studies 
explore the possibility of a plural and diverse array of outcomes and occurrences. 
Additionally, these chapters recognise the resistances both within institutions and by the 
subjects of cultural policy to the strategies and designs of Indonesian governments. The 
two case studies tackle quite different cultural institutions. The first case study chapter 
investigates the creation and operation of two kinds of arts institutions across Indonesia: 
the taman budaya (cultural parks) and the dewan kesenian (arts councils). The cultural 
parks and the arts councils were located within the provincial capital cities and were 
therefore situated within a diverse range of locations. The second case study chapter 
examines a series of national cultural research projects coordinated by the Directorate of 
Culture.  
 
Finally, it should be noted that the methodological framing of Part II does not preclude 
discussion of themes that are specific to those institutions. On the contrary, it opens up 
new areas of discussion through its appreciation of the productive power of governmental 
discourses. For instance, chapter six identifies how the cultural parks were the site of 
various governmental programs that positioned the arts in a variety of ways and chapter 
seven examines how the field of local culture was fashioned through state-sponsored 

















The Genesis of Modern Cultural Policy in Indonesia:  
Culture and Government in the Late Colonial and  
Japanese Occupation Periods, 1900-1945  
Benedict Anderson, in his introduction to Southeast Asian Tribal Groups and Ethnic 
Minorities, writes:  
It is easy to forget that minorities came into existence in tandem with majorities ... 
They were born of the political and cultural revolution brought about by the 
maturing of the colonial state and by the rise against it of popular nationalism. 
The former fundamentally changed the structures and aims of governance, the 
latter its legitimacy. (1987a, p. 1)  
This chapter explores how Indonesian cultural policy was born within the complex 
relationship between Indonesian populations and the policies of foreign administrations. 
Anderson’s observation highlights that when the Indonesian nationalists declared 
independence, they declared popular dominion over a territory that was already 
profoundly shaped by modern methods of government. Indeed, the resistance of 
anticolonial nationalists, as noted by David Scott, was articulated into a ‘political game’ 
that was itself linked to the ‘political rationality’ of the colonial state (1995, p. 198) and 
also, in the case of much of Southeast Asia, then impacted by Japanese occupation. Dutch 
colonial cultural policy, which bloomed at the beginning of the twentieth century, and 
Japanese occupying cultural policy should not be understood as fundamentally different 
to post-independence cultural policy, but as its precursors.  
 
1. Culture and Government in Indonesia from 1900 to 1945 
Scott writes that ‘in order to understand the project of colonial power at any given 
historical moment one has to understand the character of the political rationality that 
constituted it’ (1995, p. 204). Although forms of the state in Europe were not simply 
replicated in the colonies, Scott argues that colonial rule was linked to the ‘structures, 




imperial powers understood and undertook government. In his article ‘Colonial 
Governmentality’, Scott uses the example of the Colebrooke-Cameron reforms of 1832 in 
Sri Lanka to explore how changes in political rationalities in Europe had corollaries in the 
colonies. He demonstrates how power was redirected from producing ‘extractive-effects 
on colonial bodies’ to ‘governing-effects on colonial conduct’ (1995, p. 214). An effect 
of this transformation of power was the ‘reconstruction of colonial space’ (1995, p. 204). 
However, the construct of colonial space should not be considered a one-sided project 
with the results completely determined by European colonisers. We need to acknowledge 
that the ‘conditions’ of the colonised country, including local practices and differences, 
also affected colonial practice (Gouda, 1995, pp. 9,21; Stoler, 1989, p. 135).  
 
The emergence of cultural policy in Indonesia is tied to how Dutch colonial government 
constructed colonial space and the opposition of Indonesian nationalists. In order to 
understand the emergence of cultural policy, a series of steps similar to those outlined by 
Scott need to be undertaken, beginning with the broad liberal rationalities of government 
in Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century and narrowing down to the specific 
elements of Dutch colonial government within which culture was articulated. The 
governmentality group of scholars identify two features of the liberal rationality of 
government that are particularly important to the birth of cultural policy: the liberal 
approach to security and the conceptualisation of government as managing ‘natural’ 
processes. Once these elements have been discussed in the context of the liberalism, it is 
then possible to explore their different treatments by the Dutch colonial administration, 
Indonesian nationalists and the occupying Japanese.  
 
Liberalism is commonly defined as a political doctrine concerned with ensuring the 
liberty of individuals, in particular from the encroachment of the state (Hindess, 1996, p. 
123). Following Foucault, a number of scholars1 have taken a view of liberalism that 
emphasises its use of governmental methods to secure a specific ‘form of life’ (Dean, 
1991, p. 13) concerned with creating a society of free individuals. Essential to liberalism 
is the notion of ‘naturally occurring’ processes that cannot be known by the state, but are 
essential to government, the exemplar of these processes being the economy (Dean, 1999, 
                                                 





p. 50). In a liberal rationality of government, securing individual liberty is essential to 
securing these ‘natural’ processes. Foucault argues:  
The setting in place of ... mechanisms of modes of state intervention whose 
function is to assure the security of those natural phenomena, economic processes 
and the intrinsic processes of population: this is what becomes the basic objective 
of governmental rationality. Hence liberty is registered not only as the right of 
individuals legitimately to oppose the power, the abuses and usurpations of the 
sovereign, but also now as an indispensable element of governmental rationality 
itself (Foucault on 5 April 1978, quoted in C. Gordon, 1991, pp. 19-20).  
The state’s concern with security extends then to ensuring that people have developed the 
thoughts and behaviours the state deems appropriate for free and independent people in 
order for the ‘natural’ processes to properly function (Hindess, 1996, p. 130). Forms of 
indirect regulation, such as education, are therefore central to governance. In the case of 
groups considered to deviate from the norm of ‘free and independent’ people, the state is 
obliged to guarantee the security of the processes considered beyond the state. Thus 
Mitchell Dean writes in his discussion of liberal notions of security, ‘regulation made in 
the service of security has to be structured in such a way as to lead indigent and other 
troublesome groups to exercise a responsible and disciplined freedom in the market and 
in the family’ (1999, p. 116).  
 
The colonised at the beginning of the twentieth century, as was briefly mentioned in the 
introduction, are defined as lacking the capacity for self-government in liberal 
rationalities of government. Barry Hindess, in his article ‘The Liberal Government of 
Unfreedom’, analyses how liberal forms of government defined their populations through 
the concept of ‘authoritarian rule’. Hindess argues that ‘authoritarian rule’ was justified in 
the case of the colonised (and is still justified in the case of the unemployed and minors) 
as ‘the capacities required for autonomous conduct and the social conditions that foster 
and sustain them can be developed in [these populations] only through compulsion, 
through the imposition of more or less extended periods of discipline’ (2001, p. 101). In 
the Dutch Indies, a racial hierarchy defined the populations that were subjected to 
colonial ‘authoritarian rule’, as shall be explored below, including colonial cultural 
policies. The policies of the Japanese also divided the inhabitants of Indonesia into 
racialised populations in a hierarchy that contrasted markedly to the colonial construct. 




twentieth century through posing killing at the level of entire populations (1990, pp. 136-
7), it also entrenched racism within modern methods of government.2  
 
The cultural policy link between the colonial administration, the occupying Japanese and 
the nationalists is the common ‘improving’ or ‘civilising’ function attributed to culture. 
Culture was understood as being able to change the attributes of populations through 
addressing the behaviours of their members as individuals, making it an ideal field for 
governmental programs. The use of culture by both of the administrations and the 
nationalists was governmental in their purported desire to ‘improve’ the indigenous 
populations/Indonesians, although towards very different ends and using different models 
of improvement. However, there are also shared techniques and methods. An important 
shared component that enabled culture to do its civilising work is what Tony Bennett has 
termed ‘strategic normativity’. ‘Strategic normativity’ refers to the way in which culture 
has ‘functioned to lay open the ways of life of different sections of the populace to 
reformist programs of government’ (1998, p. 91). Drawing from Robert Young (1995, p. 
29), Bennett notes how culture is usually thought of as opposed to something or as itself 
internally divided. The resulting sectors are rarely on equal terms. Instead, there is 
typically a hierarchical ordering of relations between sectors. He states:  
It is this hierarchical ordering of the relations between the different spheres of 
culture that results in a strategic normativity in which one component of the 
cultural field is strategically mobilised in relation to another as offering the means 
of overcoming whatever shortcomings (moral, political or aesthetic) are attributed 
to the latter. This results in the establishment of a normative gradient down which 
the flow of culture is directed in reformist programs through which cultural 
resources are brought to bear on whatever might be the task to hand. (1998, p. 92) 
 
This chapter explores the relationship between the use of culture by the colonial state and 
by Indonesian nationalists before turning to the cultural policy of the Japanese. Firstly, I 
explore the changes in methods of governance that made cultural policy possible. 
Cultural policy is linked here to the emergence of modern methods of governance that 
were introduced by the colonial state and adopted by the nationalists and, as is explored 
in later chapters, the independent Indonesian state. Secondly, I examine the operation of 
strategic normativity in both the colonial administration’s publishing house for Malay 
language literature, Balai Pustaka, and in the first exchange of the cultural polemics, the 
                                                 




high-profile debates amongst Indonesian nationalists about Indonesian culture that took 
place in the mid to late 1930s. This chapter does not provide an exhaustive account of 
Dutch and nationalist cultural policy perspectives and institutions during this period but 
instead employs analysis of policies relating to literature to explore the features of 
colonial and early nationalist cultural policy. Literature was a prominent issue for both 
the colonial administration due to the spread of education amongst its indigenous colonial 
subjects and nationalists, as they struggled to define and develop Indonesian literature 
and culture.3 Thirdly, I examine the cultural policy of the Japanese and its relationship to 
and effects on nationalist cultural discourses and institutions. Nationalists moved into an 
uneasy alliance with the Japanese occupying administration following their opposition to 
the colonial administration.  
 
An important element of cultural policy in Indonesia since its inception that is introduced 
in this chapter is the emergence and embedding of the command culture model of cultural 
policy. Toby Miller and George Yudice use the term ‘command culture’ to differentiate 
state-based models of cultural provision from models which privilege the market. They 
write: ‘The notion of a non-market form of cultural provision always already centres the 
state in planning, creating, policing and revising cultural practice’ (2002, p. 107). They 
use the idea of the command-culture to challenge the assumption that the market-based 
model is ‘natural’ and state intervention is somehow ‘a distortion’ (2002, p.107) and to 
identify cultural provision as it occurred under fascist and socialist governments. Of 
course within the command culture model there is a wide variety of methods of cultural 
provision. Miller and Yudice are careful to distinguish between state-socialist and fascist 
models (the former characterised as proclaiming an ‘egalitarian, worker-oriented world’, 
the latter as ‘dedicated to chauvinistic nationalism and the heroisation of conquest and 
domination’, 2002, p.108) which are primarily linked through the increased role of the 
state and opposition to the market-based provision of culture. Additionally, and 
importantly for discussion of Indonesia, they address the idea of a postcolonial model, 
‘which intersects with command-cultural models and profit-based ones’ (2002, p.108). I 
argue in the chapters that follow that Indonesian cultural policy has demonstrated 
elements of command-culture and market-based models as it has struggled to come to 
                                                 
3 Other possible fields of analysis that I hope to develop in the future are the fine arts and museums (which 
are briefly touched on below). Literature received greater attention from the state than the fine arts due to 




terms with issues of national identity, ethnic difference and cohesion, internal political 
conflict, the need for economic development and the pressures of an increasingly strong 
international capitalist system. The command culture model is relevant to this chapter in 
two respects. Firstly, the ‘authoritarian’ elements of colonial cultural policy indicate the 
presence of the command culture model. Secondly, the cultural policy of the Japanese 
occupying administration can be expected to also exhibit the characteristics of the 
command culture model.  
 
2. Late Colonial Rule in the East Indies (1900-1942) 
A feature of liberalism is its constant critique of its own methods, including its operation 
in the colonies, and its constant review of the extent of its interventions.4 One such 
critique of colonial government in the Dutch East Indies coincided with the turn of the 
twentieth century, which is where I begin my analysis of Dutch colonial administration. 
While it cannot be said that the ethical period of Dutch colonial rule (1900-1930) was the 
start of the colonial government’s concern with education or welfare or that it was 
successful at achieving far-reaching gains in either of these areas, it can be said that 
increased attention and energy was given to these areas during the period and that these 
changes had a formative influence on a small but important group which became the 
future nationalist leaders. The state’s concern with education, for instance, precedes even 
the liberal period (1870-1900) of colonial rule. It began in 1848, the same year that the 
Fundamental Law was passed in Netherlands to guarantee everyone in the Netherlands a 
free education, with a grant of money to educate Javanese to become officials and slowly 
increased throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century (Saunders, 1984, p. 26). The 
rationale of the liberal period was also aimed at improving the welfare of the indigenous 
population through the removal of barriers to free enterprise which it was hoped would 
stimulate economic development. However, by the turn into the next century there was a 
realisation amongst administrators and observers in the Indies and Netherlands that 
indigenous farmers had not responded to the bounties offered by economic freedom and 
that economic welfare had, if anything, declined during the period (Wertheim & The, 
1962, p. 223).  
 
                                                 
4 Gordon has characterised liberalism as ‘a critique of state reason’ (1991, p. 15). See also Dean (1999, pp. 




The most noted expression of the changing attitude in the Netherlands towards the Indies 
is an article by C. Th. van Deventer entitled ‘A debt of honour’ and published in 1899 in 
the Dutch journal de Gids.5 Van Deventer argued that the Netherlands owed a debt of 
honour to the Indies to repay the f187 million that was taken from the Indies between 
1867 and 1878 when the Netherlands’ finances were sound and to ensure the good 
government of the Indies’ inhabitants. His sentiments gained broad support from a 
number of political parties and individuals, including Queen Wilhelmina (Furnivall, 
1967, pp. 228-9). The Indies debt of f40 million was taken by the Netherlands in order to 
encourage spending on social services, and the colonial administration began to take a 
greater interest in the living standards, work practices and education of the indigenous 
populace (Wertheim & The, 1962, p. 224).  
 
Frances Gouda has linked the ethical policy to the advent of social liberalism and the 
social policies it advocated in the Netherlands (2000, pp. 14-20). Social liberalism 
advocated an increased role for the state in the Netherlands, making the state responsible 
for securing the basic necessities that were distributed by entrenched interest groups 
within Dutch society (what Gouda calls ‘pillars’, 2000, p. 14). Gouda writes:  
social liberals envisioned the primary purpose of state policy to be educating and 
civilising both the disorganised, unruly poor and the more politically mobilised 
working class in order to elevate them to virtuous citizenship within their 
semicloistered circles. (2000, p. 18)  
The architects of the ethical policy envisioned a related change of policy in Indonesia that 
would nurture the material, educational and cultural well-being of indigenous subjects 
(2000, p. 19). The views about indigenous Indonesians that circulated between 1900 and 
1942 generally shared an evolutionary rhetoric about the relative stages of development 
of ‘native’ and ‘European’ populations (1995, p. 155).6 Overseeing this process of 
evolution was a historical task of the Dutch that bordered on the religious. Hence Johan 
Christiaan van Eerde, a Professor in the Colonial Institute in Amsterdam, could say in 
1914 that the Dutch provided the best guarantees that they would ‘implement the 
appropriate policies’ in order to administer ‘the gradual adjustment process and 
                                                 
5 Van Deventer was an ex-lawyer who had worked in the Indies before joining the Liberal Party. For more 
details about van Deventer and his article, see Ricklefs (2001, pp. 193-4) and Legge (1977, pp. 96-7).  
6 In concluding her review of the wide variety of opinions expressed in regard to the ‘native ‘other’’, Gouda 
writes with more than a hint of irony: ‘The evolutionary trajectory that primitive Indonesian people in the 
colonies needed to follow in the future in their valiant attempts to achieve full-fledged maturity and 
independence, was exactly the route that Dutch men and women had followed before, both individually and 




evolutionary development that indigenous people must go through in order to achieve a 
higher level of civilisation’ (van Eerde, 1928, p. 54 in Gouda, 1995, p. 39). Similarly, 
Dutch Prime Minister Hendrik Colijn, when replying to the Soetardjo petition for self-
government in 1937, could claim that it was for the sake of Indonesian people themselves 
that Dutch colonial authority should persist in its efforts to guide the native population on 
their journey towards intellectual adulthood (Gouda, 1995, p. 63).  
 
After 1901, the state greatly expanded its programs aimed at improving the welfare of the 
indigenous population.7 The programs that absorbed the bulk of the resources and energy 
of the colonial administration were education, irrigation and emigration8 and, although 
not receiving the same level of financial support, there was a tenfold spending increase on 
health (Ricklefs, 2001, pp. 194,198). Despite these reforms, most assessments of the 
outcomes of the period are scathing. W.F. Wertheim and The Siauw Giap highlight the 
failure of the ethical policy to achieve its lofty ideals due to its limited scope, the 
reformers’ inability to assess the needs of the indigenous population, and the stultifying 
social stratification of colonial society by race (1962, pp. 224-30). Others have been more 
acerbic in their assessment, seeing it as a token gesture aimed more at alleviating the 
consciences of the colonisers than achieving real change amongst the indigenous 
population (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 205).  
 
Although the ethical period did not bring meaningful reforms, a new appreciation of 
culture emerged within colonial administration, as is evident in Gouda’s research. Her 
book, Dutch Culture Overseas (1995), provides a broad appraisal of life and governance 
in the Dutch East Indies in the twentieth century. The primary relevance of her work for 
this chapter is her examination of how the Dutch colonial state conceived and managed 
culture. Gouda’s work assists in locating Dutch colonial administration as a version of 
liberal colonial governance and to explain why culture becomes more prominent as an 
area of policy during this period.  
 
The method through which the Netherlands pursued colonial administration was a point 
of Dutch national pride. As a minor player in Europe, the Dutch felt that they could not 
                                                 
7 Harry Benda writes: ‘The last four decades of Dutch rule in Indonesia are seemingly dominated by the 
constant theme of reform’ (1966, p. 591).  
8 The goals of emigration were to alleviate the overcrowding on Java and simultaneously provide labour for 




and should not rule with brute force. Instead, many Dutch colonial administrators ‘saw 
their primary role as one of governing their districts with more anthropological learning, 
greater cultural sensitivity, and better political skills than any other imperial power in 
Asia’ (Gouda, 1995, p. 41). Cultural knowledge was an element of Dutch colonial 
governance as it provided a resource for ‘skilled’ government. Gouda writes:  
Since the late nineteenth century, Dutch colonial governance revealed a 
remarkable symmetry between the desire for knowledge and the desire for power. 
... In other words, adat scholarship in colonial Indonesia, which had become 
deeply entrenched by the 1920s, was unequivocally beholden to the logic of 
colonial rule. (1995, p. 43)  
The Indies state, which had shown relatively little interest in cultural research before the 
ethical period, ‘embraced its role as a faithful sponsor’ of cultural research, in the process 
reconstructing what was previously considered ‘esoteric wisdom’ or the ‘whimsical 
hobby’ of oddballs into ‘a tool that was essential to the pursuit of a truly ‘enlightened’ 
colonial administration’ (1995, p. 225).  
 
Adat was defined in the Encyclopaedia of the Dutch East Indies as ‘customs and practices 
that guide every aspect of indigenous life: social relations, agriculture, treatment of the 
sick, judicial arrangements, ancestor worship, burial of the dead, games and popular 
entertainment, etc’ (Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indië, 1917, pp. 6, in Gouda, 
1995). Adat research furnished the colonial state with discrete categories and knowledge 
that it put to use within its administration. Nineteen or twenty different adat regions were 
charted based on ethnographic research (Gouda, 1995, p. 52). Gouda writes in relation to 
the legal field that:  
the task of Dutch adat law experts was to enumerate and index the data on each 
separate realm of customary law. This would lead to the construction of an overall 
taxonomy that might enable European civil servants and their native retainers to 
employ the kind of judicial reasoning that fostered, as much as possible, due 
process of law across the enormous expanse of the archipelago. (1995, p. 57) 
Good colonial government was to lean on knowledge of the practices and processes of 
the native populations.  
 
Adat scholarship’s entry into colonial administration allowed the colonial state to 
reformulate its task in line with its new ‘ethical’ commitment. The Dutch saw their task 
as nurturing ‘the organic development of indigenous people in order to enable them to 




where local customs and traditions were to be overwritten by a British model of civil 
society, the ‘unofficial spokesperson’ for Dutch colonialism (1995, p. 40), Arnold De Kat 
Angelino, writes that the Dutch had to respect the ‘organic diversity’ of Indonesians’ 
lives and ‘orchestrate the proper role of all the individual organisms that compose the 
whole’ in order to oversee the ‘right functions, the right organs, the right ligaments’ (de 
Kat Angelino, 1931, p. 464). A central concept of the Dutch form of colonial 
management was cultural synthesis that Gouda writes ‘entailed a happy marriage between 
the systematic, and above all, sensitive insights of European civil servants and pristine 
Indonesian customs and institutions that had organically grown over time and would 
continue to do so under Dutch tutelage’ (1995, p. 51).9  
 
Dutch colonial governance during the ethical period did not aim to reshape Indonesian 
society but to guide natural ‘organic’ cultural processes towards their evolution and in 
doing so oversee the improvement of the indigenous populations. From this perspective, 
the emergence of culture in policy at this time was a product of the governmentalisation 
of the state in a colonial location. Culture was being brought within the broad 
custodianship of the state and became, as noted by Tom Boellstorff, an ongoing spatial 
organising principle of the state in Indonesia (Boellstorff, 2002, pp. 26-30). Indigenous 
Indonesians fared poorly within the cultural taxonomy that supported the continuation of 
Dutch rule. They were categorised as lacking the capacities for full participation in 
colonial society and the rights of full citizenship10 and the ‘organic process’ that was to 
result in a stage of maturation suitable for Indies autonomy was going to take, according 
to Governor-General de Jonge in 1936, another 300 years.11 In addition to legitimising 
colonial rule, the pluralism of the cultural categories also supported the ‘divide and rule’ 
                                                 
9 Benda too comments on the ‘modernising’ Dutch model that underlay the basis of reforms until the late 
1920s (1966, p. 601). He also observes that the reforms of the 1930s aimed to reverse this trend through 
two moves. Firstly, a form of indirect rule that was based on ethnic groupings was to replace territorial 
groupings and, secondly, the position of the regional Dutch administration was strengthened without 
providing any education or opportunities to indigenous rulers or civil servants (1966, pp. 601-3). Despite 
these changes, both sets of reforms were evolutionary and utilised cultural taxonomies. The difference was 
that the former aimed to modernise more quickly along a Western model while the latter took a much more 
conservative approach that emphasised continued Dutch control and a slower pace of change.  
10 On the position of the indigenous Indonesian in colonial discourse, see Gouda (1995, pp. 118-193; 1998) 
and Stoler (1996).  
11 De Jonge, a conservative who was opposed to Indies autonomy, said this in an interview with the North 
Sumatran daily Deli Courant. The quote has been reproduced in Benda (1966, pp. 590-1,fn8). See Gouda 
(1995, p. 25) for a longer discussion of de Jonge’s attitude to colonial governance. The Royal Decree of 16 
November 1938 in reply to the Soetardjo petition for self-government held that ‘maturation’ to the stage of 




tactics of the Dutch state in the face of the threat of unified opposition from either 
nationalist or Islamic groups (Boellstorff, 2002, pp. 27-30; Gouda, 1995, pp. 53-6,62-3).  
 
The use of cultural knowledges within colonial governance should not be understood as 
an isolated event, but as an element of a broader change in governmental techniques. Ann 
Stoler’s research explores how technologies of race and class developed in Europe and its 
colonial empires informed the taxonomies that underlay the emergence of new techniques 
of government in Europe (1995b). Stoler argues that a racial taxonomy was used to 
differentiate populations in order to define the internal and external boundaries of the 
nation and to link individual morals and behaviours with national strength within liberal 
rationalities of government (1995, pp. 95-136).12 For instance, although 1848 marks the 
beginning of the Dutch liberal-parliamentary state ‘identified with philanthropic 
bourgeois interventions to uplift the home environments of the domestic working class,’ 
it also was the year where racial dualism was enshrined in legislation in the East-Indies 
(1995b, p. 120). Thus, while race tended to unify populations in Europe and led to greater 
inclusion in social programs, it further stratified the East Indies.13 Although the ethical 
policy introduced programs that targeted indigenous Indonesians, racial stratification still 
both divided European from indigenous Indonesian cultural programs and underlay the 
‘civilising’ function of the programs themselves.  
 
Cultural Policy for Europeans 
It was no coincidence that cultural policy began at a time when bourgeois states were 
increasingly attempting to alter the attitudes and behaviours of its citizens. Tony Bennett, 
in a study of museums in England, observes:  
In the nineteenth century... the most ardent advocates of public museums, free 
libraries and the like typically spoke of them in connection with courts, prisons, 
poorhouses and, more mundanely, the provision of public sanitation and fresh 
water. Public cultural institutions equated with educational and sanitary programs. 
For [early museum advocate William Stanley] Jevons, free libraries were merely 
one among many engines ‘for operating upon the poorer portions of the 
population.’ (1998, p. 109) 
                                                 
12 Many authors have noted how the colonies were used as social laboratories for developing technologies 
of government and scientific knowledges before being imported back to the metropole. See Gouda (2000, 
pp. 37-46) and Rabinow (1989).  
13 See also C. Fasseur’s study of racial classification in the Netherlands Indies in the twentieth century that 




The English state sponsored a capillary system of cultural diffusion because of the belief 
that exposure to bourgeois culture would alter the behaviour of the working class, 
creating more refined social conduct (1998, p. 124). Cultural institutions were viewed as 
necessary concomitants to sanitation and education initially because of the cultural 
object’s assumed near-mystical power to transform through its aesthetic properties (1998, 
pp. 107-34), but later because of its educative value if framed correctly within the context 
of a well-run cultural institution (1998, pp. 135-64).14  
 
Hierarchies of race became more important to cultural institutions with the growth of the 
natural sciences in the last twenty to thirty years of the nineteenth century. The natural 
science collections, including emerging disciplines such as ethnology, anthropology, 
geology and archaeology, provided the state with a pedagogical tool structured around 
Darwinian notions of evolution (Bennett, 1998, pp. 135-64), with broad similarities to the 
cultural taxonomies in the Dutch East Indies. The importance of Darwin for museum 
practice was that it placed the visitor on an evolutionary scale that advocated a slow 
process of change regulated by the visitor themselves. In the same manner that 
evolutionary succession ordered displays, liberal governmentality asked its citizens for an 
ordered development (Bennett, 1998, pp. 155-64). The museum, Bennett argues, was 
more than a tool for justifying the dominance of white Europeans in the colonies and 
policing racial, gender and class hierarchies within the nation. It also was an important 
pedagogical apparatus that made use of race, class and gender discourses to shape 
European citizenries (Bennett, 1998, pp. 153-4).  
 
In the East Indies, institutions were either established for Europeans or for indigenous 
Indonesians, often with very different purposes. A notable example of the trajectory of 
European cultural policy was one of Asia’s earliest museum, established in Batavia in 
1778 (Taylor, 1995, p. 106).15 Paul Michael Taylor says of the museum:  
Still, the collecting institution and its spectatorship were European, as was the 
scientific method which upheld the collecting tradition and was celebrated by the 
                                                 
14 For a more extended discussion of the linkages between the birth of the museum and the growth of 
governmentality, see Bennett (1995, pp. 17-58).  
15 The birth of the Indonesian National Museum is tied to the history of Dutch scholarship on Indonesia. 
Debates within the Dutch Society of the Sciences (Hollandsche Maatschappij der Wetenschappen, est. 
1752) over the establishment of a colonial branch in Batavia led to the founding of an independent 
scientific organisation called the Batavia Society for Arts and Sciences (Bataviaasch Genootschap van 
Kunsten en Wetenschappen), whose beginning marks the start of the museum and whose collection later 




museum. Thus museums summarized and reinforced Europeans’ sense of having 
a hierarchically more advanced culture, even in the guise of celebrating the 
cultures of other peoples whose objects were assembled. (1995, p. 106) 
A museum thus existed for Europeans in Indonesia since the end of the eighteenth 
century. However, European cultural activities and institutions experienced their biggest 
expansion only after 1900 (Furnivall, 1967, pp. 415-8). The colonial state began to invest 
much more heavily in archaeology at the same time and established a Commission of 
Antiquities (Oudheidkundige Commissie) in 1901 and paid for Borobudur to be restored 
between 1907 and 1911 (Anderson, 1991, pp. 179-80). An example of the simultaneous 
growth of non-government activities was the Culture Circles (Kunstkringen). The first 
was established in 1901 in Batavia and soon other Culture Circles were established in 
cities and towns where there was a Dutch presence. By 1930, the Culture Circles had a 
combined membership of ten thousand and promoted concerts by famous European 
musicians and exhibitions of European pictures, patronised indigenous arts and promoted 
theatre and cinema (Furnivall, 1967, pp. 416-7). Access to cultural activities and 
institutions was both a felt need of Europeans and a goal of the state. Not only did culture 
reinforce the Europeans’ superiority and right to rule Indonesia as indicated by Taylor, 
but it also was used to inculcate and reinforce the lessons and boundaries of European 
citizenship, which may have been its most important function.  
 
Cultural Policy for Indonesians 
A prime example of the different trajectory followed by cultural institutions for 
indigenous Indonesians is the government printing house Balai Pustaka. Balai Pustaka 
has its origins in a committee that was established in 1908 to study the problems of 
popular reading (Commissie voor de Volkslectuur) which became the Office for Popular 
Literature (Kantor voor de Volkslectuur) in 1917. In 1920, it acquired its own printing 
house specialising in book printing and binding. Balai Pustaka was the product of two 
trends within Dutch colonial administration. Firstly, it was part of a long-term goal of the 
standardisation of the local languages and, in particular, Malay in order to assist in the 
efficient and effective administration of the Indies colonies (Maier, 1993, p. 49). 
Secondly, its creation was an expression of the ethical policy’s attention to social welfare 
in that it was trying to alter the behaviours and attributes of the indigenous population 
through engagement with literature (Furnivall, 1967, p. 422; Ricklefs, 2001, p. 233).16 
                                                 
16 Furnivall summarises the basis for the decision as ‘it was realised that little would be gained by teaching 




This goal is confirmed by an entry about literature in the Netherlands Indies 
Encyclopaedia of 1917, which stated that the government was aware ‘that the ability to 
read could bring about all kinds of unwelcome results except in the case that there would 
be taken care of providing good and inexpensive materials’ (‘Volkslectuur,’ 1917, in 
Kimmen, 1981, pp. 88-9). Balai Pustaka was, in other words, an instrument through 
which the state attempted to assert a measure of control over the cultural development of 
its indigenous subjects where it considered the market inadequate (Kimmen, 1981, p. 89). 
It is the policies surrounding the latter goal that I am interested in here.  
 
Balai Pustaka published three kinds of books: children’s books, practical books (about, 
for instance, cooking, planting and animal breeding), and adult literature (Kimmen, 1981, 
pp. 34-5). Within its literary publications for adult readers, Merle Ricklefs asserts that 
Balai Pustaka had three tasks: the publication of older classical works in regional 
languages; translations and adaptations of Western literature into Malay; and publication 
of new Malay language literature (2001, p. 232). However, Balai Pustaka’s first Director, 
Douwe Adolf Rinkes, planned to publish periodicals ‘in a number of Indonesian 
languages’ and Balai Pustaka’s popular almanac, which sold 100 000 copies, was 
published in four languages: Javanese, Malay, Sundanese and Madurese (Drewes, 1961, 
pp. 423,433). Newspapers and magazines were also published in Malay, Javanese and 
Sundanese on a weekly, bi-weekly or monthly basis (Drewes, 1961, p. 433).  
 
The Office for Popular Literature greatly assisted the circulation of Balai Pustaka books. 
The primary form of circulation was the creation of libraries in Second Class schools.17 
By 1914, there were 680 libraries, 1618 in 1920 and 2528 in 1930 (Furnivall, 1967, p. 
422).18 Local agents were appointed for book sales where demand indicated buyers may 
be found. However, the agents did not last long, owing to the small size of the market. 
Instead, the state sent out book motor vans to aid sales and distribution. Balai Pustaka 
had a remarkable circulation given the low literacy rates. In 1920, for instance, 100 000 
books were sold and one million borrowings recorded (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 233).  
                                                 
17 Second Class schools were for indigenous children and used Malay instead of Dutch or local languages. 
They were generally attended by the children of middle and lower level bureaucrats and other wealthier 
families.  




Balai Pustaka was established because of a perceived shortcoming in the literature being 
produced in the Indies for its indigenous inhabitants in the eyes of the Dutch 
administrators. According to Rinkes, Balai Pustaka was to provide reading materials that 
would ‘satisfy the people’s desire to read and advance their knowledge, as much as and 
according to contemporary standards of order. In doing so, all things which could damage 
Government power and state security must be purged.’ Rinkes lists another of Balai 
Pustaka’s functions as preventing ‘undesirable consequences that may destroy law and 
order’ due to ‘dangerous reading matter from booksellers whose intentions were less than 
pure and by persons who wished to stir up feelings’ (Rinkes, 1923, p. 13, in Tickell, 
1982). Balai Pustaka’s editorial policies corroborate Rinkes’s comments. Balai Pustaka 
would not publish books with clearly religious overtones since it took a neutral stance on 
religion; it would not publish works that contained political views contrary to the 
government; and it would not publish any ‘immoral’ literature (Teeuw, 1967, p. 14). The 
pre-Balai Pustaka literature criticised by Rinkes above is now known as bacaan liar 
(literally, ‘uncontrolled readings’). Bacaan liar is characterised by a degree of 
independence from state control in both its form and content. In many cases, the material 
was ‘unashamedly political’, linked directly to nationalist movements and written by 
politically active figures (Tickell, 1982, p. 11).  
 
The operation of strategic normativity mentioned earlier in this chapter can be identified 
in the strategic splitting between bacaan liar and Balai Pustaka literature inherent in 
Rinkes’s comments and Balai Pustaka’s editorial policies. Political writing was labelled 
‘subversive’ and not considered good literature. Paul Tickell writes: ‘In the eyes of Balai 
Pustaka, literary meant apolitical. Political meant bacaan liar and was to be eliminated as 
‘sub-standard’’ (1982, p. 195). Of course, the hierarchical relations between the two 
forms of reading materials constructed by Balai Pustaka (listed in table 2.1) were closely 
related to the colonial state’s cultural management of its indigenous population. The state 
 
Table 2.1: The Strategic Splitting of Balai Pustaka and Bacaan Liar Publications.  
Balai Pustaka Bacaan Liar 
Apolitical Political 
Moral Immoral 




was marking out for reform those attitudes and behaviours that it considered obstructed 
its goals for the improvement of its indigenous subjects.  
 
Paul Tickell’s research about Balai Pustaka provides a number of insights into the 
institution’s practices, in particular its editorial policies. While Tickell’s argument is 
centred around the formation of the Indonesian literary canon, his account of the changes 
made to Balai Pustaka novels, such as Salah Asuhan (Muis, 1928), provides an 
illustration of Balai Pustaka’s reforming function. The original draft of Salah Asuhan, 
submitted by author and active nationalist Abdul Muis, was judged to offend ‘the moral 
and political sensibilities’ of the Balai Pustaka editors (1982, p. 196). The major cause of 
offence was the depiction of a major female character, a Dutch woman, who was in the 
original novel ‘morally suspect, the cause of a marriage breakdown, greedy, rapacious 
and ultimately [depicted] as a prostitute’ (1982, p. 197).19 In the rewritten version, the 
Dutch woman becomes half-French, half-Indonesian and the cause of the marriage 
breakdown is shifted to a male Indonesian character and his betrayal of tradition (1982, 
pp.197-8). Other novels were rejected for moral reasons, such as Armijn Pane’s Belenggu 
due to its depiction of adultery. Suwarsih Djojopuspito’s original Sundanese language 
manuscript for Buiten het Gareel, identified by some commentators as the pre-eminent 
novel of the period (Teeuw, 1967, p. 64), was originally rejected because of it contained 
too little instruction and was not written in a simple enough style (Foulcher, 1993b, p. 
225). Since Balai Pustaka had a near monopoly over defining what was serious literature, 
subjects and attitudes labelled immoral and politically subversive by the colonial state 
were labelled inappropriate for serious literature and manuscripts including such subjects 
and attitudes were more difficult to get published and suffered from a lower circulation.  
 
As a form of cultural management, Balai Pustaka had a substantial impact on Malay-
language literature. The higher quality, subsidised price and extensive circulation of Balai 
Pustaka materials effectively wiped out bacaan liar publications by the end of the 1920s 
(Tickell, 1982, pp. 16,17). A second effect of the cultural strategies used in Balai Pustaka 
was the establishment of new aesthetic standards that identified literature with apolitical 
writing. Tickell writes:  
                                                 
19 The position of white women and children was of great concern during the colonial period due to the 




Balai Pustaka never expressed its role in direct political terms, viz, the 
elimination of politically partisan oppositional literature, although it did see itself 
as ‘improving’ the standards of publishing and literature. The standards that it 
used were however loaded – excluding the politically motivated, anything that 
may have been construed as anti-Dutch, labelling all but officially published 
material as bacaan liar and its publishers as those ‘with impure intentions.’ (1982, 
p. 196) 
New forms of literature which did not conform to the standards, such as the commercial 
popular fiction, roman picisan, were dismissed as ‘popular’ (Tickell, 1982, pp. 17-18) 
and therefore substandard. The aesthetic standards established by Balai Pustaka have had 
long and ongoing effects on literary criticism (Tickell, 1982, pp. 28-53) that fed into later 
Indonesian literary debates (Foulcher, 1993b).20  
 
In the 1920s and 1930s the Dutch began to move away from the ethical policy and turned 
towards cultural relativism and racial determinism (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 231). Changes in 
the administration’s policies were reflected in Balai Pustaka which became more 
conservative and less tolerant (Tickell, 1982, pp. 195-201). The social changes that had 
been kicked off by the ethical policy had assumed by the 1930s a degree of independence 
from the Dutch state. Harry Benda writes:  
The progressive abandonment of the Ethical Policy was primarily caused by the 
fact that political and administrative reforms, Western education and welfare 
legislation, however well intended they had been, had combined in unloosing a 
whirlwind of unexpected and highly perturbing repercussions which seemed to 
threaten the very foundations of colonial society. The tides of change, in other 
words, were running faster than ever before, but they were to all intents and 
purposes spilling over the banks chartered by the proponents of the Ethical Policy. 
(1958, p. 36) 
It is to nationalism, that ‘unexpected and highly perturbing repercussion’, that I now turn.  
 
3. The Rise of Nationalism  
Nationalists had a complex relationship to the emerging European ideas about 
government, traditional power structures and the colonial state. They accepted and 
rejected elements of colonial governance and local practices and many different 
nationalisms developed across the first half of the twentieth century. A key factor in the 
growth of the nationalist movement was the Westernised education provided by the 
                                                 
20 It should also be noted that Balai Pustaka was not without its critics. Armijn Pane, an author and 
Sanusi’s brother, had criticised Balai Pustaka for assuming that the Indonesian reading public were devoid 




ethical policies of the colonial government. Almost all of the nationalists had received 
such an education (see van Niel, 1960, pp. 47-100). Nationalist organisations began to 
grow after the formation of Budi Utomo in 1908 and proliferated in the first half of the 
twentieth century, often in the face of repression by the colonial state.21 In the second half 
of the 1920s young nationalists from different regions and ethnicities formed a number of 
study clubs in educational institutions in Java. At a conference in 1928 they took the 
‘Youth Pledge’ to three ideals: ‘one Fatherland, Indonesia; one nation, Indonesia; and one 
language, Bahasa Indonesia, the language of unity’ (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 233). However, 
Dutch repression soon followed, and the nationalist movement was effectively out-
manoeuvred by the Dutch throughout the thirties despite growing nationalist sentiment.  
 
Two key groups of young nationalists exerted a large influence over Indonesian politics 
and policy after 1927. Sukarno emerged as a broad-based nationalist leader, advocating a 
position that enveloped aspects of Islam, Marxism and nationalism. The alternative was 
the more Westernised socialist-nationalist leaders (Hatta, Sutan Sjahrir, Ali 
Sastroamidjojo, Sukiman Wirjosandjojo) with international (mainly Dutch) educations 
who favoured a strategy of cadre formation. Both groups favoured political resistance 
against Dutch colonial rule to cooperative methods (Ricklefs, 2001, pp. 206-226). 
However, in the face of the arrest or exile of the more radical leaders and growing Dutch 
repression of political activities and politically active organisations, the nationalist 
movement increasingly came under the leadership of moderates who favoured dialogue 
with the Dutch in order to achieve independence through the existing political institutions 
(Ricklefs, 2001, p. 240).  
 
Cultural Debates amongst the Nationalists in the 1930s 
In the early 1930s, a group of Western-educated Indonesian intellectuals began an 
attempt to articulate a cultural counterpart to the nationalist political movement 
(Foulcher, 1980, p. 1). The primary forum for nationalist Indonesian discussion of culture 
was the literature journal Pujangga Baru, which began through a collaboration between 
the editor of a literary column in the Balai Pustaka Malay language publication, Panji 
                                                 





Pustaka, Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana, and the author and poet, Armijn Pane.22 The 
emergence of the journal elicited some criticism from amongst the political nationalists 
who were at the time committed to a non-cooperative, politically radical nationalist 
vision. They questioned the journal’s links with Balai Pustaka and the importance of a 
literary journal’s contribution to Indonesian awareness (Foulcher, 1980, pp. 13-5). The 
linkages between the group defined by Heather Sutherland as the ‘cultural nationalists’ 
(1968, p. 116) and the political movement became much closer over the course of the 
1930s due to changes in both the nationalist movement and Pujangga Baru. The colonial 
state, while increasing its repression of political activities, left cultural avenues of 
nationalist expression open and Pujangga Baru was redefined by its editors to be located 
within this space (Foulcher, 1980, pp. 15,21-2).  
 
Pujangga Baru was central to the debates about defining Indonesian culture, referred to 
by Claire Holt as ‘The Great Debate’, (1967, pp. 211-54) conducted by Indonesian 
intellectuals from the mid 1930s until 1942. Pujangga Baru’s initial volume was 
orientated towards literary criticism. Keith Foulcher, in his monograph on Pujangga 
Baru, identifies a change in its editorial policy at the beginning of its second volume in 
May 1934 to include ‘widely based social and cultural issues’ (1980, p. 19). This change 
was confirmed in 1935 at the start of its third volume, when the editorial described 
Pujangga Baru’s aims as the ‘formation, organisation and promotion of a new culture, 
the culture of unity’ (‘Tahun yang Ketiga,’ 1935, in Foulcher, 1980, p. 20). The political 
and cultural nationalist movements thus coalesced in their focus on Indonesian culture 
and led to a situation where Pujangga Baru ‘dominated the intellectual world’ 
(Sutherland, 1968, p. 127) of Indonesia from 1935 until the Japanese invasion in 1942.23  
 
The background of the cultural nationalists has a large degree of similarity as can be 
demonstrated by an examination of the main contributors to Pujangga Baru. Virtually all 
of the main contributors were Dutch-educated, had undergone the consciousness-
                                                 
22 For a detailed account of the beginnings of Pujangga Baru (and by extension the cultural nationalists) 
and biographies of its founders, see Foulcher (1980, pp. 1-15) and Sutherland (1968).  
23 While Pujangga Baru and the cultural debates that took place in its pages were the most high-profile and 
prominent of the time, it should be noted that artists in other fields such as painting (in particular the 
Persagi artists, see Sudarmaji, 1990) and theatre (Brown, 2001, pp. 79-98) were also involved with the 
nationalist movement and developed their own perspectives regarding Indonesian culture. The Pujangga 
Baru writers were also particularly prominent in the cultural institutions of the Japanese occupying 




transforming ‘bureaucratic pilgrimage’ of that system, which Anderson identifies as 
central to the nationalist movements of the late colonial period (1991, pp. 114,121-4), and 
used Dutch as their main means of communicating with Indonesians from other ethnic 
groups.24 The ethnic spread of the Pujangga Baru writers reflects the Sumatrans’ greater 
familiarity with Malay and therefore the Indonesian language they were trying to 
develop. Of the twenty-five major contributors, sixteen were Sumatran, three Javanese 
and six from other ethnicities. However, the ethnic differences were minimised by a 
central similarity, summarised by Sutherland as ‘the modernising impact of Dutch 
colonialism in the twentieth century and resultant rise of a Western educated urban 
intelligentsia, to which they belonged’ (1968, p. 110).  
 
Cultural Policy and a Cultural Polemic 
The ‘Great Debate’, despite its singular connotation, was actually a series of exchanges 
between different authors over a range of issues related to the formation of a national 
culture. It gained full momentum in 1935, which saw the first of a series of cultural 
polemics, some of which are collected together in Achdiat Mihardja’s Polemik 
Kebudayaan (1998).25 These debates, much like the literature produced by the cultural 
nationalists, suffered from the limitations of their authors’ background and confidence. 
Foulcher, for instance, characterises the debates as ‘a series of assertions and counter-
assertions of nationalist pride and self-confidence’ (1980, p. 25) rather than an attempt to 
build concrete solutions for cultural problems. Despite their limitations, the debates are 
still an important historical moment for discussions of Indonesian identity and culture. 
Most analysis of the cultural debates, despite their broad scope, has focussed on their 
relationship to the development of Indonesian literature (Foulcher, 1980; Teeuw, 1967, 
pp. 28-46).26 Below I analyse the initial cultural polemic, republished in Polemik 
Kebudayaan (1998, pp. 1-28), from a cultural policy perspective.  
 
The initial cultural polemic began as an exchange between Alisjahbana and Sanusi Pane, 
two of the most prominent cultural nationalists and most active participants in the cultural 
debates. This first exchange has been the most reviewed (Foulcher, 1980, pp. 20-1,24; 
                                                 
24 The biographical information on the Pujangga Baru writers is taken from Sutherland (1968, pp. 109-10).  
25 First published in either 1948 or 1949.  
26 An exception is the article by Sutherland (1968) titled ‘Pudjangga Baru: Aspects of Indonesian 




Teeuw, 1967, pp. 35-7), and the positions taken by both authors do not greatly alter 
throughout the period. As such, this exchange has become representative of the debates 
and is an excellent place to analyse how culture was being used by cultural nationalists. 
Alisjahbana was the dominant personality within Pujangga Baru. Born in North Sumatra, 
Alisjahbana was educated at a Dutch language elementary school at Bengkulu, primary 
teacher’s school in Bukittinggi, and teacher’s training college at Bandung. He then 
moved to Batavia to work for a headmaster’s certificate and began working for Balai 
Pustaka, first as the editor of the magazine Pandji Pustaka, later as a literary editor and 
author. Sanusi Pane was also a Batak from North Sumatra. After graduating from a Dutch 
language elementary school at Bengkulu, Sanusi studied between 1922 and 1927 at the 
Gunung Sari Teacher’s Training College which was run by the Theosophical Society. In 
1929 he travelled to India on a trip that greatly influenced his opinions and writings 
(Foulcher, 1980, p. 89, fn. 79).  
 
Alisjahbana began the first cultural polemic with an article entitled ‘Towards a New 
Society and Culture’ (‘Menuju Masyarakat dan Kebudayaan Baru’) published in 
Pujangga Baru in August 1935 (1998). In the article, Alisjahbana identified his purpose 
as ‘cleaning-up’ understandings about ‘Indonesianness’.27 He argued that Indonesianness 
was a product of the twentieth century that should be differentiated from the cultures that 
preceded it, which he labelled ‘pre-Indonesian’.28 The dynamic and unifying spirit of 
Indonesianness was a result of interaction with the West and represented a new stage in 
the development of the region, much like the coming of Indian and Arabic cultures to the 
archipelago in the previous centuries. However, Alisjahbana argued that Indonesia should 
look to the ‘dynamic’ (1998, p. 7) culture of the West as a model and opposed attempts to 
link Indonesia to ‘pre-Indonesian’ cultures which he viewed as impeding cultural 
development (1998, p. 10).29  
 
Sanusi was one of the first to respond to Alisjahbana’s theory. In an article entitled 
‘Indonesian unity’ (Persatuan Indonesia) published in the newspaper Suara Umum on 4 
September 1935,30 Sanusi voiced his opposition to Alisjahbana’s division between 
                                                 
27 ‘Keindonesiaan’ (1998, p. 4).  
28 ‘Prae-Indonesia’ (1998, p. 5).  
29 Alisjahbana’s model does allow some elements of local cultures to become ‘assimilated’ into Indonesian 
culture, but only after careful consideration that those elements are not linked to impediments to cultural 
development (1998, p. 10).  




Indonesian and pre-Indonesian cultures, instead positing that the future was dependent on 
the past. Moreover, Sanusi held that common Indonesian cultural characteristics had 
existed in art and adat before Indonesians had developed a consciousness of their shared 
identity and, in fact, there was a shared basis for all of the different local cultures (1998, 
p. 17). Sanusi also opposed Takdir’s promotion of Western culture over all other cultures. 
Sanusi rejected the materialism, individualism and intellectualism of the West which, in 
his opinion, privileged the material over the spiritual and subjugated nature (1998, p. 15-
17). In contrast to the West, Eastern culture was at one with nature and nurtured the spirit. 
Sanusi argued that ideally the material and the spiritual should be combined, placing the 
East and West on equal terms in the development of an Indonesian culture. The two 
positions were followed by another article by Alisjahbana and a reply by Sanusi, where 
both confirm their initial positions (Alisjahbana & Pane, 1998).  
 
In contrast to Balai Pustaka which involved the concrete use of a cultural resource, the 
cultural polemics were more idealistic and conducted at an intellectual level. As a 
consequence of the authors’ idealism, I focus my analysis on how Alisjahbana and Sanusi 
made use of an abstract idea of culture, within which can be identified a similar strategic 
normativity to that used by Balai Pustaka. Both Alisjahbana and Sanusi were articulating 
a similar agenda for the reform of Indonesians and both used a strategic splitting of 
desirable and undesirable cultural attributes. Alisjahbana’s division is the more 
straightforward of the two. He divided pre-Indonesian culture from a Westernised 
Indonesian culture. Indonesian culture, as set out in Table 2.2, is dynamic, free to change, 
modern and is the result of a people united. Pre-Indonesian culture, on the other hand, is 
represented as static, chained by tradition, traditional and was the result of a people 
divided. In the emotional closing sections of the article, Alisjahbana urged his readers to 
take up his vision of Indonesia and leave behind the traits he associates with pre-
Indonesian culture.  
 









Sanusi’s split was more complicated because his model was articulated against the 
Alisjahbana model with its simple splitting of past and future. Instead, he identified the 
past with healthy Eastern spirituality and divided Western influence into desirable 
material attributes and undesirable spiritual attributes. He then began to articulate his 
preferred model, which was a mixture of the desirable attributes of his characterisations 
of Eastern and Western culture, while rejecting the attributes he labelled undesirable. 
Sanusi characterised his model as a mixture of Faust representing the West and Arjuna 
representing the East:  
The perfect direction would be to unify Faust with Arjuna, fusing materialism, 
intellectualism and individualism with spiritualism, feeling and collectivism. 
(1998, p. 17) 
Haluan yang sempurna ialah menyatukan Faust dengan Arjuna memesrakan 
materialisme, intellectualisme, dan individualisme dengan spiritualisme, 
perasaan dan collectivisme.  
Sanusi held that Indonesian culture should be drawn from as broad a basis as possible 
including Western cultures. His division was thus between a balanced mixing of Eastern 
and Western culture which he contrasted to one-sided cultural models that privilege either 
East or West. Sanusi argued that Indonesia had always possessed an underlying cultural 
unity and that pursuing ‘provincialism’ that would only draw from earlier regional 
cultures would be to limit the development of Indonesian culture.  
 
Table 2.3: Sanusi Pane’s Divisions between a Balanced East-West Culture and Either Eastern or 
Western Culture  
Balanced East-West East West 
Harmony Harmony Competition 
One with Nature One with Nature Subjugates Nature 
Technology Undeveloped Technology 
Science Undeveloped Science 
Economy Undeveloped Economy 
Spiritual and Material Spiritual Material 
 
Both Alisjahbana and Sanusi’s cultural models can be read as reformist programs. Due to 
their political persuasion, they shared the desire to spread the nationalist spirit amongst 
Indonesians. Both the cultural models they promoted encouraged Indonesians to put aside 
regional divisions and unite behind a progressive vision of an emerging Indonesia. Both 




elements of an outmoded past, or, in Sanusi’s model, as part of an undesirable future. 
They were not describing the cultural attributes that were there as much as they were 
outlining which cultural attributes Indonesians should strive to produce and which they 
should avoid. In other words, they were grappling over the shape of a normative 
definition of Indonesian culture that Indonesians would journey towards.  
 
The abstract civilising function attributed to culture in the exchange between Alisjahbana 
and Sanusi Pane was only supported by a few concrete courses of action. For instance, 
Alisjahbana attempted in his writings to ‘put into practice his theory of the role of the 
artist as a leader and guide in the process of social change’ (Foulcher, 1980, p. 26). When 
criticised for the obviously didactic themes that ran through his novel Layar Terkembang, 
Alisjahbana argued that, in a time of national construction, didacticism is an essential 
element of art (Foulcher, 1980, p. 27). Similarly, in a Pujangga Baru article in 1934, 
Alisjahbana encouraged Indonesian youths to follow the example of a Spanish youth 
movement which sent groups of wandering players out to tour villages to put on theatre 
performances for the education and entertainment of villagers (Alisjahbana, 1934). Given 
Balai Pustaka’s dominance as a publisher of serious fiction during the time of the cultural 
debates and the employment history of many of the Pujangga Baru contributors, 
including Alisjahbana, who had worked for the government publishing house, it is not 
surprising that the cultural nationalists should seek to use literature as a cultural resource 
to reform Indonesian society. The problem, from a cultural policy perspective, was that 
they lacked the means and know-how to turn their abstract ideas into concrete programs 
that reached beyond the small circle of urban Indonesian intellectuals who subscribed to 
the magazine and participated in the debates. Nevertheless, their debates demonstrate a 
similar reformist impulse to the programs of the Dutch and a similar adherence to 
culture’s civilising function, albeit at a much more abstract and idealist level.  
 
4. Colonial Cultural Policy and Nationalist Cultural Discourses Compared 
In the chapter ‘Census, Map, Museum’ in the revised edition of his book Imagined 
Communities, Anderson asserts that ‘the immediate genealogy [of the official nationalism 
in the colonised worlds of Asia and Africa] should be traced to the imaginings of the 
colonial state’ (1991, p. 163). Anderson then demonstrates how the ‘grammar’ (1991, p. 




examination of the three institutions mentioned in the chapter’s title. In Indonesia, the 
civilising function of culture was also taken from the grammar of the colonial state 
through the articulation of cultural nationalism. Culture is used by both the colonial state 
and the nationalist movement in a way, to borrow a term from Bennett, which is 
‘inescapably normative’ (1998, p. 91) and is tied to historical changes in governance in 
Indonesia.  
 
The linkages between reformist programs in Europe and the ethical reforms in the East 
Indies indicate that culture was used governmentally in the Dutch colony. Balai Pustaka 
was a product of the reformist tendencies of the ethical period and was aimed, from the 
perspective of the colonial state, at improving Indonesian publishing and literature. 
Significantly, this included the omission of political and immoral themes and attitudes. 
Literature’s civilising function was central to Balai Pustaka’s operation, as literature was 
used to improve indigenous Indonesians. Balai Pustaka illustrates how cultural policy 
operates as a form of government here through how it targets the understandings and 
behaviours of individuals in order to shape the attributes of populations, in this case 
defined as different ethnic groups or indigenous readers of Malay-language literature. 
Balai Pustaka also is an example of how the cultural policy of a liberal state can 
incorporate elements of the command culture in regards to the populations it deems 
backwards or in need of special guidance. Dutch interventions into indigenous Indonesian 
literature were far more intrusive than would have been considered appropriate for the 
literature of the European populations.  
 
It is not surprising that the cultural nationalists articulated versions of culture that 
incorporated a civilising function given their Westernised education, linkages with Balai 
Pustaka and their desire to reform Indonesian society.31 Like Balai Pustaka, the cultural 
nationalists targeted certain behaviours and attitudes as undesirable and sought to 
eliminate them through articulating models of cultural development. Balai Pustaka and 
the cultural nationalists also both targeted populations, with the essential difference not 
being their operation, but the way they defined their target population. In contrast to the 
colonial regime, the cultural nationalists viewed their audience as a modernising, national 
population slowly but surely headed towards independence. Unlike Balai Pustaka, the 
                                                 
31 Sutherland writes, ‘Pujangga Baru explored one possible type of intellectual development within the 




cultural nationalists did not have the financial or logistical support of a state, and their 
arguments remained highly abstract and theoretical, although they did acquire a much 
broader influence during the Japanese occupation. In spite of the differences in methods 
and goals, the governmental function of culture – its role as a tool to shape the attributes 
and behaviours of individuals and groups – was central to both colonial era cultural 
institutions and nationalist cultural politics. A state did not harness the mass-appeal of 
national culture until the Japanese armies arrived on Java.  
 
5. Cultural Policy during the Japanese Occupation 
Japan and the Invasion of Indonesia 
The key to understanding the policy directions of the Japanese occupying administration 
is analysis of the conditions in Japan that preceded World War II and the wartime 
imperatives felt after the Japanese had seized control. Cultural policy during the 
occupation was linked to propaganda connected with wartime goals but was also 
influenced by Japanese ideas about government which had emerged in the 1930s and 
were imported with the Japanese military bureaucrats who ran Indonesia from 1942 until 
1945.  
 
During the 1930s, the military increasingly agitated to assert more control over economic 
relations and social life (A. Gordon, 2003, pp. 182-6). The military became increasingly 
independent, and certain military factions were willing to resort to violence to achieve 
their political goals (Beasley, 1990, pp. 177-84). Although ultimately not able to gain 
complete political control in Japan, a series of violent assassinations by the Imperial Way 
faction had the effect of strengthening military and bureaucratic representation in cabinet 
at the expense of the political parties (Beasley, 1990, pp. 181-2; A. Gordon, 2003, pp. 
196-7). Greater state intervention followed, and the authorities sought to control groups, 
arrest intellectuals and activists and ban books which they deemed to propagate 
‘dangerous thoughts’ that were in conflict with its goals (Beasley, 1990, pp. 184-8). 
Following the assassination of influential minister of finance, Takahashi Korekiyo, in 
February 1936, the military successfully agitated for large increases in its budget that 
required increased taxation and direct economic controls (Nakamura, 1997, pp. 141-3). 




more areas of social and economic life to address wartime needs – a trend that continued 
until the end of World War II.32 The picture that emerges is of a state increasingly under 
the influence of the military seeking to orchestrate a smooth modernisation to meet an 
escalating war. As preparations for war intensified, theories that championed the harmony 
of state and society were increasingly adopted by the state, culminating in 1940 with the 
abolition of the labour unions and political parties and the establishment of a new non-
party body, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Bourchier, 1996, pp. 45-52). 
Confronted with pressure to withdraw from war due to commodity shortages and 
increasing economic pressure from the United States of America, as well as witnessing 
German successes in Europe, Japan signed a treaty with Germany and Italy in 1940 and 
began its invasion of Southeast Asia (Nakamura, 1997, pp. 149-50).  
 
The Japanese army invaded Indonesia on 10 January 1942, and the Netherlands Indies 
administration surrendered on 8 March 1942. Japanese occupying administrations were 
quickly put into place. The first priority of the Japanese occupiers was to meet the needs 
of the Japanese war effort. The Principles Governing the Administration of Occupied 
Southern Areas,33 adopted on 20 November 1941, had as their first objective:  
For the present, military government shall be established in occupied areas to 
restore public order, expedite acquisition of resources vital to national defence, 
and ensure the economic self-sufficiency of military personnel. (Benda, Irikura, & 
Kishi, 1965, p. 1)  
However, their methods for meeting wartime military demands differed across Indonesia 
and altered as the tide of war turned against the Japanese. Indonesia was divided into 
three administrative areas run by three distinct military entities with different policies 
towards their region’s indigenous populations. Java was administered by the Sixteenth 
Army, while the Twenty-fifth Army administered Sumatra (initially from Singapore) and 
the Navy governed the rest of the Indonesian archipelago (Reid, 1980, pp. 19,23). The 
Japanese strategy in Java was centred around mobilisation based on the nationalist 
movement, whereas the two other occupying administrations relied more on traditional 
leaders to muster support. Both the Twentieth Army and the Navy initially had little time 
for nationalist movements and placed much less emphasis on generating mass movements 
(Reid, 1980, pp. 19,23), until Japanese Premier Koiso’s declaration in 1944 that 
                                                 
32 Economic historian Takafusa Nakamura asserts that national controls would have been necessary soon 
after 1937 even if war had not broken out due to the direction of the Japanese economy (1997, p. 142).  




Indonesia would be granted independence (Ricklefs, 2001, pp. 256-7). Michael Van 
Langenberg’s study of Northern Sumatra highlights the mobilisation (particularly of 
youth) and anti-feudal sentiment that accompanied the Japanese occupation (1980). 
Although the strength of the nationalists was greater on Java, Van Langenberg’s research 
demonstrates that nationalists did mobilise in other parts of the archipelago, such as 
North Sumatra, without the same level of Japanese support.  
 
The Japanese policy for meeting wartime needs planned to utilise the existing structures 
of the societies they occupied. The Principles Governing the Administration of Occupied 
Southern Areas make this clear in its first principle:  
In the implementation of military administration, existing governmental 
organisations shall be utilised as much as possible, with due respect for past 
organisational structure and native practices. (Lebra, 1975, p. 114)  
Despite this policy, the Japanese embarked on extensive social and economic reforms in 
the pursuit of wartime goals, including taking control of the mass media and banning all 
organisations at the beginning of the occupation (Kurasawa, 1988, pp. 332-4,362; 
Ricklefs, 2001, p. 251). Shigeru Sato, in his assessment of the impact of Japanese policy 
in Indonesia, writes that in Indonesia, as in Japan, the aim of the social and economic 
intervention was ‘to construct an economic and social structure that would withstand the 
stress of war, at the same time enabling the maximum mobilisation of human and natural 
resources for the war effort’ (2003, p. 289). Sato argues that Japan undertook primarily 
‘defensive’ policies that were employed as countermeasures against wartime shortages 
(2003, p. 289). However, Aiko Kurasawa notes that the attention to rediscovering and 
reviving indigenous values, in addition to reviving indigenous pride, was also linked to 
revealing basic similarities between Indonesia and Japanese culture, indicating that the 
imperatives behind Japanese policy were a mixture of ideological reform and the 
demands of wartime (1990, p. 487). 
 
One of the features that clearly distinguished Japanese from Dutch rule was the use of 
mass mobilisation. John Legge notes that the Japanese occupiers, in the circumstances of 
the Pacific war, sought to ‘mobilise Indonesian support positively behind their regime’ 
(1977, p. 138). To do so they employed methods already employed in the mobilisation of 
Japanese society in the 1930s – constructing mass organisations with close ties to the 




rural Java, characterises Japanese rule as a combination of ‘mobilisation and control’ 
(1988, p. 16). Mobilisation refers to the exploitation of economic resources, labour and 
the cooperation of the Indonesian population, while control refers to the use of tight 
controls, including censorship and suppression of ideas deemed opposed to the war effort, 
to direct and contain mobilisation. Similarly, Japanese historian Furuya Tetsuo 
characterises the government of 1930s Japan as mobilisation and repression (1976, p. 30 
in McCormack, 1982, pp. 30-1). The period of Japanese rule in Indonesia involved a 
highly interventionist, controlling state, which contrasts with the Dutch model of ordered 
development and stability.34  
 
One consequence of mobilisation that was to have a considerable influence over future 
political events in Indonesia was its effect on Indonesian youths. A large number of 
youths underwent training in the Japanese organised youth militias, such as PETA in Java 
and the smaller Giyugun in Sumatra (Reid, 1980, pp. 27-8). The young officers of the 
youth movements, who were soon to come to prominence during the War of 
Independence, were influenced by the Japanese ideology of the period (Bourchier, 1996, 
pp. 41-71). They became an important political block in the post-independence period 
and assumed national leadership in 1966 (Crouch, 1978, pp. 21-42).  
 
Nationalism and the Pan-Asian Cultural Model 
For the occupying administration, ‘culture’ was a means through which to manage the 
population and mobilise groups and individuals to sustain Japan’s imperialist vision. The 
notion of pan-Asian identity and the formation of a bloc of Asian nations under Japanese 
leadership were central to Japanese cultural policy. The original idea for a bloc of nations 
was developed in the 1920s and 1930s and encompassed Japan, parts of China, Korea and 
Taiwan.35 By 1940, the bloc had come to encompass Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, 
and was labelled the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (Yosuke, 1975). Premier 
                                                 
34 Scholars of the Japanese occupation have generally contrasted Japanese romanticism and emphasis on 
self-sacrifice and discipline to Dutch emphasis on expertise and scientific superiority, characterised in the 
title to Reid’s well-known essay, ‘Indonesia: From Briefcase to Samurai Sword’ (1980). Another example 
is Ken’ichi (1997, p. 27). However, this has the effect of downplaying the Japanese emphasis on 
bureaucratic control and rational decision making that emerged in 1930s Japan and was transported to 
Indonesia along with the Japanese occupying administration. 
35 See Lebra (1975) for a collection of documents and analysis that indicate the development of the idea of 




Tōjō Hideki, in an address to the House of Peers in 1942, outlined some of the features of 
the body. He stated that the aim of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was: 
... to enable each country and people in Greater East Asia to have its proper place 
and demonstrate its real character, thereby securing an order of co-existence and 
co-prosperity based on ethical principles with Japan serving as its nucleus. ... The 
regions which will newly participate in this work of construction are those which, 
though they abound in various resources, have had the progress of their 
civilisation and culture greatly impeded due to the ruthless exploitation by the 
United States and Britain for the past hundred years. (1975b, p. 79) 
Tōjō’s statement demonstrates the key features of Japan’s model. It was pitched as a 
cooperative body for the mutual benefit of the nations involved, but with Japan, as the 
most progressed and mature nation, as leader and builder.36 However, Japan still justified 
its privileged position and control of other countries through presenting itself as an Asian 
‘model for modernity’ (Narangoa & Cribb, 2003, p. 8) and an already revitalised Asian 
civilisation. The underlying argument, and contradiction, of Tōjō’s speech is that 
American or British imperialism should be replaced by a form of Japanese imperialism 
that was represented as more appropriate due to a shared Asian identity.37  
 
Culture was a major justification for the existence of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere. In a conference of nations in Greater East-Asia, Tōjō addressed the underlying 
cultural similarities:  
A superior order of culture has existed in Greater East Asia from its very 
beginning. Especially the spiritual essence of the culture of Greater East Asia is 
the most sublime in the world [sic.]. It is my belief that in the wide diffusion 
throughout the world of this culture of Greater East Asia by its further cultivation 
and refinement lies the salvation of mankind from the curse of materialistic 
civilisation. (1975a, p. 91) 
The pan-Asian cultural model was spread through Japanese propaganda and was 
supported by an institutional structure throughout the occupied territories. However, the 
war often created coordination problems resulting in policy differences between 
administrative areas. These differences make it difficult to discern a unified purpose 
beyond winning the war despite the pronouncements from Tokyo (Lebra, 1975, p. x). 
However, the pan-Asian model underlay cultural policy in each of the territories and in 
the pronouncements from the centre, although there were significant regional differences 
                                                 
36 Following changes in international political discourse after 1918 that recognised the right of self-
determination of nationalities, the language of cooperation had replaced the imperialist rhetoric that had 
justified previous Japanese annexations in Asia (Stegewerns, 2003, pp. 107-10).  
37 Dick Stegewerns notes the Japanese made use of the ‘civilised man’s burden’ (2003, pp. 107-10). 




in its implementation. The following discussion will examine the pan-Asian cultural 
model’s application in Indonesia, in particular how it defined relations between 
populations and the attributes of individuals.  
 
Li Narangoa and Robert Cribb, in their analysis of Japanese discourses about Asian 
identity during the age of Japanese expansionism, write that ‘Japan ... sought ... to recruit 
their subjects’ sense of identity to the imperial cause ... by creating a variety of discourses 
about the nature of their empire’ (2003, p. 1). In the case of Indonesia, the Japanese 
replaced the Western-centred cultural-racial policy of the Dutch era with a ‘pan-Asianist 
principle of homogeneity under the slogan of Asian superiority over Europe’ (Goto, 
1997, p. 16). The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere linked Indonesia to Japan 
through the promotion of Asia as an economic and cultural group that had suffered from a 
Western imperial presence. The sphere was represented as cooperative and economically 
mutually beneficial and leading to world peace (Tojo, 1975a). Japan was positioned as a 
beneficent sponsor and leader that would assist in modernising the countries that had 
suffered from Western imperialism, such as Indonesia. Premier Tōjō’s 1942 address to 
the House of Peers included the statement:  
As regards the Netherlands East Indies ... if they continue as at present their 
attitude of resisting Japan, we will show no mercy in crushing them. But if their 
peoples come to understand Japan’s real intentions and express willingness to 
cooperate with us, we will not hesitate to extend them our help with full 
understanding for their welfare and progress. (1975b, p. 80) 
Japan was particularly keen to recruit nationalists through its support of local 
nationalisms against the Western colonial powers and to make use of nationalism’s 
popular appeal. Nationalists were made the spokespeople for Japanese programs, most 
prominently in Java, but also in Sumatra (Reid, 1980, pp. 21-2). However, there was a 
tension between the nationalist desire for complete independence and Japanese control 
(as well as exploitation of Indonesian resources and Japanese police cruelty) for the 
length of the occupation. Nationalists were closely monitored and their activities 
curtailed.  
 
The relationship between Japan, Indonesia and the West reflected the treatment of the 
three different populations within Indonesia for the duration of the war. Indonesians were 
made to bow to Japanese whenever they passed them on the street, and the Japanese 




banned, and Japanese was promoted in educational institutions and newspapers (Ricklefs, 
2001, p. 250). A primary goal of the Japanese cultural programs was to spread Japanese 
culture as an example of a mature Asian culture that had succeeded in overcoming 
Western influences. A number of Japanese cultural workers (bunkajin) were sent to the 
occupied territories for the purposes of developing Asian arts (Goodman, 1991, pp. 2-5; 
Kurasawa, 1991, pp. 39-43). The Japanese intended to intern all Europeans (except 
Germans), but were initially forced to leave out Europeans whose skills were needed to 
run vital industries (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 248). Within a year, those Europeans were also 
interned in camps with terrible conditions and high death rates.38  
 
Japanese cultural policy went beyond promoting Indonesia’s place in Greater East Asia. 
It also sought to alter the behaviours and attributes of individual Indonesians. Narangoa 
and Cribb recognise the reformist element of Japan’s policies towards other Asian 
cultures when they write, ‘the Japanese prized some aspects of other Asian cultures while 
marking other aspects for improvement or elimination’ (2003, p. 2). Kurasawa’s research 
into Japanese propaganda in Indonesia provides extensive information about its goals and 
methods. She identifies the ‘long term’ goal of Japanese propaganda as ‘mental 
indoctrination’. Japanese propaganda was aimed at ‘encouraging particular Japanese 
virtues and morals, such as piety, modesty, motherly love and diligence’ (1991, p. 61). 
Kurasawa links the goal of transforming ‘the mentality of the Indonesian people into that 
of the Japanese’ (1991, p. 61) with the goal of total mobilisation for the war effort. 
However, it could also be linked into Japan’s modernising rationale that lay behind its 
justification of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Kurasawa also observes that 
Japanese propaganda included a number of short-term goals that are more directly linked 
with mobilisation. The short term goals were more practical with more concrete aims 
focussed on immediate social-economic needs, such as recruiting Indonesian volunteers, 
promoting increased food production and entertainment (1991, pp. 61-2). The first year of 
the occupation was more oriented towards the long-term goal but this changed as wartime 
hardships multiplied and became more severe and Indonesian aversion to Japanese 
indoctrination grew (1991, pp. 62-3).  
 
                                                 




Within Indonesia, there was a number of forces working against the achievement of the 
occupying administration’s cultural policy goals. In addition to the intervention of 
pressing wartime demands that required propaganda resources, Indonesians themselves 
did not passively participate in Japanese programs or simply accept Japanese propaganda. 
Instead, they took advantage of the opportunities provided by Japanese cultural policies 
in order to achieve their own goals.  
 
The Cultural Policy Infrastructure 
Japanese cultural policy was centred on the production of wartime propaganda. 
Propaganda was an important part of the war effort and was present in all of Japan’s 
occupied territories. The propaganda models show some similarities and were broadly 
based on programs from Nazi Germany (Goodman, 1991, p. 2). However, there were 
significant differences between the different territories. The use of the nationalist 
movement in propaganda by the Sixteenth Army in Java significantly differs from the 
policies of the Twenty-fifth Army that controlled Sumatra and the Navy in Eastern 
Indonesia. Outside of Java there were few concessions to the nationalists (1991, p. 118).  
 
The key department for Japanese cultural policy in Java was Sendenbu, the Propaganda 
Department (Kurasawa, 1991, pp. 36-44). Sendenbu was established in Jakarta in August 
1942. It was composed of three sections: Administration, News and Press, and 
Propaganda. As the military structure became more complex, a number of specialised 
centres were established as extra-departmental bodies in the areas of print media, 
reporting, radio broadcasting, theatre, movie production and movie distribution. In 
addition to the Sendenbu, five district operation units were established and each residency 
office had its own propaganda section. Within this administrative framework, two 
organisations in particular were focussed on the development of nationalist arts: the 
Cultural Centre and the cultural section of the nationalist-run mass organisation, Putera.  
 
In April 1943, the Cultural Centre (Keimin Bunka Shidosho) was established as an 
auxiliary organisation of Sendenbu. Its tasks were to promote traditional Indonesian arts, 
to introduce and disseminate Japanese culture, and to educate and train Indonesian artists 
(Kurasawa, 1991, pp. 17-8). The Cultural Centre consisted of five sections—




Indonesians headed each of the sections and worked as full-time staff. Japanese 
instructors were sent to the Cultural Centre to train Indonesian artists. The Centre also 
produced a yearly magazine, Keboedajaan Timoer, edited by Sanusi Pane of Pujangga 
Baru fame. Although promoting the Japanese version of Indonesian culture, the magazine 
also contained some discussion of various art forms (film, fine arts, literature) and 
promoted Indonesian poets and writers.  
 
Putera (Pusat Tenaga Rakyat – People’s Power Movement) was established on 9 March 
1943. Putera, although better known as a political organisation, also ran cultural 
programs and had a cultural section. It was a Japanese-funded organisation headed by 
leading nationalist figures who viewed it as a potential vehicle for mobilising and 
organising the populace behind the nationalist cause. Sukarno was the head of Putera and 
promoted it vigorously. Putera formed committees across Java under the supervision of a 
large central office. The central office was divided into sections dealing with education, 
propaganda, culture, health, social welfare and ‘enlightenment’39 (Kanahele, 1967, p. 78). 
The Japanese were heavily involved in the financing, organisation and appointments 
process of Putera, and hoped it would assist them in achieving their wartime goals. As a 
price for Japanese support, Putera’s leaders were forced to participate in Japanese 
propaganda. Putera provided a platform for the nationalists with a larger degree of 
autonomy from the Japanese than the Cultural Centre, greatly encouraged Indonesian 
nationalism and also initiated some of its own cultural programs.40 Differences between 
the Japanese administrators and the nationalists hamstrung Putera from its inception and 
resistance from the Pamong Praja41 restricted their activities outside of the large cities in 
Java (Kanahele, 1967, pp. 133-6). Putera became a part of the even more tightly 
controlled Jawa Hokokai mass movement on 8 January 1944 (Kanahele, 1967, pp. 137-
8), modelled on Japan’s Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei Yokysankai) 
(Kurasawa, 1991, p. 40).  
 
The Cultural Centre and Putera became important centres for the development of 
Indonesian art and cultural expression. They provided resources, published works and ran 
training workshops. Nationalist artists, writers and performers quickly gathered around 
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40 Some of Putera’s cultural programs are explored in the fine arts section below.  




the Cultural Centre and Putera and were given key positions in the cultural apparatus. 
After the defeat of the Dutch colonial government, nationalist artists and writers were 
given the opportunity for the first time to develop their arts with the resources of the state. 
Nationalism began to assume a central position in the development of the arts in 
Indonesia within Japanese-sponsored cultural institutions.  
 
The Impact of Japanese Cultural Policy 
The occupying administration intervened with a wide variety of cultural forms for the 
purposes of propaganda. The production and distribution of propaganda impacted film 
production, radio, the print media, fine arts, theatre, music, wayang and introduced a new 
art form for the duration of the occupation, Kamishibai.42 The following discussion deals 
mainly with the fine arts.  
 
In the fine arts, Japanese cultural policy further stimulated a movement that began four 
years before Japanese soldiers arrived in Indonesia. In October 1938, a small group of 
Indonesian artists formed the Union of Indonesian Fine Artists (Persatuan Ahli Gambar 
Indonesia, or Persagi) began in Jakarta. They were politically aligned with the nationalist 
movement and incorporated Indonesian themes into their work. Persagi’s basis was a 
shared critique of the state of the fine arts in Indonesia based on the nationalist vision of 
an autonomous and free nation. Its goal was to develop fine art among the Indonesian 
people through seeking the ‘style of New Indonesia’ (Sudarmaji, 1990, p. 75), 
predominantly through adopting early twentieth century European techniques with 
Indonesian subject matter. Although Persagi was disbanded when the Japanese invaded 
along with all other social organisations, and replaced with government-run bodies, 
Persagi artists increased their profile during the occupation. After limited recognition 
during the Dutch period, the nationalist artists who were active in Persagi were given 
state sponsorship, and their ideas and techniques were institutionalised in the key cultural 
organisations of the period. Claire Holt writes:  
It was during the Japanese occupation that the impetus first given by Persagi 
began to accelerate. By the time the revolution broke out in August, 1945, the 
number of Indonesian painters was perhaps double, possibly triple that of pre-war 
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days. And they were ready to throw themselves headlong into the stream of 
revolutionary activities. (1967, p. 200)  
Persagi artists held important posts in both the Japanese Cultural Centre and Putera. The 
fine arts section of the Japanese Cultural Centre was headed by Agus Djajasoeminta 
(often shortened to Djaja), the ex-Chairman of Persagi, while Putera’s fine arts section 
was headed by Sudjojono, who was the most well-known Persagi artist (Holt, 1967, p. 
198; Kusnadi, 1990, p. 85).  
 
A great number of influential Indonesian artists from the 1940s and 1950s were affiliated 
with either Putera or the Japanese Cultural Centre. Sudjojono and Agus Djaja are well-
regarded artists. Affandi, one of the outstanding Indonesian artists of the second half of 
the twentieth century, launched his career from Putera in a solo exhibition in 1943. 
Kartono Yudhokusumo, a pioneer of the ‘decorative’ art style in the 1950s, also was 
associated with Putera, as were Hendra Gunawan, Henk Ngantung, Mochtar Apin and 
Zaini. Another outstanding artist, Barli, was associated with the Japanese Cultural 
Centre’s branch in Bandung and, as part of the Japanese program, taught a number of 
young artists, including Popo Iskandar and Suparto (Supangkat, 1996, p. 45). These are 
the outstanding artists of the revolutionary and early independence periods.  
 
Training and exhibiting were core activities of the fine arts sections. For the first time the 
state sponsored artists to be trained in the contemporary fine arts. Takashi Kohno, a 
Japanese instructor of the fine arts section of the Cultural Centre, viewed training as 
central to developing the future of Indonesian fine art. He emphasised the encouragement 
of new artists and that art ‘should not be above but right in the middle of society’ (1942, 
p. 22).43 Many new artists were trained in the Japanese-sponsored institutions and 
numerous exhibitions were organised by both the Japanese Cultural Centre and Putera. In 
December 1942, the first all-Indonesian exhibition of paintings was held in Jakarta in the 
Cultural Centre and toured around Java. Two more such exhibitions occurred in 1943, 
along with five single-artist exhibitions organised by Putera. In April 1944 a fourth 
general exhibition was held.  
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Both the Cultural Centre and Putera actively promoted Indonesian artists who were using 
Western techniques. To all appearances, such work contradicted a central principle of 
Japanese cultural policy, which aimed to rid Indonesia of European influence. At the 
opening of the Cultural Centre, Seizaburo Okasaki, a representative of the Japanese 
Central Administration in Java, stated:  
In particular the greater part of the Asian continent, including Indonesia, which 
had been oppressed by the Western nations up until then, was subjected to a 
culture which destroyed Indigenous Eastern Culture. The Greater East Asia War 
is like an eternal flame which has rebuilt Eastern Culture. (1943, p. 1)  
Teristimewa pula sebagian besar benua Asia dimana Indonesia termasuk pula 
dalam lingkungan itu, yang selama ini dibawah tindasan bangsa Barat, terpaksa 
menerima kebudayaan yang merusak binasakan Kebudayaan Timur Asli... 
Peperangan Asia Timur Raya seolah-olah telah menjadi api unggun yang 
membangunkan kembali Kebudayaan Timur. 
However, Indonesian artists did not view their style as ‘Western’, but as contemporary. 
Jim Supangkat writes of Indonesian ‘modern art’ that its aesthetic basis is ‘quite different 
from that of traditional Indonesian art’ and that the ‘various popular styles in the 
development of modern art in Western Europe and the United States also appear in 
Indonesian modern art development’ (1990, p. 158). The works of Sudjojono and Affandi 
in the years before 1943 indicate the influence of impressionism.44 Indonesian artists also 
viewed their art as uniquely Indonesian because of their focus on Indonesian themes and 
their nationalist commitment. The nationalist artists explored modernity from an 
Indonesian perspective that involved combinations of themes and conventions from 
traditional and new sources. Their achievements and artworks demonstrate a style that 
reflects the politics, emotions and understandings of the needs of the time. Supangkat 
labels the style of painting that emerged ‘romanticism’, as it was influenced by the 
romantic style of ‘early nineteenth century Europe’ that initiated international modern art. 
Paintings were dominated by themes of ‘rebellion, struggle, oppression and poverty’ as 
well as political themes, and were strongly symbolic (1990, p. 159). The romantic 
imagery of revolutionary struggle continued into the 1970s (1990, pp. 149-62).  
 
Putera and the Cultural Centre generated artists who broadly shared a perspective about 
painting and an orientation to Indonesian culture. The overlap between Indonesian 
modernism and Japanese occupying doctrine created a space where Indonesian modern 
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art could flourish. The artists of this time had a sense of taking Indonesian art from its 
current state (characterised by Kohno as a ‘blank sheet’)45 towards a new destination and 
place. Kohno wrote in 1943:  
The effort we must make is now very evident in front of our eyes. Therefore 
Indonesian painters must shape a basis of painting and sculpture that is healthy in 
spirit, that is based on the new consciousness of artists and understands the new 
world, because it is a consciousness that is based on the new climate. (1943, p. 10) 
Sangat nyatalah sekarang usaha jang harus kita kerjakan dalam waktu ini 
bertimbun-timbun di depan mata kita. Maka ahli kesenian Indonesia harus 
membentuk dasar kesenian lukisan dan ukiran yang sehat dalam arti rohani yang 
didasarkan pada kesadaran ahli kesenian yang baru, faham dunia baru, ialah 
yang didasarkan susunan baru.  
The ‘new consciousness’ desired by the emerging Indonesian artists had some 
commonalities with the ‘new consciousness’ promoted by the Japanese occupying 
government. The overlap is also obvious in an article by Agus Djaja. Djaja describes 
Javanese culture and art as having undergone three centuries of ‘hypnotism’ because of 
Western colonialism and capitalism. He then highlights the opportunity to develop 
painting in the ‘new climate’ of free East Asia and the need to develop ‘Eastern’ painting. 
Mirroring the famous poet Chairil Anwar, Djaja states: ‘We the artists truly must feel 
lucky to live in these times. Though they are tough, we may want to live and die a 
thousand times.’46 The Persagi critique of colonialism is very similar to the Japanese 
critique and the sense that a new form of art is emerging for a new time also parallels 
Persagi’s direction.  
 
The overlap allowed Persagi artists to use the Japanese fine arts institutions to promote 
their own agenda. For instance, the themes of Persagi, particularly the everyday lives of 
Indonesians, became prominent in the works of new artists. According to Kusnadi, the 
Japanese did not interfere with the themes of the Indonesian artists except that they were 
asked to paint Indonesians undertaking manual labour for the Japanese war effort, which 
were to be used in recruitment propaganda aimed at Indonesian workers (1990, p. 85). 
After Japan’s surrender in 1945, Indonesian artists took up themes depicting the suffering 
of the people, soldiers and battles, and the events of the war of independence.  
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The affiliation between nationalism and modern art strengthened further in the years after 
1945. As the newly formed Republic declared independence and then fought the Dutch, 
fine artists withdrew with the republic, eventually ending up in Yogyakarta as the 
Republic’s troops retreated to that city. A number of artists recorded the war, but 
unfortunately their pictures, along with many of the pictures from the Japanese 
interregnum, were lost when the Dutch sacked the city of Yogyakarta and in the turmoil 
of the period. After the end of the war in 1949, a number of artists elected to stay in 
Yogyakarta. Holt states that in the 1950s two-thirds to three-quarters of Java’s painters 
lived in Yogyakarta (1967, p. 215). The romantic themes established by Persagi and 
developed during the Japanese years continued to be pursued in Yogyakarta and were 
particularly prominent in the arts college established there in 1950. A smaller group of 
artists in Bandung (including Barli, Iskandar and Suparto) pursued a style of art that 
moved away from realism and towards a more abstract style that became affiliated with 
the arts college at the Bandung Institute of Technology. These two art movements have 
exerted a prolonged influence over Indonesian contemporary art.  
 
While Japanese policy exercised some influence on the development and course of 
Indonesian art, Japanese art itself had little impact. Despite the rhetoric of finding an 
‘Eastern style,’ artists moved towards European impressionism. Western techniques 
seemed to grow more influential even while the Japanese were denigrating Western 
traditions and forms. Holt writes:  
it was during the Japanese occupation that Western music and painting acquired 
an enthusiastic following ... In contrast there is little clearly identifiable Japanese 
influence discernible in modern Indonesian art. (1967, pp. 198-9)47  
Indonesian artists were able to make use of the opportunities presented to them while 
pursuing their own interests, including exploration of Western methods.  
 
State control over production and distribution of film followed the model that was already 
in place in Japan.48 In Indonesia, the Japanese used confiscated movie production houses 
to make their films and also took control of all existing cinemas and ran open-air movie 
screenings (Kurasawa, 1991, pp. 46,56). Viewing options changed immediately.49 A large 
                                                 
47 See also Wertheim (1956, p. 299).  
48 The data on Japanese film policy in Japan and Java is taken from Kurasawa (1991, pp. 44-58).  
49 For instance, American films constituted 65 percent of all movies shown before the occupation and 




number of Japanese films were imported, and the occupying administration stimulated 
local film production of both news and movies for the purposes of propaganda 
(Kurasawa, 1991, pp. 51-2). The various types of film were all oriented towards 
government-approved themes, technical instruction and moral teachings. News films also 
reported speeches by prominent Indonesian leaders, most frequently Sukarno (Kurasawa, 
1991, pp. 51-3). Ticket prices were reduced substantially from pre-war prices to facilitate 
attendance (1991, pp. 56-7). The Japanese administration also expanded the use of mobile 
cinemas. Fifteen projection teams travelled the countryside giving free screenings of 
propaganda films for the rural population, many of whom had never seen a film before 
(1991, pp.58-9). The Japanese use of film for political purposes also survived the war, 
with Indonesian film-makers documenting historic occurrences of the war of 
independence (Sen, 1994, p. 17).  
 
The Japanese administration also stimulated the production of radio programs and the 
spread of radios. Around 1500 radio ‘singing trees’ (pohon nyanyi) were spread around 
Java to disseminate propaganda (Sen & Hill, 2000, p. 81). The Declaration of 
Independence was first broadcast through the nationalist capture of a Japanese radio 
station on the evening of 17 August 1945. The Republic of Indonesia Radio (RRI) began 
as a consortium of eight stations from within the Japanese network (Sen & Hill, 2000, p. 
82). The Japanese administration’s take over of the press offered Indonesians increased 
opportunities to take positions of responsibility formerly held by Dutch journalists and 
training, although the occupying administration also increased censorship (D. T. Hill, 
1994, pp. 26-7).  
 
The Japanese also needed new historical narratives, myths and heroes to replace the 
Dutch histories that had dominated textbooks and street names before 1942. Anthony 
Reid notes that the nationalist histories written for use during this period consolidated ‘a 
new nationalist orthodoxy which has proved remarkably durable’ (1980, p. 25). Key 
nationalist figures who held senior posts in the occupying administrations, such as 
Muhammad Yamin, the poet and highest ranked Indonesian in Sendenbu, and Sanusi 
Pane promoted and developed nationalist histories with two elements that would become 
standard fare in nationalist history texts. Firstly, the texts represented Indonesia’s pre-
colonial past as a time of political unity and prosperity brought by the great Hindu-




oppression with resistance at some time or another of each Indonesian region and people. 
In these histories, the Indonesian ‘villains’ of Dutch histories were made into resistance 
heroes in their narrative about the struggle for independence (1979, pp. 297-8). The new 
historical orthodoxy had its roots in nationalist intellectual attacks on the Dutch VOC and 
Netherlands Indies state-centred version of history used to educate Indonesians from the 
1920s (1979, pp. 292-3). Sanusi Pane’s Sejarah Indonesia (1965)50 became the standard 
national history and its structure, according to Reid, has been replicated in many local 
histories (1980, p. 25). Reid states of the impact of the period on understandings of the 
past: ‘While the shape of this national past owed very little to the Japanese, its projection 
into an official orthodoxy for the new nation was greatly speeded by wartime propaganda 
needs’ (1980, p. 25).  
 
The explosion of nationalist poetry and literature began during the Japanese Occupation 
although much of it was not published until after the Japanese surrender due to 
censorship. Literary critic A. Teeuw states: ‘There can be no doubt that the spiritual 
revolution in Indonesia, and closely interwoven with it the new literary movement, 
started in 1942’ (1967, p. 107). An important development for literature was the Japanese 
discouragement of the Dutch language, which has been widely used amongst the 
Western-educated elite from which many Indonesian writers were drawn, and the 
encouragement of Indonesian (1967, p. 106). Some books were published within the 
Cultural Centre and included Japanese themes and slogans (Teeuw, 1967, pp. 107-9). 
Other books were written during this time, but were not published until after 
independence. Keboedajaan Timoer, a Japanese-sponsored weekly magazine focussed on 
culture, was an important forum for the discussion of literature and poetry and included 
excerpts of new works. Chairil Anwar also had a small number of poems published in 
Keboedajaan Timoer (for example 1944), although he was generally critical of the 
Japanese and much of his poetry was published only after the end of the occupation.51  
 
Effects of Japanese Cultural Policy 
Within the material produced for propaganda purposes, the driving force of change in the 
content of cultural forms was the pressure to conform to the principles of pan-Asian 
culture. Nationalist cultural workers, through their participation in Japanese cultural 
                                                 
50 First published in 1943.  




institutions, were able to continue to promote overlapping nationalist themes, in particular 
liberation from the Dutch. The wartime content and the idea of pan-Asian culture ended 
with the Japanese occupation, as did the promotion of Japanese culture. The brutality of 
elements of the Japanese occupying forces, Japan’s ambiguous relationship with 
nationalist leaders and the Japanese defeat in WWII made for an easy departure from 
Japanese influences. Narangoa and Cribb also note that the disruptions of war prevented 
the development of institutions that may have opened up opportunities for local elites 
within the Japanese empire, preventing greater commitment to the idea of pan-Asian 
culture and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (2003, p. 18). Certainly, 
nationalist artists, writers and cultural workers involved in the mass media of the time 
were more interested in the relationship with Western ideas and techniques than with 
ideas and techniques from Japan and quickly moved away from the ‘propaganda’ of the 
period after 1945.  
 
The more important and long-lasting effects of Japanese cultural policy were not listed in 
its goals and principles. Japanese cultural policy facilitated two important trends that 
were central to cultural provision within Indonesia in the following years. The first trend, 
which was the most important for the historical development of cultural policy, was how 
Japanese cultural policy laid the foundations for the official orthodoxies of the 
independence years. The promotion of Indonesian art and culture encouraged an 
explosion of arts that entrenched some art forms and styles in the public imaginary as 
representative of Indonesia. Japanese cultural policy in particular catalysed the modernist 
arts which were aligned with nationalism, such as modernist fine arts and Indonesian 
language literature. The nationalist artists of this era and the traditions associated with 
them proceeded to become established in state-sponsored teaching and cultural 
institutions as elements of national culture.  
 
The second trend was the development of the mass culture industries, in particular film 
and radio and their relationship to national culture. It was through film and radio that 
many Indonesians gained access to the wider world and first heard and saw their national 
leaders. The spread of the new culture industries was in many ways linked to the spread 
of a new consciousness of being Indonesian and the emergence of the Indonesian nation. 




significant ‘in the sense that it provided most rural people with accessibility to modern 
entertainment media such as movies’ (1991, p. 65). Kurasawa continues:  
Those media enlarged their mental environment and surroundings and brought the 
people into contact with the larger society. Through the screen, they first saw the 
faces of their national leaders and the great capital city of their ‘nation’, and thus 
came to be more familiar with the events going on outside their immediate 
society. (1991, p. 65) 
Although the new culture industries would not be national in scope for many years, from 
the time of the Japanese occupation they were national in perspective.  
 
6. Conclusion 
While Dutch colonial policy displayed features of the command culture model in its 
treatment of indigenous Indonesians, the model was most in evidence during the period 
of Japanese occupation than any other in Indonesia’s history. Previously existing cultural 
institutions were disbanded and state-approved or state-run institutions provided the 
cultural infrastructure as part of the occupying administration’s propaganda apparatus. 
Within this model of cultural provision, the administration’s cultural policies were 
applied within administration-run or approved programs. Cultural policy during the 
occupation had two sets of objectives. First was the material objective of addressing 
problems and needs caused by the war. Second was the ideological objective of serving 
the needs of the Japanese imperial state articulated through the idea of pan-Asian culture. 
The latter set of objectives have a continuity with colonial cultural policy: occupation-era 
cultural policies included both a ‘civilising’ function and lessons about relations between 
populations that could be seen within Dutch colonial cultural policy and nationalist ideas 
about culture. The modernising imperative of the Japanese imperial state sought to 
‘improve’ indigenous Indonesians based on a Japanese, rather than Western, set of 
normative cultural values. The racial hierarchies of culture were thus restructured in 
Japanese cultural policy but not thrown away. For the duration of the Japanese 
occupation, culture was implicated in a much more ambitious attempt at transforming 
Indonesian society than it was under the Dutch due to the interventionist streak in 
Japanese governance, which was amplified by the pressures of fighting a war.  
 
Japanese cultural policies in Indonesia, although successfully implemented and 




pan-Asian culture or ape Japanese culture as a ‘mature’ Asian culture. Putting aside its 
failures, Japanese cultural policy did have some long term governmental effects. The 
Japanese ideological opposition to and erasure of Dutch and Western cultures and 
narratives created a situation that nationalists exploited to spread their own ideas about 
Indonesian culture and history through their involvement with Japanese propaganda. 
Japanese cultural policy, which reinforced and encouraged aspects of Indonesian national 
culture in order to unite rather than divide Indonesians and put them on par with their 
European ex-colonial masters, greatly strengthened the nationalist elements of cultural 
policy. The notion of a national culture was further developed within the cultural policy 







From Cultural Regulation to Cultural Leadership: 
the Changing Uses of Culture in the Periods of Constitutional 
Democracy (1950-1957) and Guided Democracy (1957-1965) 
This chapter explores the changes to cultural policy during the periods of Constitutional 
Democracy and Guided Democracy, in particular focussing on two trajectories: the roles 
defined for the state and for non-state organisations in cultural policy. These two periods 
offer interesting glimpses of the possible alternatives to the system that eventuated during 
the New Order regime.1 This chapter aims to situate the cultural policy of the period 
within the changing rationalities of governance. To understand the changes to cultural 
policy, it is necessary to trace the broader changes in how understandings about the 
function of the state changed. For this reason, discussion of cultural policy in both 
periods is preceded by an exploration of the methods of governance and the social and 
political forces that were acting on them. The broad change in the tasks and objects of 
government established the conditions that led to a series of changes in cultural policy 
content and implementation, including the decline then the return of the command culture 
model of cultural provision.  
 
While the war of independence (1945-49) was a formative period for the fledgling nation-
state, the near complete disruption of state authority prevented the development of both 
national institutions and the implementation of national policies.2 The conflict between 
the new Indonesian state and the Netherlands made the coordination of state activities 
near impossible given the small area under the control of the new republic. According to 
                                                 
1 No extended research has focussed specifically on official cultural policy during this period, although 
Yampolsky provides a very brief overview in his article about New Order cultural policy (1995). 
Foulcher’s research into LEKRA (1986) provides the most detailed insight into cultural politics and 
policies while focussing on an arts organisation, while Maier’s research into literary history provides 
insights into the cultural politics of the period (1987; 1996). McVey’s detailed analysis of Indonesian 
Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia – PKI) policy and internal debates regarding wayang and 
education provides similar insights into the PKI (1986; 1990).  
2 This period is probably better characterised as an interregnum between the control of the Japanese 




Benedict Anderson, ‘in many areas of Java and Sumatra the state almost disappeared in 
the face of popular insurgence’ (1990c, p. 99).3 The Indonesian state, through the 
military, only consolidated its position in the 1950s and established its authority across 
Indonesia, in the process overcoming regional uprisings in Ambon, Sumatra, Sulawesi 
and West Java. My account begins in 1950 with the advent of a new Constitution 
following the end of warfare, when thoughts turned to developing new institutions and 
governing the new nation.  
 
1. Politics and Governance After the War of Independence 
Within a governmental analytical framework, the key to understanding changes in 
cultural policy between 1950 and 1965 rests on how culture is configured in the 
rationality that shapes governance. In his ‘Governmentality’ lecture (1991b), discussed in 
the thesis introduction, Michel Foucault traces the historical change in governmental 
rationalities that have shaped the exercise of power over conduct by rulers. While 
governmental rationality is important for the broad parameters it sets for the exercise of 
government, its examination here would not reveal great differences. The two periods are 
both relatively short and sequential and did not involve great methodological or technical 
innovation. Instead, what is needed is an examination of the political rationality of two 
distinct political periods. Mitchell Dean defines political rationality as:  
the relatively systematic, explicit, discursive, problematisation and codification of 
the art or practice of government, as a way of rendering the objects of government 
in a language that makes them governable. (1994, p. 187)  
The same governmental practices may be quite differently configured within different 
political rationalities. Political rationalities can therefore explain the differences between 
governance in, for instance, a country that has experienced a change of administration but 
little or no technical innovation or, like Indonesia between 1950 and 1965, a country with 
a relatively unchanged political elite and social structure, but with a changing language 
and method of government.  
 
The seminal text on the Constitutional Democracy period is Herbert Feith’s The Decline 
of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (1962).4 The key division in Feith’s analysis is 
                                                 
3 See also Anderson (1972) and Cribb (1991) for discussions of control by popular insurgent groups rather 
than the state during the revolution.  
4 The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia is the first book referred to as reference material in 




between ‘administrators’ and ‘solidarity makers’. He defines ‘administrators’ as ‘men 
with administrative, legal, technical and foreign language skills, such as are required for 
the running of a modern state’ (1962, p. 24). They had received a Western education, 
normally up to university level, or were needed for ‘central organisation and strategy’ 
(1962, p. 24) and negotiations with the Dutch during the war of independence. Solidarity 
makers, on the other hand, possessed ‘what may be called integrative skills, skills in 
cultural mediation, symbol manipulation, and mass organisation’ (1962, p. 24). Solidarity 
makers generally had received a primary or senior secondary Western education or a 
Muslim education and the basis of their authority was ‘traditional or charismatic authority 
or (most usually) a combination’ (1962, p. 25). Feith characterises the period as changing 
from an ‘administrator’ oriented understanding of government to a ‘solidarity-maker’ 
understanding (1962, pp. 113-22). Other Indonesian researchers have used similar 
characterisations to explain the changes during the period. For instance, Daniel Lev views 
the change from Constitutional Democracy to Guided Democracy as the abandonment of 
‘copies’ of Western European institutions for institutions that represented a return to 
Indonesian traditions (1966, pp. 1-2).  
 
From a governmental perspective, Feith’s notions of ‘administrators’ and ‘solidarity-
makers’ can be understood as two competing political rationalities pushed by different 
elements of the political elite. The two groups were promoting differing policy priorities 
linked to differing understandings of how Indonesia should be governed. In Feith’s 
words:  
The conflict between ‘administrators’ and ‘solidarity makers’ was sometimes one 
between different groups of government leaders stressing different and conflicting 
aspects of government activity. At other times it was a conflict within government 
parties, usually involving antagonism between ‘administrator’-controlled factions 
advancing pragmatic arguments in support of government policies and ‘solidarity 
maker’-led factions opposing these policies in the name of the nationalist ideology 
... And at other times again it was a direct conflict between an ‘administrator’-led 
government and a ‘solidarity maker’ led opposition (or in later years between a 
‘solidarity maker’-led government and an ‘administrator’-led opposition). (1967, 
p. 115)  
Feith states that the two groups were not mutually exclusive and that certain leaders could 
exercise both type of ‘skills’ (1962, p. 25). Another way of understanding the ability of 
certain leaders to move between the groups is to understand the groups as discursively 
                                                                                                                                                 
identifies The Decline of Constitutional Democracy as a ‘hegemonic text’ due to its importance in defining 




constructed. Certain leaders were adept in making appeals using the discourses of either 
administrators or solidarity makers to achieve outcomes.5  
 
This thesis adopts Feith’s administrators/solidarity-maker distinction in order to explore 
the changing political rationalities of the two periods while acknowledging that analytical 
innovations within Indonesian studies research have questioned elements of Feith’s 
analytical framework.6 For the purposes of this chapter, one criticism in particular needs 
to be addressed: Feith’s (and Lev’s) focus on elite politics, meaning the national 
institutions and the political parties in Jakarta. This narrow focus on the upper stratum of 
the state and political parties provides detailed insights into national politics that greatly 
assists understanding of national policy making during the 1950s. However, it also raises 
problems. First, analysis of the centre, when combined with a liberal philosophical 
framework, depicts regional opposition to the Indonesian state as manifestations of 
instability or disorder rather than as the expression of alternatives to the Indonesian 
national state (Philpott, 2000, p. 64). Second, the 1950s saw a proliferation of cultural 
institutions that were not included in analysis of the political elite. The analysis that 
follows includes these non-state organisations in policy analysis and argues that they 
became increasingly important to cultural policy during the Guided Democracy period.  
 
2. Policy and Culture during Constitutional Democracy 
The cultural clause of the 1950 Constitution, which used the same wording as the 1949 
Constitution of the Indonesian Federal Republic (Republik Indonesia Serikat – RIS),7 
states:  
The government will protect the freedom to partake in culture, the arts and 
science. Respecting this principle, the government will, to the greatest extent 
possible, promote the development of nationalism in culture, the arts and science.8  
Penguasa melindungi kebebasan mengusahakan kebudayaan serta kesenian dan 
ilmu pengetahuan. Dengan menjunjung asas ini maka penguasa memajukan 
                                                 
5 Lev also notes changes in how government was understood and executed when he argues: ‘the dominant 
elite simply gave up trying to maintain itself according to one set of rules and turned to another set ... Thus 
if the leadership appears to be the same, the political institutions of the [Guided Democracy] period have 
become very different from those of [Constitutional Democracy]’ (1966, pp. 1-2).  
6 The criticisms of Feith’s research paradigm were reviewed in the ‘Introduction’ to this thesis. The 
criticism can be extended to include Lev’s research into Guided Democracy (1966).  
7 The clause is section 40 of the 1950 Constitution and section 38 of the RIS Constitution.  




sekuat tenaganya perkembangan kebangsaan dalam kebudayaan serta kesenian 
dan ilmu pengetahuan.  
The emphasis on freedom and what can be assumed to be individual rights reflects a 
liberal current that runs through the 1950 Constitution and can be expected to run through 
the cultural policy of the period of Constitutional Democracy. To understand why this 
liberal current was introduced, it is necessary to first explore the administrator rationality 
that was most dominant at the beginning of the period of Constitutional Democracy.  
 
The administrator political rationality of the Constitutional Democracy period can be 
uncontroversially characterised as a Western-style liberal form of government. While 
political analysts and historians have disagreed about the causes for its demise,9 there is a 
widespread agreement that the four cabinets that cover the 1949-1953 period were 
oriented towards the use of Western-style expertise in their policies and committed to 
parliamentary democracy along Western lines.10 These cabinets were committed to 
institutional development and made gains in the areas of education, health and macro-
economic policy (Feith, 1994, p. 21) although it should also be noted that there were 
widespread problems with policy development and implementation.11 The commitment to 
a liberal democratic system of rule is also reflected in the regulation of other institutions. 
The press enjoyed a large degree of freedom, the courts were independent even when 
dealing with ministers or army officers, and there was a commitment to the rules of 
parliament and parliamentary debate (Feith, 1994, p. 21). Feith states that these cabinets 
‘concentrated their attention on normalisation, the restoration of secure conditions, and 
                                                 
9 The early and persisting division over the causes of the decline is between Feith’s ‘quasi-structuralist’ 
(Mackie, 1994, pp. 27-8) account in The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, which stresses 
the difficult barriers to Guided Democracy and the growing strength of the opposition, and Benda’s cultural 
critique of Feith’s argument, which argues that the ‘Western’ system of Constitutional Democracy was 
unsuited to Indonesia’s past history and cultural traditions (Benda, 1982). For reviews of this debate see, 
Feith (1994), Lev (1994), Mackie (1994), and McVey (1994). Given my critique of the use of culture in 
Indonesian Politics Studies in the Introduction, I disagree with the cultural explanation while 
acknowledging Feith’s preference for the ‘problem solver’ perspective.  
10 See, in addition to the Feith and Lev books discussed earlier, Mackie (1994, pp. 27-8), Lev (1994, p. 42), 
and Legge (1977, pp. 149-50) for accounts that adopt the characterisation of the early years of 
Parliamentary Democracy as a version of liberal democratic government. Benda too characterises the 
‘problem solvers’ as ‘the truly Westernised members of the Indonesian elite’ (1982, p. 17). McVey makes a 
similar division into two groups which are based on (1) a commitment to the ‘things which would make 
Indonesia the social, economic, and political equal of other nations’ and (2) excluding things that were 
‘foreign to ‘Indonesian-ness’’ (1994, pp. 4-5).  
11 Three problems stand out. Firstly, the number of parties needed to form a cabinet meant that the large 
parties had an effective veto over government policy (Cribb & Brown, 1995, p. 61). Secondly, the 
bureaucracy increasingly tended to respond to pressure from groups outside of government when 
implementing policy and frequently vetoed policies that would adversely impact its own membership 
(Feith, 1962, p. 311).Thirdly, political appointments politicised the bureaucracy and impeded smooth 




the establishment of strong, unified and efficient government’ (1962, p. 303) although 
their brief terms in office and the economic and social issues they faced concurrent with 
the political hurdles of the times reduced their effectiveness (Feith, 1994, pp. 22-4; Lev, 
1994, pp. 39-42; Mackie, 1994). The administrator oriented political rationality began to 
wane from 1953 with the Sastroamidjojo cabinet (1953-1955), as it excluded the parties 
with the strongest commitment to that rationality (Cribb & Brown, 1995, p. 59) and 
continued to weaken until the end of Constitutional Democracy in 1957,12 when Sukarno 
began to reassert his power.13  
 
Cultural Policy Debates in Four Cultural Conventions14 
The Ministry of Education, Training and Culture (Kementerian Pendidikan, Pengamatan 
dan Kebudayaan – Kementerian PPK) began on 19 August 1945 as one of twelve 
ministries created to administer the two day old state of Indonesia and the nationalist 
educator Ki Hadjar Dewantara was named the first Minister of Education, Training and 
Culture (Menteri PPK).15 The Cultural Office (Jawatan Kebudayaan) within the Ministry 
of Education, Training and Culture (Kementerian PPK) was the primary locus of cultural 
policy formation and programs. The Department of Education, Training and Culture 
(DPPK) organised a series of three cultural congresses between the years of 1948 and 
1954. In addition to the three cultural congresses, a ‘Cultural Conference’ was held in 
1950 to address the relationship between Indonesian and foreign cultures, a thinly veiled 
reference to the 1949 Cultural Accord between Indonesia and the Netherlands made as 
part of the Round Table Agreement with the Dutch. The four meetings constitute an 
important window into the cultural policy formulations of the political and cultural elite, 
including Ministers and high-ranking bureaucrats along with prominent cultural 
commentators. The opinions voiced in these forums provide insights into the basis of the 
early cultural policies of the Republic that are discussed in the following section and the 
field of cultural policy options that were considered.  
 
                                                 
12 The 1955 elections (Cribb & Brown, 1995, pp. 68-73) and the PRRI and Permesta regional rebellions 
(Ricklefs, 2001, pp. 308-11) further weakened and marginalised the administrator-oriented parties 
(Masyumi and the PSI).  
13 See Feith (1967) for a detailed analysis of the end of Constitutional Democracy and the advent of Guided 
Democracy. The solidarity-makers’ critiques of Constitutional Democracy are returned to later in the 
discussion of the political rationality of Guided Democracy.  
14 Two more cultural congresses have been held in 1991 and 2003, demonstrating the historical importance 
that is placed on the early conferences.  




a. The 1948 Cultural Congress 
 
The first cultural congress was initiated and organised by the Yogyakarta Cultural Office 
with the support of the Governor of Yogyakarta and the DPPK. The conference followed 
two other meetings (Sukabumi in November, 1946, Solo in April, 1947). However, this 
was the first large congress and was attended by the President and Vice-President, who 
both gave speeches to mark the occasion. The congress was held at a time when 
Indonesia was trying to represent itself to the United Nations and the Western powers as a 
united country with a national culture.16  
 
The first congress, more than any other, regenerated the themes of the nationalist cultural 
debates that preceded World War II. The binaries around East/West structured most of 
the participants’ arguments about culture. The regeneration of the cultural debates 
quickly was apparent in the presentations of two of the most prominent statesmen of the 
period. Vice President Hatta, after defining culture as the opposite of nature and the 
product of ‘humankind’s struggle ... to reach a higher plane of existence’,17 divided 
culture into two types: material and spiritual (1950, p. 15). According to Hatta the West 
excelled in the production of material culture but had fallen behind in the pursuit of 
spiritual culture, whereas cultural prosperity was the result of a balance between the two 
kinds. Similarly, the then Minister of PPK and future two-time Prime Minister, Ali 
Sastroamidjojo, called for a ‘harmony’ between the material and the spiritual (1950a, p. 
22). Both men emphasised the use of Indonesia’s existing methods and cultures alongside 
new measures to enliven and renew national life.  
 
Although some participants postulated an unassailable gap between Western and Eastern 
culture,18 the majority of participants resolved the dichotomy between East and West 
through a synthesis in a ‘new Indonesian culture’. However, problems were already 
starting to make themselves felt with the ‘synthesis’ formulation. Two incidents in 
particular were problematic because they raise the issue of internal divisions. The first 
occurred in the discussion after the first session when a participant, Mohamad Zain, 
                                                 
16 Ajip Rosidi, in his opening address at the International Conference of Sundanese Culture, claimed that 
the government only held the first three congresses in order to advertise that it had a ‘high culture’ that was 
appropriate for a nation-state (2001).  
17 ‘Perjuangan manusia ... untuk mencapai penghidupan yang tinggi’ (Hatta, 1950, p. 15).  
18For instance, bureaucrat Kuntjoro Purbopranoto quotes Kipling in English that ‘East is East and West is 




raised the issue of the ‘antithesis’ between different cultures within Indonesia (in 
particular the antithesis between Java with the other Islands, ‘Bertukar Pikiran,’ 1950, p. 
46). He was immediately addressed by the Chair who told him that the topic of discussion 
was Indonesian culture and that he should not differentiate the cultures of the various 
islands.  
 
The second disagreement followed Dewantara’s paper on national education. 
Dewantara’s ideas were important to the conceptualisation of Indonesian culture during 
the period and he is the most likely source for the definition of Indonesian culture that 
accompanied the 1945 Constitution (Yampolsky, 1995, fn. 11). Dewantara was an 
innovative educator and the founder of the Taman Siswa school movement that educated 
and employed a large number of nationalists. His educational policies reflected a 
syncretic perspective on Indonesian culture. Dewantara thought that Indonesian culture 
should be comprised not just of Western elements but also various indigenous traditions 
and practices. He still viewed Indonesian culture of the future as unitary and singular and 
that it would arise from the mixing of different regional and foreign cultures.19  
 
Dewantara defined Indonesian culture as the ‘peaks of all of the regional cultures in all 
Indonesia’.20 The writer Armijn Pane contested the definition:  
The new generation does not want a federative culture, but a single culture. The 
definition is not able to fulfil our desires now, and means that we are tied to old 
constructions. (1950, p. 91) 
Angkatan baru tidak menghendaki kebudayaan yang federatief, tetapi kebudayaan 
yang bulat. Definisi tidak dapat memenuhi kemauan kita sekarang, dan berarti 
bahwa kita terikat kepada bentuk-bentuk yang lama. 
According to Armijn, discussions of difference and plurality were not important because 
old forms of cultural practices would make way for the forms of ‘New Indonesia’. In fact, 
as the examples above demonstrate, they were discouraged in favour of a theoretical 
social change that would simultaneously resolve the pressures within Indonesian society. 
Sastroamidjojo drew attention to a related issue in both of his speeches: the gap between 
the ‘young generation’ who want to ‘improve culture they feel is not in accordance with 
                                                 
19 For a longer discussion of his life and ideas, see Pranata (1959) and Foulcher (1986, pp. 14-7).  




the times’ and an ‘old generation’ who want to preserve older cultural forms (1950a, pp. 
21-2; 1950b).21  
 
The first Cultural Congress was one of the first forums to discuss the relationship of the 
state to Indonesian culture. The state was given an important place from the beginning of 
the congress and the importance of culture to administration was acknowledged. Even so, 
there was no clear consensus on how the state relates to culture. In his address, Vice-
President Hatta recognised the governmental importance of ‘culture’ for state 
administration:  
A state’s administration is able to prosper if culture is at a high level, because 
culture influences also the characteristics of a state’s administration. (1950, pp. 
14-15)  
Pemerintahan sesuatu negara dapat hidup subur apabila kebudayaan tinggi 
tingkatnya, karena kebudayaan berpengaruh pula pada sifat pemerintahan 
negara. 
Later in his address, he combined the importance of culture for a state together with the 
goals of the state:  
The goal of a state is to provide a reasonable lifestyle for all of its populace, and a 
state can only survive if culture there is good and of a high standard. (1950, p. 15) 
Tujuan negara ialah untuk memberi penghidupan yang layak bagi manusia 
segenap penduduknya, dan negara hanya bisa hidup apabila kebudayaan disitu 
baik dan mempunyai tingkat yang tinggi.  
These statements raise the question of responsibility for the development of a ‘healthy’ 
culture. Hatta did not address or clearly answer this question although, at the end of his 
address, he encouraged all of the participants to work towards a ‘higher culture’22 which 
suggests that he viewed cultural development as the task of both society and the state. 
Two later papers by Ki Mangunsarkoro and Kuntjoro Purbopranoto asserted a more 
central role for the state in shaping Indonesian national culture, with little discussion of 
society (Mangunsarkoro, 1950; Purbopranoto, 1950).  
 
                                                 
21 It is also worth noting that the editors of Indonesia included a note at the end of the proceedings that 
clarified their own position on the relationship between regional culture and the ‘culture of unity’ 
(kebudayaan kesatuan). The editors state that regional cultures should be able to develop in their own 
regions (but not ‘imperialistically’ in other regions) and that national culture should develop across 
Indonesia as the culture of unity. The editors note that while this view would previously have been 
considered ‘provincialist’, it was no longer viewed that developing regional cultures would impede the 
development of a national culture (Editor, 1950b, pp. 1-2).  




In marked contrast to the determining elements in the formulations above, Sastroamidjojo 
was careful to distinguish the style of the new government from its Japanese predecessor. 
He argued: 
I take the position ... that we from the Ministry of PPK should not interfere so that 
it appears as if there is pressure or a decree from above to organise something that 
is wanted by one group only. That is our express undertaking because we 
remember past periods, mainly the Japanese period, where culture was directed, 
led by the centre with a particular purpose. (1950b, p. 12) 
Saya berpendirian ... tidak seharusnyalah kita dari Kementerian P.P. dan K. 
campur tangan sehingga seolah-olah merupakan tekanan atau merupakan 
perintah dari atas untuk menyelenggarakan sesuatu yang dikehendaki oleh satu 
golongan saja. Pendirian yang demikian itu kami sengaja oleh karena kami ingat 
kepada zaman-zaman yang lampau terutama di Zaman Jepang dimana 
kebudayaan didirigir, dipimpin oleh Pusat dengan maksud yang tertentu.  
Sastroamidjojo viewed the role of the state as facilitating the activities of non-state 
groups rather than determining cultural attributes. In his speech he emphasised that the 
conference was the initiative of the Kedu Cultural Centre and called the involvement of 
the Ministry of PPK ‘passive’ (1950b, p. 12). The role of the state Sastroamidjojo defines 
is a departure from Japanese practice and has some parallels with the Dutch liberal model 
of supervising ‘natural’ cultural developments.  
 
The conference also settled on a broad definition of culture. The ‘Conclusions’ of the 
conference state that ‘culture includes all aspects of humankind’s life in society (both 
physical and spiritual). Not just art.’23 Finally, an important institutional development 
was the creation of the Institute of National Culture (Lembaga Kebudayaan Nasional – 
LKN) whose name later changed to Institute of Indonesian Culture (Lembaga 
Kebudayaan Indonesia – LKI). The debates about the creation of the Institute at the first 
Congress were dominated by the need to include both the ‘young’ and the ‘old’ 
generation in its committees and operation, ensuring that it was inclusive (‘Pembentukan 
Organisasi Kebudayaan,’ 1950). The legislation for the beginnings of LKI was put in 
place at the congress, but the opening had to be postponed due to the Dutch invasion of 
Yogyakarta. The body was formed in Jakarta in March 1950.  
 
                                                 
23 The ‘Conclusions’ of the conference state: ‘Ditegaskan, bahwa kebudayaan meliputi segenap kehidupan 
manusia dalam masyarakat (baik lahir, maupun batin). Tidak hanya kesenian saja’ (‘Kesimpulan-




b. The Cultural Conference 
 
One of the first acts of LKI was to organise the Indonesian Cultural Conference in August 
1950. The theme of the conference was ‘National Culture and Its Relationship with the 
Cultures of Other Nations’ (Kebudayaan Nasional dan Hubungannya dengan 
Kebudayaan Bangsa-bangsa Lain). The topic and papers were focussed on the 1949 
Cultural Accord between Indonesia and the Netherlands that listed specific measures that 
both parties had to undertake in the other’s territory and guaranteed the free movement of 
people and materials related to culture and the arts. It also safeguarded the Dutch cultural 
presence in Indonesia24 creating a backlash from the many Indonesian artists and 
intellectuals who had been inspired by the ‘revolution’ and were relying on it to create 
‘new Indonesia’ (Foulcher, 1986, pp. 15-6). The three plenary sessions were given by 
Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana, Ki Hadjar Dewantara and Trisno Sumadjo.  
 
The speeches themselves were restatements of earlier positions, so I will not dwell on the 
papers at length. Ki Hadjar Dewantara restated his more syncretic perspective on national 
culture (1950b). Dewantara was critical of the Dutch control of cultural exchange during 
their tenure in Indonesia. According to Dewantara, during the colonial period all cultural 
exchange occurred via the Netherlands causing Indonesia to neglect relations with her 
immediate neighbours in Asia and only have access to other European countries through 
the Dutch. Dewantara thought that the Cultural Accord was a mistake and that Indonesia 
should itself experience the cultures of many different countries in order to equip itself to 
develop a national culture. Trisno Sumadjo, a painter and writer from the younger 
generation of artists, took a similar position in his attack on the Cultural Accord.  
 
Alisjahbana repeated the position he held during the Pujangga Baru debates. Alisjahbana, 
who was a participant in the Round Table Agreement, stated that Indonesians should 
utilise links to the Netherlands to access both international culture and the largest body of 
knowledge about Indonesian culture. Alisjahbana viewed Indonesian culture, which he 
understood broadly as all aspects of life, as ‘very far from being native to our state’25 and 
also far from the prosperity of the modern era. He stated that ‘it is already proper that we 
                                                 
24 At the time there were some assertions that the cultural provisions would be used to gain a trade 
advantage (Editor, 1950a).  




open our nation as wide as possible to the riches of all the culture of the new era’.26 The 
consensus that emerged from the conference followed the thought of Dewantara. It 
emphasised the requirement that Indonesian culture be free to follow its own path and 
demonstrated a commitment amongst artists and cultural bureaucrats to a liberal 
understanding of artists as requiring freedom to be at their most creative. However, the 
conference also was the catalyst for the creation of an artists’ group with an alternative 
understanding about culture and the role of artists. The People’s Cultural Institute 
(Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat – LEKRA) was formed just ten days after the conference 
as a response to disillusionment at the direction that the participants were taking with 
regard to Indonesian culture (Foulcher, 1986, p. 17).27  
 
c. The Second Cultural Congress 
 
The second congress was organised by the LKI and held in Bandung in 1951. Whereas 
the first congress had been focussed on general concerns about Indonesian culture framed 
by a general and theoretical perspective,28 the second congress was much more focussed 
on institutional development and the practicalities of encouraging cultural activity.29 The 
binaries that dominated discussion in the first congress were pushed aside as attention 
turned to the issues of institutional development. The five topics chosen for discussion 
are an example of the altered focus: cultural policy, copyright, art criticism, film 
censorship and literature.  
 
The two papers that dealt most thoroughly with cultural policy and received the most 
attention in the subsequent discussions were by Kuntjoro Purbopranoto and Muhammad 
Yamin. Purbopranoto began with the definition of culture that was agreed on at the first 
congress before limiting himself to art as a ‘concrete’ focus for cultural policy. He 
                                                 
26 ‘Telah selayaknya kita membuka negeri kita seluas-luasnya untuk kekayaan segala kebudayaan zaman 
baru’ (Alisjahbana, 1950, p. 30).  
27 I discuss LEKRA in detail in the section of this chapter about non-state cultural organisations during 
Guided Democracy.  
28 At the beginning of the second congress, the Chair of LKI, Bahder Djohan stated in the opening speech 
that the central point of the first congress was the discussion of the bases of culture (‘dasar-dasar 
kebudayaan’) and that ‘the cultural problem mainly was viewed from the perspective of its relationship 
with State Development and Societal Development’ (1952, p. 12). (‘... soal kebudayaan itu terutama 
dipandang dari sudut perhubungannya dengan Pembangunan Negara dan Pembangunan Masyarakat.’)  
29 The Minister of Education and Culture, Mr. Wongsonegoro, encouraged participants to ‘discuss as 
completely as possible how organisations can best implement this culture’ (1952, p. 17). (‘... membicarakan 




continually emphasised the need for ‘concrete’ and ‘practical’ discussion (1952, p. 392). 
He argued:  
The goal of arts and cultural organisations ... is to care for and foster the expertise 
of its members (artists) and strengthen national identity. (1952, p. 388) 
Tujuan organisasi kesenian dan kebudayaan ... ialah memelihara dan memupuk 
keahlian para anggota (seniman) dam memperkuat kepribadian bangsa.  
He then developed his ideas for a network of arts organisations reaching from the village 
to the national level which were enthusiastically received.  
 
Yamin, who was a prominent nationalist leader during the war of independence and 
Japanese periods and held important positions during both the Constitutional Democracy 
and Guided Democracy periods, presented a comparative study of different countries’ 
cultural organisations. He assessed cultural policy in China, Russia, France, the United 
States of America, Egypt and India-Pakistan. Yamin’s long paper called for a 
‘decentralised’ system with a ‘place for representatives of regional cultures in the central 
leadership,’ acknowledging the growing need for recognition of regional cultures (1952, 
p. 425). Yamin attempted to formulate cultural institutions that can further stimulate 
cultural activity in an enlivened and diverse cultural milieu. He argued for the creation of 
a new cultural organisation to coordinate the fields of education, science and culture 
including conservatories of art, libraries and a University ‘of international quality’ (1952, 
p. 428).30 Like Purbopranoto, Yamin viewed cultural policy centred on the development 
of a national culture31 despite the ‘geographic’ and ‘racial’ differences in Indonesia 
(1952, p. 432).  
 
The difference between the first and second congresses reflects the changing political 
climate. The first congress, held during the war of independence at a time when the fate 
of the Republic of Indonesia was uncertain, reflects the feeling that a new society and a 
new type of human – the Indonesian – was emerging. The second congress was held 
                                                 
30 The conference did birth a new organisation with greater scope than a focus on the arts and culture. The 
idea for the National Society for Sciences (Masyarakat Ilmu Pengetahuan Nasional), which later became 
the Indonesian Society for Sciences (Masyarakat Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia – MIPI), was formulated in 
the months following the conference (Prawirohardjo, 1952). MIPI’s scope reflects the breadth of the 
definition given to culture which includes almost all aspects of life of the populace. MIPI was established 
with Law No. 6, 1956 (Prawirohardjo, 1959). Initially under the Department of Education and Culture, 
MIPI was transferred to a newly created Ministry for National Research in 1962 before becoming LIPI 
(Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia) in 1967 and being made directly responsible to the President. 
(LIPI, 1971).  
31 For instance, as the name of his new cultural organisation, he suggests ‘Proclamation Institute’ 




when administrators held political power. They had turned their attention to the problems 
facing Indonesia with a perspective informed by their Western education. Their attention 
was primarily focussed towards institutional development. However, Yamin in particular 
looked beyond the West in his search for a suitable model. A concern remained that 
Indonesia not copy the West, but develop a unique culture.  
 
The debates in the second congress also demonstrate a raised awareness of the need to 
accommodate a number of different cultures within Indonesia. Bujung Saleh, a prominent 
writer and LEKRA activist, raised the issue of cultural autonomy and minority cultures 
(1952). An attendee from Bali, Utusan, discussed the position of art in Bali (1952). He 
stated that the Balinese have an investment in their art, unlike Indonesian culture which 
was the province of educated nationalists, and that the relationship between culture and 
religion in Bali was different to Islam. He then discussed the issue of tourism and the 
need for tourists to understand Balinese art rather than simply viewing it as a spectacle. 
However, a concern with the development of a singular national culture still dominated 
the debates. The ideas of LEKRA also were represented at the conference, but were not 
central to discussion. A.S. Dharta, one of LEKRA’s most eloquent spokesmen of the 
early 1950s, expressed the need for artists to side with progressive political forces and 
their obligation contribute to societal transformation (1952).  
 
d. The Third Cultural Congress  
 
The third cultural congress was held in Solo in September 1954. Rather than focussing on 
cultural policy generally, the congress focussed on the issue of culture in education. The 
third congress was organised by the Consultative Committee on National Culture (Badan 
Musyarawah Kebudayaan Nasional – BMKN). The three topics covered were: cultural 
education for the school community, for the city community and for the workers and 
farming community. The narrower scope of the third congress was accompanied by a 
narrowing of participants and ideas. The congress focussed almost exclusively on 
education and the concerns of the DPPK. The conclusions made recommendations to 
expand the DPPK’s role and power in the social sphere without calling for any reforms to 




1954). In contrast to the excitement and possibilities of the second cultural congress, the 
third congress promoted increasing state intervention, control and leadership.32  
 
The proceedings of the four conventions provide a resource for identifying the positions 
of the politicians, bureaucrats and cultural commentators that had the attention of the 
makers of cultural policy. Three key features from the cultural conventions provide an 
interesting and important picture of the terrain on which cultural policy was being made 
and the key issues of the period. The first feature is the use of synthesis to create a single 
national culture from elements considered antagonistic. Synthesis was regularly used to 
solve the Eastern culture and Western culture dichotomy and was also used to overcome 
the differences between the ‘old’ and ‘young’ generations, and between their desires to 
protect ‘old’ cultural forms and foster new forms. The national culture that was supposed 
to eventuate from this vague, theoretical and unproven process was to overcome the 
divisions between different groups within Indonesia. Synthesis also involved a level of 
state intervention in order to control the synthesis to avoid the normalisation of particular 
cultural attributes (for instance, the negative elements of Western culture). In other 
words, there were elements of a command culture model alongside liberal notions of 
artistic freedom. It should also be emphasised that in most cases the resulting culture was 
singular. At the time of the first Cultural Congress, it was a commonly assumption 
amongst the Western-educated cultural elite that Indonesia would develop one culture 
and all other cultures would fade away. This assumption was highly problematic in the 
case of ethnic cultures and, even during the early years of the republic, there was a quiet 
acknowledgement by some participants of the issues raised in indigenous ethnic cultures.  
 
Secondly, the Cultural Conference in particular and, to a lesser degree, the second 
Cultural Congress took the position that artists required artistic freedom in order to 
produce the highest quality of work possible.33 The commitment to artistic freedom 
correlates with the liberal notion that freedom is a requirement for optimum performance, 
be it the production of a commodity or work of art. The third feature is the changing 
position of attendees in regards to the role of the state in cultural policy. The first Cultural 
                                                 
32 Sapardi Djoko Damono’s analysis of the three Cultural Congresses reflects the marginal interest of the 
third congress. In a twenty-one page article, he spends under three pages discussing the third congress 
(1987).  
33 In an unanswered question at the first Cultural Congress, Asmara Hadi asked if ‘freedom to create’ 
(‘kemerdekaan untuk mencipta’) was to be included in LKN (‘Pembentukan Organisasi Kebudayaan,’ 




Congress was awash with theories about the state’s relationship to culture, while the state 
was generally designated responsibility for national culture. In the second Cultural 
Congress, attendees were concerned with institutional development where the state was 
to provide the infrastructure for cultural activities that would secure the conditions for the 
development of national culture. The emphasis was on practical plans for a cultural 
policy infrastructure.  
 
The dominant faction in the cultural conventions, all of which were organised by the state 
or, in the case of the Cultural Conference, a state-sponsored institution, was the Western-
educated, liberal-leaning elite. Islamic or Left-wing positions about the arts were 
marginalised at this time by a ‘liberal’ pro-West, modernising position. The communists 
were still ostracised and in the process of regrouping after the events in Madiun in 1948 
(Thomas, 1981, p. 371), and Islamic groups were split on questions of culture and the 
form that Islamic cultural and artistic expression should take (Maier, 1987, pp. 10-11). 
These other perspectives only rarely arose in the debates and only in the question times of 
the sessions.  
 
Cultural Policy during Constitutional Democracy 
A good starting point for an analysis of cultural policy is a 1951 article about culture by 
the Head of the Cultural Office, Soedarsono (1951). After emphasising the importance of 
the moment for the development of culture in Indonesia, Soedarsono turned his attention 
to the controversial Cultural Accord with the Netherlands. Much like the majority opinion 
at the Cultural Conference the preceding year, Soedarsono stated that the ideal and only 
acceptable condition for the development of Indonesian culture was absolute freedom:  
Where old ties are retained, of course these forced ties are not free, so the ‘free 
development’ of independent peoples is just a myth. (1951, p. 73)  
Dimana ikatan2 lama diteruskan, ikatan paksaan tentu tidak bebas, maka 
‘perkembangan bebas’ dari manusia merdeka adalah kosong belaka  
Soedarsono discussed at length the repercussions of ‘forced’ cultural relationships (the 
periods of Dutch colonialism and Japanese occupation) and emphasised the positive 
results of ‘natural’ relationships with neighbouring countries (such as India and China) 





Soedarsono then turned his attention to national culture, which he defined as the basis of 
the nation and therefore an important resource to be developed. He lists the four ‘basic’ 
goals of the Cultural Office which can be summarised as follows:  
1) Democratisation of every cultural field until they penetrate to all of wider society 
and become popular (but also ‘protected so they do not become vulgar’);34  
2) Verticalisation of DPPK (the spread of cultural offices to lower levels);  
3) Leading culture towards ‘national universal culture’35 and away from 
provincialism; and 
4) A harmonious prosperity where all cultural fields’ (language, the arts and 
archaeology) receive attention (1951, pp. 74-5).  
Soedarsono also emphasised an ‘international orientation’36 in cultural policy where 
culture is to be used to foster relations with other countries and the inclusion of a cultural 
attaché in international trips. Soedarsono finished by emphasising that the ‘path of 
synthesis is more constructive than analysis that enlarges differences’ in the case of 
indigenous cultures (1951, p. 75).37  
 
Soedarsono’s emphasis on freedom should be viewed in the context of the broad 
definition of culture that underlay the operation of the Cultural Office and sanctioned 
greater intervention than was the case in most Western countries. The 1953 outline of 
policy for DPPK provides an insight into the definition of culture:  
The function of Culture in a free nation-state is not only limited to investigating 
objects, but those objects in all fields must live in the natural culture of all of 
Indonesian society and become the basis of life for all of the nation. (‘Garis-Garis 
Besar Politik Pendidikan, Pengadjaran dan Kebudajaan,’ 1953, p. 4) 
Fungsi Kebudayaan dalam negara yang merdeka tidak hanya terbatas hingga 
penyelidikan objek2, akan tetapi objek2 itu dalam segala lapangan harus hidup 
dalam alam budaya segenap masyarakat Indonesia dan menjadi dasar kehidupan 
bagi seluruh Bangsa.  
This definition is reminiscent of the Dutch emphasis on the daily lives of indigenous 
Indonesians in adat research, but also reflects the struggle in newly independent countries 
to develop national cultures that united different ethnic, religious and social groups. A 
consequence for the Cultural Office of using a broad definition was that it took on an 
extremely wide range of the tasks. The scope of the Cultural Office’s self-apportioned 
brief burdened policy makers with almost impossible tasks that were well beyond their 
                                                 
34 ‘Dijaga jangan sampai vulgar’ (1951, p. 74).  
35 ‘Kebudayaan universil national’ (1951, p. 74).  
36 ‘Orientasi internasional’ (1951, p. 75).  





capacity.38 They were not equipped either financially or technically to fulfil their role as 
the creators of a new culture which becomes apparent when the policies of the various 
areas are examined more closely.  
 
The four divisions within the Cultural Office can be divided into two types: newly 
formed divisions and institutions appropriated from the colonial regime. The appropriated 
institutes were the National Museum and the Institute of Archaeology (Dinas 
Purbakala).39 In an article that discussed museum display in 1945, Soedibio 
Soewardipoetro, a writer for English language magazine, The Voice of Free Indonesia, 
observes the change that independence had brought to museum management:  
The museum is justly renown for its ethnographical collections. Formerly 
exhibited in dark and unattractive rooms, they are now in brilliantly lighted halls. 
The visitor is strongly impressed by a sense of space, good taste and novelty. The 
exhibits are not shown as curious or strange quaint people and many a prejudiced 
foreigner finds himself revising his opinion regarding these ‘savages’. (1945, p. 
17) 
From the racial hierarchy of the colonial period, colonial era institutions were reoriented 
to represent the heritage of a civilised and unified people, while using contemporary 
methods of museum display.  
 
Moh. Amir Sutaarga, the most important figure in museum management in the 1950s and 
1960s (McGregor, 2003, pp. 93-4), made a similar argument in a long article (1968).40 
Sutaarga begins by reviewing a speech by the Dutch Head of Oudheidkundige Dienst 
(Bureau of Archaeology), Dr. F.D.K. Bosch, noting that both the role that Bosch assigned 
museums in Indonesia and many of his criticisms are still valid. However, Sutaarga 
incorporates another goal within museum management:  
... museums are not only a tool to combat the cultural poverty of a nation - as has 
already been proven by Dr Bosch in his speech analysed earlier – but museums 
are also an institution that advances the civilisation of a nation. (1968, p. 8) 
... museum itu bukanlah semata-mata suatu alat untuk mencegah bahaya 
kemiskinan kebudayaan suatu bangsa saja –seperti yang sudah dinyatakan oleh 
Dr. Bosch dalam pidatonya yang diuraikan tadi itu – tetapi museum pun suatu 
lembaga untuk memajukan peradaban bangsa itu 
                                                 
38 For instance the Cultural Office was expected to implement supervision and maintenance for all natural 
structures and ancient structures as national monuments (Djohan, 1951, p. 5), a huge undertaking in a 
country as large and diverse as Indonesia.  
39 The two were initially joined before a Division of Museum Management was established in 1956 
(Soebadio, 1985, p. 16).  




In Sutaarga’s article, two functions of museums emerge as central to their contribution to 
the achievement of an advanced civilisation: firstly, museums are to protect the nation 
from cultural poverty by keeping and collecting cultural objects and knowledges; and 
secondly, a didactic function that spreads knowledge about the past and the future, 
including through technological museums that focus on the sciences (1968, pp. 12-17). 
Sutaarga’s article demonstrates how the functions (and the critique) of museums in 
independent Indonesia shared a number of continuities with colonial practice, with the 
important difference that Indonesians were now also addressed as national subjects.41 
 
The new divisions in the Cultural Office were Arts, Historical Documentation and 
Language. Arts policy encompassed both modern forms and traditional forms that were 
still relevant to Indonesian society. Early arts policy was focussed on developing the Arts 
Section (Bagian Kesenian) as the developer of national artistic forms. The three central 
tenets of the Division’s early plans can be summarised as:  
1) A ‘scientific’ approach to developing the arts (‘using psychology, ethnology, 
aesthetics, etc’)42 where all the various types of art are collected together, studied, 
then suitable foundations identified as an embryonic ‘basis’ for Indonesian 
national arts;  
2) Educating Indonesians about arts through the mass media, in schools and 
organising artistic events ‘with high values’43; and  
3) Increasing the technical proficiency of Indonesian artists and providing artists 
with scholarships and tools (Bagian Kesenian, 1951, p. 5).  
The first tenet reflects the synthetic perspective about Indonesian culture where a single 
culture was going to eventuate with elements of the different cultures present within 
Indonesia. The state’s role here was not just to oversee, but to study (using the natural 
sciences) and identify the basis of the national arts. However, there is no suggestion in the 
policy that artists’ activities were to be directed by the Arts Section, even though this 
Section was attempting to define the national arts and shape popular tastes. Artists were 
to be taught technical skills and to be provided with tools and grants. The Arts Section 
had a supervisory role in relation to artists where creative expression was not directed to 
particular ends. The contradiction with the Arts Section’s attempts to define the national 
arts highlights the presence of two discourses about the regulation of the arts and the role 
of the state. The arts were also to be taught in schools, but only those arts ‘with high 
                                                 
41 Balai Pustaka also came under the control of the new government (Sen & Hill, 2000, p. 23). However, it 
lost its place as the primary publisher of Indonesian fiction in the face of increasing competition. 
42 ‘Psychologis, etnologis, estetis, dsb.nya’ (1951, p. 5).  




values’, indicating the presence of hierarchies of different kinds of arts within policy. 
Arts policies were very broad in scope44 and well beyond the capabilities of a small 
government department with limited resources. It was not until increased government 
spending in the 1970s that the Cultural Office would develop the capacity to implement 
large-scale projects in accordance with its own formulation of its role.  
 
An important legacy of the 1945-65 period for Indonesian artists was the creation of arts 
colleges. By 1953 there were four state-sponsored art schools operating within Java of 
which three were under the control of the Fine Arts Section. The Indonesian Academy of 
Fine Arts (Akademi Seni Rupa Indonesia – ASRI) in Yogyakarta was the first arts college 
in Indonesia. ASRI was established in 1949 in a city which had a large number of 
nationalist artists (Editor, 1951). The Indonesian Karawitan Conservatory (Konservatori 
Karawitan Indonesia – KKI) was established in 1950 in Solo, Central Java. R. Anderson 
Sutton suggests that one of the aims of establishing the KKI was to provide a place where 
all the regional arts could blend together, which is in accordance with the goals of the 
Fine Arts Section during this period (Sutton, 1991, p. 175). The third institution 
controlled by the Cultural Office was the Western Music School (Sekolah Musik Barat) 
in Jakarta. All three of these institutions were established on the understanding that they 
would contribute to the development of nationalism and the Indonesian arts. An art 
teacher training program was established in Bandung in 1947 as part of the University of 
Indonesia’s Bandung campus. It later became part of the Bandung Institute of 
Technology in 1959.  
 
From the early 1950s there were links between cultural policy and foreign policy. A 1951 
report indicates that the Cultural Office had a UNESCO Bureau and an International 
Division45 and Soedarsono’s report of the same year also emphasised an ‘international 
orientation’46 in cultural policy. The 1953 policy outline places a high importance on 
introducing and promoting Indonesian culture to the international community in order to 
influence opinions about Indonesia, assist the development of Indonesian art and 
demonstrate that the Indonesian nation is interested in supporting the development of 
                                                 
44 For instance, the Division of Arts was responsible for all ancient arts which had disappeared, organising 
all art that was currently being performed in Indonesia, demonstrating Indonesian art to the international 
community, supporting artists and running three art schools (‘Garis-Garis Besar ...,’ 1953).  
45 ‘Urusan Luar Negri’ (Djohan, 1951, p. 6).   




culture (‘Garis-Garis Besar ...,’ 1953, p. 4). The bulk of activities in this area were 
cultural exchanges for students, artists and Cultural Office officials. A 1955 report lists 
exchanges in 1954 to East Pakistan, China, ‘several states in Asia, Europe and America’47 
and future trips to China, Czechoslovakia, and plans for cultural representatives in a 
number of major foreign cities (‘Garis-Garis Besar ...,’ 1955, p. 198). In 1955, Indonesia 
became a member of UNESCO’s Executive Board, underlining its commitment to 
international cooperation in the cultural field (‘Garis-Garis Besar ...,’ 1955, p. 199).  
 
The emphasis on international cooperation peaked in 1955, largely because of the Asia-
Africa conference held in Bandung, West Java. Instigated by Ali Sastroamidjojo when he 
was Prime Minister in 1954, the Asia-Africa conference was a large conference of Afro-
Asian states that brought domestic prestige to Sastroamidjojo and Sukarno (Ricklefs, 
2001, pp. 301-2). One of the four goals of the conference was ‘to consider social, 
economic, and cultural problems and relations of the countries represented’ (Yamin, 
1955, p. 9), which resulted in the formation of the Committee on Cultural Cooperation 
during the conference (1955, p. 95). The Conference’s ‘Final Communiqué’ strongly 
endorsed cultural cooperation as a means of ‘promoting understanding among nations’ 
(1955, p. 34). The communiqué expressed a desire to renew ‘old cultural contacts’ 
between Asian and African cultures that had been ‘interrupted’ by colonialism and 
develop new ones through the means of bilateral arrangements (1955, pp. 34-6). The 
Conference took care to state that ‘true to the age old tradition of tolerance and 
universality’, that cultural contacts with non-Afro-Asian countries should be pursued 
simultaneously to promote worldwide cooperation (1955, p. 35). The Conference was 
scathing of colonialism, which at this stage referred to ongoing colonial administration of 
some territories in Afro-Asia that ‘suppresses the national culture of the people’ (1955, p. 
35).48 The Asia-Africa conference marks the beginnings of an important movement in 
international relations of which Indonesia was an early leader. One of the goals for the 
conference outlined by the Indonesian parliament was to organise a ‘special group’49 of 
nations in the United Nations based on shared positions. The Final Communiqué 
recommended collective action in the United Nations and other arenas on particular 
                                                 
47 ‘Pelbagai negeri di Asia, Eropa dan Amerika’ (‘Garis-Garis Besar ...,’ 1955, p. 198).  
48 Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco are singled out due to the suppression of the study of the indigenous 
cultures and languages of those countries (Yamin, 1955, p. 35).  




issues (1955, pp. 7,37). The Non-aligned Movement and the Group of 77 grew out of this 
impetus (Kang, 1988, p. 160).  
 
Throughout this period the Cultural Office was developing sub-branches at the lower 
levels of government. Regional offices responsible to the national office in Jakarta were 
built in all provincial capital cities in the 1950s. However, development was not uniform 
as provinces and regencies could also sponsor their own cultural offices which were 
responsible to a lower level of government. An extreme case is Yogyakarta, which had 
four cultural offices with overlapping activities in the mid 1950s: the national Cultural 
Office, the Cultural Office of the Province of Central Java, the Cultural Office of the 
Special Territory of Yogyakarta, and the Yogyakarta municipality’s Cultural Office. By 
the end of the 1950s there were individual cultural technicians (teknisi budaya) who 
worked in particular sub-regencies (Kecamatan), although it was not until the 1990s that 
every sub-regency had its own cultural technician.50  
 
A final point about the early years of cultural policy in Indonesia is the activities of state 
sponsored institutions. LKI was active in the early years with the publication of the 
cultural magazine Indonesia. In 1952 it was replaced by BMKN, which took control of 
Indonesia. BMKN was a nongovernmental arts organisation funded by the state. It was an 
apolitical body with individuals, including artists, intellectuals and bureaucrats, and 
groups represented. BMKN adopted a broad engagement with culture that was 
symptomatic of much of the cultural policy of the period. Holt notes that its goals and 
programs were ‘all encompassing’ and that its ‘wide-ranging aims were rarely 
implemented with concrete, detailed and systematic programs of action’ (1967, p. 246). 
BMKN’s liberal perspective about culture was soon contested by LEKRA from within as 
a member association. LEKRA’s position (which I discuss in the final section below), 
combined with sporadic government funding, increasingly weakened the BMKN as the 
1950s progressed. Holt states that in the early 1960s, BMKN ‘became a somewhat 
impotent residue of the ‘liberal’ orientation toward the arts’ (1967, p. 248).  
 
Arts organisations were active during the period. For instance, Claire Holt notes that fine 
arts collectives proliferated and multiplied in Yogyakarta during and after the struggle for 
                                                 




independence (1967, p. 201). During the early 1950s the Cultural Office was attempting 
to provide an institutional framework that arts organisations could use. BMKN provides 
an example of this cultural policy model. It was a government-organised body that 
involved artists and arts organisations in order to facilitate their activities. An article by a 
representative of the Cultural Office in East Java, Karyono Js., both notes the multiple 
activities of cultural groups in the area and provides an example of the place of cultural 
groups in cultural policy (1953). He stated that the potential is high, although ‘the 
features in several things and several places are still very elementary.’51 He then turned to 
the application of cultural policy. Karyono emphasised the need to take forward-looking 
steps towards these cultural groups that were ‘more active and concrete’,52 such as giving 
subsidies.  
 
Cultural policy during Constitutional Democracy was characterised by two contradictory 
models regarding the role of cultural policy. The first model was a commitment to 
institutional development that can be characterised as a broadly liberal model of cultural 
regulation. This commitment can be seen in the development of a cultural infrastructure, 
including groups like LKN and BMKN, whose members were also drawn from outside 
the bureaucracy, arts schools, as well as a network of cultural bureaucrats throughout 
Indonesia. The state was understood a facilitator of national culture rather than a leader, 
as reflected in its organisation of BMKN and the notion that if the state established the 
right conditions national culture would develop. An important condition that was 
repeatedly emphasised was freedom from outside interference, a common element of 
liberal cultural policies.  
 
The second model was centred on the process of synthesis that it was assumed would 
create a national culture. The Cultural Office took responsibility at times for supervising, 
at times for instigating the process of synthesis itself and included encouraging desired 
elements and discouraging bad. Although the notion of ‘supervision’ accorded with 
certain elements of liberal models (for instance, encouragement of high culture rather 
than popular culture), the Indonesian state’s role often extended beyond that of most 
Western countries. The commitment to synthesis and a single culture was peculiar to the 
early 1950s and was an inheritance from the war of independence and earlier nationalist 
                                                 
51 ‘Sifatnya dalam beberapa hal dan beberapa tempat masih sangat elementair’ (Karyono Js., 1953).  




movements when there was a commitment to the development of a unified, new national 
culture for the new nation.  
 
The cultural policy of Constitutional Democracy demonstrated some continuity with late 
colonial and Japanese occupying cultural policy in its use of culture to alter the 
behaviours of individuals and manage populations. However, the underlying rationale 
differed markedly from the perspectives of the occupying administrations. Cultural policy 
was structured around building an independent nation that was an equal with other 
nations in the international system. The aim of the different fields of cultural policy was 
to facilitate the continued development of a national population understood as a group of 
free individuals with a national commitment through their understanding of Indonesia’s 
cultural and historical development. The central goal was, in the words of Sutaarga, to 
make ‘the civilisation of a nation prosper’ (1968, p. 8). In comparison to the more 
directive cultural policies of the preceding periods, Constitutional Democracy’s cultural 
policies were more focussed on facilitating cultural development although there were 
elements of a command culture in some of its plans and programs surrounding the use of 
synthesis. However, this was minor relative to what it preceded and what was to follow in 
Guided Democracy.  
 
The administrator governmentality is most obvious in the state’s reduced role when 
compared to the Japanese Occupation and Guided Democracy, particularly the 
understanding of the state’s role as a facilitator. However, the commitment to institution 
building was often thwarted by the highly idealistic and vague definitions of culture. 
Cultural policy was plagued by the political imperative of an inclusive, popular 
nationalism. Its inclusiveness pushed its goals and brief well beyond the capacity of the 
Cultural Office and often resulted in vague and impracticable policies.  
 
3. Policy and Culture During Guided Democracy 
The cultural policy changes brought by Guided Democracy occurred during, and to a 
large degree because of, the advent of the solidarity-maker political rationality. The 
problems of the Constitutional Democracy period reviewed earlier, combined with the 
opposition of Sukarno and the army (Lev, 1994; Mackie, 1994), made it susceptible to the 




soon was to reshape the methods and institutions of governance. Below I provide a brief 
synopsis of Sukarno’s critique of Constitutional Democracy, followed by a summary of 
the solidarity-maker political rationality that shaped governance from 1959.  
 
Sukarno was particularly scathing of the ‘liberal’ system which he regarded as ‘alien’ to 
Indonesia (Lev, 1966, p. 50) and ‘imported’ (Sukarno, 1970c, p. 84). Daniel Lev 
identifies two themes in Sukarno’s attack (1966, pp. 50-1). Firstly, Sukarno attacked the 
adversarial aspects of parliamentary democracy, relating them to the worsening economic 
and social problems in Indonesia. Secondly, Sukarno emphasised the return to 
Indonesia’s own identity. According to Sukarno, the problems Indonesia faced were a 
result of the adoption of a foreign system that was inappropriate for Indonesia. In 
contrast, Sukarno presented his own ‘concept’ as true to the spirit of Indonesianness:  
I want to propose something that is in harmony with the Indonesian spirit, the real 
spirit of the Indonesian Nation, that is: the spirit of family life. (1970c, pp. 88-9) 
The ‘fifty-percent-plus-one’ method of parliamentary democracy was to be replaced with 
a system that emphasised consensus through concepts that Sukarno represented as 
uniquely Indonesian: mutual-help (gotong-royong) and consultation-consensus 
(musyawarah-mufakat) (Lev, 1966, p. 56).53 Sukarno also stated his preference for single-
party states like China and Russia where development ‘runs smoothly’ (Lev, 1966, p. 
57).54 Culture was a significant justification used by Sukarno for political change.  
 
Sukarno’s critique of government, supported by the army leadership under Nasution, was 
successful in overcoming the opposition of the supporters of Constitutional Democracy. 
Sukarno reintroduced the 1945 Constitution on 5 July 1959, strengthening his position as 
President and taking up the position of Prime Minister.55 Sukarno’s ideas and slogans 
dominated Guided Democracy (Legge, 1972, p. 357). The new power of the President 
moved authority from discussions in parliament to Sukarno’s speeches (Maier, 1987, p. 
                                                 
53 Researcher Selo Soemardjan, in an article that reflects the sentiment and politics of the times, 
characterises the change as a move to a culturally appropriate system: ‘President Sukarno dramatically 
implemented his desire to move away from the system of liberal Western democracy and to return to a 
system of Guided Democracy, conceived as more consistent with the institutionalised patriarchal or 
identity-centred structure of Indonesian social organisations in general’ (1963, p. 71).  
54 He was attracted to the organic connection between ruler and ruled: ‘What the ministers determine is in 
fact distilled from the people, and what is ordered by the ministers penetrates to the common people’ (Lev, 
1966, p. 57). See also Lev (1966, p. 52) and Sukarno (1970a, p. 82).  
55 For a detailed summary of the events of the period, see Feith (1967) and Lev (1966). Cribb and Brown 
write: ‘In his series of reforms from 1957 to 1959, however, Sukarno did away with the checks and 
balances which had enabled the politics of stalemate to flourish and put into place institutions which would 




12). Perhaps the most important example was his Independence Day speech of 1959 that 
the Supreme Advisory Council a few months later called the Political Manifesto 
(Manipol) and declared it provided the general program of government.56 One political 
observer noted that the ‘President, formally detached from political parties, is the sole 
agency to issue fundamental decisions’ (Soemardjan, 1963, p. 77), although other groups, 
in particular the army, were able to exert substantial political pressure (Feith, 1967, pp. 
379-83).  
 
The central element of the solidarity-maker political rationality was the integration of 
different groups. Revolution, the most frequent theme in Sukarno’s speeches in the 
Guided Democracy period (Feith, 1967, p. 385; Legge, 1972, p. 349), was the most used 
of Sukarno’s integrative ideas with which he attempted to unite Indonesians. He urged 
people on to the task of nation-building and attempted to turn attention away from the 
deteriorating economy and the divisions between different groups (Feith, 1967, pp. 400-
9). John Legge, much like Feith, recognises that ‘a good deal of Sukarno’s radicalism ... 
was designed to serve the goal of preserving a social status quo’ (1972, p. 353). He notes 
that Sukarno desired to mobilise Indonesians through the idea of revolution, but he gave 
no specific direction, provided no detailed plans and supported a regime that was 
‘essentially representative of an existing elite’ (1972, pp. 352-4).  
 
It is not surprising then to repeatedly come across the observation that despite his 
attention to ideological direction, Sukarno ignored policy direction and left concrete 
policy details to others (Cribb & Brown, 1995, p. 89; Legge, 1972, p. 315). Despite 
Sukarno’s aversion to detail, policy during the Guided Democracy period was 
increasingly influenced by Sukarno’s ideas and rhetoric. Particularly important to policy 
making was Manipol and the USDEK doctrine57 that Sukarno claimed was a clarification 
of the five main points of Manipol. Feith identifies the most appealing aspect of Manipol-
USDEK (as they came to be known) as the sense of purpose it gave people after a long 
                                                 
56 See Supreme Advisory Council (1970) and Sukarno (1970b) for extracts of both documents.  
57 Sukarno’s USDEK doctrine pronounced in his speech on 28 May 1960 (Sukarno, 1961, p. 54). 
U UUD Proklamasi 1945 Constitution Proclaimed in 1945 
S Sosialisme Indonesia Indonesian Socialism 
D Demokrasi Terpimpin Guided Democracy 
E Ekonomi Terpimpin Guided Economy 





absence of shared direction (Feith, 1967, p. 368). The remaining political parties and 
most voluntary organisations were forced to make a statement declaring their support for 
Manipol-USDEK and the Pancasila (Feith, 1967, p. 373). The notion of ‘national 
identity’ in USDEK was particularly important to cultural policy and is examined in the 
next section. Feith also demonstrates widespread opposition to the doctrine and multiple 
interpretations to modify it according to the desires of particular individuals and groups 
(1967, pp. 366-72). Despite the veneer of adherence as the government extended its 
influence across state and non-state institutions, there are indications that the doctrine was 
not uniformly interpreted or applied.58  
 
Sukarno continued the trend toward a solidarity maker political rationality. The central 
thrust of Guided Democracy was to provide unity after the divisions of the 1950s and in a 
climate of ongoing opposition between different groups. The use of ritual and symbolism 
in the pursuit of integration overtook an expertise-based perspective on policy (Feith, 
1967, p. 385). However, Guided Democracy also struggled to secure the conditions for 
effective government. Legge writes: ‘Indonesia’s problem was ... that the new regime, 
like the old one, was unable to mobilise the power that was needed if government was to 
be effective and if the gigantic problems of the economy were to be tackled seriously’ 
(1972, p. 318).  
 
The Cultural Office during Guided Democracy  
The move from the administrator to the solidarity maker political rationality began to 
make itself felt in cultural policy from 1956. As Sukarno’s political power increased and 
was strengthened with the return to the 1945 Constitution, his ideas and concepts 
increasingly dominated cultural policy. However, given the ambiguity of Sukarno’s 
statements, attention needs to be paid to the programs and policies of the cultural 
institutions to find anything more than the general direction of cultural policy.  
 
A useful starting point for cultural policy analysis is the cultural clause that came into 
effect with the 1945 Constitution. Clause 32 of the 1945 Constitution states:  
The government shall advance Indonesian Culture.  
Pemerintah memajukan kebudayaan Indonesia.  
                                                 
58 Feith also notes that some army commanders resisted pressure ‘to create a Manipol-USDEK ideological 




Gone was the ‘freedom to partake in culture’ and emphasis moved towards the 
government’s responsibility for the advancement of national culture. The 1945 
Constitution itself was linked to a romantic nationalism associated with the struggle for 
independence, that emphasised the importance of society (often represented by the will of 
political power-holders) over the individual. The clause was accompanied by a 
‘Clarification’59 that states:  
The culture of the nation is culture that arises as the product of the character of the 
entire people of Indonesia. Old and authentic culture is found in high cultural 
achievements [Lit. peaks of culture] in regions throughout Indonesia [and is] 
considered the culture of the nation. Cultural effort must be directed to the 
advancement of civilisation, culture and unification, and should not reject new 
materials from foreign culture that can develop and enrich the culture of the 
nation and raise the level of humanity of the Indonesian nation.60 
Kebudayaan bangsa ialah kebudayaan yang timbul sebagai buah usaha budinya 
rakyat Indonesia seluruhnya. Kebudayaan lama dan asli terdapat sebagai 
puncak-puncak kebudayaan di daerah-daerah di seluruh Indonesia, terhitung 
sebagai kebudayaan bangsa. Usaha kebudayaan harus menuju ke arah kemajuan 
adab, budaya dan persatuan, dengan tidak menolak bahan-bahan baru dari 
kebudayaan asing yang dapat memperkembangkan dan memperkaya kebudayaan 
bangsa sendiri, serta mempertinggi derajat kemanusiaan bangsa Indonesia.  
Phillip Yampolsky identifies three points of confusion within the explanation. Firstly, the 
first sentence provides little explanation about anything and avoids addressing whether 
Indonesian culture was created along with the concept of Indonesia or encompasses all of 
the cultures of the various ethnic groups (1995, pp. 703-4). Secondly, the second sentence 
contradicts the first in that it limits national culture to ‘old and authentic’ forms (1995, p. 
704). Thirdly, the clarification provides no guide about how to determine what qualifies 
as a ‘high cultural achievement’ (1995, p. 704). This clause did not have much impact on 
early cultural policy due to the upheavals of the revolution.61 However, its return placed 
its ideas and rhetoric at the centre of cultural policy where its ambiguity caused much 
debate.  
 
The change in the Cultural Office was assisted by a new Menteri PPK who held office 
from 1957 until the army gained political power and forced him from office in 1966. 
                                                 
59 ‘Penjelasan’.  
60 This is based on Yampolsky’s translation (1995, p. 702). Yampolsky also notes that Clause 32 evoked 
some consternation within the Exploratory Committee on Efforts to Prepare for the Independence of 
Indonesia (Badan Penyelidik Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia) due to the absence of any 
mention of regional cultures (1995: 702).  
61 Yampolsky writes: ‘Aside from a brief period in 1945, the [1945 Constitution] was not implemented 




Professor Prijono62 had earned a Doctorate from Leiden University and had long been the 
Dean of the Arts Faculty at the University of Indonesia when Sukarno appointed him 
Minister. Prijono has been linked to the left-leaning, Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) 
affiliated Murba party (Thomas, 1981, p. 373) and was considered a strong supporter of 
the President’s ideas (Lee, 1995, p. 182). He received the Stalin peace prize in 1955 and 
was Chairman of the Indonesia-China Friendship Association from 1955-1957. Prijono 
interpreted Sukarno’s proclamations for application in cultural policy and education. In 
1959, for instance, he issued a statement called ‘Nation Building and Education’ (1970) 
which Feith and Castles state ‘was sometimes regarded as a kind of educational 
supplement to the Political Manifesto of August 1959’ (1970, p. 327).63  
 
A trend that began in 1956 was an increasing recognition of regional cultures.64 This 
trend first became apparent in the ‘Independence Day Review’ of 1956 where the cultural 
office began to position local cultures as elements of national culture. The review states:  
To give an opportunity for the growth of the national culture, the Government 
also gives good opportunities to local cultures to develop. Local cultures of a high 
quality will enrich national culture. (Setjonegoro, 1956, p. 568)  
Untuk memberikan kesempatan kepada pertumbuhan kebudayaan nasional itu, 
Pemerintah memberi pula kesempatan sebaik-baiknya kepada kebudayaan 
daerah-daerah untuk berkembang. Kebudayaan daerah yang tinggi mutunya akan 
memperkaya kebudayaan nasional. 
Prijono continued to acknowledge the place of regional cultures.65 In 1958 he repeated a 
formulation, ‘our art must be national art in spirit but can be regional in its form,’ in a 
series of speeches (1958a, p. 11).66 Prijono’s formulation marks the beginnings of a 
policy that positions regional arts to accord with national goals and the behaviours of 
                                                 
62 Prijono’s biographical information comes from Feith (1970, pp. 477-8).  
63 Lee, in his study of education in Indonesia between 1945 and 1965 states that Priyono ‘tried faithfully to 
incorporate the symbols and themes of Guided Democracy’ (1995, p. 99).  
64 Feith identifies 1954 as the year that more attention turned to regionalism due to the increasing demands 
for autonomy in Sumatra and Sulawesi (1962, p. 317). However, I did not find any evidence of such a 
change being mirrored in cultural policy until 1956.  
65 A speech of the Menteri PPK who preceded Dr. Prijono, the conservative nationalist Sarino 
Mangunpranoto, also emphasised the importance of regional cultures from 1956. Mangunpranoto 
highlighted that national culture is derived from regional cultures: ‘National culture should have its roots in 
regional cultures. Regional cultures must give the life essences to national culture’ (1956, pp. 611-2). 
(‘Seharusnya kebudayaan nasional berakar pada kebudayaan daerah. Kebudayaan daerah harus memberi 
zat-zat hidup kepada kebudayaan nasional.’)  
66 ‘Kesenian kita haruslah kesenian yang nasional isinya tapi boleh daerah bentuknya.’ This was also the 
title of a speech he gave on 20 July 1958. Interestingly, LEKRA’s interest in regional cultures also began in 
approximately 1955 (Foulcher, 1986, p. 30), which perhaps dates a sea change in how regional cultures 
were understood in Indonesia that also coincides with the increased regional discontent that followed the 




Indonesians. He argued for a mixture of Western and Indonesian arts that builds high 
moral quality (1958a, p. 12), although his emphasis was on the indigenous forms, and 
was scathing of art that is ‘full of sex’67 and of low moral character. Within this 
formulation, Prijono emphasised that commitment be to the nation and not a particular 
ethnicity. He stated in ‘Nation Building and Education’ that ‘we must, if possible, abolish 
ethnic-consciousness and raise men’s consciousness to the level of the nation’ (1970, p. 
328).68  
 
Cultural policy after 1959 became increasingly dominated by Sukarno’s notion of 
‘national identity’ outlined in the USDEK doctrine. Sukarno related ‘national identity’ to 
a number of different areas including science, politics, the arts and the economy. 
However, the only definitive statement he made was that ‘Indonesia has a socialist 
identity’ (1961, p. 64). In August 1960, a large Consultation Concerning the Meaning of 
National Identity69 was held in Salatiga. According to the Chair of the organising 
committee, the goal of the conference was to develop the ‘practical guidelines for the 
implementation of cultural tasks and activities in the framework of the President’s 
Political Manifesto.’70 Six fields were covered: religion and philosophy, education, 
ethics, the arts, law and society. I limit my discussion below to the field of arts policy.  
 
Prijono’s message to the conference provides an insight into how ‘national identity’ was 
used within the bureaucracy. Prijono recognised that Indonesian culture is a synthesis of 
different elements including Hindu, Muslim and Western, and made reference to the 
existence of regional cultures by calling culture in the Republic of Indonesia ‘multiform’ 
(1960, p. 19). He then argued that nation building requires a synthesis of cultures into 
one, if not in shape (bentuk), then in essence (isi). The division of essence and shape was 
an important element of the main thrust of his argument, as is demonstrated by his 
statement:  
We can and we must shape modern Indonesian identity, which I feel has not yet 
been formed as deeply and as broadly as it could be, using what we have inherited 
from our ancestors, in a way consistent with the Political Manifesto and USDEK. 
In this way, modern Indonesian identity will be a national Indonesian identity 
whose characteristics are widely shared and whose spirit is socialist. (1960, p. 20)  
                                                 
67 ‘Kesenian yang penuh dengan ‘sex’’ (1958a, p. 12).  
68 This text is an English translation. The translators are Feith and Castles.  
69 Musjawarah I Sekitar Arti Kepribadian Nasional.  
70 ‘Pedoman praktis untuk melaksanakan tugas2 dan kegiatan2 kebudayaan dalam rangka Manifesto 




Kepribadian Indonesia modern yang menurut perasaan saya belum terbentuk 
dalam arti yang sedalam-dalamnya dan seluas-luasnya, dapat dan harus kita 
bentuk dengan bahan-bahan yang diwariskan kepada kita oleh nenek-moyang dan 
yang kita sesuaikan dengan Manifesto Politik beserta USDEK-nya. Dengan 
demikian maka kepribadian modern Indonesia itu adalah kepribadian nasional 
Indonesia yang umum ciri-cirinya dan sosialis jiwanya.  
Prijono rated whether a culture was national by its accordance with the ideas and 
positions put forth in the state’s political doctrine. For instance, he turned to Manipol-
USDEK to determine which elements were desirable and undesirable within his 
ancestors’ cultures (1960, p. 19). He continued to identify the ‘best tools’ for growing 
modern Indonesian identity as ‘culture broadly defined’ which included ‘art, literature, 
traditions and ‘way of life’ which, he added, ‘must be empowered by our modern 
ideals’.71  
 
The three papers about arts policy are all focussed on elaborating how the arts contributed 
to ‘national identity’. All of the papers also included a division similar to essence and 
shape which reflects the problems of trying to link diverse cultural forms and traditions to 
a single ‘national identity’. The first speaker, Soebagio Sosrowardojo, spent most of his 
paper critiquing the overlapping dichotomies of Western/Eastern culture and 
modern/traditional arts. He defined art that comes from ‘a world view that is positive, 
tends towards realism and has a people-minded attitude’ as reflecting Indonesian 
identity.72 Although he critiqued Sanusi Pane’s resolution of the dichotomy in a 
‘synthesis’ as ‘impossible’ (1960, p. 8), the themes of his talk remained similar including 
the inclusion of elements of Western culture (1960, pp. 12-14). The second speaker 
Hoemardani followed Prijono’s formulation more closely than either of the other two 
speakers. He used the same terminology (isi and bentuk) although, rather than centring 
the ‘essence’ on Manipol-USDEK, Hoemardani used the more vague term ‘spiritual 
heritage.73  
 
The third speaker, Achdiat Karta Mihardja, held that the ‘national identity’ was based on 
the Pancasila (1960b, p. 31). He defined the work of the arts as enriching knowledge and 
seeking truth which he viewed as vital to the life of the nation. He defined ‘good art’ as 
                                                 
71 ‘Alat yang menurut perasaan saya paling baik untuk menumbuhkan kepribadian Indonesia modern 
adalah kebudayaan dalam arti luas jadi dalam arti kesenian, kesusasteraan, adat-istiadat dan ‘way of life’ 
pada umumnya, yang tentunya harus dijiwai dengan cita2 modern kita’ (1960, p. 20).  
72 ‘Pandangan dunia yang positif, kecenderungan kepada realisme dan sikap kerakyatan’ (1960, p. 12).  




art that ‘contains elements of truth, goodness, beauty’74 and ‘is related to ethics and 
characteristics that are considered vital to a particular time and place.’75 From this 
position, he made two suggestions about developing ‘dynamic and effective cultural 
politics’76 that would fit within his framework. His first suggestion was to increase 
opposition, including state opposition, to ‘cheap and sensational entertainments’ that had 
‘damaging effects’77 (1960a, pp. 49-50). Mihardja’s second suggestion was educating 
people about how to appreciate good art as a way of combating the imported commercial 
forms (1960a, p. 51). He called for greater integration of the activities of the state cultural 
apparatus and artistic groups to achieve his vision for cultural politics (1960a, p. 52).  
 
All three speakers combined elements of the previous orthodoxy with the more radical 
agenda of the state. Both Hoemardani (1960, p. 49) and Mihardja (1960, p. 18) discussed 
the need for freedom alongside calls for greater state intervention. Hoemardani argued 
that excessive rules impoverishes art (1960, p. 22) and that there was a ‘responsible 
freedom’ within society that extends to artists. The ‘responsibility’ of artists was to be 
oriented towards the national interest (1960, p. 25), indicating a lesser degree of freedom 
when compared to the calls of the early 1950s. Mihardja took a position closer to the 
earlier orthodoxy. He held that a dynamic cultural politics required freedom from rules 
and taboos (1960, p. 49). Prijono himself had, in an earlier speech in 1958, criticised the 
formulation of ‘art for art’s sake’ that had become associated with the Western-oriented 
liberal artists of the period. Instead, Prijono supported ‘engaged art’ or art that promoted 
‘peace and happiness ... through state development.’78  
 
Interestingly, the aesthetics of the state can be seen to have similarities with the preceding 
period. Art that was in accordance with the ‘national identity’ was considered to hold 
high values and morals, including certain forms of Western art. Through educating artists 
and the people about such arts, the ‘national identity’ could become complete as people 
acquired the values associated with those arts. Ruth McVey, in her study of attitudes to 
wayang in the PKI, notes how ‘technical’ reform was broadly understood as inevitable 
                                                 
74 ‘Mengandung unsur2 kebenaran, kebaikan, keindahan’ (1960a, p. 48).  
75 ‘Dihubungkan dengan etik dan cita2 yang dianggap urgen pada sesuatu-waktu’ (1960a, p. 48). 
76 ‘Suatu politik kebudayaan yang dinamis dan efektif’ (1960a, p. 49).  
77 Mihardja writes: ‘Hiburan murah dan sensasionil itu sangat buruk efeknya terutama jiwa massa’ (1960a, 
p. 49).  
78 ‘Kesenian yang mengabdikan diri, ‘l’art qui s’engage’ ... Untuk kesentosaan dan kebahagiaan kita 




within the party and how many of the ‘technical’ reforms had been suggested by other 
groups not linked to the PKI (1986, pp. 28-40). McVey suggests that these ‘technical’ 
reforms were in fact ‘ideological, reflecting new ideas as to proper cultural models’ 
(1986, p. 38) and were linked to the PKI leaders’ place in the metropolitan superculture 
of the Indonesian middle class (1986, pp. 40-2). Aesthetic reforms in cultural policy, like 
the PKI standpoint on wayang, reflected the views of the Indonesian middle class and, as 
McVey notes and as is demonstrated in the next two chapters, has a continuity of 
understanding with cultural policy during the New Order regime (1986, p. 40).  
 
During Guided Democracy, the formulation of national arts had widened to include 
regional arts within the definition of ‘national arts’. Certain arts of high quality and moral 
character that build the nation were to be encouraged and developed in the community. 
More importantly, the classification of which arts were ‘of a high quality and moral 
character’ and the moral leverage provided by identifying a ‘national culture/identity’ that 
was emerging but required development provided a discursive framework for the Cultural 
Office and elites. Much like the formulations before it, the state and elites were well 
positioned to pressure Indonesians about their decisions and behaviours. They could 
pronounce what arts and behaviours were ‘high quality’ and ‘national’ and which were 
not. Tying regional cultural forms to the discursive framework extended the discursive 
power structure into the most popular forms in all of the regions across Indonesia at the 
same time as the Cultural Office was extending its reach down to the sub-national levels 
of government.  
 
The cultural bureaucracy began to assert a state view about acceptable and unacceptable 
cultural forms, which followed Sukarno’s opinions, including his attitude to the West.79 
In a statement issued on 30 October 1959, representatives of DPPK asserted:  
Crazy-looking Western dances like rock ‘n’ roll, cha-cha, samba and the like are 
not acceptable to the DPPK, if performed by Indonesian boys and girls either in 
their own homes or in public places. (Departemen Pendidikan Pengadjaran dan 
Kebudajaan, 1960)  
Dansa Barat jang kegila-gilaan sebangsa rock’n roll, cha-cha-cha, samba dan 
sebagainya tidak mendapat persetujuan dari Departemen P.P. dan K., apabila 
dilakukan oleh putra dan putri Indonesia, baik dalam lingkungan rumah tangga 
sendiri, maupun ditempat umum.  
                                                 
79 Feith notes that Sukarno ‘repeatedly denounced’ rock-and-roll, jitterbugging and various other imports 




In the statement, a series of guidelines are put forward setting forth the official position 
about what constitutes Indonesian dances and music, acceptable Western dance and 
music and unacceptable Western dance and music. Ballet and artistic dance are 
acceptable, as are their accompanying music, opera and chamber music. As a ‘balance’, 
DPPK promoted national dances, in particular lenso, saputangan and serampang 
duabelas (Departemen Pendidikan Pengadjaran dan Kebudajaan, 1960). Serampang 
duabelas was invented around 1954 by a bureaucrat from Medan’s Arts Office in 
conjunction with a member of a local royal family (Sedyawati, 1987, p. 248). After 
quickly developing a local following, the state started supporting it as an alternative to 
Western dances, and it became a state-supported dance craze across Indonesia.80 Another 
state-led endeavour to create a national cultural form was a genre of music called 
Hiburan Daerah. Yampolsky describes the genre as ‘songs sung in regional languages 
and derived from regional cultures … adapted to standard Western tunings and idioms 
and [that] were accompanied by cocktail-lounge combos’ (1995, p. 706). Multiple 
recordings of Hiburan Daerah were made and broadcast through Republic of Indonesia 
Radio (Radio Republik Indonesia – RRI).  
 
The international elements of cultural policy varied in line with Sukarno’s diplomatic 
manoeuvres. Although not as prominent in cultural policy as was the case during the 
early 1950s, cultural exchanges continued, but were limited to Sukarno’s international 
allies (‘Politik Pendidikan dan Kebudajaan Dep. PPK,’ 1964). Cultural programs and 
speeches also incorporated support for Sukarno’s foreign policy goals and views, such as 
the campaign to gain control of Irian Jaya81 from the Netherlands and opposition to the 
‘colonialist and imperialist bloc’.82 A broader and perhaps more fundamental parallel can 
also be drawn between the changing international climate, Sukarno’s foreign policy and 
the features of cultural policy. While there was increasing disillusionment amongst the 
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries with the state of international relations, 
Sukarno tended to take more radical positions than his fellow leaders in this movement, 
                                                 
80 Interestingly, Edi Sedyawati, herself a well known dancer and Director-General of Culture from 1993 
until 1998, critiques the spread of Serampang Duabelas as ‘aesthetically poor’ and the dancers as lacking 
knowledge of Malay dance traditions (1987, p. 248). As a result, a number of state-sponsored institutions 
organised a Malay Dance Class in Jakarta in 1972 that demonstrated to Sedyawati and other participants 
that Malay dance did indeed have ‘sophisticated’ (‘canggih’) technique and a ‘sufficiently wide range’ 
(‘cukup luas’) of sources (1987, p. 249) – an example of the assertion of elite control over a popular form 
through the application of aesthetics.  
81 Now divided into two provinces: West Irian Jaya and Papua.  




particularly as his domestic position became more tenuous (Legge, 1972, pp. 358-84). In 
1961, Sukarno divided the world into two groups: the New Emerging Forces (NEFO) and 
the Old Established Forces (OLDEFO) (Legge, 1972, p. 344).83 He became increasingly 
scathing of what he called continued ‘colonialism and imperialism’ through the continued 
domination of international political and economic relations by the great powers (Legge, 
1972, p. 344). Sukarno’s increasingly radical positions took its toll on Indonesia’s 
international prestige. From its position of leadership in 1955, Legge argues that 
Indonesia’s moves away from the West and towards the Soviet Union ‘had lost the 
sympathy of many of those who had supported her initiatives at the Afro-Asian 
Conference’ (1977, p. 160). The confrontation with Malaysia in 1964 further undermined 
Indonesia’s leadership and led to Sukarno withdrawing from the United Nations in 
January 1965 and from the International Monetary Fund, Interpol and the World Bank in 
August 1965 (Legge, 1972, pp. 369-70; Ricklefs, 2001, pp. 335,338).  
 
Sukarno’s criticisms of the international system shared similarities with the criticisms of 
many postcolonial states. These shared criticisms resulted in a change in UNESCO policy 
in the 1970s and 1980s when the NAM began asserting its numerical weight, resulting in 
the debates about creating a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and New World 
Information and Communication Order (NWICO).84 The NAM countries argued for a 
reshaping of existing economic and communication structures to protect the cultures of 
developing nations from the economic and cultural imbalance of the existing system 
(Dutt, 1995, pp. 185-234; McBride & Roach, 1994). Two features of the UNESCO 
debates were already apparent in the cultural policy of Guided Democracy. Firstly, 
UNESCO’s criticism of Western cultural imperialism85 and disparities between North 
and South in the circulation of cultural goods and information (Miller & Yudice, 2002, 
pp. 169-71) was similar to Indonesia’s critique of Western influence on Indonesian 
culture and desire to address the influx of Western popular culture. Secondly, UNESCO 
assumed the structural imperative of the nation state. Its discussions about culture often 
elided cultural identity with national identity, which was problematic given its 
commitment to cultural plurality (Tomlinson, 1991, pp. 70-1). Similarly, national culture 
                                                 
83 Although the division was defined largely in terms of former colonies and former masters, other elements 
occasionally were attached including wealth-poverty, socialist-capitalist, and, underlying all of these 
divisions, Sukarno’s friends and foes (Legge, 1972, pp. 344-5).  
84 Indonesia’s support of America in the cold war may have prevented it and other South East Asian nations 
from taking a leadership role in the movement.  




was the structural imperative of cultural policy, within which ethnic cultures were forced 
to fit and cultural plurality was contained. Indonesia’s position in international relations 
reinforced these features of cultural policy.  
 
One museum that was designed during Guided Democracy, but never completed, was the 
National Monument History Museum (Museum Sejarah Monumen Nasional, hereafter 
the Monas Museum). Katharine McGregor’s recent research into the Monas Museum 
provides both detailed description of the displays and analysis of the planning process 
and underlying concepts (2003). Sukarno was personally involved with the project and 
signed off on all of the plans for the displays (2003, pp. 95-7), while the museum 
committee itself was chaired by Prijono (2003, p. 99). Two themes dominated the 
portrayal of Indonesian history: first, the progression towards socialism and away from 
imperialism (2003, pp. 104-5); secondly, nationalism and a united people (2003, p. 104). 
The two themes were not always easy to represent given the record of Indonesian history 
(2003, pp. 93, 104-9) and clashed in some instances, such as the absence of scenes 
depicting class struggle (2003, p. 117).  
 
The years between 1956 and 1965 brought changes to cultural policy which can only be 
understood against the broader political climate under Guided Democracy. Defining and 
spreading ‘national identity’ and the development of socialism became the central focus 
of cultural policy. Institutional development, such as the building of arts educational 
institutions, ended with the period of Constitutional Democracy. Instead, the Cultural 
Office was engaging with the politics of the Guided Democracy period through its 
attempts to mobilise artists and Indonesians behind Sukarno’s political agenda. An 
example of its leadership is the summarized message that Prijono sent out to artists at a 
conference in 1960 about cultural in general and literature and art in particular (Prijono, 
1963):  
... permit things that accord with all the characteristics of our Revolution and 
especially those that accord with Indonesian socialism, and reject everything that 
opposes or is contrary to those features. (1963, p. 95) 
... membenarkan apa yang sesuai dengan semua cita-cita Revolusi kita khususnya 
sesuai dengan sosialisme Indonesia, dan menolak semuanya yang bertentangan 




Compared to the preceding period, the government’s guidelines were more prescriptive, 
such as the case of dance and music, as cultural activities were linked to political 
positions.  
 
Examining the concepts of ‘artistic freedom’ and ‘synthesis’ provides a method of 
gauging the changes of Guided Democracy. The concept of artistic freedom was 
increasingly sidelined as a ‘liberal’ position regarding culture, while politically oriented 
cultural expression was embraced as long, as it was aligned with Sukarno’s concepts and 
terminology. In their rhetoric, supporters of Sukarno like Prijono demanded a 
commitment to their goals and increasingly attempted to narrow the field of possibilities 
for what constituted ‘national identity’ and national culture. The civilising function of 
culture was harnessed to Sukarno’s political agenda and attempts to mobilise the national 
population. From facilitating the development of a national culture, the goal of cultural 
policy became to encourage participation in the political programs of Sukarno through 
the rhetoric of creating a socialist society. These moves were controversial and contested, 
as will be examined in the next section about non-government arts organisations. In these 
circumstances, the notion that freedom was the optimal condition of artistic creativity was 
a minority position.  
 
The notion that a singular national culture was to develop through ‘synthesis’ was absent 
from cultural policy from 1956. The central reason for this absence was the introduction 
of indigenous ethnic cultures into cultural policy and the framing of ethnicity as an 
element of the national population. Two occurrences assisted this change. Firstly, 
Sukarno’s emphasis on indigenous traditions turned attention towards indigenous 
cultures. Secondly, acknowledgment of the culture of the ‘regions’ as national culture in 
the constitutional definition of national culture also excluded perspectives that viewed 
regional culture as obsolete due to the advent of a new national culture. While there was 
still to be acculturation and the inclusion of some Western elements, the Cultural Office 
promoted a cultural plurality rather than assisting the development of a single national 






Non-Government Arts Organisations 
An important change between Constitutional Democracy and Guided Democracy was the 
relationship between non-state cultural organisations and cultural policy. From the mid-
1950s but increasing markedly in the 1960s, artists’ associations became involved in 
Sukarno’s ‘remobilisation’ (Anderson, 1990c, p. 106) of Indonesia and began to actively 
support his ideas and concepts. Anderson writes: 
The punctuational rhythms and legislative focus of parliamentary 
constitutionalism were replaced by an accelerando of mass politics penetrating 
ever more widely down and across Indonesian society. The major political parties 
of the period ... threw themselves into expanding not merely their own 
memberships but those of affiliated associations. (1990c, p. 107)  
Artists’ associations played a prominent role in the application of Sukarno’s concepts 
when it came to culture. The vagueness of Sukarno’s concepts allowed them to be 
broadly interpreted to fit with a range of political programs and ideologies. The greater 
involvement of artists’ associations with cultural policy interpretation and 
implementation during this period is the primary concern of this section. Additionally, the 
interaction of the artists’ associations during Guided Democracy has implications for the 
direction of cultural policy during the New Order period.  
 
The DPPK encouraged cultural workers to engage with the politics of Guided 
Democracy, in particular including political positions and messages into their work. In 
his 1963 speech, Prijono enunciated a definition of the role of the nationalist artist. First, 
he established the ‘point of departure’ for artistic activity which is the revolution and 
socialism as defined within Sukarno’s Manipol. From this position, Prijono linked culture 
together with the political position of the government:  
the best works are those works that give energy, support, spiritual strength, 
happiness to work, self-belief, especially to the working class, the farmers and our 
armed forces. (Prijono, 1963, p. 94)  
karya-karya yang terbaik adalah karya-karya yang memberi semangat, dorongan, 
kekuatan batin, kegembiraan berkerja, kepercayaan akan diri sendiri khususnya 
kepada kaum pekerja, kaum tani dan angkatan bersenjata kita.  
Prijono then called on the administrators of the Cultural Office and the DPPK to ‘get or 
invite our artists and writers to create works that are like that’.86 Prijono’s direction of 
cultural workers extended to condemning abstract works and directing artists and writers 
                                                 
86 ‘Petugas-petugas pada Jawatan Kebudayaan ... harus mengusahakan atau mengajak seniman-seniman 




towards realism (as Prijono thought that style was more easily understood by the three 
groups he, and the PKI, viewed as needing to be incorporated in the nation building effort 
– farmers, the working class and soldiers), the adoption of particular themes (such as 
paintings and stories about national heroes) and the active opposition to imperialists 
(1963, pp. 96-99). The prescription of the cultural workers’ role and interventions into 
cultural expression within cultural policy contributed to the growing divisions between 
Indonesian artists.  
 
The largest and most important artist organisation of the 1945-65 period was the People’s 
Arts Institute (Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat – LEKRA). LEKRA was formed by a group 
of fifteen cultural workers on 17 August 1950 in response to the Cultural Accord (which 
LEKRA termed ‘imperialist’) and Alisjahbana’s advocacy of Western style 
modernisation in the Cultural Conference earlier that month (Foulcher, 1986, p. 17). The 
group included two leaders of the newly reformed PKI, D.N. Aidit and Njoto along with 
A.S Dharta, Joebaar Ajoeb and Henk Ngantung, who all were prominent LEKRA leaders 
of the future. LEKRA used a Marxist framework to resolve the issue of the development 
of Indonesian culture. They promoted the development of a ‘People’s culture’87 to oppose 
the ‘anti-People, feudal and imperialist culture’ of the Indonesian ruling class (Foulcher, 
1986, p. 18). The cultural workers were to be responsible for building of a socially just 
and democratic Indonesia through cultural activities.  
 
LEKRA was, as Foulcher notes, a product of its times and environment:  
In its formulation of an approach to the Indonesian culture question, it indicated 
its descent from the Pujangga Baru debate, with all the optimism and idealism of 
the 1930s in the face of the Indonesian future. (1986, p. 19)88 
LEKRA was committed to modernisation and nationalism much like the groups that 
participated in the cultural meetings previously discussed and that dominated cultural life 
in Jakarta in the 1950s.89 However, it differed in its commitment to a particular vision of 
national culture and how it envisioned the role of the artist and their links to society. 
LEKRA expected national culture to emerge from the Indonesian people. LEKRA was 
not interested in a particular aesthetic style, but instead relied on a definition of socialist 
realism that promoted a commitment to social justice. According to the LEKRA 
                                                 
87 ‘Kebudayaan Rakyat’. 
88 Maier also notes the overlap between LEKRA and its opponents (1987: 18).  




perspective, art should both demonstrate the inequalities present in social reality and 
promote a process of revolutionary change (what has been labelled kerakyatan or people 
mindedness, Foulcher, 1986, p. 29).  
 
LEKRA thus involved itself in what it termed a ‘cultural struggle’ against the more 
liberal visions of other cultural commentators, such as the people who had dominated 
discussion in the early 1950s, and began to promote its version of socialist realism. 
LEKRA began a period of increased mobilisation following its 1959 National Congress 
in Solo, Central Java (Foulcher, 1986, pp. 105-7). Its members identified the political 
climate as becoming increasingly conducive to its vision and responded through a closer 
alignment with Sukarno’s guidelines and increased mobilisation of its members. LEKRA 
had always maintained a commitment to the ‘August 1945 Revolution’, which was 
apparent in its initial 1950 statement of belief, the ‘Mukadimah’ and its revised 
Mukadimah adopted at the 1959 Congress (Foulcher, 1986, pp. 213-4,219-20). The 
revised Mukadimah in particular positioned LEKRA as continuing the struggle against 
colonialism started with the ‘revolution’ (Foulcher, 1986, p. 220). At the congress, Njoto 
introduced a new slogan that came to summarise LEKRA artists’ commitment to political 
involvement: ‘politics is the commander’.90 The directions of Sukarno and his supporters 
during Guided Democracy confirmed for the movement that ‘a cultural revolution was 
now underway’ (Foulcher, 1986, p. 107). LEKRA also became more aggressive in 
putting forth its position, as did its opponents in the early 1960s.91 The polarisation into 
two sides within debates over cultural issues was aligned with the broader political 
polarisation. Tensions escalated.  
 
In 1963 a group of writers affiliated with the literary magazine Sastra, many of whom 
had already engaged LEKRA members in cultural debates, published a challenge to 
Manipol as the basis of national cultural life. Known as the Manifes Kebudayaan 
(Manikebu), the document opposed LEKRA’s social commitment in the arts with liberal 
universal-humanism and a commitment to ‘artistic freedom’. Henk Maier summarises 
Manikebu as a ‘challenge in the struggle for authority over the literary world’ (1987, p. 
24). In particular, it was a challenge to the LEKRA concept that ‘politics is in command’ 
                                                 
90 ‘Politik sebagai Panglima’ (Foulcher, 1986, p. 107).  
91 See Maier (1987, p. 23) and Foulcher’s discussion of LEKRA and anti-LEKRA activity in the early 




(1987, p. 24). After a four month hiatus, LEKRA responded with ferocious attacks on the 
Manikebu signatories and the literary magazine Sastra. Foulcher says of LEKRA’s 
reaction to Manikebu: 
It was seen as an act in open defiance of the direction of state ideology, and a 
particularly audacious challenge to LEKRA’s role as the only legitimate voice of 
Indonesian artists and cultural workers. (1986, p. 126)  
LEKRA managed to do more than attack its opponents in its publications and speeches. 
The radical nationalists, led by LEKRA, gave the document the acronym Manikebu 
(which sounds like the Indonesian term for buffalo sperm). Under pressure from his 
advisors, Sukarno banned Manikebu in May 1964, after accusing it of weakening the 
spirit of the revolution (Maier, 1987, p. 25). Signatories were attacked in the press, their 
works were banned (Foulcher, 1986, p. 133), and some were demoted from their 
positions or sacked (Maier, 1987, pp. 24-7; Mohamad, 1988, p. 2). The ferocity of 
LEKRA’s response should be viewed in the context of the intensification of conflict 
between powerful political groups for who much was at stake.  
 
LEKRA was affiliated with the PKI, although in practice it generally operated 
autonomously with little guidance from party leadership.92 In the 1960s other parties and 
artists associated with different parties began to establish their own cultural organisations. 
The Indonesian National Party (PNI) established the National Cultural Institute (Lembaga 
Kebudayaan Nasional – LKN) under the leadership of Sitor Situmorang.93 Created in 
1959, the LKN supported Sukarno’s Manipol-USDEK doctrine and was aligned with 
LEKRA against the supporters of Manikebu. In the early 1960s, LKN became the 
proponent of the ‘official’ nationalist line instead of the weakened BMKN. Like LEKRA 
members, LKN members were also jailed, censored and banished after 1965. Nahdlatul 
Ulama established the Institute of Muslim Artists and Cultural Workers of Indonesia 
(Lembaga Seniman Budayawan Muslim Indonesia – LESBUMI) and began to explore the 
meaning of Indonesian culture from the perspective of Islamic artists.94 Other artists’ 
                                                 
92 Foulcher emphasises this point (1986, p. 206), although LEKRA did come under pressure from the PKI 
in 1964 (1986, pp. 128-131).  
93 For a longer analysis of LKN, see Maier (1996).  
94 LESBUMI was started in 1962 (Sjamsulridwan, 1963) by a number of Muslim intellectuals associated 
with NU. The important players were also significant figures in the film industry (Djamaluddin Malik, who 
was chairman, Usmar Ismail, Asrul Sani) who drew many workers from that industry into LESBUMI. 
LESBUMI was opposed to the PKI affiliated Film and Arts Workers Union (Serikat Buruh Film dan 
Seniman) (Sen, 1994, p. 30). A case could be made that LESBUMI was created in Jakarta with this purpose 
in mind, although its focus and attitude differed in branches outside the capital. The LESBUMI branch in 
Riau focussed on teaching Q’uranic arts and banned Western dancing and more traditional dancing styles 




organisations with political party affiliations were the Cultural Institute of Indonesian 
Christians (Lembaga Kebudayaan Kristen Indonesia – Lekrindo) and the Cultural 
Institute of Catholic Christians (Lembaga Kebudayaan Indonesia Katolik – LKIK).  
 
The activities of non-government arts organisations were an important element of cultural 
policy during Guided Democracy. Guided Democracy differed from Constitutional 
Democracy in that artists’ associations were being urged to adopt political themes and 
particular styles that demonstrated political support for Sukarno. Cultural policy was an 
element of the increased mobilisation of the period. The vagueness of Sukarno’s agenda 
and terminology led many groups with diverging views to support his ideas, but also 
caused much dissent between groups with different interpretations linked to different 
agendas. State rhetoric encouraged further intensification of recruiting and educating 
LEKRA members and the active pursuit of the ‘people’s culture’. However, Maier notes 
that LEKRA’s slogans, like Sukarno’s, may have increased political awareness, but they 
did not ‘offer clear directions as to how socio-political changes could be realised’ (1987, 
p. 21). Instead, cultural mobilisation became part of maintaining the delicate political 
balance. The government also became increasingly implicated in the left-versus-right 
cultural politics of the period. The ideas of Sukarno were increasingly aligned with the 
more radical groups, in particular LEKRA, which alienated the Western-educated artists 
whose positions had previously been much closer to the positions of the state. It 




The key cultural policy change of the periods is how the state defined its role. From a 
regulatory role where the state provided an institutional structure for activities that 
focussed on fields that were defined as national culture, the state assumed a leadership 
role where it attempted to mobilise the populace behind its political programs. The model 
of cultural provision during this period can be understood as postcolonial in that it 
                                                                                                                                                 
Daerah Riau di Pekanbaru, 1963). LESBUMI disbanded in 1966 because of the decreasing importance of 
(and increasing state and societal antipathy towards) political association and the opposition of more 
conservative Muslims (a letter from Situbondo in 1965 gives notice of NU’s decision to disband LESBUMI 
due to its endangering of the authority of the party through its more open attitude to the arts and racy 
artistic displays by NU standards. He specifically cites a dancing display at a Performance Night). I would 




included elements of a liberal model and a command model. However, the role of the 
state demonstrates that the features of the command culture model declined in the early 
1950s before returning with increasing strength from 1957, due in no small part to 
Sukarno’s understanding of governance and preference for a one-party state.  
 
Another important change was the role of non-state cultural organisations in cultural 
policy. Sukarno’s mobilisation of non-state organisations and the requirement that those 
organisations sign pledges to support state doctrine combined with the escalating 
activities of artists’ associations to redefine the relationship between artists’ associations 
and the state. The role of non-state cultural organisations in cultural policy changed from 
being supported by infrastructure provided by the state in their efforts to build a national 
culture to an engagement with the state to promote a political program within their 
activities. Expressing alignment included the adoption of particular themes and styles that 
were understood to be aligned to Sukarno’s goal of creating a socialist society. However, 
cultural expression was equally about proclaiming support for a variety of groups aligned 
to Sukarno in the tumultuous politics of Guided Democracy, since the ambiguity of 
Sukarno’s concepts allowed them to be interpreted in multiple ways and linked to a 
variety of political agendas.  
 
The force that drove the changes in cultural policy was the exchange of the 
‘administrator’ political rationality for a ‘solidarity-maker’ political rationality, marked 
by Sukarno’s ascent to political power between 1957 and 1959. The regimes of practices 
that shaped cultural policy’s form and purpose changed substantially with the change of 
political rationality. Understandings of the acceptable limit of state intervention changed 
dramatically, as did the definition of the role that cultural workers should play in 
achieving the state’s political goals. Both periods used culture as a tool to ‘civilise’ and 
unite the diverse Indonesian populace. However, the two periods were attempting to 
shape very different societies and adopted different methods. From attempting to 
facilitate the development of a population of free individuals with a nationalist 
commitment and outlook, cultural policy became a tool for mobilising the national 
population behind Sukarno’s political agenda. In as much as they were attempting to 
‘improve’ individuals and shape the attributes and behaviours of populations, the cultural 
policies of 1950-1965 demonstrate a broad similarity with late colonial and occupying 




An important change in cultural policy across both periods that had wide ranging effects 
was the move away from the understanding that cultural ‘synthesis’ would result in the 
creation of a single national culture to an understanding that a diversity of cultures could 
signify national culture. This change brought ethnic cultures within the realm of cultural 
policy, expanding cultural policy into a wide range of cultural forms, including both 
ceremonial and community arts and practices. Cultural policy’s aesthetics, however, were 
brought from the ‘metropolitan superculture’ (H. Geertz, 1963, p. 35) of the Indonesian 
middle-class and differed greatly from the variety of aesthetic understandings within the 
indigenous ethnic groups. However, it was not until the New Order era that the state had 
the resources to undertake broad and sustained interventions into indigenous ethnic 







The New Order as a ‘Cultural Process’ 
 
 
The formidable New Order strategist and architect of the New Order regime’s early 
political and social policies, Ali Moertopo, acknowledged the importance of cultural 
change to the New Order regime when he wrote: ‘The New Order is a cultural process.’1 
The New Order regime viewed cultural change as both a desirable and inevitable aspect 
of its policies and, as a close reading of Moertopo’s quote indicates, intended to direct 
cultural development. However, the regime could not exercise complete control over the 
cultural processes present within Indonesia during the New Order era. This chapter 
explores the ‘cultural processes’, both generated from New Order governance and from 
other groups and dynamics, from which cultural policy arose. While the official cultural 
policy programs and institutions are analysed in the following chapter, this is only 
possible after an exploration of how broader political and social changes impacted 
notions of national culture, particularly amongst political power-holders.  
 
Indonesian national culture, far from being a pre-existing set of attributes, has a 
temporally changing character. Philip Kitley, in his discussion of Television in New 
Order Indonesia, argues that the changing ‘national cultural project’ from Guided 
Democracy to the New Order era should be understood as ‘three entwined processes of 
cultural denial, affirmation and invention, which together have attempted to map a 
unitary and unifying cultural identity across [Indonesia]’ (2000, pp. 5-7). Chua Beng 
Huat and Eddie Kuo similarly draw attention to the processes of deployment and 
suppression or erasure of different ‘elements’ in their discussion of the invention of 
‘Singapore’ and ‘Singaporeans’ (1998, p. 38). They write: ‘In each deployment, some 
                                                 




elements of the past will be discursively suppressed or erased, others accented and given 
added semiological significance’ (1998, p. 38). Kitley (2001, pp. 12-3) and Chua and 
Kuo highlight the importance of discourse in the construction of national cultural 
identities (1998, pp. 37-9). They argue that national identity is ‘necessarily the results of 
discursive practices that formulate them as objects ... which are ‘called into existence’ by 
statements that circulate in different discourses, in different spheres of social practices’ 
(1998, p. 37). While I am tracing a discursive formation through analysis of its 
constituent parts (in the words of Chua and Kuo, its ‘ontological elements’, 1998, p. 37) 
and am interested in questions of discursive deployment and erasure, unlike Chua and 
Kuo, I am not directly analysing the construction of a national identity. I trace here the 
discursive formation that gave rise to a particular cultural policy.  
 
After a brief historical introduction, I examine four ‘ontological elements’ that informed 
cultural policy. The first three cultural policy informing factors were central to the 
articulation of national culture from the 1970s. These are: the governmental discourses of 
the New Order regime; the supporters of the concept of universal humanism that 
dominated the national arts and national cultural debate in the New Order era; and the 
governmental uses of ethnic cultural practices. The final section addresses the impact of 
social changes in the 1980s and 1990s brought about by sustained economic growth.  
 
Two themes run across the chapter. Firstly, the notions of deployment and erasure are 
used to assess the chronology of the period and provide a sense of the changing 
environment within which cultural policy was produced. Secondly, the argument that 
cultural policy in Indonesia is a variation of a widespread form of contemporary 
governance is continued here, but with a focus on the broader governmental discourses in 
which culture was employed, rather than the specific cultural programs within the 
Directorate of Culture (Direktorat Kebudayaan, the new name for the Cultural Office)2 
which are the subjects of the next chapter. This chapter is focussed on changing 
discourses and only provides brief examples of their effects on cultural practices. The 
impact of these changes on cultural policy is explored in chapter four.  
 
                                                 
2 The name of the Office of Culture changed to Directorate of Culture in 1964. Although the name change 
occurred before Suharto took control of the government, the different names are a convenient way of 




1. Historical Background: The Political Climate of the Early New Order 
Period 
The core of the New Order political elite was a military faction that had built alliances 
with anti-communist civilian groups in the last years of the Sukarno regime. In the 
months following the attempted coup of 1 October 1965, a broad coalition of groups that 
had suffered in the political polarisation of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy supported the 
army’s tough handling of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Two groups were 
particularly important sources of support: the urban middle class and Islamic mass 
organisations (Aspinall, 2000, p. 26). Many university students, academics and 
professionals rallied to the army. Students’ and scholars’ action fronts (such as KAMI, 
KAPPI and KASI)3 agitated initially against the PKI and later against Sukarno, providing 
crucial support for Suharto’s political manoeuvrings. The Islamic parties Muhammadiyah 
and Nahdlatul Ulama openly supported the army, and Nahdlatul Ulama, in particular, 
was involved in the killings and suppression of rural communists (Cribb, 1990; Sulistyo, 
2000). The New Order regime was reliant on the support of these groups to maintain 
power and this reliance was reflected in how the regime responded to the problems of 
governance it faced when it first came to power.  
 
Suharto’s faction consisted of officers of similar age and, most importantly, similar 
experiences from the War of Independence and the pre-1965 period. The military had 
been increasingly caught up in politics in the fifteen years preceding 1965 and developed 
substantial links with various political groups and business concerns. By 1965 the 
military was part of the political elite, and was deeply involved in politics, civil 
administration and economic management (Crouch, 1978, p. 22). On taking power, 
Suharto and his supporters were not primarily concerned with instigating social change. 
They wanted to consolidate their position of power.  
 
The stabilisation of power in the hands of the New Order elite corresponded with the 
breakdown of the coalition that was so effective in 1965. Opposition began to surface as 
early as 1967 with student protests in Jakarta (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 354) as the urban middle 
                                                 
3 KAMI – Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia (Indonesian University Students’ Action Front), KAPPI – 
Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda dan Pelajar Indonesia (Indonesian Youth and High School Students’ Action Front), 
KASI – Kesatuan Aksi Sarjana Indonesia (Indonesian Graduates’ Action Front). These groups were formed 




class became disillusioned with the economic policies and the level of corruption 
(Aspinall, 2000, p. 28).4 The Malari riots and the subsequent political crackdown 
galvanised civilian critics of the government. Edward Aspinall identifies the end of the 
civilian coalition as 1977-78 with large student demonstrations and public dissent 
surrounding the elections and parliamentary session (Majelis Perwakilan Rakyat – MPR) 
followed by state occupation of campuses and a wave of arrests (2000, p. 29).  
 
An important tool the New Order state used to assert control was violent anti-communist 
repression. The usefulness of the violent actions of the army was not limited to the 
elimination of the politically powerful PKI. Repression provided a deterrent for potential 
political opposition, and the techniques used on the communists were later used on other 
political opponents.5 Ken Ward describes the killing of thousands of communists and 
sympathisers as the ‘fundamental fact of the New Order’ (1973, p. 67). Ward writes:  
By continuing to inflict extreme penalties, whether execution or imprisonment for 
indefinite periods, against those who had participated in communist politics, the 
new government had at its disposal an example with which to threaten critics from 
all parties and to discourage any from engaging in active politics. (1973, p. 71)  
Anti-communism also made important new alliances possible in the international arena. 
Suharto quickly abandoned Sukarno’s foreign policy stance (particularly the 
confrontation with Malaysia and alignment with China) and pursued economic aid from 
Western countries. Indonesia’s non-communist creditors formed themselves into the 
Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia and from July 1966 began making arrangements 
to reschedule Indonesia’s debt repayments. Anti-communism strengthened both the 
domestic and international position of the new regime.  
 
Substantial amounts of Western aid were given in conjunction with economic policy 
reforms.6 The Suharto government’s early economic policy focused on stabilisation and 
rehabilitation of basic infrastructure and encouraging foreign investment. A significant 
economic policy change in 1967 stimulated foreign investor interest in Indonesia. The 
New Order regime reversed the highly restrictive foreign tariff and investment policies of 
its predecessor between the years of 1967 and 1972. In 1973 the regime began to again 
                                                 
4 Feith identifies the beginning of the end of the coalition in the full parliamentary special session of March 
1968 (1968, p. 103).  
5 See Thomas (1981, p. 384) on the repression of student opposition.  
6 Anderson notes that the lowest IGGI commitment per year between 1967 and 1974 was higher than total 
net government expenditures and receipts in 1957 and 1960. In some years aid covered 50 percent of the 




restrict foreign investment, a decision that was made possible through revenue increases 
caused by the boom in oil prices. Following Malari in 1974, which counted amongst its 
causes the worsening situation of indigenous businessmen and the growing influence of 
foreign capital, investment restrictions intensified and all foreign investments required a 
local partner (until 1992). The commitment to a liberal economic order since 1972 has 
thus been ‘half-hearted and ambivalent’ (H. Hill, 1994, p. 66), and economic policy has 
fluctuated between liberal policies, economic nationalism and pay-offs to Suharto’s 
supporters.7 The liberal economic policy reforms of 1967-72 constitute an element of 
broad cultural policy change in the early New Order period. Miller and Yudice state: ‘The 
embrace of market reforms oriented towards foreign investment has distinct cultural 
corollaries’ (2002, p. 145). However, the impact of economic reform on practices of 
consumption and identification were more regularly and severely criticised in the 1980s 
and 1990s, as is discussed in the final section of this chapter. In the regime’s early years, 
the problems of providing the ideal conditions for fast modernisation and securing its 
political position had a much greater influence over how culture was articulated within 
governmental discourse.  
 
2. Culture in the New Order Regime’s Rationality of Government 
Although a variety of governmental discourses, strategies and techniques were part of 
New Order governance, many of which are considered in the discussion below, the 
discourse of development (pembangunan)8 had the most influence on the articulation of 
culture. Ariel Heryanto identifies pembangunan as one of the two most consequential 
‘key-words’ in New Order era language, meaning terms that are ‘significant’, ‘binding’, 
and ‘indicative ... in certain forms of thought’ (1988, p. 8).9 Heryanto’s exploration of 
pembangunan followed Raymond William’s keywords approach (1983), where a term’s 
semantic history and relationship to social and historical formations is explored. The 
analysis of development/pembangunan below follows a slightly different, but related, 
understanding of development suggested by Simon Philpott: that the ‘government of 
                                                 
7 Liddle discusses how the balance between rent-seeking and liberal policies contributed to the collapse of 
the Suharto regime (1999). For a discussion of the changing economic and financial situation of the New 
Order regime until the mid-1990s, see H. Hill (1994).  
8 In this chapter, I use the term pembangunan to refer to the use of development in Indonesia during the 
New Order era.  




development/growth’ was an element of a ‘particular form of governmentalisation of the 
state’ (2000, pp. 166-7) that arose in Indonesia following the fall of the Sukarno regime.  
 
Development and Governmentality  
The usage of the term ‘development’ that is relevant to government in Indonesia began 
after 1945 around the term ‘underdeveloped’ (Williams, 1983, p. 103). According to 
Raymond Williams, two ideas became connected at this point in time: firstly, the 
‘development’ of natural resources; and secondly, that economies and societies pass 
through ‘stages of development’ (1983, p. 103). From 1945, the concept of development 
became increasingly focussed on a group of societies, which included Indonesia, 
identified at the time as the ‘Third World’ (Arndt, 1981). The peak of development’s 
popularity coincided with the years when the New Order regime was at its most confident 
in the 1970s and 1980s.  
 
Marc DuBois, in his Foucaultian critique of development, focuses on the ‘new relations 
of power’ that development introduces into the ‘Third World’.10 According to DuBois, 
development aims to restructure ‘the behaviour and practices of individuals and 
populations’ with the goal of increasing ‘economic productivity, the wealth of the nation, 
the level of health or education of the people – in short, to increase public welfare’ (1991, 
p. 10). DuBois writes:  
Particularly in the Third World, [the masses] are not only presented as human 
resources, but as resources in need of modification, adaptation, and change – in 
other words, development. (1991, p. 10) 
Barry Hindess (2001, p. 108) connects development’s ‘improving’ function to the 
features of liberal imperial administration discussed in chapter one. Much like the 
colonial subject, the subject of development requires capacity building in order to achieve 
the goal of autonomous action. He writes:  
The aims of the [liberal] project have barely changed, but the end of empire has 
transformed the conditions in which it can be pursued ... The liberal project of 
improvement ... can no longer work through what it once saw as the civilising 
effects of a benign imperial rule ... Instead, the liberal project is now pursued by 
significant minorities in non-Western states, many of whom have adopted some 
version of the earlier liberal view of the people among whom they live, and also, 
                                                 




more remotely, by western states themselves working through a different range of 
indirect means. (2001, p. 108)11  
While the central thrust of Hindess’s argument about the continuities of imperial rule and 
development is accepted here,12 I would be more cautious about characterising 
development as a ‘liberal project’ given its many forms and implication in different state-
systems, many of which have been decidedly non-liberal and have loudly rejected 
liberalism.  
 
An alternative characterisation lies within DuBois’s understanding of development as a 
form of biopower exercised over and within non-Western nations (1991, pp. 9-10). Like 
cultural policy, biopower is concerned with both monitoring and regulating the norms of 
populations and changing the conduct of individuals (Foucault, 1990, pp. 137-8), and 
both culture and biopower became a focus of state activities around the same moment. 
However, biopower refers to a different range of governmental fields that are concerned 
with the processes and evolution of life (Dean, 1999, p. 100).13 Dubois illustrates the 
concern with populations through the policies of population control (1991, pp. 10-18) and 
the introduction of ‘scientific’ norms regarding family size, methods of birth control and 
child rearing (1991, pp. 17-8). DuBois also identifies the other side of biopower in the 
disciplinary power that development exercises over the practices of individuals in non-
Western nations. Development introduces methods that firstly make individuals’ actions 
calculable and, secondly, inserts individuals into training regimes (1991, pp. 18-24). 
However, DuBois tends to downplay the agency of the non-Western states in the 
operation of development. Both Heryanto (Heryanto, 1988) and Jonathan Rigg et. al. 
(1999) stress the particularities of pembangunan in Indonesia and emphasise that its 
usage is the assemblage of both national and international semantic and political histories 
and had a special salience for the New Order regime. An indication of the importance of 
                                                 
11 Hindess continues: ‘They operate, in effect, through national and international aid programs that assist, 
advise and constrain the conduct of postcolonial states, through international financial institutions and also, 
of course, through that fundamental liberal instrument of civilisation, the market’ (2001: 108). Similarly, 
H.W. Arndt links the prevailing meaning of development to colonial authority (1981, p. 462).  
12 The existence of a form of continuity is also suggested by the emergence of the contemporary meaning of 
development in 1945 when many colonies became nation-states. My purpose is to note the existence of a 
continuity rather than chart its complex history, which would involve more analysis than required here. 
Alatas, in his book The Myth of the Lazy Native, provides an interesting and relevant exploration of the 
historical links between colonial and developmental discourses. He writes regarding the representation of 
indigenous Southeast Asians: ‘The image of the indolent, dull, backward and treacherous native has 
changed into that of a dependent native requiring assistance to climb the ladder of progress’ (1977, p. 8). 
13 Biopower encompasses phenomenon that focus on living beings, such as health, sanitation, birth rate, 




pembangunan was a declaration by the 1983 parliament that gave Suharto the title ‘Father 
of Pembangunan’.14 That this occurred, as Heryanto notes, at precisely the time that 
development became a target of criticism in other parts of the world indicates that 
pembangunan had a degree of importance in Indonesia independent of how development 
fared internationally (1988, p. 19). Pembangunan also extended to areas outside of the 
limits commonly sets for biopower, such as culture and economics.  
 
Development was a rationality of government that was readily adopted within 
authoritarian states. It provided a rationale for intervention at the level of populations and 
individuals that had a large degree of independence from liberal concerns regarding 
individual freedoms, but still received the approval of the international community and, 
in particular, the more powerful Western states.15 Pembangunan’s centrality to the New 
Order regime can thus be understood through the way it both provided a rationale for and 
legitimised the application of modern forms of state-power, providing the basis of an 
Indonesian, authoritarian ‘normalising society’ (Foucault, 1990, p. 144) with a focus on 
fostering exploitation of both natural and human resources.  
 
Culture in Pembangunan 
The origins of pembangunan were in the alliances that the New Order faction formed 
with two Indonesian groups and the international community when it first came to power 
and was connected to the economic problems that faced the regime in its early years. One 
of the groups, labelled the ‘modernising intellectuals’ by Ward (1973, p. 180) and R. 
William Liddle (1973, p. 79), was the intellectuals and students from the action fronts. 
These groups were most responsible for a trend that dominated public debate in the late 
1960s and early 1970s (Liddle, 1973, p. 178). Adopting the language of Daniel Bell, 
Seymour Martin Lipset and Samuel Huntington,16 these groups, which had been alienated 
during Guided Democracy, advocated a turn to a political system that focused exclusively 
on modernisation and de-emphasised divisions within society (Ward, 1973, pp. 75-80). 
Ward associates the ‘cult of non-ideological pragmatism’ that developed within these 
                                                 
14 ‘Bapak Pembangunan’ (Philpott, 2000, p. 164).  
15 Philpott identifies this element of the New Order regime when he writes, ‘the New Order sought to create 
a state premised on a form of economic freedom aimed at securing its legitimacy, even if it did not entail 
liberal norms of self-limitation’ (2000, p. 166). 
16 See Ward (1973, p. 75) and Bourchier (1996, pp. 156,197). Ward also mentions their attention to Karl 




groups with the ‘anti-ideology mainstream of American social science’ (1973, p. 75). 
Many of the modernising intellectuals became organizers of and spokesmen for 
GOLKAR17 in 1970 and 1971 (Liddle, 1973, p. 197).  
 
The other group has come to be known as the ‘technocrats’ (Mackie & MacIntyre, 1994, 
p. 35; Ricklefs, 2002, p. 352; Robison, 1986, pp. 108-11). The technocrats were a group 
of US-trained economists at the University of Indonesia that Suharto summoned to advise 
him on how to tackle the economic problems of the late 1960s. The technocrats utilised a 
‘market-oriented, outward-looking approach’ (Mackie & MacIntyre, 1994, p. 35) that 
included many elements of the orthodox liberal perspective on economic management. 
Their policies received the approval of the international community, demonstrated by 
debt rescheduling and increased aid donations. The techniques and technologies of 
pembangunan were applied through the macroeconomic reforms of the technocrats, the 
programs of the aid packages and the New Order regime’s development projects. In 1969, 
pembangunan was confirmed as a central concept and goal of the regime through the 
advent of the first of the Five Year Development Plans (Rencana Pembangunan Lima 
Tahun – Repelita).  
 
Lieutenant-General Ali Moertopo was one of the most prominent ideologues and political 
operators of the New Order regime. He also played a major role in laying the foundations 
of the understanding of pembangunan that became central to governance (Krissantono, 
1991, pp. 141-3). Born in 1924, Moertopo began his Military career in the informal 
military forces (laskar) that fought for independence during the revolution. He was 
involved in crushing the PKI Tiga Daerah and Madiun revolts during the War of 
Independence and the PRRI/Permesta rebellion after it. Moertopo’s career was 
predominantly in military intelligence. As a member of the newly formed regular forces 
(TNI), he became close to Suharto in the 1950s. After 1965, Moertopo was involved in 
many covert operations including the rigged ‘Act of Free Choice’ in Irian Jaya in 1969. 
Moertopo was a private adviser to Suharto from 1966-74 and held a number of 
intelligence roles (including responsibility for the emasculation of opposing political 
parties, the construction of GOLKAR, and its overwhelming election victory in 1971). 
His positions became increasingly high-profile. In 1974 he became Deputy Head of the 
                                                 





State Board for Intelligence Coordination (Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara – BAKIN) 
and was Information Minister from 1978 until 1983. As an important political player in 
the New Order era between 1965 and 1983, Moertopo was influential in the Department 
of Education and Culture, particularly during the 1978-1983 period when Daoed Yoesoef 
was the Minister of that Department (Pangaribuan, 1995, p. 40).  
 
Moertopo’s ideas on development took shape through his leadership firstly of the Special 
Operations Unit (Operasi Khusus – Opsus) and later with the Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) that he helped establish in 1971.18 Key members of Opsus 
later were prominent in CSIS, and both organisations were important hubs of policy 
formation.19 Through the role of the technocrats, Moertopo and Opsus, the New Order 
regime picked up on the corporatist logic of much modernisation theory which identified 
a depoliticised society and technocratic reasoning as ideal for fast modernisation (Hadiz 
& Dhakidae, 2005, p. 7; Heryanto, 2005, pp. 65-6) and adopted certain of its discourses 
that justified the existence of a strong state. Moertopo published several books 
elaborating his ideas about pembangunan in the 1970s and 1980s. The first was 
Accelerated Modernisation of 25 Years’ Development (Akselerasi Modernisasi 
Pembangunan 25 Tahun, 1973). A few years later Moertopo turned his attention more 
specifically to the role of culture in development in his book Cultural Strategies (Strategi 
Kebudayaan, 1978).  
 
Greg Acciaioli summarises Cultural Strategies as articulating ‘a full-blown theory of 
cultural evolution, which situates the developmentalism of the New Order Indonesian 
state ... as the teleological realisation of a process of cultural evolution that has 
characterised Indonesian society from its archaic beginnings’ (2001, p. 8). The central 
thrust of Cultural Strategies was to plan the future changes in Indonesian culture in order 
to build human capacity and national strength. Moertopo’s definition of culture was 
linked to the evolutionary development of humanity. He defined culture firstly as a form 
of ‘strength’20 which he later clarified as ‘human resources potentials’ (1978, p. 9).21 
                                                 
18 Robison and Hadiz write that a ‘sophisticated and pervasive apparatus of social control and mobilisation 
was designed in the early 1970s within Moertopo’s Special Operations Command (OPSUS), the New 
Order’s most important security and intelligence office’ (2004, p. 48).  
19 Krissantono calls CSIS the ‘kitchen of the New Order government’ (‘dapurnya pemerintah Orde Baru’, 
1991, p. 140).  
20 ‘Kekuatan’ (1978, p. 9).  




Moertopo then defined culture as ‘all the processes of development of human life’22 and 
finally as the process of ‘humanisation’ (1978, p. 10). For Moertopo, culture was shaped 
by human agency in conjunction with outside influences, causing him to reject the 
East/West typology of earlier theories (1978, pp. 38-9). Cultural Strategies was an 
exercise in outlining what elements Indonesian culture needed to ‘culturalise’ and as such 
operated as a normative plan for Indonesia’s future.  
 
A key feature of Cultural Strategies was the identification of cultural deficiencies in 
Indonesia’s cultural evolution. Moertopo argued:  
The New Order must be capable of finishing the huge task that faces it, that is to 
make Indonesia into a stable subject, a strong subject, by the standards of world 
development. The New Order must be able to execute cultural tasks that are very 
important, executing cultural borrowing (acculturation) in the passage of world 
history both now and in the future. This is the cultural nucleus that we must 
formulate now. This includes thoughts and planning connected to scientific and 
technological progress, economic development, the development of social 
systems ... progress in language and the arts and development connected with 
religion. (1978, p. 36)  
Orde Baru harus mampu menyelesaikan tugas besar yang menghadapinya, yaitu 
membuat Indonesia menjadi subyek yang mantap, subyek yang kuat, di dalam 
ukuran perkembangan dunia. Orde Baru harus mampu melaksanakan tugas 
kulturil yang sangat berat, melaksanakan akulturasi di dalam perkembangan 
sejara dunia dewasa ini dan di masa mendatang. Inilah inti sebagai budaya yang 
harus kita rumuskan dewasa ini. Ini meliputi pemikiran dan penataan yang 
berkenaan dengan pengembangan pengetahuan dan teknologi, pembangunan 
ekonomi, pembangunan sistem kemasyarakatan ... pengembangan bahasa, 
kesenian dan pembangunan yang berkaitan dengan agama.  
Moertopo held that Indonesians were not sufficiently developed in the areas of economy, 
technology and information and that these should be the focus of ‘acculturation’ that 
would bring Indonesians to the level of ‘humanity’ required by the international and 
domestic climate (1978, pp. 44-5). Moertopo made the development of the capacities of 
Indonesians, in other words the creation of idealised modern Indonesian subjects who 
could contribute economically, the primary goal of cultural development. The state’s 
economic priorities overrode all other possible considerations, such as cultural identity, 
traditional knowledge and lifestyles and considerations of equity.  
 
Moertopo’s writings provide an example of how pembangunan and development theories 
more widely mirrored colonial understandings of governance including culture’s role in 
                                                 




governance.23 Like colonial administrators, Moertopo described Indonesians as backward 
and unable to respond to the demands of the times, qualities which he attributed to a 
culture shaped by an easy environment and climate (1978, pp. 39-42). He held:  
... a relaxed cultural style has clearly become the main source of various mental 
barriers that we are experiencing now, even though the current situation requires 
that the Indonesian society lives with a culture of work, whatsmore a culture of 
hard work. (1978, p. 42)  
... gaya kebudayaan santai yang nampaknya menjadi sumber utama dari 
bermacam-macam hambatan mental yang kita alami sekarang, padahal situasi 
sekarang meminta agar masyarakat nusantara hidup dengan pola kebudayaan 
kerja, bahkan pola kebudayaan kerja keras.  
According to Moertopo, this situation required the New Order regime to ‘save the 
historical process’ of national evolution by directing national culture towards the 
priorities of pembangunan.24 Much modernisation theory, linked as it was to the end of 
colonialism, also shared the hierarchy between modern and traditional ways of life. 
Liddle writes that ‘development ideology of Western social science’ which was adopted 
in Indonesia by the modernising intellectuals, had at its heart ‘a sharp distinction between 
traditional and modern societies’ and constructed a hierarchy between the two that 
privileged the modern and condemned the traditional (1973, p. 181).  
 
Moertopo’s writing has been linked to the functionalist school in American sociology 
through the way it drew on the writings of Indonesian anthropologist Koentjaraningrat 
(Acciaioli, 2001, pp. 8, fn. 6). Koentjaraningrat was the most influential Indonesian 
anthropologist of the New Order era (Hadiz & Dhakidae, 2005, p. 12). He made great use 
of the concept of ‘cultural value orientation’25 which he borrowed from the works of 
Clyde and Florence Kluckhohn (Koentjaraningrat, 2000, pp. 27-8). The Kluckhohns were 
part of the functionalist movement in North American social science and worked in one 
of its key engine rooms at Harvard between 1940 and 1960 (Marzali, 1998).26 Utilising 
his background, Koentjaraningrat expressed a popular version of the relationship between 
culture and pembangunan in a series of newspaper articles that were reprinted as a book, 
Culture, Mentality and Development (Kebudayaan, Mentalitet dan Pembangunan, 
2000).27 Koentjaraningrat preceded Moertopo, and followed Dutch colonial thought, in 
                                                 
23 See also Philpott (2003).  
24 ‘... menyelamatkan proses sejarah’ (1978, p. 36).  
25 ‘Orientasi nilai-budaya’.  
26 I discuss Koentjaraningrat’s methodology in greater detail in chapter seven.  




designating Indonesians’ ‘mental attitude’ as ‘generally not prepared for development’.28 
His articles in Culture, Mentality and Development then mapped out a course for 
development, identifying ‘cultural values’ that needed to be repressed and traits that 
needed cultivation.29 Koentjaraningrat’s ideas should be understood in the context of the 
1970s where Indonesian social sciences were being reshaped by international academic 
training regimes that emphasised value-neutral research and an authoritarian regime that 
was using technocratic governance to contain criticism of its legitimacy and decisions. 
Vedi Hadiz and Daniel Dhakidae write regarding the growth of the social sciences during 
the New Order era:  
[The] main inclination was still toward social science development that basically 
became part and parcel of the New Order’s broader development agenda from the 
1970s until its demise in the 1990s. (2005, p. 9) 
Moertopo’s writings about culture built on Koentjaraningrat’s ideas, drawing on the 
authority of the social sciences to legitimise the New Order regime’s policies.  
 
Moertopo also warned that economic, technological and scientific pembangunan may 
bring with it negative effects, such as disappearance of identity and social conflict (1978, 
pp. 45-8). Moertopo advocated that a process of ‘enculturation’ be undertaken by national 
leaders that involved the selective protection of elements of Indonesian culture in order to 
ameliorate undesirable consequences. Culture therefore played a double role in 
pembangunan. It encouraged Indonesians to expand their capacity for economic 
production through adapting to modern technologies and sciences, and it protected 
against the negative effects of pembangunan.  
 
Cultural Strategies articulated culture’s place within the ‘normalising society’ governed 
by the technologies and techniques of pembangunan. It viewed individual Indonesians in 
terms of their capacity for production and urged them to build their capacities through 
cultural change based on a normalising ideal model. Cultural Strategies thus used culture 
to link the capacities of individual Indonesians to national strength. Furthermore 
pembangunan becomes the latest stage in the long cultural evolution of Indonesian 
society. Acciaioli writes:  
                                                 
28 ‘Sikap mental orang Indonesia umumnya belum siap untuk pembangunan’ (2000, p. 32).  





[In] Ali Moertopo’s framework the developmental process of cultural evolution 
finds its fruition in the explicit process of ‘Development’ (pembangunan), as 
enacted by the New Order, an apotheosis of self-conscious human agency, in its 
Development policies and programs. (2001, p. 9) 
Moertopo was eventually excluded from power at the beginning of the Fourth 
Development Cabinet in 1983 as part of a Suharto clean-out that was suspected to be 
motivated by his desire to end continuing rivalries between political elites (Pangaribuan, 
1995, p. 58). While Moertopo was absent from later political and policy decisions, his 
articulation of culture’s role in pembangunan resonated with cultural policy from the 
early 1970s until the present. He passed away in 1984.  
 
Other New Order Era Governmental Discourses and Strategies 
While pembangunan can be thought of as being a cultural process and including a 
specific set of ideas about culture, the New Order regime’s methods of governance also 
included cultural corollaries, or effects that were not intended by the regime. This section 
analyses four different discourses and strategies of government that included cultural 
components or cultural corollaries.30 While discourses are the languages, thoughts and 
practices through which subjects and objects are given meaning, strategies include an 
element of choice in the designation of means, actions or procedures in order to come up 
with winning solutions. Put another way, while discourses constitute meaning, strategies 
can alter how discourses are deployed.  
 
a. Political Emasculation  
 
The New Order regime employed a political strategy that analysts, such as David 
Bourchier (1998, p. 207), have labelled ‘depoliticisation’.31 Depoliticisation began in the 
early 1970s through three methods that the New Order power-holders employed to 
consolidate their political position. Firstly the new government undermined the autonomy 
of groups that could provide substantial opposition because of their mass support in 
society. The political parties, large Islamic groups, professional groups and unions were 
weakened and brought under the control of Suharto cronies, generally through the 
                                                 
30 Since definitions of ‘discourse’ and ‘strategy’ are provided in the introduction, only a quick review of the 
difference between them is included here.  
31 Ward states: ‘Far from educating Indonesia’s masses within the framework of a world-view based on 
ideology, as is attempted by Muslims and communists, the leaders of the New Order are convinced that 
‘de-education’ is required to rid the people of the ideological thinking that has ‘poisoned’ Indonesian 




network of functional groups (Crouch, 1978, pp. 245-72; McIntyre, 1972; Ward, 1973, 
pp. 70-71). Secondly the New Order elite used their position as military-bureaucratic 
office holders to enrich themselves and their cronies, ensuring continued support through 
what has been labelled a system of patrimony (Crouch, 1979; Robison, 1986). Thirdly, 
Suharto purged both the military and the bureaucracy of possible opposition, removing 
any internal opposition to his rule and appointed loyal individuals, often military officers 
who were reliant on his support, to important government and military positions 
(Bourchier, 1996, p. 151; Crouch, 1978, pp. 221-244; Ricklefs, 2001, p. 349).  
 
The strategy of political emasculation was further pursued around the 1971 and 1977 
elections in ways that reached further into Indonesian society and strengthened the 
political hegemony of the New Order regime and, in particular, the position of its election 
vehicle, GOLKAR. In 1970 the government announced that government employees must 
observe ‘monoloyalty’ to the government, preventing bureaucrats from joining political 
parties except GOLKAR. The doctrine of the ‘floating mass’, a term coined in 1971, 
emphasised that Indonesia’s rural and working classes were not to be distracted from the 
task of state-led development with political involvement in parties (Anderson, 1990c, p. 
115). Another barrier to political participation was the 1975 banning of all political party 
branches below the regency level except for a few weeks before elections, effectively 
preventing them forming into mass organisations capable of challenging the government 
(Crouch, 1978, p. 272).32 The political emasculation of Indonesian society attempted to 
bar political discussion from everyday life in New Order Indonesia, including in cultural 
and artistic expression. Themes and expressions considered ‘political’ were frowned on, 
banned and sometimes resulted in detention and even death. 
 
Restraint of political expression was not applied uniformly to all Indonesians nor was it 
uniformly implemented across the period. Artists affiliated with groups considered 
political enemies, such as the left and Sukarno, were killed and gaoled in the 1960s and, 
after the release of political prisoners including many artists and writers beginning in 
1979, experienced continued hostility and were excluded from their previous occupations 
(Hatley, 1994, pp. 247-8). Regional arts (which I explore in the fourth section) 
                                                 
32 The New Order regime also attempted to depoliticise students following protests before and after the 
1977 elections and undertook a number of repressive measures against student groups, including the 




experienced an immediate change in themes that Hatley characterises as ‘depoliticisation’ 
(1994, pp. 229-38). In contrast to these two groups, the urban groups that had alliances 
with the regime when it came to power remember the years between late 1960s and the 
late-1970s as a time of freedom of expression. Following the Malari riots in 1974 the 
regime became less tolerant of dissent and launched another offensive again in 1978 – the 
crackdown on dissent mirrored the end of the coalitions that brought the New Order 
regime to power. From 1989, the prospect of increased ‘openness’ for discussion was 
raised by New Order figures and there were some encouraging signs that there was room 
for freedom of expression (Bourchier, 1996, pp. 258-63; Hatley, 1994, pp. 244-5).33 
However, the 1990 banning of Teater Koma’s play Suksesi (Hatley, 1994, pp. 244-5) and 
the 1992 crackdown against the performance genre Kethoprak Plesenden34 indicate that 
the expression of political dissent was still barred. Another crackdown on political 
activities began in 1994 with the closure of three political magazines (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 
399) and the 1996 attack on Megawati Sukarnoputri and the political offices of the 
opposition Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat Indonesia – PDI).  
 
b. Language and New Order Governmentality  
 
One way that the New Order regime made its policies acceptable to its supporters, the 
political elite, the army and the broader populace was by articulating them through 
familiar idioms and authoritative discourses. The process of expression35 made particular 
use of Sukarno’s concepts and expressions and Western social science through the 
discourse of pembangunan as previously explored.  
 
The New Order regime made good use of a type of speech that Roland Barthes calls 
‘myth’ (1972, pp. 109-58), which allowed the regime to represent their policies as non-
political. Barthes identifies myth as the mechanism that produces ‘naturalised’ (or 
depoliticised) speech. Certain symbols evoke shared memory of, for instance, nationalism 
                                                 
33 For a detailed account of the period of ‘openness’ including its basis in social changes and elite conflict, 
see Aspinall (2000, pp. 63-79).  
34 Kethoprak is a form of popular theatre in Java that developed early in the twentieth century. Kethoprak 
plesedan subverted the conventions of the genre for humorous effect and to engage in social comment and 
critique (Hatley, 1994, p. 256).  
35 By ‘process of expression’, I refer to the way that the discourses of the New Order regime were 
expressed through certain idioms while simultaneously altered by economic and socio-political needs. The 
process of expression was thus continuous and changing. The discourses are not hidden in symbols or 
idioms. They are transformed by them and are present for all to see. I am following the logic of Foucault, 




or a well-known story or an ethnic group. Myth is the mechanism that evokes such a 
memory and therefore hides the specific history of the symbol. Barthes gives the example 
of a picture of young African in a French uniform saluting with ‘his eyes uplifted.’ To 
Barthes, the picture signifies that ‘France is a great Empire, that all her sons, without any 
colour discrimination, faithfully serve under her flag’ obscuring the history of French 
colonialism in Africa. In his words: ‘What French imperiality obscures is also a primary 
language, a factual discourse which was telling me about the salute of [an African] in 
uniform’ (1972, p. 122). New Order discourse was replete with a ‘mythology’ of 
Indonesian nationalism, tradition and pembangunan.  
 
Sukarno’s genius, as mentioned in the previous chapter, lay in his ability to unite diverse 
groups through his use of language and symbols. Strong support for Sukarno in the early 
years of the New Order regime concerned Suharto and his followers. They undermined 
popular support through repositioning Sukarno’s popular symbols of Indonesian identity. 
The most prominent was the Pancasila, which had its meaning reworked in the early 
years of the New Order regime such that it became one of the key ideological documents 
of the conservative, authoritarian state.36 The 1945 Constitution was also reinterpreted 
through the Pancasila with similar emphasis (Bourchier, 1996, pp. 166-78; Ramage, 
1995).37 A third example is Sukarno’s concept of gotong royong. From a term again 
aimed at facilitating popular participation, under the New Order regime gotong royong 
became a way of legitimating top-down programs through its connection with an 
imagined indigenous lifestyle (Bowen, 1986).  
 
c. Family Principles 
 
The concept of kekeluargaan or family principles was an important element of the 
governmental rationality of the New Order state. Bourchier depicts the ‘spirit’ of 
kekeluargaan as one ‘of organic wholeness, harmony, stillness’ (1996, p. 164). 
Elsewhere, Bourchier gives a more critical description of kekeluargaan as ‘a word with 
overtones of stasis, patriarchy and a feudalistic ‘know thy place’ traditionalism’ (1998, p. 
                                                 
36 The process has been well documented by Morfit (1981), Ramage (1995, pp. 10-44) and Bourchier 
(1996, pp. 162-166).  
37 Ramage also notes the way that oppositional groups have developed their own competing understandings 




204).38 The basis of kekeluargaan is an idealised model of traditional Indonesian society 
drawn from Dutch adat scholarship.39  
 
Kekeluargaan became a state model for Indonesian society in three different locations.40 
Firstly, kekeluargaan establishes relationships within the family. The standard text for 
indoctrinating schoolchildren, Pancasila Moral Education (PMP), states:  
In the family there is a feeling of mutual consideration and empathy. The father 
works in the interests of the whole family. Your mother cares for your father and 
all the children. Often your father puts the needs of his family above his own 
needs. He postpones buying himself shoes because he has to buy your schoolbag. 
It is the same with your mother... Father and mother see you and the interests of 
the family as more important than their own. How happy is a household with such 
a mother and father. (Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1984 in 
Bourchier, 1996, p. 234)  
A second location is the community. Kekeluargaan reflects the notion that the traditional 
(and therefore authentic) Indonesian community operates without conflict and in a state 
of balance. Leaders are ‘spiritually united’ with their communities and ‘everyone 
cooperates in a spirit of community mindedness and family-ness’ (Bourchier, 1997, p. 
162). The third location is the nation-state. Kekeluargaan became the guiding principle of 
the state’s relationship to society. The most obvious manifestation of ‘family principles’ 
at the national level is Suharto’s title as the ‘Father of Development’. According to 
Heryanto, this title emphasises ‘a ‘natural’ authority and over-all order’ (1988, p. 20).41 
 
d. State/Society  
 
A significant strategy of the New Order regime was its articulation of the relationship 
between state and society. The variety of ways the incorporation of society into the state 
has been achieved has been well documented.42 The point is succinctly put by David 
Bourchier:  
                                                 
38 It is worth noting that Bourchier uses the term to characterise New Order era conservative indigenism 
(1998, p. 204).  
39 Parker writes: The state ideology of Indonesia ... drew upon a vision of integrated nation and state within 
the ideological framework of kekeluargaan’ (2003, p. 8). There are links between kekeluagaan and 
integralism, which was revived by the regime in the 1990s and is explored in the final section of this 
chapter.  
40 Bourchier identifies the terms use across a number of different sites. He states: ‘Family, society and state 
are represented as a continuum, each of them grounded in traditional values’ (1998, p. 207).  
41 Kitley demonstrates that kekeluargaan also extended into the state-owned mass media in his analysis of 
the TVRI soap opera, Keluarga Rahmat (2000, pp. 146-77).  
42 On corporatism in Indonesia, see MacIntyre (1994). On political parties, see Ward (1973), Ricklefs 




The dismantling of the party system; the corporatisation of youth, women, 
farmers, workers and professionals’ organizations; the requirement that all social 
organizations submit to government supervision; and the proliferation of 
restrictions on the freedom to organize are all consistent with the idea of a 
progressive incorporation of civil society into the state. (1997, p. 176) 
Michel Foucault identifies the articulation of the dividing line between state and society 
as an important governmental strategy (Foucault, 1991b). In the case of the New Order 
regime, the state’s agenda was considered paramount, and civil society was considered 
important because it was a means to achieve that agenda. The dividing line between state 
and society was blurred through representing the interests of the state and civil society as 
organically linked. However, in practice the regime would not allow civil society to 
challenge its articulation of the national interest. Authorities sought to impose a high 
degree of regulation on the institutions of civil society (including intervening in 
appointments and banning organisations) and any actions that authorities considered a 
critique of state action or a barrier to the achievement of state goals were labelled 
antisocial and anti-Indonesian. The New Order’s articulation of the state-society 
relationship, like kekeluargaan, was used to justify the repression discussed in the 
previous sections. These two discourses, while underlying the institutional configuration 
developed in the 1970s, were reasserted in the 1990s in the form of integralism which is 
discussed in the final section.  
 
Exploring the discourses and strategies that have informed cultural policy provides a 
partial picture of how the New Order regime understood the task of government. Philpott 
writes:  
The techniques, technologies and rationalities of the New Order were a particular 
form of governmentalisation of the state, with ‘development’ as its leitmotiv. This 
entails thinking about New Order authoritarianism as an activity that made 
government thinkable and practicable as an art dependent upon particular 
knowledges to give form to the domain it sought to govern, rather than treating it 
in institutional terms. (2000, p. 167)  
Cultural policy was given shape within the New Order regime’s governmental rationality. 
When the New Order regime came to power in 1965-66 it erased many of the discourses 
that had informed cultural policy since independence and in particular during Guided 
Democracy. Gone was the political mobilisation, the concept of ‘national identity’ and 
                                                                                                                                                 
MPRS Resolution No.XX/1966), see Bourchier (1996, pp. 165-78). On the parliament, see Feith’s 




the goal of creating a socialist society that had been at the centre of cultural policy since 
1959.  
 
The new justification for cultural policy was culture’s role in pembangunan, which 
became a key governmental discourse in 1969 and remained important across all 
portfolios for the regime’s duration. Depoliticisation was an important tool of the regime 
that was enforced in conjunction with pembangunan and justified through kekeluargaan 
and the related conceptualisation of the relationship between state and society. 
Depoliticisation severely limited the cultural practices of all groups, although some 
periods within the New Order era offered particular groups more room for cultural 
expression than others. In particular, the early New Order period from 1966 until the late-
1970s provided contemporary artists who had been amongst its supporters a space where 
they could practice their arts with a degree of freedom than had been absent since the 
early 1950s, as I explore in the next section. The freedom for this group was curtailed in 
1978 and, despite promises of ‘openness’ in the late 1980s, was restricted until Suharto 
fell in 1998. Similarly, New Order language was asserted more vigorously at different 
times, in particular the late 1970s and 1980s. For instance, in 1982-84 Suharto 
successfully pushed for the Pancasila to be made the sole philosophical basis (azas 
tunggal) of all socio-political organisations in the face of complaints from Islamic and 
other groups (Mackie & MacIntyre, 1994, pp. 15,31).  
 
Although the regime has often been represented as making decisions independently from 
non-state actors, official cultural policy was also influenced by non-state groups and 
cultural workers. During the early part of the New Order period when these groups were 
at their most popular and energetic, their ideas and agendas exerted some influence over 
cultural debate and discourses.  
 
3. The Indonesian Arts Community and the New Order Regime 
Universal Humanism and the New Order Regime 
The term universal humanism was constructed during the debates about the life and 




Independence, and a group of poets and writers that surrounded him (Foulcher, 1993a).43 
A loose-knit group of cultural workers who were colleagues of Chairil issued a statement 
the year after Chairil’s death in 1949 known as the Gelanggang Testimony of Beliefs 
(Surat Kepercayaan Gelanggang). They made their commitment to universalism clear in 
the statement’s opening words: ‘We are the true heirs of world culture and must 
perpetuate this culture in our own way.’44 The concept of humanism, defined as ‘a 
conviction that the problems of humanity start within universal human nature’ (Foulcher, 
1993b, p. 240) was also attributed to Chairil in articles written after his death. In 1951, 
H.B. Jassin, a literary critic later closely involved with Manikebu, defined the term 
universal humanism to summarise the rationale of Chairil and the other writers of what 
was becoming known as the Generation of ‘45 (Foulcher, 1993b, p. 241). As the radical 
challenge strengthened, universal humanism, understood slightly differently in the 1960s 
as the assertion that ‘the autonomy of the individual artist, free from political 
involvement, was the precondition for genuine aesthetic achievement’ (Foulcher, 1993a, 
p. 246),45 became the rallying point of anti-Sukarno artists. Their position became 
increasingly marginalised by Sukarno, LEKRA and the PKI during the period of Guided 
Democracy.  
 
As was discussed briefly in the last chapter, in September 1963 the magazine Sastra 
printed Manikebu, which outlined the opposition of a group of twenty-one ‘universal 
humanist’ artists and writers to the then dominant radical nationalist position. The 
signatories included Jassin, Wiratmo Soekito, Trisno Sumardjo, Goenawan Mohamad, 
Arief Budiman and Taufiq Ismail (Mohamad, 1993, p. 12). As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the artists who were affiliated with LEKRA or supported Sukarno attacked the 
document and the signatories suffered from the reprisals until the start of the New Order 
regime. From this marginalised position at the end of 1963, the Manikebu group and its 
creed of universal humanism would in three years come to dominate the arts community 
in Indonesia. The supporters of universal humanism (from now on referred to as universal 
humanists) were at their most united in opposition to radical nationalism after the 
publication of the Manifes Kebudayaan (Manikebu) in 1963 and during the early years of 
                                                 
43 ‘Universal humanism’ has a complex and much-debated history. I provide only an outline here. See 
Foulcher (1993a) for a more detailed account.  
44 Translated in Foulcher (1993b, p. 241).  
45 The terms meaning has altered over time. See Foulcher (1993a, p. 247) for a discussion about the 





the New Order regime. They were a loose knit group, rather than an organised faction of 
modern artists, who tended to work in arts classified as ‘national’ (such as Indonesian 
language literature, contemporary theatre, contemporary fine arts and certain musical 
genres).  
 
The first prominent alliance between the army and universal humanists occurred around 
the time Manikebu was signed. The significance and extent of the contacts is a widely 
contested point (Foulcher, 1986, pp. 124-6; D. T. Hill, 1984, pp. 33, fn. 66; Maier, 1987, 
p. 24; Mohamad, 1988, pp. 10-15).46 However, all commentators agree that the army 
sponsored and facilitated a national conference for writers (Konferensi Karyawan 
Pengarang Indonesia) in the middle of the ongoing debates in March 1964. The universal 
humanists aligned themselves with the army against the groups that supported Sukarno. 
In the face of ferocious attacks, it is neither surprising nor unjustified for the universal 
humanists to seek protection from the only group powerful enough to resist the PKI, 
LEKRA, Sukarno and their allies. As such, the Manikebu had a ‘political function’. 
David Hill reports Arief Budiman’s statement to a conference about Manikebu in October 
1982 that the ‘manifesto could not be seen as neutral for it was a rallying point for the 
anti-Communists who sought military support for their ideological position’ (D. T. Hill, 
1984, p. 33). Universal humanism and the military had established an important point of 
contact.  
 
The alignment became more concrete in the dramatic atmosphere of Jakarta in the days 
following the attempted coup. Universal humanist artists became closely aligned with 
young artists associated with the student movement and the modernising intellectuals 
discussed above. PKI had always struggled to gain the support of the university-educated 
who predominantly came from elite families and considered the PKI particularly 
responsible for the corruption and hypocrisies of Guided Democracy (McVey, 1990, p. 
20). An example of the nexus between the three groups is the literary magazine Horison, 
which began publication in July 1966.47 Horison has been described as ‘the literary 
vanguard of the then student movement’ (D. T. Hill, 1993b, p. 252). Positioning itself as 
                                                 
46 Although not all of the signatories were connected with the military, some have since acknowledged their 
ties. Wiratmo Sukito, the primary author of Manikebu, later admitted to working ‘voluntarily’ for the secret 
service of the armed forces in the time leading up to and following Manikebu (Soekito, 1981; 1982) in (D. 
T. Hill, 1984, p. fn66).  




humanist and the defender of creative freedom, Horison was stridently anti-Sukarno and 
anti-communist.48 The editorial board consisted of signatories of Manikebu (Jassin, Zaini, 
Taufiq Ismail, and Arief Budiman) and was headed by the similarly inclined Mochtar 
Lubis (D. T. Hill, 1993a). The poetry of Taufiq Ismail, himself a student, became the 
catch-cry of the 1966 student movement, where he was prominent at rallies and in the 
press. Similar commitments to Western models of artistic and social development 
cemented links between the groups which were initially built on increasing unease with 
Sukarno’s radical nationalist policies. After being marginalised within Sukarno’s national 
front, both groups rose to prominence during the brutal dismantling of the communist 
organisations and were initially aligned with the New Order regime.  
 
Points of Agreement, Points of Disagreement 
The universal humanists and the New Order regime were not comfortable companions. 
Universal humanism’s commitment to artistic integrity and the importance it placed on 
independence did not sit easily beside the New Order regime’s ideal of a servile and 
politically inactive populace. After the initial alignment, some artists began to criticise 
the regime in the late 1960s for human rights abuses of their former adversaries, 
alongside the changing attitudes of the modernising intellectuals (Southwood & 
Flanagan, 1983, pp. 175-81). The New Order regime tolerated a degree of dissent from 
some of their former supporters. For instance, Rendra’s popular, politically-critical poetry 
was tolerated in the 1970s. However, the changed political climate after the national 
elections in 1977 led to a clamping down on dissent; Rendra was jailed in 1978 then 
banned from public performance for seven years (Hatley, 1994, pp. 228-9). Arief 
Budiman was also consistently critical of the state in the national press from the late 
1960s, as were other artists and intellectuals.  
 
The actions of the politically active universal humanists at this time can be characterised 
as dissidence or tolerated political dissent from former allies within defined boundaries.49 
Much like the student movement, they saw themselves as a ‘moral force’ rather than a 
political force. They were allowed to operate within a ‘dissident niche’, albeit one that 
narrowed considerably until the period of ‘openness’ (keterbukaan) beginning in the late 
                                                 
48 Some observers saw Horison as a continuation of Sastra, where Manikebu was published (D. T. Hill, 
1993b, p. 252).  




1980s. Their opposition was a ‘purely expressive politics’ (Linz, 1975, p. 213 in Aspinall, 
2000, p. 37) that did not focus on transformation of the social order, mass mobilisation or 
the development of politically active groups.50 Of course, it should be remembered that 
many supporters of universal humanism did not publicly demonstrate any political 
commitment at all, either in their work or otherwise. When a universal humanist made a 
political statement, she or he did so as an individual rather than as a representative of a 
particular group.  
 
The rise of the universal humanists is historically associated with the rise of the New 
Order regime. Political links were established around Manikebu and the universal 
humanists’ support of the new regime was initially forthright and adamant in the hope of 
establishing a free environment for artistic expression. They gained support from the 
regime through the institutionalisation of their position and their acceptance as a valid 
(although at times a barely tolerated) element of Indonesian society. They also shared 
some commonalities with the regime’s methods of governance. Particularly notable are: 
(1) their disavowal of mass-politics; (2) the apolitical position of many of the universal 
humanists; (3) their artistic aesthetics that gave preference to spiritually uplifting art (a 
version of which was adopted within the cultural policy of the new regime discussed in 
the next chapter) and (4) their opposition to communism. While not linked to the political 
program of the regime to the extent of LEKRA and LKN under Sukarno, they were 
allowed to dominate the arts community for many years and received institutional support 
through positions in universities and arts colleges, government grants and access that was 
denied to ex-radical nationalists.51  
 
The Ismail Marzuki Arts Centre: a ‘Cultural Oasis’ 
An important instance of the institutionalisation of universal humanism was the 
establishment of the Ismail Marzuki Arts Centre (Taman Ismail Marzuki – TIM). TIM 
immediately became the most prominent performance venue in Indonesia after its 
creation in 1968 and hosted more performances and audiences than any other venue in 
                                                 
50 Julie Southwood and Patrick Flanagan would call them ‘loyal opposition’ (other examples are student 
movements and the Legal Aid Institute – Lembaga Bantuan Hukum) because they accept the ‘basic fact of 
the New Order system of power’, while arguing for particular institutional reforms (1983, pp. 205-6).  
51 Hill writes: ‘By 1968 ... [artists] who shared the values of the political force which swept aside all leftist 
opposition gained government blessing and established their cultural hegemony from a base in the capital’ 




Indonesia in the 1970s.52 It was the location of numerous national festivals and 
conferences, the most popular theatre and dance performances and widely-reported 
discussions of the arts and culture.53 TIM was the creation of Major-General Ali Sadikin, 
the Sukarno-appointed governor of Jakarta54 and the artists associated with Manikebu.55 
The universal humanists dominated the formateur committee, the Jakarta Academy 
(Akademi Jakarta – AJ), the Jakarta Arts Council (Dewan Kesenian Jakarta – DKJ) and 
the DKJ Daily Worker’s Council which were formed to organise and run TIM. In 
accordance with universal humanist principles, the involved artists desired, as stated in 
the program for TIM’s official inauguration, a cosmopolitan centre of artistic creativity 
and freedom where ‘nevermore the arts will be subject to and tool of political bickering 
and suppression’56 (‘Peresmian Pusat Kesenian Jakarta Taman Ismail Marzuki,’ 1968, p. 
26), leading one prominent artist to label TIM a ‘cultural oasis’.57 This metaphor gains a 
darker edge when considering the brutal events that surrounded TIM’s construction, the 
absence of the left and changes in community art forms discussed in the next section.  
 
According to LIPI researcher Bisri Effendi, the three problems that dominated 
discussions of the establishment of TIM were (1) the threat of left-wing artists’ 
involvement in TIM; (2) concern about bureaucratic intervention; and (3) the problems of 
shaping and managing a cultural centre (2001, p. 677). The first concern is reflected in 
the enforced absence from TIM for many years of artists who supported Sukarno (D. T. 
Hill, 1993b, p. 250). Although many universal humanists appear to have easily reconciled 
the apparent contradiction of artistic freedom with limiting expression, the exclusion of 
these artists did not sit easily alongside other universal humanists’ commitment to 
freedom of expression. For instance, Arief Budiman’s article in Kompas criticises TIM 
                                                 
52 Goenawan Mohamad states that TIM had 500 000 visitors in 1970 (1993, p. 111).  
53 Hill (1993b, p. 245) and Hatley (1994, p. 221) both confirm TIM’s centrality to the arts in New Order 
Indonesia.  
54 Despite Sadikin’s connection with Sukarno, he remained governor of Jakarta until 1977. After his term, 
Sadikin became more openly critical of the New Order regime and was a prominent signatory of the critical 
‘Petition of Fifty’ in May 1980.  
55 The process of TIM’s creation has been reviewed a number of times. See Effendi (2001), Hill (1993b), 
and Mohamad (1993, pp. 105-116). For the official view, see Murgiyanto (1994b).  
56 Other statements in the program confirm the centrality of universal humanism. For instance: ‘The aim of 
today is to free artistic life forever of depressing trends of the past and to promote instead the socio-artistic 
climate that knows no political occupation and recognises the artist’s real responsibilities’ (‘Peresmian 
Pusat Kesenian Jakarta Taman Ismail Marzuki,’ 1968, p. 25). Goenawan Mohamad’s discussion of TIM in 
1977 is another example, based as it is around an (often unflattering) assessment of TIM’s achievement of 
its goal of ‘creative freedom’ (‘kemerdekaan kreativitus’) (1993, pp. 105-116).  





for excluding the left from the new arts institutions (1969). Referring to the spectre of the 
left despite its recent decimation may also have been aimed at assuring the New Order 
regime of the new centre’s political stance.  
 
The second issue was not so easily resolved. While Sadikin was governor, artists enjoyed 
a large degree of creative freedom thanks to his financial and political patronage, 
although on occasions Sadikin himself intervened to request the banning of 
performances, (Mohamad, 1993). However, a change of governor brought new political 
and financial pressures to TIM, changing the ecology of the ‘cultural oasis’.58 The state, 
through the Jakarta provincial government, increasingly intervened in DKJ appointments, 
using its authority to influence inclusion and exclusion in the premier national 
performance space. Still greater interventions followed in the 1980s and 1990s. While 
Hazil Tanzil was General Manager of TIM (1982-1990), he brought TIM into line with 
the system of human resource management employed by the Province of Jakarta and 
made TIM workers civil servants (Murgiyanto, 1994a, p. 70). In 1991, management of 
TIM was taken away from the original management team of TIM, the Jakarta Arts 
Council (Dewan Kesenian Jakarta – DKJ), and given to the Jakarta Arts Foundation 
(Yayasan Kesenian Jakarta), which was formed in 1989 in an attempt to address funding 
shortfalls through collaboration with the private sector (Gondomono & Murgiyanto, 
1994, p. 62; Wahono, 1994b, p. 53).59  
 
However, government intervention did not reduce, but instead reinforced the dominance 
of universal humanism. Hill writes:  
Despite sporadic friction between the DKJ and the government, ostensibly of the 
‘independence’ of TIM, the existence of the Arts Centre, none the less, is a sign of 
official government backing for a stream of Indonesian culture which has become 
dominant after the destruction of the left in 1966. Having gained government 
blessing and funding for their Arts Centre, these artists dominated ‘New Order’ 
Indonesian literary and artistic life from their base in the national centre of the 
performing arts. (1993b, p. 250)  
Despite the ideas of universal humanists and their institutional strength relative to other 
groups, having an artistic space run by artists has not produced a popular version of 
national culture. Instead, after initial successes,60 art in TIM has been increasingly 
                                                 
58 On state intervention in TIM see Hill (1993b, pp. 248-51) and Mohamad (1993, pp. 105-116).  
59 These changes are examined in greater detail in chapter six while analysing the Jakarta Arts Council.  
60 See, in particular, Keith Foulcher’s exploration of a revival of Lenong theatre in TIM that attracted an 




isolated from the populace and cultural provision has been increasingly dominated by 
commercial enterprise (D. T. Hill, 1993b, p. 256). TIM itself has not operated within a 
vacuum, separated from broader social change. Declining attendance figures in the 1980s 
and 1990s forced TIM to open itself to commercial ventures such as a cinema complex 
and craft shops; its management became increasingly oriented towards attracting private 
capital (D. T. Hill, 1993b, p. 251). Additionally, the views of the universal humanists 
(which were engrained in much of the arts establishment) were challenged by the 
development of alternative perspectives, such as the New Art Movement (Supangkat, 
1990, pp. 161-2; 1994) and contextual literature (sastra konteksual) (Foulcher, 1987).61  
 
While universal humanism was not ‘deployed’ by the New Order regime, universal 
humanists did play a role in filling the cultural space created by the erasure of the 
elements of the arts community affiliated with the left and Sukarno. As a discourse that 
generated a set of ideas about culture, universal humanism generated its own 
understandings about the role of artists and cultural expression in society that can be 
differentiated from the New Order regime’s governmental discourses. However, the 
relationship between the supporters of universal humanism and the New Order regime 
created points of contact and mutual support that should not be ignored. The universal 
humanists had no qualms in representing the annihilation of the left as deserved and 
moved quickly to suppress their legacy by asserting their own version of history and 
ideas about culture. Also important is the overlap between features of universal 
humanism and the regime’s methods of governance that facilitated the adoption of 
elements of universal humanism, such as a commitment to spiritually uplifting art and 
freedom from politics (but not freedom of political or creative expression), into the New 
Order regime’s cultural policies that I discuss in the next chapter. The universal 
humanists were at their most influential between the late 1960s and late-1970s when the 
regime was formulating its cultural policy. Decline was brought by the crackdown on 
political dissent in the late 1970s, declining attendance figures and increasing provincial 
encroachment in TIM and challenges from alternative perspectives in the arts. However, 
proponents of universal humanism continued to dominate the arts establishment 
(including continued involvement in TIM), while politically critical art was further 
                                                 
61 For a discussion of cultural expression in Indonesia during the New Order period with a focus on the 
state of critical cultural practices, see Hatley (1994). Hatley demonstrates that political art was still being 




marginalised. Throughout this time, New Order economic policy opened Indonesia to 
international companies and the economy began to boom. The marketplace increasingly 
became the provider of cultural goods for the majority of Indonesians in the 1980s and 
1990s, which I explore in section five below.  
 
4. Indigenous Ethnic Cultures  
The third element of cultural policy I discuss differs from the previous two in that it is not 
a set of discourses or strategies like New Order governance or universal humanism. 
Instead, indigenous ethnic culture is considered here as an important issue where cultural 
identity is contested and shaped. Previous discussions of indigenous ethnic identity in this 
thesis have demonstrated that it has been an important element of governance since the 
colonial era. Indigenous ethnic culture became one of the central focal points of New 
Order era cultural policy, surpassing even its importance during Guided Democracy. This 
section explores the historical continuities and breaks between previous eras and the New 
Order era regarding how ethnic cultures were used in governmental programs. I explore 
two areas: regional art forms and official representations of cultural pluralism.  
 
Regional Art Forms 
Due to the traumatic events at the beginning of the New Order era, many regional art 
forms went into hiatus, particularly within Java, until the early 1970s. Before 1965, 
political parties made use of the links between communities and local arts in their 
attempts to build support and consensus for their programs. The scale and visciousness of 
the attacks following 1965 caused many artists to fear for their lives if they had 
affiliations, however tenuous,62 or even if their art form had been affiliated with leftist 
organisations.63 When troupes began performing again in the early 1970s, they did so 
with bureaucratic or military backing (Effendi, 1998, p. 213; Hatley, 1994, pp. 220,230; 
                                                 
62 The experiences of a female shadow puppeteer (dalang), Bardijati, demonstrate the extent of the 
repression (Antariksa, 2001). Bardijati was popular in Central Java before 1965. She was a member of 
LEKRA, but, it should be noted, was not familiar with LEKRA ideology and was not a LEKRA leader. 
Bardijati and her husband were arrested four days after Gestapu, were jailed for eighteen months; and many 
of her possessions including her puppets and gamelan were permanently ‘borrowed’ by the military 
(Antariksa, 2001, p. 13). She was not allowed to perform again until receiving official authorisation in 
1976. From this time until today she has not received the recognition and income that her talents previously 
brought her.  
63 See Hatley (1994, pp. 220,229-30), Effendi (1998, pp. 211-3), Widodo (1995, pp. 10-11) and Hefner 




van Groenendael, 1985, pp. 140-151). The state replaced the political parties as an 
important sponsor of the regional arts and began to increasingly intervene in performance 
techniques. Performance texts also became increasingly aligned with the regime’s 
priorities. An insight into the regime’s role for regional arts can be gained from the six 
ethical rules from the dalang association Ganasidi, formed on 12 July 1969.64 Ganasidi 
itself was an initiative of Major General Surono, the commander for Central Java and the 
Special District of Yogyakarta (van Groenendael, 1985, p. 145), who had the desire to 
guard dalangs ‘against future political errings [and] improve the level of the art and 
performance style ... so that these might make a positive contribution to the development 
of the Indonesian people’ (van Groenendael, 1985, p. 146).  
 
Regional art forms were altered by their use as a means of communication between the 
regime and ordinary citizens. The alteration of regional art forms occurred because of 
three interlinked processes. Firstly, as was demonstrated above, content was directly 
altered through the insertion of pembangunan slogans and lessons. The military (Hatley, 
1994, pp. 229-31) and the Directorate of Culture ensured that ‘actors and singers 
incorporate government messages into their speeches and song lyrics’ (Yampolsky, 1995, 
p. 711). Secondly, the regime discouraged political topics and discussion. Political 
themes were erased65 and replaced with generic, inoffensive stories and pembangunan 
messages. Thirdly, a broad process of improvement took place, including reduced 
performance time, use of Indonesian language and the alteration of elements that were 
considered ‘immoral’. Philip Yampolsky characterises ‘respectability’ as the ‘essence of 
the notion of upgrading artistic quality’ (1995, p. 711). These changes have been 
                                                 
64 Dwi-Warsa Ganasidi’s Six Ethical Rules (Ganasidi, 1971) in (van Groenendael, 1985):  
1. In the fulfilment of his duty as a counsellor and educator, the dalang is the servant of the people. As a 
provider of healthy entertainment, it is his duty firstly to support the people in its struggle to achieve 
social well-being and security, and secondly to boost the morale of the Indonesian people.  
2. As the servant of his country, it is the dalang’s duty to give precedence to the National Interest by 
honouring the Pancasila and the Constitution of 1945 and obeying and observing their injunctions in 
conformity with the government’s policy.  
3. As a servant to the Indonesian culture, that is to say, as someone devoted to the preservation of its 
originality and purity, the dalang is bound to do his utmost for and assist in the development of his 
arts, in harmony with the advancement of the Indonesian people.  
4. In his private life, it is the dalang’s duty to guard the dignity of his office and put his art into practice, 
as well as to devote his energies to the mastering of all the facets of his art.  
5. As leader of the performance, it is the dalang’s duty to watch over the morals of his company, in 
addition to honouring and defending his culture.  
6. It is the dalang’s duty to promote cooperation and harmony between artists and to avoid all that is 
likely to conduce to conflict. 




discussed at length elsewhere66 and are returned to in the next chapter and in both of the 
case studies in Part II of the thesis.  
 
While the New Order regime was working hard to erase the discourses of Guided 
Democracy, its model for managing indigenous ethnic cultures was quite similar. A 
process of improvement including a concern with morality remained central to the 
regime’s treatment of regional cultural forms and slogans continued to be inserted into 
performances. McVey identifies this process as a continuation of a middle-class reform 
agenda linked to the urban culture of the politically powerful (1986, pp. 40-2). Art forms 
that expressed regional and national identity could not be seen in either era to include 
‘immoral’ or ‘backward’ behaviour, invoking a range of cultural programs discussed in 
the next chapter. Where Guided Democracy and the New Order differed was not in their 
methods, but in two other important respects. Firstly, the normative model that lay at the 
heart of their treatment of regional cultural forms rejected Sukarno’s overtly political 
priorities and privileged the political priorities of pembangunan. Instead of encouraging 
involvement with achieving political goals and the achievement of a socialist society, 
regional art forms were to encourage a focus on economic development and an 
acceptance of the social hierarchy. Secondly, the resources they invested in regional 
cultural programs far outstripped previous political regimes and were applied across a 
much longer time period.  
 
New Order Pluralism and Taman Mini 
Indonesia’s diversity, with its multiple potentials for conflict and intractable differences, 
presented a particularly tricky problem for the new regime. How could they acknowledge 
Indonesia’s obvious pluralism while preventing discord and the rise of regional powers 
based on cultural groupings? Keith Foulcher argues that ‘region’ is incorporated into 
national culture through appropriation of the visual and decorative traditions as evidence 
of the harmony of ‘national’ and ‘regional’ cultures (1990, pp. 302-3). The representation 
of pluralism through decorative traditions performs two important functions. Firstly, the 
process removes pluralism from the political field and places it in the cultural field, 
stripping it of political content and reducing the possibility of political mobilisation. 
Secondly, the process of representation was an important method of inculcating the New 
                                                 
66 For a discussion of these kinds of changes, see also Widodo (1995), Effendi (1998), Acciaioli (1985) and 




Order model of pluralism into the population as part of the nationing process. Cultural 
institutions, through their representations of Indonesian cultural diversity, taught 
Indonesians what it meant to be Indonesian. Cultural institutions played an important role 
in disseminating lessons about being Indonesian in the New Order era. A particularly 
high-profile example of such an institution in Indonesia is the ‘Beautiful Indonesia in 
Miniature’ Theme Park (Taman Mini Indonesia Indah – Taman Mini).  
 
Taman Mini was opened on 20 April 1975. Students had protested against the building of 
Taman Mini because of its extravagance in a time of economic hardship for many 
Indonesians (Pemberton, 1994b, pp. 241-6). Its stated purpose was to educate Indonesians 
about their nation and themselves. At Taman Mini’s opening, Suharto said:  
By visiting this park we will know ourselves better, we will know our nation 
better and we will love our motherland more. Therefore the ‘Beautiful Indonesia’ 
Park is also a real effort to strengthen national development, now and in the 
future. (Writers-Group, 1978, p. 9, in Acciaioli, 1996, p. 39) 
Similarly the Minister for Education and Culture, Daoed Yoesoef, in a speech at its sixth 
anniversary, defined Taman Mini as a ‘cultural park’ in that it contributes to cultural 
growth ‘towards civilisation’ and an ‘educational park’ in that it illustrates ‘the unity-in-
diversity-ness of the values we revere’ (1981/82, pp. 6-7).67  
 
Taman Mini has been analysed repeatedly in order to demonstrate the New Order state’s 
construction of national culture with similar conclusions (Acciaioli, 1996; Errington, 
1997; Hellman, 1999, pp. 48-60; Pemberton, 1994b). Acciaioli’s article ‘Pavilions and 
Posters’ provides a sustained analysis of the park’s representations of regional cultures in 
its geography, displays, and posters and finds similarities in their representations about 
Indonesia. From a relatively close representation to regional forms in Java, Sumatra and 
Bali, the representations become increasingly homogenous as the ethnic group is situated 
further from the ‘cultural centre’ (which coincides in the Taman Mini itself with its 
geographical location of the ethnic group further from the centre the park). Acciaioli 
argues:  
[Taman Mini] constructs the generic Indonesian, and presents all the local variety 
of Indonesian cultures as regional variations, defined by administrative divisions 
in matters of detail, upon basic shared themes, the purported ‘local genius’ or 
basic cultural substratum of Indonesianness. What diversity is evident is generated 
centrally, permitted embroidery upon an homogenised broadcloth dictated by 
                                                 




government officials bent on constructing a generic type, whether of abode or 
costume, promulgating the message of sameness rather than difference. (1996, p. 
39) 
Pluralism is sanitised and produced for Indonesians to internalise and foreigners to 
absorb.68  
 
Benedict Anderson notes the similarities in New Order pluralism to the cultural 
management promoted by Dutch colonial policy. The reasons he gives for the regime’s 
‘strong support for conservative ethnolinguistic community leaderships’ centre around 
preventing strong, coherent oppositional movements from forming (1987b, p. 77). 
However, New Order cultural pluralism was more than a ‘Machiavellian policy of divide 
and rule’ (Anderson, 1987b, p. 77). By inscribing a hierarchy within ethnic cultural forms 
and practices, New Order cultural pluralism had the model of the regime’s ideal cultural 
subject inscribed within it. Cultural institutions, such as Taman Mini, were governmental 
in that they taught lessons about both being Indonesian and the relationship between 
different indigenous ethnic populations and between indigenous ethnicity and the nation.  
 
The construction of regional cultures became the vehicle for New Order cultural 
pluralism and an important focus for New Order governance. Regional cultures both 
managed populations through inculcating lessons about the proper relationship between 
ethnic groups and their place in the nation, as well as disseminating lessons to individuals 
about morality, and proper conduct. The New Order regime’s model of indigenous ethnic 
identity was a reforming discourse. As indigenous cultural forms increasingly became the 
focus of cultural programs, they were subject to greater observation and alteration in an 
effort to make them accord with the discursive formation that surrounded them. However, 
the outcomes desired by the regime were not guaranteed. Indonesian society may have 
been increasingly targeted through programs, but it was not a programmed society.  
 
                                                 
68 John Pemberton’s discussion of Taman Mini notes that it also taught lessons about the nature of power in 
New Order Indonesia. Through its representations of tradition, Taman Mini normalised hierarchical power 
relationships, demonstrated the proper attitude for Indonesians to take towards authority and legitimising 
New Order regime’s authority and right to rule (1994b). There are similarities here with the notions of 




5. Responses to Changing Social Conditions and Political Imperatives in the 
1980s and 1990s 
The 1980s and 1990s were a time of economic growth that led to social change through 
the growth of the urban middle class (Antlov, 1999; Gerke, 2000; Ricklefs, 2001, p. 384; 
Robison, 1996; Robison, Beeson, Jayasuriya, & Kim, 2000). The success of the New 
Order regime’s economic policies, while providing the resources for the regime’s 
activities and a form of legitimacy, also had two other effects that concerned the regime 
that were canvassed in the Introduction to this thesis: first, success led to a huge growth 
in circulation of consumer goods and forms of conspicuous consumption which the 
regime worried would offend other elements of society; and second, economic growth fed 
groups in the middle classes that hoped for reforms for greater freedom of expression and 
that would possibly lead to democracy. The growth of these groups concerned the 
Suharto regime, which responded through the repression of opposition69 and through a 
form of ‘cultural politics’, which forms the subject matter of this section. 70  
 
Marl Ricklefs writes: ‘Being anti-communist, suspicious of radical Islam and in favour of 
capitalist-style development, Indonesia in the late 1970s was well placed to maintain the 
support of the United States, and therefore of other Western powers’ (2001, p. 370). 
Ricklefs’ continues to note that this gave Indonesia a degree of freedom over other 
internal matters such as East Timor and Aceh. However, it was also a choice to 
incorporate particular forms of governance, in particular market mechanisms that were 
viewed as desirable by Western states.71 Indonesia’s economic policy changes of the 
1980s reflect the regime’s engagement with the international order, although the 
outcomes were at times far from those desired by Western states and international 
                                                 
69 For a brief summary of repression in the 1980s, including the Tanjung Priok massacre and subsequent 
arrests, see Ricklefs (2001, pp. 381-2). Repression was more frequent in the 1990s, including the mid-1994 
banning of three major news magazines, Tempo, Detik and Editor, subsequent battle through the courts (D. 
T. Hill, 1994, pp. 41-4) and the 1996 attack on the PDI headquarters and subsequent arrests and 
disappearances (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 403).  
70 Another important change was the growth of Islam and its growing importance for politics, in particular 
Suharto’s courtship of Islamic groups. However, I have chosen not to explore this issue here due to the 
small impact it had on cultural policy. See Hefner (1993; 1998a; 2000) and Ricklefs (2001, pp. 379,400) for 
detailed analysis.  
71 Hindess suggests that liberal political thought views the market as a ‘powerful instrument of civilisation’ 
that has been constructed ‘as a matter of deliberate policy, by a number of powerful states and supra-
national agencies’ (2002, p. 135). Hindess argues that by engaging in the international system of states and, 
in particular, the international market, newly independent states such as Indonesia are placed within a 
hierarchy of states that compares them to Western liberal-democratic norms and pushes them towards 




economic institutions (Robison & Hadiz, 2004, pp. 71-102). When oil prices fell after 
1982, the regime responded through a process of deregulation (including the financial 
sector), catalysing increased investment from both domestic and international financiers 
(H. Hill, 2000, pp. 76-8). The most prominent and sustained manufacturing boom of the 
New Order era began with the economic policy change of the mid-1980s. This change 
was aimed at fostering export-oriented growth and encouraging private investment. The 
boom lasted until the economic crisis in 1997.72 Industrialisation had transformed 
Indonesia’s economy which, by the mid-1980s, had become dependent on private 
investment and business. However, business remained dependent on the regime for 
opportunities and was precluded from exerting pressure for reforms that would damage 
the private interests of the power-holding elite (Robison & Hadiz, 2004, pp. 69-144).73  
 
Table 3.1: GDP at constant 1983/93 prices ($US million). 
Year GDP  Percentage Growth 
1985 85,082 2.5 
1987 94,518 4.9 
1990 263,162 9.0 
1991 286,765 7.2 
1992 307,474 7.2 
1993 329,776 7.3 
1994 354,641 7.5 
1995 383,792 8.2 
1996 413,798 7.8 
1997 433,246 4.6 
1998 376,374 -13.1 
1999 379,352 0.8 
2000 398,017 4.9 
2001 411,691 3.4 
2002 426,741 3.7 
Source: Asian Development Bank 
 
                                                 
72 Manufacturing exports grew at an annual average rate of between 20 to 30 percent from 1980 until 1996 
(Asian Development Bank, 2001, pp. 176-7).  
73 It should also be noted that the international environment of the 1990s saw the promotion of economic 
imperatives over the political imperatives of the Cold War years, which allowed for increased criticism 




Years of economic growth brought significant social change. Indonesia’s cities were 
crowded and jammed full of the rewards of industrialisation: office blocks, housing 
estates, cars, motorbikes, mobile phones, designer clothes, their cheap imitations, 
shopping malls, stores, traffic jams, pollution and advertising. Between 1990 and 2000 
(which includes three years of economic recession), motorcycles grew from 2.3 per 100 
households to 7.7 and telephones increased from 1.3 to 10. During the same period, 
consumer expenditure increased by a factor of 7.6 (from 117,120 billion rupiah to 
888,631 billion rupiah). The mass media also expanded, facilitating the circulation of 
more images, information and advertising.74 The number of colour televisions in use 
grew by 89.6 percent (to over 26 million) and the number of homes having access to 
satellite television increased by 97.3 percent between 1995 and 2000 (Euromonitor, 
2003).75 Newspaper circulation increased by 14.3 percent for daily newspapers and 63.7 
percent for non-daily newspapers between 1995 and 2000.76 Clearly, some major social 
changes were taking place across Indonesia.77  
 
The cultural effects of the changes to the Indonesian economy received the regime’s 
attention from the late 1970s and were increasingly criticised in the 1980s and 1990s. The 
most noticeable and far reaching change has been the spread of consumer culture. Ariel 
Heryanto, in his account of the identity politics of the new rich,78 states:  
Lifestyle and consumer culture have not simply occupied a larger slice of the 
nation’s quantitative spending and public discourse. They have participated, to 
say the least, in the changing dynamics of the nation’s social hierarchy, providing 
new profiles to the new rich, and modifying or undermining the profiles of others. 
Lifestyle has become a crucial site for the construction, negotiation and 
contestation of identity in Indonesia. (1999b, p. 178)79 
                                                 
74 For a discussion of the expansion of the mass media during the New Order era and its complex 
relationship to politics, power and social change, see Sen and Hill (2000).  
75 As televisions are normally watched by larger groups of people in Indonesia than Western countries 
(including neighbours, extended families and friends) and satellites feed more than one household (in some 
accounts, even hundreds), the numbers of people who are actually accessing these forms of media are 
probably much higher than these figure indicate.  
76 The economic crisis no doubt hampered growth during this period, but the explosion of print media 
following the end of the censorship practices of the New Order regime also stimulated growth.  
77 The source for all of these statistics is Euromonitor (2003).  
78 A concept Heryanto critiques but still uses (1999b, p. fn6). Richard Robison provides a careful analysis 
of the different groups that have been grouped under the label ‘middle class’ from a Marxist perspective 
(1996). As was noted in the Introduction, conspicuous consumption has also been adopted by members of 
the working class (Gerke, 2000, pp. 146-7; Murray, 1991, p. 138).  
79 See also Gerke (2000), who also emphasises the importance of consumption in Indonesia despite the 




Although Heryanto is focussed on particular strata of the population (the bourgeois and 
middle class), the spread of mass consumer goods and mass culture have had a far-
reaching impact on Indonesia, which became more apparent as Indonesians’ purchasing 
power increased.80 The decision to open some sections of the Indonesian markets to 
international business allowed a range of goods and lifestyles into Indonesia that had 
previously been banned or discouraged by the Sukarno government or simply were 
difficult to access. The state’s cultural programs had to compete (or at least coexist) with 
a rapidly expanding array of market-driven cultural products and practices. Economic 
policy and economic growth, in particular in industries centred on consumption, opened 
up avenues to novel cultural commodities and new subjectivities to a broader section of 
the population.  
 
The regime’s response to the growth of consumption was ambiguous and changed over 
time. From the mid-1970s, the regime moved to combat what it regarded as excessive 
consumption and individualism amongst middle-class Indonesians. One program it 
employed was a ‘Simple Life Style’ campaign, which began in 1974 but was 
reinvigorated in 1983, 1986 and mid-1993 (Heryanto, 1999b, pp. 177-8). Although 
targeted at the lifestyles of the upper class, the campaigns claimed only a few scapegoats, 
who were state officials, never the privately employed. Another attempt to limit the 
influence of commerce was the ban on television advertising on the state station TVRI. 
When he announced the ban, Suharto said that his reasons were ‘to focus television more 
on facilitating the development programs and to avoid the detrimental effects [of 
advertising] which do not promote the spirit of development’ (Kitley, 2000, p. 64). Philip 
Kitley places the ban on advertising in the broader political context where there was a 
widespread dislike of foreign companies and investors who tended to dominate television 
advertising; allowing such advertising to continue could have left Suharto open for attack 
by Islamic groups during the 1982 election campaign (2000, pp. 63-72). Kitley writes:  
The advertising ban was linked to a polemic that constructed foreign capitalism as 
materialistic and based on assumptions and a way of life inimical to idealised 
principles of Indonesian national culture. (2000, p. 69)  
Advertising remained off the airwaves until August 1990, when two commercial stations 
opened in Jakarta.  
 
                                                 
80 Consumption was increasing rapidly during this period. Between 1988 and 1996, private consumption 




By the 1990s, the regime was taking credit for the Indonesians’ increased capacity to 
consume brought by its liberal market policies (Heryanto, 1999b, pp. 164-6). However, 
the regime also felt that the pressures brought by these changes raised issues of concern. 
In addition to concerns about the compatibility of the new lifestyles with conservative 
cultural discourses and pembangunan, the regime was also concerned that the uneven 
division of the spoils of economic growth could cause unrest amongst the Indonesian 
poor and working class. The state responded through efforts (some sincere) to combat the 
economic imbalance between rich and poor (and also indigenous/Muslim and 
Chinese/Christian owned business, Hefner, 1998b) through financial assistance, loans, 
and corporate partnerships (Heryanto, 1999b, pp. 164-5; Yoon, 1991).  
 
A third area of concern for the regime was the political commitments of the new rich. As 
David Bourchier notes ‘rapid growth of the middle classes ... together with the 
accelerative integration of Indonesia with the global economy and the ending of the Cold 
war led to increased pressure on the government to loosen its grip and extend political 
rights to vocal sections of the population’ (1998, p. 212). The regime responded through 
asserting ‘Indonesian values’. Through Indonesian values, the regime critiqued 
liberalism, individualism and excessive consumption through the revival of conservative 
indigenous discourses. The relationship amongIndonesia, conspicuous consumption and 
the Asian values debate was discussed in the Introduction. Here I explore a specific 
example of ‘Indonesian values’ that Bourchier identifies as the regime’s response to the 
pressures caused by the growing middle class: the return of integralism.  
 
Integralism’s intellectual heritage dates back to Dutch adat scholarship in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and has similarities to the Japanese occupying 
administration (Bourchier, 1996; 1997).81 The ‘central point of reference for all 
discussion about integralist ideology in Indonesia’ is a speech by constitutional lawyer 
Raden Supomo in 1945 as Indonesia was preparing for independence (Bourchier, 1997, p. 
159). Supomo differentiated integralism from individualism82 and class theory83 before 
defining it as a theory where ‘the state was committed not to individual rights or 
particular classes but to society conceived of as an organic whole’ (Bourchier, 1997, pp. 
                                                 
81 It has also been argued that integralism has a basis in indigenous thought (Reeve, 1985).  
82 By individualism, Supomo meant Hobbes, Locke, Spencer and Rousseau.  




160-1). Supomo, and prominent New Order figures that followed him, including 
Moertopo, military lawyer Sudharmono84 and conservative historian and Minister of 
Education and culture (1983-5) Nugroho Notosusanto, argued that integralism was more 
in keeping with Indonesian identity due to its similarities with indigenous legal systems. 
Integralism had been largely absent from Indonesian public life from 1945 until 1965, but 
remained prominent in the writings of a few army ideologues.85  
 
Integralism allowed the regime to appeal to the conservative ideals of ‘family’, 
‘community’ and ‘tradition’ in the face of calls for greater freedom and individual rights 
(Bourchier, 1998, p. 212). Integralism began to be pushed into the public sphere 
following a seminar and publication organised by Abdulkadir Besar on the eightieth 
anniversary of the birth of the long-time advocate of integralism, Djokosutono 
(Bourchier, 1996, pp. 253-4). Within three years integralism had been incorporated into 
the P4 courses and by the end of the decade was a common feature of the speeches and 
language of New Order figures (1996, pp. 254-5). Providing a political history that 
legitimated the absence of criticism and autocratic political strategies, it resurfaced when 
the regime identified that its greatest threats were no longer political Islam and 
communism but instead ‘liberalism and individualism’ (1998, pp. 208-9).86 In particular, 
Bourchier identifies criticism of human rights abuses and calls for democratic and liberal 
reform based on the constitution – both of which were the products of a growing middle 
class (1996, p. 156). Although integralism was devastatingly critiqued by Marsillam 
Simanjuntak in the early-1990s (1994), references to conservative indigenous ideals 
continued until the regime fell in 1998.  
 
6. Conclusion  
Conservative indigenous discourses presented a version of Indonesian culture that 
represented hierarchical relationships as elements of an ingrained cultural heritage, 
justifying the patrimonial character of relationships within New Order government. 
Unlike Moertopo’s construction of ‘culture’ within pembangunan, indigenous discourses 
relied on the dichotomy of Western and Indonesian that divided liberal reforms from a 
                                                 
84 On Sudharmono, see Bourchier (1996, pp. 179-221).  
85 Bourchier identifies Col Sutjipto SH and Lt.Col Abdulkadir Besar (1996, p. 138).  
86 However, communism did occasionally appear in the 1990s, but as a spectre rather than an organised 




pre-existing Indonesian culture. Although some assumptions are shared with Sukarno’s 
notion of ‘national identity’, such as an association of individualism, liberalism and 
materialism with a Western other, culture under Suharto was used to justify a 
conservatism that justified and buttressed the political power of the New Order regime.  
 
The regime’s response to a changing society in the late 1980s and 1990s was to attempt 
to reinforce the political order and their governmental discourses. It attempted to 
strengthen the official ‘cultural process’ in the face of a broader and more pervasive 
cultural process unleashed by New Order economic policies. However, official discourses 
were increasingly out of step with the lifestyles of a large portion of the political elite, of 
which the most conspicuous were Suharto’s children, and a growing portion of the 
expanding middle class. Nonetheless, the regime continued to assert the necessity of 
authoritarian control and utilise the discourse of pembangunan throughout its period of 
rule. Through the deployment of these discourses, the features of a normative 
‘authoritarian’ subject were inscribed into New Order era cultural policy as I explore in 







New Order Cultural Policy: Cultural Institutions and Programs 
 
As discussed in the last chapter, the state in the New Order era has been marked by a 
rapid expansion of its capabilities. Driven firstly by foreign aid and foreign investment 
and then the boom in oil prices, real government receipts between 1966 and 1978 grew at 
an average annual rate of 27 percent compared with a 21 percent average decline in 
receipts between 1961 and 1966 (Schiller, 1996, p. 21). In 1977-8, government 
expenditures were 22.6 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) compared with 9.3 
percent of a vastly smaller GDP in 1966 (Schiller, 1996, p. 22). The growth of its 
resources fuelled an increasing level of state intervention into the lives of Indonesians 
through a rapid growth in personnel and programs.1 Cultural policy programs received 
significant funding boosts as part of the rapid expansion of the Indonesian state. The state 
hired personnel and expanded programs to promote national culture and the arts. The 
Directorate of Culture was a primary beneficiary of the funding boosts.2 An exploration 
of the trends, policies and tensions within the Directorate provides a fascinating picture of 
the pressures that shaped New Order era cultural policy.  
 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section analyses trends and 
influences across the Directorate of Culture. In the second section, specific areas of 
cultural policy are assessed. The final section uses the previous discussions to assess how 
the characteristics of cultural policy changed across the New Order era.  
 
                                                 
1 The interventionalist state, fuelled by the boom in production in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
accompanied by an increasing commitment to shaping its subjects and society, has been labelled in 
Indonesian studies the powerhouse state (C. Geertz, 1972, p. 327; Schiller, 1996, p. 17).  
2 Of course the oil boom allowed for increased expenditure in other areas of cultural expression. One 
example is cinema. Sen writes that the early 1960s to 1980s was ‘a time of increasing ... expenditure on 
cinema’ (1994, p. 157). However expenditure increases were tied to its governmental uses. Sen writes that 
they accompanied by ‘increasing government policy declarations, legislative initiatives [and] executive 




1. Cultural Policy Trends and Influences 
Continuities and Breaks with Guided Democracy Cultural Policy  
In his article ‘Old State, New Society’, Benedict Anderson (1990c) argues that an 
important break between policy behaviour at the end of Guided Democracy and the start 
of the New Order periods is the change from encouraging popular mobilisation behind 
nationalist policies to an overriding concern with state strength and stability. While I 
explore the accuracy of Anderson’s assessment for cultural policy below, there is also 
prima facie evidence of continuities in the techniques through which culture was used 
within governance. General evidence of culture’s continued use as a civilising tool were 
the continued association of culture with education and the absence of significant changes 
to the internal structure of the office beyond grouping the various policy-areas together 
within different branches.3 The major structural change of the Suharto period was the 
creation of the Directorate of Local Beliefs (Direktorat Pembinaan Penghayat 
Kepercayaan Terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa – Ditbinyat) which focussed on Javanese 
spirituality at the request of President Suharto and to the consternation of Islamic groups.4 
The Cultural Office under Sukarno and the Directorate of Culture under Suharto both 
viewed culture as a necessary part of the development of Indonesia as a nation. However, 
the understanding of what it meant to be Indonesian and how Indonesians should behave 
differed considerably.  
 
The Directorate of Culture justified its continued existence (and expenses) through a New 
Order version of what Toby Miller and George Yudice label ‘cultural citizenship’ (2002, 
pp. 24-8) or the governmental work that culture can do for the state.5 Cultural policy 
sought to teach Indonesians about Indonesia. Indonesians had to learn about the unity of 
Indonesian culture, about the different groups that lived together in Indonesia, how they 
                                                 
3 For instance, an Office of History and Anthropology existed alongside an Institute of Archaeology and 
National Relics from 1960 until 1975 when an Office of History and Archaeology was formed alongside a 
Research Institute of Archaeology and National Relics and a Research Institute of History and Culture.  
4 The existence of Ditbinyat, proclaimed in a Suharto speech on 16 August 1978, was strongly criticised by 
the Muslim United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan – PPP) at the time and in 1997 the 
conservative Indonesian Committee for World Solidarity (Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia – 
KISDI) called once again for Ditbinyat to be abolished (AS, 1997).  
5 Miller and Yudice use a pluralistic definition of cultural citizenship, defining it as a democratic ideal: 
‘Cultural citizenship concerns the maintenance and development of cultural lineage via education, custom, 
language and religion, and the acknowledgement of difference in and by mainstream cultures’ (2002, p. 
25). However, they also recognise that there are differences between states and the problems this throws up 




lived together in harmony, the way that Indonesia was modernising and how modern 
Indonesians lived. Indonesians had to learn their history, about their own and other ethnic 
identities, the things the state had done and was doing for them and the proper 
relationship to foreign cultures and technologies. In short, Indonesians had to be taught 
after the Sukarno years how to be Indonesian in New Order Indonesia.  
 
Development 
The discourse of development was the most important organising principle of New Order 
era cultural policy. The prioritisation of development changed the focus of cultural policy 
from encouraging mobilisation behind Sukarno’s political plans to build a socialist 
society to supporting state-led domestic growth. More importantly still, development 
provided an enduring cultural policy rationale that explained the purpose and goals of 
cultural policy to cultural bureaucrats and justified its existence as part of the broader 
purpose of state-led modernisation.6 Three elements in particular deserve our attention.  
 
In a speech in 1978, the Minister for Education and Culture, Daoed Yoesoef, made the 
surprising observation that in a ‘democratic’ nation like Indonesia, the state should 
facilitate the actions of non-government organisations in undertaking cultural activities 
rather than organising activities itself (1978, p. 35).7 Yoesoef then included a significant 
proviso:  
It must be acknowledged, in a state that is developing like Indonesia, where the 
non-government sector is still relatively weak in the areas of funds and facilities, 
the government is pushed to undertake actions in many areas, including culture. 
(1978, p. 35)  
Harus diakui, di suatu negara yang sedang berkembang seperti Indonesia, di 
mana sektor non-pemerintah masih relatif lemah di bidang dana dan fasilitas, 
pemerintah terdorong untuk melakukan sesuatu aksi di bidang apapun, termasuk 
bidang kebudayaan.  
                                                 
6 Within the Directorate of Culture, the term pengembangan, which also means development but in the 
sense of cultivation, was preferred to pembangunan. However, pengembangan subjected culture to similar 
instrumental usage by the regime. In a booklet outlining cultural policy, pengembangan clearly retains the 
transitive character of pembangunan that foregrounds human action to shape culture. It states that 
pengembangan refers to activities that ‘increase quality’ (‘mempertinggi mutu’), ‘enrich values’ 
(‘memperkaya nilai-nilai’), and ‘strengthen national cultural identity’ (‘memperkokoh identitas budaya 
bangsa’) (Direktorat Kebudayaan, 1994/95, p. 14).  
7 Yoesoef writes: ‘The government in a democratic state like Indonesia does not possess the pretension or 
desire to itself undertake cultural actions’ (1978, p. 35). (‘Pemerintah di satu negara demokrasi seperti 




Indonesia’s status as a ‘developing nation’ provided a rationale for action within the 
country itself, as well as defining its place within the international order. Increased state 
intervention in cultural policy was necessary to due to apparent deficits (that it can be 
assumed are relative to ‘developed’ countries) within society. After sixteen years of 
sustained economic growth, a booklet outlining the policies of the Directorate of Culture 
produced in 1994/95 was still emphasising that Indonesian society is ‘bound by tradition 
that does not always support readiness and maturation to think, behave and act openly 
and progressively, respecting time and prepared to engage in healthy competition’.8 The 
justification for greater state intervention and control remained society’s backward state 
of development throughout the New Order era.  
 
Secondly, a development rationale reconstructed cultural policy as a necessary 
supplement to economic modernisation. A 1970 report of the Department of Education 
and Culture outlined the problems facing the New Order regime’s goal of accelerated 
development. Chief among them is ‘traditional elements that impede ... economic 
development’ (Harmidjojo et al., 1972, p. iv). The report continued:  
The value system from traditional society usually tends towards an attitude that 
leans towards fatalism because of development’s slow growth ... Although 
economic improvement continues smoothly, it is obviously harder to change 
attitudes and mentalities to accept the relevant renewal that accompany the needs 
of socio-economic development and rational, realistic politics. (Harmidjojo et al., 
1972, p. iv)  
Sistim nilai dari masyarakat yang tradisional biasanya berkisar pada sikap yang 
mengarah kepada fatalisme oleh karena lambatnya perkembangan 
pembangunan... Walaupun perbaikan ekonomi berjalan lancar, tampaknya lebih 
sulit untuk mengubah sikap dan mental untuk menerima pembaharuan yang 
relevan dengan kebutuhan pembangunan sosial ekonomi dan politik yang rasionil 
dan realistis.  
Cultural policy is charged with the task of ‘directing the way of thinking of Indonesian 
society... towards a modern outlook’.9 Economic development was not enough. It needed 
to be supported by cultural change. The state, in addition to leading economic 
development, was to lead cultural development. The transition to modernity also 
facilitated the move away from previous political and social commitments and a greater 
commitment to the state and state projects. Science and technology, for instance, were to 
                                                 
8 ‘... masyarakat Indonesia masih terikat oleh nilai-nilai tradisional yang tidak selalu mendukung kesiapan 
dan kematangan berpikir, bersikap dan bertindak secara terbuka dan maju, menghargai waktu, dan berani 
bersaing secara sehat’ (Direktorat Kebudayaan, 1994/95).  
9 ‘...mengarahkan alam pikiran masyarakat Indonesia... kepada sikap yang modern.’ (Harmidjojo et al., 




be integrated into Indonesian culture by the state, which was very careful not to oppose 
culture and science.10  
 
The third element related to the negative effects of modernisation. A summary of cultural 
policy written in 1976 dramatically cautioned that modern technology, along with 
‘bringing prosperity and profits, can also cause loss and, what’s more, danger for 
humankind’.11 Modernisation could weaken social harmony and the ‘spirit’ of the nation 
and cause conflict.12 Additionally, modernisation could bring ‘negative foreign 
influences’ that could poison national culture. A prominent aspect of New Order era 
cultural policy was combating the negative social changes of modernisation, such as 
ethnic and social conflict (which is largely explained through reference to weakened 
social ties).13 Cultural Policy did so through strengthening those elements of national 
culture that the New Order regime viewed as desirable. Rather than leading to specific 
measures, combating the negative effects of modernisation tended to be a justification for 
the existence of cultural policy in general with its larger goals of promoting ‘spiritual 
development’ and nationalism.  
 
The 1985 UNESCO publication Cultural Policy in Indonesia, written by then Director-
General of Culture Haryati Soebadio, confirms the importance of Indonesia’s program of 
development for Cultural Policy and the double-bind it presented:  
On one hand, development needs a culturally congruent environment to be 
successful, while on the other, it also tends to bring negative side-effects in its 
wake, which may only be solved through cultural measures. (Soebadio, 1985, p. 
12)14 
Soebadio’s statement provides a short summary of the two elements of regime-led 
development that defined the broad goals of cultural policy across the New Order era. 
Yoesoef’s 1978 speech similarly defined the role of ‘cultural development’ as providing 
                                                 
10 A related statement was made by the Director-General of Culture Ida Bagus Mantra in 1970: ‘Hopefully 
the potential of science and technology that brings respite will ease the burden of bodily life and make the 
spiritual creativity of national cultural life prosper’ (1970, p. 4). (‘Hendaknya potensi ilmu-pengetahuan 
dan teknologi yang memberi keringanan, kemudahan beban hidup jasmaniah dapat lebih memberi 
kesuburan pada kreativitas jiwa pribadi budaya bangsa.’)  
11 ‘Teknologi modern di samping membawa kemajuan dan keuntungan dapat pula mengakibatkan kerugian 
dan bahkan bahaya bagi umat manusia’ (Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1976, p. 5).  
12 I realise that there are conflicting goals surrounding the role of modernisation, tradition and science and 
technology. Competing priorities exist within the Directorate and there is often confusion about the details 
of a modern yet indigenous Indonesia.  
13 See, for instance, Soebadio (1985, pp. 33-4).  





an environment conducive to economic development and ameliorating its negative effects 
(1978).  
 
The changing structure of Indonesian society brought by years of economic growth 
exerted some pressures on cultural policy, which are connected to the regime’s response 
to the increasing penetration of Indonesia by consumer goods and lifestyles discussed in 
the previous chapter. Cultural policy in the 1970s and 1980s tended to emphasise the 
positive feature of the development discourse about culture: directing national culture to 
assist economic development. In the 1990s, the balance shifted towards negative features: 
combating negative outside influences that were considered to be weakening national 
culture. In the booklet The Guidance and Development of Culture (Pembinaan dan 
Pembangunan Kebudayaan, Direktorat Kebudayaan, 1994/95), the primary challenge for 
cultural policy was to redress the flow of Western popular culture into Indonesia. The 
booklet states:  
The entry of values that are opposed to Pancasila and other lofty values through 
television programs from outside, films and reading materials are a threat for 
national cultural development. (Direktorat Kebudayaan, 1994/95, p. 20) 
Masukya nilai-nilai yang bertentangan dengan Pancasila dan nilai-nilai luhur 
lainnya melalui paket acara televisi dari luar, film, dan bahan bacaan merupakan 
ancaman bagi pembangunan budaya nasional.  
The changes in social structure that occurred during the New Order era did not evoke 
novel policy responses, but instead shifted the emphasis within existing policy directions, 
emphasising the protection of national culture against intruding influences. Nevertheless, 
the two features remained the same: creating a culturally-congruent environment for 
national development while ameliorating its negative effects.  
 
International Connections 
International cultural discourses also influenced Indonesian cultural policy. Soebadio 
listed six bilateral cultural agreements, a range of cooperative relationships and 
involvement in UNESCO programs in her 1985 UNESCO-sponsored report Cultural 
Policy in Indonesia (1985, pp. 50-8). Like the Guided Democracy period, cultural policy 
continued to critique of Western influence on Indonesian culture and to oppose the influx 




victim of the Western nations’ strength in cultural products and information,15 while 
utilising developmentalist discourse within Indonesia. The New Order regime also moved 
quickly to reengage with the international community (Warmenhoven, 1973, p. 269), 
where its involvement with UNESCO and other international agreements gave legitimacy 
to the slippage between Indonesian national culture and the plurality of cultures that 
existed in Indonesia. Like Guided Democracy, national culture remained the structural 
imperative of cultural policy and was reinforced by Indonesia’s engagement with global 
politics. However, there were some important differences from the preceding era.  
 
After some goodwill was gained from the foreign policy changes of the first decade of the 
New Order period, Indonesia’s invasion and military-style rule of East Timor was 
roundly condemned by the international community. From the mid-1980s, Indonesia 
began once again to reassert its claims for leadership amongst the non-aligned nations, 
particularly through negotiations with Vietnam over the occupation of Cambodia 
(Ricklefs, 2001, p. 383). Despite the peaceful resolution in Cambodia, Indonesia could 
not beat Yugoslavia for the 1988 Presidency of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). 
Merle Ricklefs observes that Indonesia’s ‘standing in this group was still being 
undermined by East Timor’ (2001, p. 383). By 1991, concern over East Timor had faded 
to the extent that Indonesia was able to win the NAM Presidency (2001, p. 384). 
Indonesia’s domestic position was developed in conjunction with its involvement in 
NAM and its calls for equitable development. The Third NAM Summit Conference in 
1970 in Zambia brought a change from a political emphasis to a position that linked non-
alignment with the struggle for development (Kang, 1988, pp. 77-8). Political researcher 
Henri Warmenhoven writes that at the Fourth Summit Conference in Algiers in 1973, 
Foreign Minister Adam Malik ‘stressed the ways nonalignment could be utilised in the 
current climate of rapprochement in order to help the developing nations to accelerate 
their process of nation-building and economic development’ (1973, p. 276).  
 
Although Indonesia was located within NAM when it began asserting its numerical 
weight in the United Nations and UNESCO and began to argue for a New International 
Economic Order and a New World Information and Communication Order, its 
                                                 
15 Soebadio, for instance, distinguishes between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries when discussing 
the lesser financial contribution of Indonesia to joint cultural activities (1985, p. 51). The use of the 
developing/developed distinction is not just a reference to finances, but invokes an international discourse 




commitment to reforming the economic and cultural order was not as clear cut as 
Sukarno’s commitment during Guided Democracy. The New Order regime’s cultural 
anti-Western rhetoric, which encompassed the two continuities with Guided Democracy 
mentioned previously, was at best ambiguously supported by its economic and foreign 
policies. As was discussed in the previous chapter, the New Order regime opened the 
door to international markets and cultural products and its rule of East Timor contradicted 
the notions of national sovereignty and non-intervention that were important elements of 
NAM. While the New Order regime’s international engagement reinforced elements of 
its cultural policy, its cultural rhetoric was undermined by its actions in other fields.  
 
The Director-Generals of Culture 
Mantra, the Director-General of Culture from 1968 until 1978, established the policy 
framework that continued within the Directorate of Culture throughout the New Order 
era. Mantra had received a Dutch education as a child before completing postgraduate 
study in India in the area of cultural history. He had lectured in the University of 
Indonesia (Universitas Indonesia) in Jakarta and, after his time as Director-General, went 
on to be appointed as Governor of Bali (Leirissa & Katartadarmadja, 1984). His major 
achievement as Director-General was to establish a series of national cultural projects 
that absorbed much of the funding increase of the 1970s. He was followed by Soebadio, 
who was Director-General until 1988 and also taught in the same Faculty at the 
University of Indonesia in the area of ancient languages. G.P.H. Poeger, the brother of the 
Sultan of Yogyakarta, was Director-General from 1988 until 1993. The next Director 
General was Edi Sedyawati, a well-known dancer who had been involved in the 
establishment of Ismail Marzuki Arts Centre (Taman Ismail Marzuki – TIM) and who 
had once again taught and studied in the Literature Faculty in the area of ancient 
archaeology. She held the position until the fall of the New Order government in 1998.  
 
There are some remarkable similarities among the Director-Generals. All were either 
from Central Java or Bali (the two ‘cultural centres’ of Indonesia). More significantly 
still, three of the four had taught in the Literature Faculty at the University of Indonesia in 
areas associated with ancient texts and archaeology.16 Mantra, Soebadio and Sedyawati 
all viewed national culture as a system that formed the basis of a way of life (kehidupan) 
                                                 
16 The Director-General in office was drawn from the same faculty in the same University for all but five of 




common to all Indonesians that was connected to the notion of civilisation (Mantra, 1978, 
pp. 10-11; Sedyawati, 1995/6, p. 77; Soebadio, 1986, p. 21). Through the work of these 
people, cultural policy for the entire New Order era shared the purpose of shaping an 
Indonesian civilisation as part of the goal of national development. However, Soebadio 
took a more instrumentalist view of culture that aligned it closely with the interests of the 
New Order regime.17 The Director-Generals also shared a focus on cultural heritage and 
expanded programs concerned with recording cultural history and archaeology that were 
begun by Mantra.  
 
The New Order Regime’s Policy Making System 
One of the most significant techniques that the regime used to ensure a centralised system 
of policy development and implementation was funding. There were two kinds of funding 
within the New Order era bureaucracy. The first kind was the recurring budget that 
covered the costs of basic operations and maintenance. Although the routine budget 
expanded markedly over the course of the New Order era (see Table 4.1), it tended to 
barely cover the costs of employment and maintaining facilities. The second system of 
implementing policy, the development projects, was a much more lucrative distribution 
of state-resources for all parties involved.  
 
Beginning with the first Five-Year Development Plan (Rencana Pembangunan Lima 
Tahun – Repelita) in 1969, development projects quickly became the regime’s primary 
means of meeting its policy objectives. The word ‘project’ (proyek) in Indonesia brings 
with it, in addition to links with state development programs, also the management 
techniques employed by officials who often made money from their involvement. In his 
analysis of the changing state in Jepara during the 1970s and early 1980s, Jim Schiller 
makes the point that for bureaucrats, ‘the most important source of legal income was 
uang proyek or uang pelaksana proyek’ (project money or project manager’s money, 
1996, pp. 154-5). Compared to other sections of the bureaucracy, there was not much 
money in the Directorate of Culture. However, projects promised prestige, a larger than 
                                                 
17 For instance, Soebadio placed the concerns of the New Order regime at the centre of her writings about 
culture, such as her statement that ‘cultural identity is no other than what in Indonesia is called national 
defence’ (1986, p. 21). (‘... cultural identity itu tidak lain daripada yang di Indonesia kita namakan 
ketahanan nasional.’) The same article uses the 1945 Constitution to interpret Indonesian culture itself 




usual pay cheque and possibly financial kickbacks for senior officials working for the 
national and provincial level bureaucracies.  
 
Table 4.1: Directorate of Culture Budgets (Rp. Thousand).18  






1969/70 295,579 163,000 1981/82 3,480,156 23,556,700 
1970/71 308,579 205,325 1982/83 3,556,287 26,886,588 
1971/72 223,023 205,685 1983/84 3,875,149 19,021,500 
1972/73 360,585 300,000 1984/85 4,371,649 29,500,000 
1973/74 509,564 576,053 1985/86 5,598,272 31,293,959 
1974/75 695,849 2,181,246 1986/87 6,109,121 17,573,125 
1975/76 1,191,004 4,499,400 1987/88 5,969,087 6,426,659 
1976/77 775,737 6,683,291 1988/89 Not available Not available
1977/78 1,047,331 8,907,646 1989/90 Not available 9,277,988 
1978/79 1,174,952 10,289,365 1990/91 Not available 17,638,795 
1979/80 1,386,397 11,315,269 1991/92 Not available 23,079,995 
1980/81 2,367,817 18,319,587 1992/93 Not available 28,240,304 
1981/82 3,480,156 23,556,700 1993/94 Not available 36,940,488 
1982/83 3,556,287 26,886,588 1994/5-98/9 286,925,070 274,642,453
 
Cultural policy was formulated through a highly centralised system of policy making that 
worked in a five year cycle. Part of the Supreme Advisory Council’s (Majelis Perwakilan 
Rakyat – MPR) tasks when it convened every five years was to decide on policy 
directions for the next five years. They envisioned this task as translating the New Order 
regime’s key ideological documents, the Pancasila and the 1945 constitution, into policy 
programs that addressed current problems and positioned Indonesia for future prosperity. 
The resulting document, the Broad Outline of State Policy (Garis Besar Haluan Negara – 
GBHN) was passed across to the National Planning Board (Bapenas), which, in 
consultation with the bureaucracy, translated the GBHN into the Repelita. The Repelita 
were the basis of the policies developed and put into place by the various departments 
and directorates. Over the life of the Repelita, Bapenas and the Directorate of Budgeting 
                                                 
18 Compiled from date in Directorate of Culture reports: Mantra (1978, pp. 101-2) and Direktorat 




(Direktorat Anggaran) determined which programs were approved or rejected in 
accordance with the Repelita.  
 
Thus programs and projects had to demonstrate a direct link with the Repelita, the 1945 
Constitution and/or the Pancasila, explaining the constant references to these three 
documents in Directorate of Culture publications and reports. As the juridical basis for 
cultural policy, the explanation for culture in the 1945 Constitution remained significant 
throughout the New Order era. Since the elements of the Repelita that are relevant to 
culture have been analysed at length elsewhere (Hellman, 1999, pp. 40-7; Yampolsky, 
1995, pp. 706-10), only a brief summary is provided here. Culture was mentioned in each 
of the five year plans although it was only briefly touched on in the first plan (1968/69-
1973/74). From a two page section in Repelita 1 that also covered sport, culture grew to 
forty pages in Repelita 5 (1989/90-1993/94). Both Philip Yampolsky (1995, pp. 709-11) 
and Jörgen Hellman (1999, pp. 41-5) note the developmental emphasis. Hellman also 
identifies an expanded focus on local cultural sites and knowledges in Repelita 2 
(1974/75-1978/79), which increased further in the later Repelita. The concern with 
regional art forms, cultural objects, sites and knowledges was part of a broader 
concentration of focus on indigenous cultural practices within the Directorate. The 
increased number of references to the 1945 Constitution in successive Repelita sections 
about culture placed concern with indigenous culture at the centre of cultural policy, 
continuing a trend begun in 1956. Although tourism was only occasionally mentioned in 
the cultural sections of the Repelita (generally in the context of cross-sector cooperation, 
but also briefly in Repelita 5 in connection with developing historical sites for tourism), 
culture was often mentioned in the tourism sections both as an important resource and as 
an object that needed careful management in the context of tourism. Cultural tourism, in 
large part due the experiences of Bali, was viewed as a potential source of revenue by the 
regime (Picard, 1997).  
 
Both foreign and Indonesian observers challenged the patriarchal quality of the cultural 
development projects. Mary Zurbuchen writes in relation to state-sponsored cultural 
research: 
Research (penelitian) itself is a kind of ‘project,’ one with a narrowly defined 
subject and a limited period for implementation, generally defined by calendar or 




relation to questions of government policy and the achievement of some aspect of 
development. (1990, p. 139)  
Benny Yohanes, the Head of the Indonesian College of Performing Arts (Sekolah Tinggi 
Seni Indonesia – STSI) in Bandung, took aim at the way that people involved in New 
Order government projects prioritised profit over artistic quality in a newspaper article 
published two years after the fall of Suharto:  
At the same time, the behaviour of the arts bureaucracy too often views art as a 
‘project’, so that suggested ideas aimed at conceptual innovation are not 
accommodated. The ‘projectisation’ of art, which is a legacy of the decadent New 
Order bureaucracy, has infected the distorted behaviour of arts institutions that 
exist in a collegial environment. The tendency to exploit the potential of artistic 
authenticity and profitability always surfaces through camouflaged pretexts. 
(2000)  
Sementara itu, perilaku birokrasi kesenian telah terlampau terbiasa memandang 
kesenian sebagai ‘proyek’, sehingga penawaran gagasan-gagasan yang 
bertujuan ke arah pembaruan konsep, tak siap untuk diakomodasi. Mem-’proyek’-
kan kesenian, yang merupakan warisan dekaden birokrasi Orba, telah turut 
menjangkiti perilaku distorsif institusi kesenian yang berada dalam lingkaran 
kolegialnya. Kecenderungan mengeksploitasi potensi otentisitas dan potensi 
finansial kesenian, selalu muncul lewat berbagai tameng kamuflase.  
Although the system of policy making was successful in inscribing the New Order 
regime’s version of culture at the centre of cultural policy, it attracted criticism which 
was articulated before and after the fall of the regime.  
 
2. Cultural Policy Areas Under the New Order 
In the following discussion, Indonesian cultural policy is divided into three areas: 
archaeology, museums and history; language; and arts policy. The archaeology and 
museums sections have similar histories. Both were institutes under the colonial regime 
that were inherited and transformed by the Indonesian state. History can be traced to the 
Sub-Division of Customs and Traditions created in 1956 (Soebadio, 1985, p. 16), which 
later was combined with archaeology to become the Institute of History and 
Anthropology (Lembaga Sejarah dan Antropologi) in 1960. This Institute was split into 
the Directorate of History and Archaeology (Direktorat Sejarah dan Purbakala) and the 
Research Centre for History and Culture (Pusat Penelitian Sejarah dan Budaya) in 1975 
before becoming the separate Directorate of History and Traditional Values (Directorat 
Sejarah dan Nilai-Nilai Tradisional), the Directorate for the Protection and Management 
of Historical and Archaeological Artefacts (Direktorat Perlindungan dan Pembinaan 




(Pusat Penelitian Arkeologi Nasional) in 1980. History, Archaeology and Museums also 
had a common emphasis on the historical construction of Indonesia. Language and Arts, 
on the other hand, have both been established since independence and had quite distinct 
roles and histories. However, all areas contributed to the management of national culture 
across a range of fields.19  
 
Archaeology, Museums, History  
The feature that links these three areas together was their role in constructing what Miller 
and Yudice call ‘historical citizenship’. They state, in the context of museums:  
Historical citizenship emerges in the contemporary moment, but in reaction to the 
past. It knows that errors lie back there, before we knew. The past’s 
commemoration in museum form is rendered as a strictly delimited ethical zone, a 
space that divides worthy and unworthy conduct. (2002, p. 148) 
In the case of Indonesia, a concern about the political affiliations of citizens limited the 
extent that the past could be constructed as negative. When the affective commitment of a 
citizen is doubted, the past tends to be glorified rather than critically assessed. However 
the Indonesian museum, archaeological site and history book were still ‘delimited ethical 
zones’. They combined lessons in conduct with attention to professionally-correct 
display, viewing and behaviour in an attempt to ensure that the lessons were correctly 
imparted and absorbed.  
 
A 1972 report assigned archaeology the goal of ‘completing humankind with knowledge 
and consciousness about themselves’.20 The report adopted the term ‘know yourself’21 to 
justify archaeology’s importance. It continued: ‘Therefore, if we want to participate and 
be active in shaping the future of our nation, like it or not we must first truly know 
ourselves now.’22 In order that Indonesians could know their ‘national past’, the state 
needed to support the continued work of archaeology, protection of important sites and 
objects, the introduction of new techniques and start to spread information about 
                                                 
19 Arts education was originally under the control of the Directorate of Culture before being transferred to 
Education in 1976. Although arts educational institutions were important points of mediation for New 
Order cultural discourses, they are not examined in detail here due to the split in 1976. For detailed analysis 
of two educational institutions, see Hough (2000), Hellman (1999) and the collected articles of musician 
and teacher Dieter Mack, who taught and performed for a number of years in Indonesia (2001a; 2001b).  
20 ‘Tujuannya adalah melengkapi manusia dengan pengetahuan serta kesadaran akan dirinya’ (Harmidjojo 
et al., 1972, p. 120).  
21 ‘Kenalilah dirimu’ (Harmidjojo et al., 1972, p. 120).  
22 ‘Maka kalau kita hendak turut serta aktif membentuk masa depan bangsa kita, mau tidak mau kita harus 




archaeological remains in schools. A later article noted that society needed to be taught to 
appreciate the importance of archaeological remains’ ‘cultural value’ (Tjandrasasmita, 
1976, p. 33).  
 
Museums had a similar justification. A quote from a speech by Director-General Mantra 
in 1970 captures the rationale behind museums and the relationship between historical 
objects and society:  
From the angle of cultural management, the important meaning of research and 
care for historical artefacts [and] works of high art which are kept in museums as 
valuable artistic objects is able to become a source of information from generation 
to generation in the effort to cultivate the national identity. The disappearance of 
valuable artistic objects from Indonesia means we lose our source of inspiration 
and self-belief. (1970, p. 4)  
Dari sudut pembinaan kebudayaan penting artinya penelitian dan pemeliharaan 
peninggalan benda2 sejarah [dan] hasil karya seni yang tinggi yang disimpan di 
museum2 sebagai benda2 seni berharga yang dapat menjadi sumber pengetahuan 
dari generasi ke generasi dalam usaha memelihara kepribadian bangsa. 
Hilangnya benda2 seni yang bernilai tinggi dari Indonesia berarti kita 
kehilangan sumber inspirasi dan kepercayaan pada diri sendiri.  
Thus, both archaeology and museums were viewed as caring for culturally valuable 
objects that could contribute to building national identity. However, Mantra neglected to 
mention in his quote that Indonesians needed to be trained in an aesthetics of viewing to 
appreciate culturally valuable objects. Through the process of acquiring the viewing 
aesthetics and learning to appreciate those objects’ historical importance and value, the 
viewing public became Indonesian.  
 
Museums expanded as part of the growth of government beginning in the early 1970s. By 
1976 there was a plan and government support to build a museum in the capital city of 
every province (Herman, 1976, p. 36). By 1990, there were 140 mainly state-sponsored 
museums in Indonesia (Taylor, 1995, p. 113).23 The centralised system of museum 
development was also reflected in design and exhibition practice. Exhibits followed a 
standard format that reinforced the New Order state’s ideas about the essential sameness 
of cultures within Indonesia (See Taylor, 1994; 1995, pp. 115-6). The concern with 
representing national unity in museums remained throughout the New Order regime as 
can be seen in a statement by Sedyawati on 17 January 1994 in her opening address to the 
‘Indonesia-Dutch Seminar On Museum Development Problems’:  
                                                 




As an educational instrument, a museum in Indonesia should also have a 
presentation strategy that is in line with Indonesia’s national development policy. 
The idea of nationality, of national unity, and of the supporting position of 
different ethnic groups within the Indonesian nation are basic ideas that should 
underlie any strategy of presentation. (1995/6, p. 26)  
Acciaioli’s research into a Bajau museum exhibition demonstrates how the state used 
elements of various ethnic cultures in order to tie them back into the nation while 
excluding other elements that are in conflict with the state’s governmental discourses 
(2001, p. 7).24  
 
In addition to representing cultural unity and harmony, museums also instructed 
Indonesians in other ways. Museums themselves were regulated spaces that compelled 
certain behaviours and prohibited others. Take for instance a 1976 article on correct 
lighting by a bureaucrat working in the Directorate of Culture. The correct technical 
expertise needed to be used to both protect display objects and guarantee that visitors 
both enjoy their visit and absorb information correctly (Herman, 1976, p. 36).25 Concerns 
with methods of museum management and display have remained present in Indonesia 
since the Dutch established the first museums. Similarly, museums have retained their 
didactic role, in particular their mediating role between different ethnic populations. The 
key difference was that they changed to serve the development priorities of the New 
Order regime.  
 
Two related terms ran through the areas of archaeology, museums and history: ‘cultural 
values’ (nilai-nilai budaya) and ‘cultural heritage’ (warisan budaya). In his end of term 
report in 1978, Mantra placed ‘values’ at the centre of the activities of these three 
sections:  
The importance of the glorious values that are contained inside archaeological 
artefacts, history and the other elements in cultural anthropology are a reminder 
that the efforts ... to develop and research them need to be increased. (1978, p. 20) 
Mengingat pentingya nilai-nilai luhur yang terkandung di dalam peninggalan 
purbakala, sejarah dan unsur-unsur lainnya dalam antropologi budaya, maka 
usaha-usaha ... pemgembangan serta penelitiannya perlu ditingkatkan.  
                                                 
24 The Bajau are a formerly nomadic people indigenous to Indonesia who used to live on ocean-going 
boats. Acciaioli also connects the normalisation of the state’s version of Indonesian culture in museums 
with broader political strategies and rationales (2001, pp. 12-17). 
25 Herman states as one of the reasons for correct design: ‘to give information with a visual display that is 
easily appreciated by the general public’ (1976, p. 36) (‘... memberikan informasi dengan sarana visual 




Cultural values were viewed as the cultural heritage of the nation that was threatened by 
negative outside influences. Mantra also outlined future steps that needed to be taken in 
regards to cultural heritage:  
Protection of cultural heritage is implemented through the activities of research, 
excavation, safeguarding, restoring, protecting, appreciating, documenting and 
publication of the cultural heritage of the nation and the regions. The environment 
(for these activities) entails the areas of history, cultural anthropology, 
archaeology and historical/archaeological artefacts. (1978, pp. 58-9)  
Penyelamatan warisan budaya ini diselenggarakan melalui usaha-usaha 
penelitian, penggalian, pemeliharaan, pemugaran, pengamanan, penghayatan, 
pendokumentasian dan penerbitan dari warisan budaya nasional maupun daerah. 
Ruang lingkupnya mencakup bidang sejarah, antropologi budaya, arkeologi dan 
peningalan sejarah/purbakala.  
The concept of cultural heritage was central to the Research Centre for History and 
Cultural Anthropology which became the Directorate of History and Cultural Values in 
1980. The activities associated with this area of the Directorate of Culture expanded 
rapidly in 1973 with the announcement of an ambitious publication program in Repelita 
2. Under the title, ‘Saving and Caring for the Historical and Cultural Heritage,’26 the New 
Order regime made indigenous cultures a focus of research and data collection and 
announced its intention to publish the information to ‘spread knowledge’ of Indonesia’s 
cultural heritage (Departemen Penerangan, 1974, pp. 225-9).  
 
The Directorate of History and Traditional Values was thus generated within, and then 
carved out of the Archaeology Section. Like Archaeology, it was oriented towards 
protecting and preserving ‘cultural values’, but the focus of its activities was the cultural 
practices and knowledges of indigenous ethnic groups, events and figures in Indonesia’s 
nationalist history. Its programs involving history and indigenous cultures cannot be 
viewed as only recording and spreading ‘cultural heritage’. Research in the Directorate of 
History and Traditional Values was greatly influenced by developments in the Indonesian 
social sciences in the 1970s. As was briefly explored in the last chapter, the social 
sciences in Indonesia were subject to both a North American research paradigm (Hadiz & 
Dhakidae, 2005, p. 13) that was apolitical in perspective and promoted American-style 
modernisation and the requirements of the New Order regime. Vedi Hadiz and Daniel 
Dhakidae argue:  
                                                 




It was during the New Order ... that social sciences and academia were geared 
towards fulfilling the requirements of the exercise of state power. This clearly 
shaped the orientation of social science research, activity and training. (2005, p. 7)  
State-run research projects played a major role in influencing research directions. In state-
sponsored cultural research, most of which was managed by the Directorate of History 
and Traditional Values, the ideas and research methods of the Indonesian anthropologist 
Koentjaraningrat were influential, particularly the use of quantitative surveys and the 
focus on cultural values and their relationship to development.27  
 
An article by the inaugural head of the Directorate of History and Traditional Values, S. 
Budhisantoso,28 provides an interesting insight into how the most influential figure in the 
Directorate of History and Traditional Values understood its role. He argued that in 
addition to protecting culture from negative outside influences, history also played an 
‘active role’ in shaping society through assessing the evolution of society and culture to 
identify areas of ‘cultural lag’ (1983/4, pp. 16-17). Cultural lag was caused by the 
different rates at which stages of evolution were achieved by the technological system 
and the cultural system present in Indonesian society. According to Budhisantoso, the 
study of history could make society aware of the problems it faced in order to help it 
shape its future, but this is not the only role that history played in shaping society. In the 
final line of his article, Budhisantoso writes:  
Historical instruction is not just about increasing the consciousness of national 
history, but it will also intensify the feelings of unity and unification, love of the 
nation, and national pride that is very much needed as the developmental 
allowance of a complete Indonesian humankind, along with planning for the 
future of the whole of Indonesian society. (1983/4, p. 17)  
Pendidikan sejarah bukan saja meningkatkan kesadaran sejarah bangsa, 
melainkan ia akan mempertebal rasa kesatuan dan persatuan, semangat cinta 
akan tanah air, dan kebanggaan nasional yang sangat diperlukan sebagai bekal 
pembangunan manusia Indonesia seutuhnya serta perencanaan masa depan 
masyarakat Indonesia seluruhnya.  
History’s links to the priorities of the state are clearly evident here. Like the policies 
relating to museums and archaeology, concerns with national development and national 
unity undergirded the focus on cultural heritage.  
 
                                                 
27 Chapter seven provides a detailed account and analysis of the research publications generated by the 
Directorate of History and Traditional Values where these themes are further explored. 





Language has been a political tool of rulers and social elites for centuries and in many 
countries, generally because of its role in unifying or distinguishing different social 
groups.29 The Indonesian language is historically linked closely with the nationalist 
movement and its goal of modernisation – an association that has been encouraged by the 
state since the Japanese occupation because of the overlap with a number of its own 
goals, including (symbolically) unifying diverse social and ethnic groups within the 
nation, simplifying administration and providing a ‘modernising’ language to construct 
Indonesian citizens. In an article titled ‘The Political Function of the National Language’ 
Amran Halim, a bureaucrat in the Directorate of Culture, argued:  
... the existence of an agreement regarding the function and state of Indonesian as 
a national language is a symbol of the resoluteness of Indonesian national energy, 
a unifying tool of many societies with different backgrounds, languages, cultures 
and ethnicities inside a single Indonesian national society, and a communication 
tool between ethnic groups, between areas and cultures. Secondly, in its position 
as language of state, Indonesian is the formal state language, introductory 
language to the world of education, a tool of communication at the national level 
for planning and implementing national development, as well as a tool of cultural 
development, science and technology. (1976, p. 10) 
... adanya kesepakatan mengenai fungsi dan kedudukan bahasa Indonesia sebagai 
bahasa nasional adalah lambang kebulatan semangat kebangsaan Indonesia, alat 
penyatuan berbagai-bagai masyarakat yang berbeda-beda latar belakang, 
kebahasaan, kebudayaan dan kesukuannya ke dalam satu masyarakat nasional 
Indonesia, dan alat perhubungan antarsuku, antar daerah serta budaya. Kedua, 
di dalam kedudukannya sebagai bahasa negara, bahasa Indonesia adalah bahasa 
resmi pemerintah, bahasa pengantar di dalam dunia pendidikan, alat 
perhubungan pada tingkat nasional untuk kepentingan perencanaan dan 
pelaksanaan pembangunan nasional, serta alat pengembangan kebudayaan, ilmu 
pengetahuan, dan teknologi.  
Correct use of Indonesian was bound to the creation of productive citizens with a strong 
national commitment. Recommendations in the early cultural policy plans followed 
language programs with educational programs, including such topics as farming, fishing, 
handcrafts and other skills needed to meet local needs (Harmidjojo et al., 1972, p. 94).  
 
The Indonesian language did not only provide access to the state. It also provided access 
to a range of non-state institutions and information that contributed to economic, political 
and cultural citizenship. Indonesian provided access to national press, radio and film, as 
                                                 
29 See Miller & Yudice (2002, pp. 5-7) for a short discussion and Anderson (1991) for a discussion of the 




well as access to books about science, literature and culture (Halim, 1976, p. 12). 
Indonesian created opportunities for citizens to undertake self-education and thus 
improve themselves and Indonesia. The national media also provided a valuable state 
service through the creation of a national viewing public. Citizens could be constantly 
reminded of their place in the national community, and the state could disseminate 
information directly into their homes and lives.  
 
Indonesian cultural policy expressed great concern about the regulation of the national 
language. The unity of the Indonesian people was only symbolically complete when they 
were all speaking exactly the same national language and not misusing words or 
disobeying grammar. Bureaucrats also thought vocabulary growth presented a problem, 
as new words would continuously enter the lexicon and threaten to destroy its 
homogeneity and, most disturbing of all, cause misunderstanding. Misapprehension of 
the national language threatened to subvert state-led development and slow Indonesia’s 
journey to prosperity. The answer to these problems was through the state-led creation 
and promotion of a formal language (bahasa baku). Language policy focussed on 
creating and promulgating ‘standard Indonesian’ across all islands and to all people 
within the borders of Indonesia with a single spelling and grammar to promote 
modernisation. A report from 1972 summed up the feelings at the time of cultural policy 
bureaucrats about Indonesian: ‘Indonesian is still lacking in scientific terms and modern 
technique, as well as definite structures, to fulfil its function as a scientific language or a 
language of modern culture’.30 However the report continued by forecasting that, with the 
right guidance (like Chinese and Japanese), Indonesian will overcome its difficulties 
(Harmidjojo et al., 1972, p. 85).  
 
The management of languages also included policies about local and foreign languages. 
The reasons given for the state management and protection of local languages are both 
cultural and connected to the development of formal Indonesian. Local languages, as part 
of local cultures, come under state protection which involved their formalisation 
(pembakuan). The formalisation of languages that are largely oral and informal renders 
the language calculable and amenable to programs, particularly in the field of education 
                                                 
30 ‘Bahasa Indonesia masih sangat kekurangan akan istilah-istilah ilmu pengetahuan dan teknik moderen 
serta kekurangan akan struktur-struktur tertentu untuk menjalankan fungsinya sebagai bahasa ilmu 




(Halim, 1976, p. 13). Foreign languages were viewed as desirable because of the access 
they give to science and technology. Although not concerned with the development of 
foreign languages themselves, there is a concern that foreign expressions could come to 
dominate Indonesian (Halim, 1976, p. 14). Within the state’s framework, both local and 
foreign languages had the potential to help or hinder the development of Indonesian. 
Proper understanding and management, according to the state, would assist the state’s 
goal of every citizen speaking and comprehending standard Indonesian.31  
 
Arts Policy 
Arts policy in the Directorate of Culture during the New Order period was predominantly 
focussed on indigenous art forms rather than the contemporary arts (Yampolsky, 1995, p. 
710). While the emphasis on indigenous forms strengthened a policy direction begun 
during Guided Democracy, there were significant changes at the beginning of the New 
Order period. Meanwhile, contemporary artists’ engagement with the state during Guided 
Democracy was heavily criticised. The changing relationships between artists and the 
state were driven by four reasons. Firstly, the regime’s initial alignment with the 
supporters of universal humanism entrenched an artistic rationale in the contemporary 
arts that discouraged political engagement and made contemporary artists uneasy about 
incorporating the regime’s development messages into their works. Secondly, indigenous 
art forms were reinvigorated through the patronage of the New Order elite at the 
beginning of the New Order period in order to overcome the stigma that had been 
attached to them due to engagement with LEKRA and other politically-affiliated arts 
organisations during Guided Democracy. Indigenous art forms were therefore more easily 
targeted by the regime’s cultural programs. Thirdly, the interpretation of the 1945 
Constitution emphasised indigenous ethnic cultures as the basis of national culture. 
Indigenous art forms were the most symbolic elements of the indigenous ethnic cultures. 
Finally, indigenous art forms were a good fit with the notion of cultural heritage, with its 
emphasis on historical connections. Indigenous art forms became the focus of a broad 
range of programs with the twin development goals of the development of Indonesians 
and the development of Indonesian art.  
 
                                                 




Arts policy in particular drew on universal humanism in its understanding of art and the 
role of the arts. Universal humanism made its entry into cultural policy in the late 1960s 
and was at its strongest in the early 1970s32 before weakening in parallel with the 
influence of the groups that were its strongest supporters. For instance, a report in 1970 
published by the Department of Education and Culture included a long criticism of the 
‘paternalistic’ Sukarno era and called for a range of reforms including a constitutional bill 
of rights, independent judiciary, free elections, freedom of opinion and freedom of 
association demonstrating the connection with the urban modernisers (Harmidjojo et al., 
1972, p. 41). After the 1972 elections, the changing political climate reduced the scope of 
the Department to call for such reforms. However, the ‘spiritual value’ of culture 
remained, as can be seen in a summary of arts policy in the first issue of the Directorate 
of Culture’s magazine in 1976, Warta Budaya:  
Especially in traditional art the creativity of artists and appreciators needs to be 
developed and spread [by the state] so that we are completely able to appreciate 
our present Indonesian culture. On the other hand, the development of modern 
Indonesian art must also be directed to appreciation of Indonesian cultural values, 
including universal values. (Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1976, p. 9) 
Khususnya dalam seni tradisi kreativitas pada seniman maupun penghayat perlu 
dikembangkan dan disebarluaskan sehingga sepenuhnya dapat memberikan 
penghayatan budaya kita Indonesia kini. Sebaliknya perkembangan seni modern 
Indonesia harus pula mengarah ke penghayatan nilai budaya Indonesia, termasuk 
nilai-nilai universal.  
The connection to universal humanism (and the group of modernising intellectuals more 
generally) and the invocation of cultural heritage were clearly demonstrated in this 
policy.  
 
The spiritually improving qualities of art were often emphasised in contrast to its political 
role, which is an important difference with arts policy during Guided Democracy. Art that 
included political commentary was not considered national because it reduced the 
spiritual value of art. However, Indonesians still needed to be taught how to appreciate 
the intrinsic qualities of national art works and Indonesian art works themselves needed 
to be made spiritually uplifting. For instance, a report published in 1972 stated:  
The goal of arts management is not only safeguarding arts that are already there 
but also trying to increase the quality of that art so that it is able to truly constitute 
                                                 
32 The connections between the Directorate and the universal humanists in TIM were multiple. At the time, 
TIM was at its most popular and some TIM personnel, like Sedyawati, also worked for the Directorate. 
Additionally, there was collaboration between the Directorate and the Jakarta Arts Council under the 




spiritual food for its admirers. Serving up quality art requires complete 
concentration, full dedication and an outpouring of pure spiritual character from 
its makers and doers. (Harmidjojo et al., 1972, p. 114)  
Tujuan pembinaan kesenian ialah bukan saja memelihara kesenian2 yang telah 
ada tetapi juga berusaha untuk meningkatkan mutu seninya sehingga benar dapat 
merupakan santapan rohani bagi yang menikmatinya. Penyajian kesenian yang 
bermutu memerlukan konsentrasi yang bulat, dedikasi yang penuh dan 
pencurahan sikap jiwa yang murni dari para penggarap dan penjadinya.  
This aesthetic discourse regulated the inclusion and exclusion of arts and artists into the 
category of ‘national art’. If art was not sufficiently ‘spiritually uplifting’ or of sufficient 
quality, it could only gain inclusion through undergoing certain aesthetic transformations.  
 
The use of a discourse of aesthetics hid issues of class and ethnicity. From associations 
between various socio-cultural groups, their cultural practices and political parties, 
Indonesians were to engage with their culture as an inspiring spiritual experience much 
like watching an opera or listening to a symphony (see policy documents such as 
Harmidjojo et al., 1972, p. 115). Miller and Yudice recognise the unifying function of 
aesthetics: 
‘Standards of taste’... are part of hegemony, a key means of differentiating and 
stratifying society. The value projected by aesthetic hegemony is ultimately 
premised on a series of exclusions ... Social harmony is bought at the expense of 
those whose tastes are not only aesthetically unacceptable but, more importantly, 
potentially contestatory. (2002, p. 11)  
The educated middle class tended to define the aesthetic standards and therefore could 
most easily access national arts.  
 
While the emphasis on spiritual improvement differentiated New Order arts policy from 
the arts policy of Guided Democracy, there were a number of continuities in how it 
functioned to alter behaviours; its goals were ultimately not that dissimilar. Much like the 
regime’s use of regional art forms discussed in the previous chapter, there was a 
continuity in what was considered technical improvement across the two eras that is 
located in the shared middle class background of the political elite and extends back to 
the 1920s (McVey, 1986, pp. 31,39-40). The New Order era process of making art 
‘spiritually improving’, like Guided Democracy’s emphasis on ‘quality’ (Setjonegoro, 
1956, p. 568), aimed to ensure regional arts were of a high standard. Regional arts were 
subjected to a similar set of ‘national’ aesthetic criteria in both periods. This continuity 




accord with the behaviour desired by the state and centred on the state’s preferred forms 
of regional and national identity. While there were significant differences between the 
messages of the two periods, their methods and broad aim to improve Indonesians and 
Indonesian art remained similar.  
 
Within arts programs, two terms were particularly important due to both their frequency 
and how they tie together different discourses about the arts: guidance (pembinaan) and 
development (pengembangan). National development, in the context of arts programs, 
referred to both developing the arts and developing Indonesians. A 1976 article provides 
definitions for the terms in the context of the arts:  
The implementation pattern in the Indonesian arts includes a particular 
understanding of management (pembinaan) and development (pengembangan). 
Pembinaan refers to activities of caring for, protecting, researching, excavating, 
recording, giving guidance and direction along with processing and increasing 
quality. Pengembangan refers to activities of dissemination, including activities to 
increase the quality of art appreciation, and, what is more, to spread expertise and 
art works as far as possible into society to complete cultural life. (Departemen 
Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1976)  
Pola pelaksanaan dalam kesenian Indonesia mencakup pengertian pembinaan 
dan pengembangan. Pembinaan dalam arti usaha-usaha memelihara, 
menyelamatkan, meneliti, menggali, mencatat, memberikan bimbingan dan 
pengarahan, serta pengolahan dan peningkatan mutu. Pengembangan dalam arti 
usaha-usaha penyegar luasan, baik usaha yang menuju peningkatan penghayatan 
seni, maupun perluasan tenaga dan karya seni dalam masyarakat seluas-luasnya 
untuk melengkapkan kehidupan budaya.  
The terms continued to feature prominently in the 1994/95 publication The Guidance and 
Development of Culture (Pembinaan dan Pengembangan Kebudayaan, Direktorat 
Kebudayaan, 1994/95). Arts policy, through activities like pembinaan and 
pengembangan, involved both the preservation of indigenous arts and its improvement, as 
a part of the project of national development, in accordance with the aesthetic criteria that 
dominated the Directorate of Culture.33 The two terms also inscribed a relationship 
between the holders of knowledge (the bureaucrats) and the receivers of knowledge 
(artists, society), where knowledge flows from the former to the latter, in the process 
transforming artistic practices.  
 
                                                 
33 A number of observers have critiqued the New Order regime’s arts policy, in particular its aesthetic 
changes to indigenous art forms. See Yampolsky (1995), Acciaioli (1985), Hefner (1987) Widodo (1995), 
Effendi (1998) and Suanda (1995). The specifics of the arts programs are discussed in detail in chapter six 




The Licensing Regime for Arts Events 
Although licensing was for the most part managed by the police, the Directorate of 
Culture was also involved in the licensing of arts events. Licenses for arts events were 
required by a 1963 piece of legislation34 that was revised in 1995.35 Under the legislation, 
various types of meetings required either a license, a police notification of the activity, or 
did not require police involvement. ‘Cultural meetings’, according to the police field 
directives, are gatherings that aim to discuss or perform music, dance, drama, poetry, 
opera, pantomime and other related art forms. According to the legislation, cultural 
meetings did not require either a license or notification unless they could possibly cause a 
public or traffic disturbance. In practice, ‘cultural meetings’ required a license in most 
places in Indonesia. Such licenses had to be applied for at least seven days before the 
event and would be deemed granted if either the police affirmed the request or there was 
no response prior to three days before the event. According to the law (which is still in 
place), police could charge for licenses at their discretion.  
 
Although modern artists were affected,36 traditional artists were generally more restricted 
by the licensing regime. Due to the distance they had to travel and the number of shows 
they performed during their times of high demand, they often did not apply for licenses 
and were forced to bribe police.37 Dancer and researcher Endo Suanda notes that artists in 
Cirebon Regency had to pay fees to the Office of Tourism, pay for ‘Artist Cards’ every 
two to three years, and ask the Office of Education and Culture for permission before 
every performance, whereas artists in the provincial capital Bandung only required a 
                                                 
34 Undang-Undang No. 5 Pnps 1963 tentang Kegiatan Politik.  
35 Surat Keputusan Bersama Menteri Dalam Negeri dan Menteri Pertahanan Keamanan Republik 
Indonesia No. 153 thn.1995 tentang Petunjuk Pelaksanaan Perijinan Sebagaimana Diatur dalam Pasal 
510 KUHP dan Pemberitahuan Sebagaimana Diatur dalam UU No. 5 Pnps 1963.  
36 See, for instance, the experiences of Theatre Comma (Teater Koma) (Budianta & Budiman, 2001, pp. 
1267-8; Cohen, 1991; ‘List of Art Works that were Banned,’ 1995; Wahono, 1994b, pp. 1244-5), 
playwright Ratna Sarumpaet (‘Playwright Plans to Sue Police,’ 1997) and even dangdut singer Roma Irama 
(‘List of Art Works that were Banned,’ 1995) because of his affiliations with Islamic organisations.  
37 Suanda’s account of a trip by a group of Cirebon Mask Dancers (Topeng Cirebon) includes a negotiated 
bribe with police (1995). Askadi Sastrasuganda, a senior Dalang who has performed for over fifty years in 
Cirebon and also worked for the Directorate of Culture at the local level, stated to me in an interview: ‘If a 
traditional artist wants to travel, he needs a travel license for every trip outside the local area. He also 
requires a performance license from the police and Office of Education and Culture and the Office of 
Tourism. If an artist is performing every night across different regencies and cities, they do not have the 
time to fulfil all of the bureaucratic requirements. Therefore, if they encounter police, they pay a bribe. ... 
Therefore paying the police becomes the norm. This is a huge obstacle for artists. The focus is on the needs 
of the bureaucracy, not on the needs of artists’ (Interview, Desa Cankring, Kecamatan Waru, Kabupaten 




permit from the police (1995, pp. 122-3). In Cirebon, the arts became a source of funds 
for the Office of Education and Culture and Tourism through their regulatory role.  
 
3. New Order Cultural Policy as a Command Culture Model 
From the features and characteristics outlined in this chapter, it is possible to identify the 
model of cultural provision in the New Order era, which I argue is a version of the 
command culture model. The key governmental rationality for cultural policy was 
national development. Development justified the regime’s interventions into all aspects of 
culture through the assumption that culture in Indonesia was backward and inappropriate 
for economic development. Although development was an important part of liberal 
rationalities of government, development discourses had some important differences in 
Indonesia. Instead of being constructed as a temporary measure to quicken a ‘natural’ 
developmental process, it was conceived as a permanent state of affairs to achieve an 
outcome defined by the regime. Cultural policy was conceptualised as exercising state 
control over culture. A state version of culture was disseminated through development 
programs aimed at civilising the population.  
 
The expansion of the Directorate facilitated the spread of the regime’s version of national 
culture. At the end of Repelita VI in 1998, 74,722 people were employed full-time under 
the supervision of the Directorate of Culture across Indonesia, and many more were 
employed for specific tasks (Direktorat Kebudayaan, 1999a, pp. 10,12,13). There were 
sizable line-offices in every province and offices in every city and regency. Within each 
city and regency, a Penilik Budaya or Cultural Officer was designated to every sub-
regency in Indonesia with a centrally determined set of tasks.38 Outside of the Directorate 
and the line offices, there were numerous institutions located in various provinces that 
reported to the Directorate. These were the 24 Cultural Parks, 11 Historical and 
Traditional Values Research Bureaus, 9 Preservation of Historical Remains and 
Archaeology Reserves, 10 Archaeology Bureaus, 6 specialised museums, 25 provincial 
museums and the Borobudur Research and Conservation Bureau. Centrally defined 
programs were being run across Indonesia by a large organisation that coordinated a 
variety of different institutions.  
 
                                                 




There was a large degree of continuity within cultural policy throughout the New Order 
era. An event that confirmed the direction of New Order era cultural policy, while 
simultaneously linking it to the days of the independence struggle, was the 1991 Fourth 
Cultural Congress (Kongres Kebudayaan IV). The Cultural Congress had the theme ‘from 
art to development’ (‘dari seni sampai pembangunan’) and, unsurprisingly, confirmed 
the direction of the regime’s cultural policy in its recommendations despite the opposition 
of some participants (BHS, 1991).  
 
In the 1990s, the regime’s cultural discourses still privileged a highly regulated model of 
cultural provision. However, the command culture model of the early New Order period 
had been impacted substantially by the fruits of its economic policies: booming 
manufacturing, media and tourism industries and related changes in the lifestyles of 
Indonesians. The unplanned competition for market share between official cultural 
provision and market provision was a significant change in how the majority of 
Indonesians accessed culture and the choices available for them. Regulation of media, for 
instance, was increasingly difficult in the 1990s because of the proliferation of different 
media types, providers and means of production and distribution (Sen & Hill, 2000, p. 
12). Artists and observers also became more critical of the Directorate’s policies and 
positions, such as the criticism of Director General Sedyawati’s support of the banning of 
Ratna Sarumpaet’s play Marsinah about a female labour activist who was killed by the 
military in 1993 (Mohamad, 1998).  
 
The regime responded to the competition with its command culture in two ways. Firstly, 
as was discussed in the section on ‘development’, the regime shifted its emphasis in 
cultural policy from the positive elements of national development such as developing 
national culture to assist economic development, to its more negative features of 
combating negative outside influences that would weaken national culture and protecting 
cultural values and heritage. Secondly, some attempts were made at adopting cultural 
policy to the changing situation. Contemporary popular culture became a topic of cultural 
research in the 1990s,39 although it was still dwarfed by the attention given to indigenous 
cultural forms. Additionally, the Directorate began to organise a triennial Indonesian Arts 
Festival (beginning in 1995).  
                                                 





New Order era cultural policy can be broadly identified as a continuation of a reformist 
use of culture that had been an element of every government in Indonesia since 
colonialism. The element of cultural policy where changes (like those identified by 
Anderson) occurred was not its techniques or its governmental function but in cultural 
policy’s normative model. In other words, cultural policy was attempting to shape a new 
type of cultural subject suitable for the New Order era. Guided Democracy’s emphasis on 
political messages and mass mobilisation was replaced by national development 
messages and the call for stable and ordered development. Development goals and 
messages were spread through cultural institutions and programs with the twin aims of 
developing individuals and strengthening the national population. New Order cultural 
policy also emphasised the spiritual value of culture and a conservative notion of cultural 
heritage and values in contrast to the emphasis on engagement during Guided 
Democracy. The changes in the Directorate of Culture were due to the inculcation of new 
norms connected to the new political, social and economic imperatives felt by a 
conservative authoritarian regime.  
 
The changing role designated for artists was more complex. Contemporary artists 
generally did not incorporate regime themes or messages into their work. Indigenous arts 
were treated much more instrumentally. Artists who worked with indigenous art forms 
were subject to training regimes and made to incorporate development themes and 
messages. The normative models for the arts in the two periods also included some 
similarities. The most noticeable was the aesthetic standards within the cultural programs, 
with their emphasis on technical innovation, performance quality and morality. 
Additionally, both Guided Democracy and the New Order period employed a version of 
the command culture model where the state undertook the task of controlling cultural 
provision and exchange rather than relying on the market.  
 
The New Order state was able to secure the conditions for the deployment of its 
governmental discourses to an extent unprecedented in Indonesian history since it had 
unparalleled resources and technologies with which to govern. Cultural governmental 
discourses were disseminated in programs and institutions across Indonesia as never 




contend with the challenge of growing cultural consumption through the expanding 
Indonesian market. Apart from responding to the threat of marginalisation from the 
cultural lives of Indonesians, New Order cultural policy remained remarkably unchanged 







Cultural Policy in the Reform Era:  
Ethnic Identity, Decentralisation and Tourism 
Reformasi 
Yang jumlah korbannya 
Konon sudah melebihi revolusi 
Ternyata hanya sekedar basa-basi 
Sebab tak mampu menghapus korupsi 
Apalagi mengadili para mantan petinggi  
 
Acep Zamzam Noor, Dongeng Dari Negeri Sembako (2001, p. 49)  
 
The Era of Reformation 
Whose numerous victims 
Appear to already exceed the revolution 
Turned out to be a mere formality 
Because it could not eliminate corruption 
To say nothing of prosecuting ex-authorities 
 
Acep Zamzam Noor’s poem summarises not just the feeling amongst many Indonesians 
about the reformasi movement in Indonesia, but also amongst many political analysts. 
Despite the hope and energy that it initially produced, the critics of reformasi held that it 
did not produce democratic reforms to the extent expected by its early advocates and did 
not break with many questionable past practices. This chapter argues that during the time 
period examined here1 the most important cultural policy changes were generated in a 
situation where the national governments instigated extensive institutional change but did 
not articulate or follow a defined democratic agenda. However, I also argue that despite 
their limitations these changes created greater potential for future cultural policy 
                                                 




diversity, innovation and wider social participation in policy making than existed in the 
New Order era.  
 
The complexity of the situation has given rise to two simultaneous sets of cultural policy 
changes that, although not contradictory, are not obvious partners. Firstly, ethnic and 
regional identity politics became increasingly important in the context of decentralisation. 
Secondly, culture’s role was challenged in a contentious restructure that took the culture 
portfolio out of education and joined it with tourism. While the first of these reforms has 
links to reformasi calls for the end of centralised control and creates the potential for 
greater innovation, popular participation and diversity in the long term, the second 
represents a greater immediate change. However, the restructure was actually a New 
Order initiative that was implemented in the Reform era and has little connection to 
popular pressures for reform. The reasons for this configuration are grounded in the 
political events of reformasi.  
 
1. Changes to Governance after Suharto 
Suharto’s successor, Habibie, was caught between popular demands for reform and his 
connections with New Order era elite. Habibie had little choice but to institute reforms, 
most notably decentralisation of political and financial control, given the demands from 
numerous groups, the mass popularity of reformasi and his need to prove his democratic 
credentials before the 1999 elections (Bourchier, 2000, p. 31; Emmerson, 1999, pp. 335-
340). He was assisted by the power that Suharto had concentrated in the Presidency and 
its dominance over the DPR and the MPR. However, his reformist initiatives were often 
mitigated by his close relationship with a corrupt elite and his supporters’ commitment to 
the status quo.2  
 
Following the 1999 elections, Abdurrahman Wahid was elected president despite his 
National Development Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa – PKB) having won only 
eleven percent of the seats in the DPR.3 The political dealings necessary for him in the 
October Presidential election to defeat Megawati, whose PDI-P had won thirty-five 
                                                 
2 Emmerson writes: ‘The New Order was over in the sense that a return to power by its founder seemed 
inconceivable. But if that regime had amounted to more than just one man, if it had been a set of 
institutions, a cohort of officials, and a way of doing business, these were still in place’ (1999, p. 342).  




percent of the 462 contested seats, quickly hamstrung his political agenda. The military 
turned against Wahid because of his support of human rights trials and his interventions 
in military appointments (Gorjao, 2003, pp. 15-20,24-29). Additionally, the international 
good will that he attracted as the victor of fair elections also disappeared, as his cabinet 
fell out with the IMF (Djiwandono, 2003, p. 211). Wahid attempted more cultural 
initiatives than any other post-Suharto President, perhaps because of his background as a 
serious intellectual with long-standing connections to the artistic and literary community.4 
Two such initiatives were his Presidential decree making the Indonesian Communist 
Party (PKI) a legal institution (which was later rejected by the legislature) and an aborted 
shake-up of the Directorate of Culture, the second of which is discussed in the final 
section of this chapter. Wahid’s moves to reconcile with the victims of 1965-665 and his 
apology for the violence was a move away from the anti-communist rhetoric of the New 
Order regime. Responses from artists to Wahid’s initiative were generally negative 
(Aritonang, 2000b; Imran, 2000b; Romli HM, 2000a), and emphasised a continuing 
rejection of the PKI and LEKRA’s perceived ‘politicisation’ of the arts. The divisions 
within the Wahid cabinet and between Wahid and the parliament, including the end of the 
alliance of Islamic parties that brought him to power (Fealy, 2000, pp. 11-13), prevented 
pursuit of any extensive reforms and quickened the downfall of his government. All of 
Wahid’s former allies, excluding PKB, aligned themselves against him and in support of 
Vice-President Megawati.  
 
Megawati assumed power on 23 July 2001 and followed a conservative political agenda 
from her inception.6 Following widespread celebration after her inauguration, Megawati 
disappointed reform-minded supporters and observers through her lack of leadership, 
particularly in contentious policy areas (Crouch, 2003, p. 15; Malley, 2003a, pp. 135-6). 
Megawati was less active in her efforts to fight corruption than Wahid and more willing 
to accommodate the military leadership’s opposition to reform (Robison & Hadiz, 2004, 
p. 248). Hadi Soesastro, a well-known political observer from the Centre of Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta, has written, ‘great disappointment has been 
expressed by the public and the media with the performance of her Cabinet ... Megawati 
                                                 
4 Wahid has also worked in the arts as joint-head of Taman Ismail Marzuki (TIM) Operational Committee 
from 1982 until 1985.  
5 Many members of the organisation that Wahid led, Nahdlatul Ulama, had been implicated in the 1965-66 
killings.  
6 Malley writes: ‘Her instincts are socially and politically conservative’ (2003a, p. 136). For an assessment 




is now being dubbed the ‘do nothing’ President’ (2003, p. 3). The three post-Suharto 
presidents were thus unable and/or unwilling to pursue reforms that would extensively 
alter the existing power structure, tied as they were to Suharto era institutions and power 
structures.  
 
Initial assessments of the Reform era classified it a ‘transitional period’ when Indonesia 
was gaining the features of a liberal democratic polity (Budiman, 1999; van Klinken, 
1999). Indeed Indonesia developed some of these attributes such as free and fair elections 
and a legislature that is now central to law making. However, more recent assessments 
have criticised the substance of the reforms. The political and electoral reforms also 
entrenched the power of the legislature and political parties without resulting in a clear 
and direct accountability to voters (Fealy, 2001). Ordinary Indonesians have been forced 
to continue to make use of the non-democratic methods and avenues when dealing with 
administration and government (Tornquist, 2002, p. 564) or the judiciary (Lindsey, 2000, 
pp. 289-91; 2002). Tim Lindsey’s analysis of law reform during the Habibie era argues 
that little actual reform took place. He writes that ‘very few of [the] new laws and 
amendments have actually delivered any substantial reform at all’ (2000, p. 279). Instead, 
the laws were inclined to be broad statements of reformist principle, lacking in substance 
and detail and therefore doomed to failure.7  
 
Richard Robison and Vedi Hadiz, pursuing a neo-Marxist analysis, argue that the 
political-business groupings (oligarchies) of the New Order regime, which profited from 
the corruption and the market reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, survived the collapse of 
the Suharto regime. Furthermore, they argue the oligarchies have adjusted to take 
advantage of the new political climate and institutions, limiting the possibilities of 
political and economic reform (2004, p. 12). In contrast to the strength of the oligarchies, 
the groups that supported a liberal agenda have been unable to organise themselves into a 
‘force’ able to capture state power (2004, pp. 29,259). Moderate observers, like Harold 
Crouch, have come to similar conclusions regarding the limited extent of reform. Crouch 
writes:  
                                                 
7 Economic reform was driven by donor countries and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which were 
attempting to fundamentally restructure Indonesia’s economic institutions and policies in the face of 




... the state is weak because it itself is made up of powerful competing vested 
interests. The state has been penetrated by interests that are opposed to reform. 
(2003, p. 33) 
Crouch concludes that the ‘Indonesian state has a considerable capacity for 
improvisation’ that allows it to survive without tackling the fundamental causes of 
problems (2003, p. 33).8  
 
The picture that emerges from political analysis is of a country where the groups most 
committed to democratic reform have been sidelined from the political process and far-
reaching democratic change has been successfully resisted. Practices changed in response 
to popular pressure, pressures from outside groups like the IMF and any reform initiatives 
that were generated within the system, but these responses tended to limit the extent of 
reform. Institutional change did happen, but it was initiated within divided political 
institutions that were more responsive to groups and interests that favoured the status quo 
than they were to advocates of far-reaching democratic reform. Unlike previous regime 
changes in Indonesia where elements of the preceding rationalities of government were 
more unambiguously critiqued and rejected (and groups excluded) and new rationalities 
constructed in their stead, the Reform era produced a mishmash of watered down policy 
initiatives driven by a raft of often competing interests. The absence of a strong group or 
coalition has resulted in the absence of a coherent critique of governance that could have 
driven broad reform of state institutions and policy. Although the popular initiatives of 
the early days of reformasi had some impact on cultural policy, most notably a partial end 
to the state’s licensing regime for cultural events, they did not penetrate far into official 
cultural institutions. Institutional change did occur in cultural policy, but it cannot be read 
as being driven by a push for democratisation – national politics ensured that was not the 
case.  
 
2. Immediate Impact of Reformasi: Winding Back State Licensing of Arts 
Events 
An immediate impact of reformasi was a demand for freedom of expression that was 
quickly manifest in the candid reporting of the crisis in the media and amongst 
contemporary urban artists. The early manifestations of reformasi need to be 
                                                 
8 Smith Kipp’s summary of political and economic developments in Indonesia in 2003 asserts similar 




distinguished from later changes that emanated from the bureaucracy and the Reform era 
governments. The immediate changes were generated through popular pressure for 
reform combined with demands from media organisations and their audiences for a more 
critical media (Sen & Hill, 2000, p. 71) and carried out without the involvement of the 
state. Contemporary urban artists were among the groups that were most involved in 
reformasi. They quickly began to incorporate reformasi themes in their works and 
became increasingly critical of social and political events (Supriyanto, 2002, p. 7).9 
Another effect of the reformist tendencies amongst modern artists was the almost 
immediate rejection of the state’s licensing regime for arts events in many urban areas.  
 
In the cities, the licensing regime ended quickly after the fall of Suharto, but not because 
of democratic reform initiated by politicians or bureaucrats. The organisations and 
individuals who held arts events stopped asking for permits, and the police no longer 
enforced the regime. The end of the licensing regime has facilitated the emergence of 
small arts institutions and performance venues. One such venue is Rumah Nusantara in 
Bandung, West Java. A group of local artists headed by Aat Soeratin, a well known local 
actor from television and theatre, began Rumah Nusantara at the end of 1998. Rumah 
Nusantara is based in a house on the outskirts of Bandung that has been transformed into 
a performance space, shop and cafeteria. The house has been provided rent free and, 
instead of paying set amounts, donations are collected from audiences at the end of a 
performance. Performers usually donate their time and are friends of the organising 
committee. Although this arrangement makes programming difficult, there are regular 
performances that are reasonably well attended. An arts institution like Rumah Nusantara 
could not have survived the New Order era level of regulation with any public 
prominence. The increased level of flexibility has provided space for smaller arts 
organisations to grow.10  
 
The end of the licensing regime has only been partial. At the end of 2003, artists outside 
of the large cities, such as in Cirebon, are still seeking permits from and paying police 
and their local cultural office. This difference between the contemporary urban artists and 
                                                 
9 Another example is the fine artist Sunaryo, who covered some of his paintings in black cloth in protest at 
the killings of students in 1999 (Maulana, 2000a). They were still covered when I visited his gallery in 
2001. Soni Farid Maulana, a Sundanese poet and journalist, draws attention to the theme of human rights 
abuse in his end of year review of the arts in 1999 (Maulana, 2000a).  




the practitioners of indigenous arts (traditional artists) reflects the uneven impact of 
reformasi and the continuation of a division between how the two kinds of artists relate to 
the state. Modern artists have adopted reformasi themes and became increasingly vocal in 
their criticism of social and political events in addition to benefiting from the end of the 
licensing regime of arts events. There has not been an equivalent impact amongst 
traditional artists who have less contact with each other and were less involved in the 
largely urban reformasi movement.  
 
3. Decentralisation, and the Growth of Ethnic and Local Identity Politics 
In contrast to the immediate changes brought by reformasi that were generally limited to 
urban artists, the institutional changes of the reform era brought cultural policy change 
across Indonesia. The most influential reform has been the process of decentralisation.  
 
Decentralisation 
During the New Order era, the state emphasised the decorative aspects of ethnic and local 
identity in its promotion of a superficial plurality. After the fall of Suharto, ethnic and 
local identity politics began to be reasserted as an important form of mobilisation across a 
variety of locales as the highly centralised political structure began to weaken. Some 
observers of Indonesian politics noted a change in the level at which important political 
decisions are made. Gerry van Klinken has called for a ‘disaggregation’ of the Indonesian 
state in response to the increased incidence of local political conflicts involving societal 
and state actors all the way from Jakarta to the village level (2001c, p. 3). Similarly, 
Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy emphasise the need for a revision of political analysis 
about Indonesia. They state: ‘In our struggle to understand Indonesian politics today, we 
must attempt to comprehend what is happening at the local level’ (1998, p. 11).  
 
Such far reaching changes have implications for cultural policy. The overlap between the 
splintering of political power, mobilisation of ethnic and local identity through cultural 
events and groups and institutional changes to the state’s cultural apparatus due to 
decentralisation is complex and requires an understanding of the social and political 
pressures at the national and sub-national levels. Following a discussion of 




kinds of pressures it is putting on cultural policy. These are necessary steps towards 
understanding why and how local politics is becoming more important to cultural policy.  
 
The fall of Suharto was accompanied by increasing opposition from regional elites who 
had felt ignored and sidelined during the New Order era. Particularly prominent in the 
Indonesian and international media was the separatist and federalist aspirations of four 
provinces rich in natural resources: Aceh, Papua, Riau and East Kalimantan (Aspinall & 
Fealy, 2003, p. 2). However, tensions were not exclusively between the centre and the 
regions, as demonstrated by Michele Ford’s analysis of Riau (2003) and the subsequent 
split of Riau to form a new province – Riau Islands. George Quinn’s research confirms 
the complexity of the emerging local politics in Java, as various local elites and 
communities mobilise to secure their interests and define internal and external social 
boundaries (2003). Most of these movements are rooted in local histories that extend 
back years before the fall of Suharto, but began to assert themselves much more 
aggressively from 1998. The successful East Timorese fight for independence further 
strengthened the resolve of separatist groups and added to the impression that Indonesia 
was splintering. Habibie responded with a piece of legislation which has shaped Reform 
era politics.  
 
The Regional Autonomy (Otonomi Daerah) legislation was passed in August 1999, two 
months after the June election and before the MPR session to determine the new 
president. It was touted as a response to federalist and separatist ambitions and as proof 
of the President’s and parliament’s democratic credentials (Jones, 2002, pp. 59-61). Since 
the legislation and the reasons for various provisions are analysed in detail elsewhere, 
only a brief summary is given here.11 The central element was the decentralisation of 
various areas of government, including education, health, the environment, labour, public 
works, natural resource management, tourism and culture, to the regency/municipal level 
along with a much larger share of revenue and the power to raise revenue. Another 
important element is that appointments at all levels of government are to be made by the 
local legislatures, not the national executive as was previously the case.  
 
                                                 
11 See Rasyid (2003) for a summary of the legislation from one of its key instigators and implementers. See 




Assessments of political decentralisation can be divided into two groupings. The first 
group emphasises increased democratisation of Indonesian society due to the devolution 
of power and resources to the lower levels of government (for examples of this group, see 
Antlov, 2003; Colongan, 2003; Rasyid, 2003).12 They argue that the fruits of 
decentralisation are greater responsiveness, better representation and increased 
participation of a variety of groups in decision making. The second group emphasises the 
extent that New Order era elites (old elites) have been able to capture the decentralisation 
process (this group includes Hadiz, 2003; Malley, 2003b; van Klinken, 2001c). Old elites 
formed new alliances to take advantages of the political and economic opportunities 
presented by reformasi. For instance Vedi Hadiz, in contrast to the first group described, 
argues that political decentralisation in fact strengthened the predatory interests of the old 
elites and that rent-seeking continues to drive Indonesian political life (2003, pp. 121-2).  
 
The Growing Assertion of Ethnic and Local Identity 
In the context of these changes it is not surprising that ethnic identity is becoming an 
increasingly important tool of local elites. The use of ethnic identity politics is a result of 
contemporary contests over resources and is often linked to political contests at the sub-
national level of government. Although ethnic identity politics is spread across Indonesia, 
it does not have a uniform operation, but instead is dependent on local historical and 
political configurations. Van Klinken, in his exploration of the new and quite different 
political configurations emerging in Central and East Kalimantan, demonstrates the 
increasing importance of ethnic identity to local elites in local political configurations, 
particularly in contests over control of the state:  
The complexity grows as new elites – not part of the westernised national elites 
who rode high on earlier waves of anti-colonial nationalism – enter the arena by 
mobilising hitherto unmobilised sections of the population. These other elites 
could for example (claim to) represent the traditional chiefs, princes and landlords 
upon whom the imperial powers relied in colonial-dominated Asia and Africa. In 
the context of a weakened central state, Indonesia is presently seeing a resurgence 
of such ‘new’ (or newly prominent) elites. (2001c, p. 3)  
There is evidence of a growing politicisation of ethnic identity in Papua, Riau, throughout 
Java, in West Sumatra (Sakai, 2003) and in Jakarta itself (Shahab, 2001). Another 
measure is the widespread demand that important local positions in the bureaucracy be 
given to ‘native sons’ (putra daerah).13 Many of these movements have long been present 
                                                 
12 These scholars assess developments favourably while noting repeated incidence of money politics.  




in the local communities, but could not flourish in the climate of New Order centralism. 
The decentralisation of local politics has revived their usefulness.  
 
The growth of ethnic and local identity politics has implications for cultural practices 
across Indonesia. Accompanying the political mobilisation of people along lines of ethnic 
and local identity is the growth of ethnic and local cultural practices. Some communities 
have flagged the reintroduction of traditional systems of government to replace the 
village system enforced on the whole of Indonesia under Suharto. Bali and West Sumatra 
have both debated the merits of officially reintroducing their traditional systems of local 
government in place of the desa system forced on them by the New Order regime 
(Cohen, 2001). Another example is Greg Acciaioli’s account of a return to traditional 
legal systems amongst the To Lindu people in Central Sulawesi following the end of New 
Order centralism (2002, pp. 221-30). Local content, particularly local languages, customs 
and crafts, is finding its way into school curriculum.14 The turn to ethnic identity politics 
has also resulted in violence in certain areas between indigenous peoples and migrants.15 
The ethnic internal boundaries of the nation are becoming increasingly important for 
politics and in people’s lives.  
 
A symptom of the increasing importance of sub-national politics has been a proliferation 
of conferences exploring and celebrating the cultures of various ethnic groups across 
Indonesia. These conferences have a much wider scope than the artistic events organised 
by the New Order which tended to showcase only the performing arts. An example is the 
International Conference of Sundanese Culture (Konferensi Internasional Budaya Sunda 
– KIBS) held in Bandung from 22 to 25 August 2001. Six concurrent panels ran, which 
addressed: Literature and Sundanese Culture; History, Archaeology and Philology; 
Religion, Spirituality and Outlook on Life; Economy, Society and Politics; Art; and 
Lifestyle, Architecture, Food and Clothes. KIBS followed similar conferences in Central 
Kalimantan in December 1998, Riau in January-February 2000, Papua in May-June 2000, 
Minahasa in August 2000 (van Klinken, 2001c, p. 6) and about Malay identity in Batam 
in September 2001 (SMN, 2001). KIBS was opened by a representative of the Governor 
                                                 
14 In 2001, Bandung had drafted legislation to include the viewing of local arts in the curriculum of all 
primary school aged children. Interview with Dana Setia, 20 November 2001.  
15 Central Kalimantan is one such example (van Klinken, 2001c). Ambon’s recent violence is the result of 
similar tensions between elites and communities, but the key divide amongst the inhabitants was religion, 




of West Java and was sponsored by the Province of West Java for approximately $31 000 
AUD (150 000 000 Rp.) and the Toyota Foundation, a Japanese non-profit organisation, 
for approximately $72 500 AUD (350 000 000 Rp.) (Maulana, 2001). The role of 
regional governments in many of these conferences is substantial due to their willingness 
to fund such causes in return for an association with large ethnic constituencies, although 
they are generally cautious of claims that would alienate the national government and the 
military.16  
 
The cultural agenda of regional ethnic organisations prioritises the place and prosperity of 
ethnic constituencies and their cultures and draws attention to communal concerns with 
their decline under the Indonesian nation-state. Ajip Rosidi, a well known poet, novelist 
and academic from West Java and head of the Sundanese cultural organisation Rancage, 
provides an interesting example of how ethnic cultural organisations frame their agendas 
in his opening speech at KIBS (2001). Rosidi begins by discussing the years after 1942 in 
West Java, where there was a twenty-year period of turmoil (due to the Japanese 
occupation, the revolution, and the Darul Islam rebellion) that interrupted local lifestyles 
and cultural practices. From the beginning of the New Order period, the state turned its 
attention to modernisation and industrialisation. According to Rosidi, Sundanese culture 
and society were further weakened during this period due to the ‘Westernisation’ which 
accompanied modernisation and in-migration of ‘other people’17 to take advantage of 
economic opportunities. Sundanese began to lose interest in local arts and practices as 
their society began to ‘disintegrate’ (2001, p. 3). Rosidi then turns his attention to the 
Indonesian state. He claims that the state has never seriously addressed the issue of 
culture. Rosidi states:  
To defend culture against extinction, a political will is required from the state and 
national leaders. And until now, we have not yet seen a political will. How will a 
political will to restore cultural life surface if consciousness of and understanding 
about culture’s importance to shaping the nation has never existed? (2001, p. 4)  
Untuk menjaga jangan sampai punah, diperlukan adanya political will dari 
pemerintah dan para pemimpin bangsa. Dan sampai sekarang political will itulah 
yang belum pernah kelihatan. Bagaimana akan timbul suatu political will untuk 
membenahi kehidupan budaya kalau pengertian dan kesadaran tentang 
pentingnya kebudayaan dalam berbangsa juga tidak pernah timbul?  
                                                 
16 See Colombijn (2003, pp. 344-63) for an account of the Riau Malay movement, including the 
relationship to the provincial government.  




Rosidi then outlines the failure of the state to address the decline of traditional ethnic 
cultural practices, particularly in the case of education, to which he devotes a third of his 
speech. He concludes by stating that the role of KIBS is to encourage the development of 
a political will. KIBS, he hopes, will increase interest about and appreciation of 
Sundanese culture in both the local, national and international communities and will 
increase pressure on the state to develop a meaningful and effective cultural policy.  
 
Six characteristics can be identified within Rosidi’s speech that often recur within the 
analysis of ethnic cultural organisations from the late 1990s.18 They constitute a new key 
pressure on cultural policy in the reform era. The first characteristic is the historical 
decline of an ethnic culture. A once thriving culture declined due to the tides of history, 
in particular modernisation and the entrance of Western popular and high culture.19 The 
second is the identification of culture as a neglected area of governance. Rosidi accuses 
the state of failing to protect or seriously address cultural issues throughout the 
independence period and in particular the developmentalist New Order period.20 The 
third characteristic is the conservative agenda underlying the argument. Sundanese 
culture tends to refer to older cultural forms and lifestyles, rather than emerging 
local/global practices and tends to exclude non-indigenous ethnic groups living in the 
region from the cultural and political arena.21  
 
The fourth is that the state is compelled to act to protect local indigenous practices. An 
underlying element of such demands is competition for resources within the local arts 
community, which is discussed in chapter seven on the Cultural Institutions.22 The fifth 
characteristic is the relationship to Indonesian culture. In politically aware organisations 
like Rosidi’s Yayasan Rancage, the relationship between the ethnic culture in question 
and Indonesian culture is clearly spelt out. Rosidi, for instance, clearly states that 
Sundanese culture is also Indonesian culture (Rosidi, 2001, p. 8), whereas Al azhar, in his 
                                                 
18 Many similarities exist with a text of Al azhar, the head of the Free Riau (Riau Merdeka) movement, who 
was also heavily involved with the arts in Riau (Al azhar, 1997b). I include references to Al azhar’s text to 
support my claim that these characteristics can be generalised.  
19 See also Al azhar (1997a, pp. 767-9).  
20 See also Al azhar (1997a, pp. 764-5). Al azhar’s claim is broader still: Riau Malays were marginalised 
culturally, economically and socially during the independence era in the lands they once owned.  
21 Al azhar also emphasises ethnic revival through exploring the ‘heritage of the past’ (1997a, p. 768). The 
activities of Al azhar and his associates in Riau are more encompassing that Rosidi and Yayasan Rancage. 
When I was in Riau in 2001, I attended a rock concert for local youth organised and promoted by Al 
azhar’s organisation.  




description of the growth of Riau Malay identity, rejects that Riau Malay culture is 
Indonesian (1997b, p. 764). The final characteristic is increased attempts to engage with 
international groups and individuals. Rosidi makes a plea for more international 
academics to study Sundanese culture and for more international interest. Ethnic cultural 
organisations are becoming increasingly aware of the importance of international 
recognition for the well-being of their organisation and culture. The original declaration 
of Riau sovereignty (Daulat Riau) included an interpretation of the demands in English 
(Colombijn, 2003, p. 348) and a Malay culture conference in Batam in 2001 fostered 
links between Riau and Malays in neighbouring countries. International recognition 
generates cultural prestige, breeding local interest and pride and improved funding 
opportunities from the state, international organisations and tourism.  
 
4. Cultural Policy in the Reform Era 
While decentralisation and the growth of ethnic identity politics exerted pressure for 
cultural policy change across Indonesia, their effects were felt much more at the sub-
national level than the national level. The Directorate of Culture, located at the national 
level, also experienced pressure for change, but this was predominantly generated by 
pressures and political decisions that began in the New Order era rather than post-New 
Order reforms. Below I firstly discuss changes within the Directorate of Culture, in 
particular a controversial cabinet-level decision to join culture with tourism rather than 
education, as well as responses to decentralisation. Secondly, I explore the impact of 
decentralisation at the sub-national level through an examination of cultural policy 
formation in West Java.23  
 
                                                 
23 I have chosen West Java for three reasons. First, it is representative of neither the centre nor the 
periphery, due to its proximity to Jakarta and Central Java, the current commitment of the West Javanese to 
the Indonesian nation and the minority status of the ethnic Sundanese in Indonesia. West Java is 
predominantly ethnic Sundanese and issues regarding Sundanese culture predominate. The Sundanese are 
acutely aware of their minority status compared to the Javanese majority in both Indonesia and Java. 
Second, West Java itself contains many active cultural forms, and Bandung is a centre of cultural activity. 
This, along with concerns to protect Sundanese culture, has stimulated cultural policy in Bandung, making 
it an ideal case study. Third, there is a tension between the ethnic Sundanese and the smaller indigenous 
groups, particularly the Cirebonese, regarding the status of Sundanese culture relative to other local 
indigenous cultures. This tension is present in many other provinces due to Indonesia’s cultural diversity 




The Directorate of Culture and Tourism 
A sea change in cultural policy has been signalled through a restructuring of the 
Directorate of Culture that has seen culture linked to tourism rather than education. 
Suharto’s last Development Cabinet (Seventh) instituted the restructure in 1997. Without 
any consultation within the bureaucracy, Suharto announced a change in the Minister’s 
portfolios with the term culture appearing twice. The Ministries of Education and Culture 
and of Tourism, Post and Communications became the Ministry of Education and Culture 
and the Ministry of Tourism, Arts and Culture. The movement from education to tourism 
was followed through before decentralisation took effect and with significant internal 
resistance.  
 
The move of culture into the tourism portfolio began a series of events that constitute the 
biggest structural shake up in the Directorate of Culture since its inception as the Cultural 
Office in 1945. The Minister of Tourism, Post and Communications in the Sixth 
Development Cabinet, Joop Ave, successfully lobbied Suharto to have culture and its 
4300 bureaucrats moved across to the Department of Tourism.24 The Seventh 
Development Cabinet was dissolved before any substantial changes could be made. 
Habibie left culture with tourism, and some planning was made for the move. The first 
Wahid cabinet did not include culture in any portfolio (although there was a State 
Ministry of Tourism and Arts), as Wahid was planning to implement a National Cultural 
Board to oversee the area.25 The second Wahid cabinet saw culture again linked with 
tourism, which is where it remained under Megawati. Bureaucrats within the Directorate 
of Culture have generally not responded well to the move. Most have a commitment, 
through their own studies in arts and culture faculties and their work history in the 
Directorate, to culture as a tool of national development and conceive of culture’s role as 
central to maintaining national cohesion and identity.  
 
The Broad Outline of State Policy (Garis Besar Haluan Negara – GBHN) for 1999-
200426 provides an insight into both the nexus of tourism and culture within the cultural 
                                                 
24 Interview with Jasli Falal, 10 September 2001. Falal was the Head of the Cultural Section at the National 
Planning Board at the time of the move.  
25 Interview with Jasli Falal, 10 September 2001.  




apparatus and the continuing presence of New Order era cultural discourses. The first 
subsection frames the goals for Culture, the Arts and Tourism:  
To cultivate and manage the national culture of the Indonesian nation, which has 
its origins in the noble cultural heritage of the nation, national culture that 
contains universal values including belief in the one true God has the goal of 
supporting the care of harmony in social life and developing the national 
civilisation. (Majelis Perwakilan Rakyat, 1999, p. 30) 
Mengembangkan dan membina kebudayaan nasional bangsa Indonesia yang 
bersumber dari warisan budaya leluhur bangsa, budaya nasional yang 
mengandung nilai-nilai universal termasuk kepercayaan terhadap Tuhan Yang 
Maha Esa dalam rangka mendukung terpeliharanya kerukunan hidup 
bermasyarakat dan membangun peradaban bangsa.  
This subsection indicates that New Order era cultural discourses still frame national 
cultural policy. It pays homage to cultural heritage, universal humanism’s understanding 
of culture as universal, and culture’s role in national development. The third subsection 
confirms the continued centrality of national development by its statement that a critical 
attitude to cultural values needs to be maintained to develop values that are conducive to 
‘facing opposition to national development in the future.’27  
 
However, there are also some changes. The fourth subsection states that the state should 
develop the freedom to create in the arts and protect the rights and royalties of artists. 
From a peripheral position during the New Order era GBHN, tourism became much more 
prominent in the cultural policy section. It is mentioned in two places. Firstly, the 
government is to make ‘traditional’ arts and culture a ‘vehicle for the development of 
national tourism and promoting it overseas.’28 The linkage between indigenous cultural 
forms and tourism is, as we shall see below, the most controversial of the developments 
of the Reform era. Secondly, in a move aimed at allaying opposition, the development of 
tourism is to be ‘holistic’,29 ‘participatory’30 and respectful of culture and the 
environment (1999, p. 31).  
 
Internally, the Directorate has undergone numerous restructures. The key elements of the 
restructure were the division of the Directorate of Culture into two Directorates: the 
Directorate of Cultural Values, Art and Film and the Directorate of History and 
                                                 
27 ‘Menghadapi tantangan pembangunan bangsa di masa depan’ (1999, p. 30).  
28 ‘Menjadikan kesenian dan kebudayaan tradisional Indonesia sebagai wahana bagi pengembangan 
pariwisata nasional dan mempromosikannya ke luar negeri’ (1999, p. 31).  
29 ‘Utuh’ (1999, p. 31).  




Archaeology (Directorat Nilai Budaya, Seni dan Film and Direktorat Sejarah dan 
Purbakala). Secondly, mass cultural forms, specifically film and video, are included once 
again within the purview of official cultural policy. According to the GBHN, the 
Directorate of Cultural Values, Art and Film is to ensure ‘healthy’ cinematic 
developments in order to ‘improve religious morality and national astuteness, develop 
positive public opinion and increase economic value’.31  
 
Two changes which have not been well received in the Directorate are the process of 
decentralisation and the downgrading of the culture portfolio within the Megawati cabinet 
(LOK, 2004). As part of the decentralisation process, a number of Technical 
Implementation Units (Unit Pelaksanaan Teknis – UPT) have been put under the control 
of the lower levels of government. UPT were units of national government departments 
that were present in the region but were directly responsible to the national bureaucracy 
in Jakarta and constantly communicated with their affiliated section. As control of the 
UPT moved to the sub-national levels of government, bureaucrats in the Directorate saw 
the institutions which they had built and run for a number of years move out of their 
grasp. Additionally, Megawati changed the status of Tourism and Culture from a 
department to a state ministry (kementerian negara). State ministries receive a much 
lower level of funding and have lower staffing levels. They also are focussed on policy 
development rather than operational activities such as those undertaken by the UPT. The 
worries of the cultural bureaucrats were allayed by the creation of a Development Board 
of Culture and Tourism (Badan Pembangunan Kebudayaan dan Parawisata) soon after 
the announcement of the Megawati cabinet. The cultural apparatus now sat within the 
Development Board and, under such an arrangement, would be separate from the tourism 
apparatus and could continue to control the UPT that remained.32 The cultural 
bureaucrats’ rearguard action had so far produced results. However, Presidential Decree 
29/2003 soon brought many of these issues to the surface in a very public row.  
 
                                                 
31 ‘... untuk meningkatkan moralitas agama serta kecerdasan bangsa, pembentukan opini publik yang 
positif dan peningkatan nilai tambah secara economi’ (1999, p. 31).  
32 The cultural parks (taman budaya) and the provincial museums had already been transferred to the 
Provincial governments. The UPT which remained were the Historical and Traditional Values Research 
Bureaus (11), the Preservation of Historical Remains and Archaeology Reserves (9), Archaeology Bureaus 
(10), special museums and the National Museum (6), the National Gallery, and the Borobudur Research 




Presidential Decree 29/2003 dissolved the Development Board and merged its 4300 
employees into the State Ministry of Culture and Tourism (600 employees). The 
announcement of the move started a media standoff between the State Minister for 
Culture and Tourism, I Gede Ardika, and the Head of the Development Board, Setyanto 
Santoso between the last week of April and the first week of June in 2003. Ultimately, the 
presidential decree backed by the Minister could not be overcome by opposition within 
the department, but this did not stop opposition within the Directorate from fighting it all 
the way. The Minister’s reasons for the move were to prevent the duplication of tasks and 
to improve effectiveness and efficiency (COK, 2003). The reasons given for the 
resistance to the move were multiple: the operational activities and the UPT would not be 
allowed to continue within the smaller confines of a state ministry (TRI, 2003); the work 
of the employees would be disturbed; there will be internal unrest (COK, 2003); and any 
reorganisation should be delayed until after the 2004 election, as there was a good chance 
of future restructuring (NAR, 2003).  
 
The subtext to this argument about bureaucratic processes and efficiency only 
occasionally broke through to the surface in the newspaper articles. The key issue, 
masterfully avoided by the Minister and his upper echelon of bureaucrats, was the 
government’s changing use of culture. From an approach where the government, in the 
words of the Secretary of the Development Board, Nunus Supardi, provided ‘cultural 
leadership’ with the goal of creating national unity (TRI, 2003), the government moved 
towards a more commercially aware approach that takes account of the cultural industries 
and is less inclined to run programs itself. Teuke Jacob, a Professor of Anthropology at 
Gadja Mada University, and cultural observer Rahman Arge, labelled the change in 
method ‘sacrificing culture’ (NAR, 2003). In an interview with Kompas, Jacob stated: 
This policy [of fusing the two bodies] mirrors the weakness of the government’s 
commitment to culture. An institution which already possesses concrete authority 
to manage culture is then fused to an institution which does not run programs. 
(NAR, 2003) 
Kebijakan itu mencerminkan betapa lemahnya keberpihakan pemerintah terhadap 
kebudayaan. Lembaga yang sudah punya wewenang konkret untuk mengurusi 
kebudayaan justru dilebur ke lembaga yang tidak operasional. 
Free of the burden of state employment, these two commentators accused the government 
of neglecting its duty of cultural leadership as set out in the 1945 Constitution and 




culture or a return to the Department of Education.33 The media stoush ended with 
Santoso pressing defamation charges against a number of members of the tourist industry 
after a no-confidence motion was passed against his leadership of the Development 
Board. The substance of the motion was that Santoso was an ineffective leader and more 
oriented ‘towards projects, not towards the market’.34  
 
Underlying the Minister’s agenda is a reconsideration of the role of culture in policy. 
Culture’s utility seems to be shifting from a tool of nation building to include 
employment and revenue raising through its association with tourism. Such a change is 
consistent with developments in other countries, but contradicts the underlying rationale 
of cultural policy during the New Order era. The extent of the Reform era change can be 
underlined by the outrage felt by ex-Director-General of Culture Edi Sedyawati. In a 
conference in 2003, she strongly criticised the restructure:  
I see those two departments [Education and Culture] together in a single domain 
of activities, educating and providing culture. Educating at its base provides 
culture, while providing culture is a process of education. There is the connection. 
(EH, 2003)  
Saya melihat kedua departemen tersebut sama-sama dalam satu ranah kegiatan, 
mendidik dan membudayakan. Mendidik pada dasarnya membudayakan, 
sementara membudayakan adalah proses pendidikan. Di situlah keterkaitannya, 
At the end of 2003 it was difficult to see if tourism was indeed ‘commodifying’ culture 
or, alternatively, if the connection to tourism had in fact freed indigenous cultural forms 
from the priorities of the New Order era. However, another position provides a different 
perspective on the debate. In contrast to the opinions of Indonesian cultural observers and 
bureaucrats, Philip Yampolsky’s study of the effects of New Order era cultural policy on 
indigenous art forms suggest that the two processes are not opposed, but instead reinforce 
each other as they both redesign indigenous arts ‘for external consumption, whether by 
tourists ... or festival audiences’ (Yampolsky, 1995, p. 714). The ‘national’ and ‘cultural’ 
positions are in fact two contending rationalities within the Directorate that are both 
‘reforming’ culture in ways that are not dissimilar. From this perspective, the position of 
the Directorate remains oriented towards strengthening the nation through economic 
growth.  
                                                 
33 It should be noted that more criticisms were loudly expressed during the Fifth Cultural Congress held at 
Padang Panjang in West Sumatra in October 2003. Ex-Director General Sedyawati was particularly 
stinging and evoked wide agreement (EH, 2003). The recommendation for an ‘autonomous’ Department of 
Culture was even one of the formal recommendations of the conference (MAM, 2003).  




Making Cultural Policy in Decentralised Indonesia 
Decentralisation, in addition to making the state more sympathetic to popular concerns 
about local majority ethnic cultures and the demands of ethnic cultural organisations, has 
also created opportunities for the non-national levels of government to reassess policy 
content. Although the responsibility for most cultural policy activities was decentralised 
to the regency and city governments, some responsibility was shouldered by the 
provincial governments, including management of the cultural parks (taman budaya),35 
museums and the provincial level cultural office and coordination of province-wide 
cultural activities.  
 
At the end of April 2001, the provincial government of West Java decided to consolidate 
the cultural apparatus that it had inherited through the decentralisation process. Four 
departments in West Java36 were brought together to form the Provincial Office for 
Culture and Tourism (Dinas Kebudayaan dan Parawisata Propinsi Jawa Barat, 
commonly referred to with the acronym Disbudpar). West Java provides an interesting 
study of the different pressures that exerted themselves on cultural policy at a sub-
national level. Below I focus on two aspects of cultural policy in West Java: Disbudpar’s 
strategic plans that were developed early in 2001; and a planning meeting that engaged 
with elements of the arts community in West Java held in November 2001.  
 
a. Strategic Planning in West Java 
 
The province developed strategic plans (rencana strategik) to guide policy between 
elections (2001-2005). The strategic plans indicate that Disbudpar embraced the merger 
of culture and tourism without the antagonism that occurred in the Directorate of Culture 
at the national level. There was little evidence of divisions amongst bureaucrats or 
criticism from the arts community regarding what the strategic plans represented as a 
mutually beneficial union (Dinas Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata, 2001b, p. i). Nonetheless, 
differences between strategic plans indicate the presence of different policy directions.  
 
                                                 
35 I examine the history of the cultural parks and the impact of decentralisation in chapter six.  
36 The four offices were: the Provincial Tourism Office (Dinas Pariwisata Daerah); Regional Office for 
Tourism and Art; (Kantor Wilayah Pariwisata dan Kesenian); Provincial Office for Education and Culture 
(Dinas Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan); and the Archaeology and Arts Sections from the Regional Office of 
National Education (Kantor Wilayah Departemen Pendidikan Nasional, Bidang Kepurbakalaan dan 




The strategic plans for the areas that were previously under central control continue to 
exhibit features from the cultural discourses of the New Order era. For instance, the 
Cultural Preservation and Development Strategy in West Java (Strategi Pelestarian 
Pengembangan Kebudayaan di Jawa Barat, Dinas Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata, 2001c) 
adopted a broad definition of culture borrowed directly from the New Order era. Culture 
was defined as ‘the materialisation of humankind’s capacity to actively adapt to their 
environment’.37 In the discussion of the ‘usage’ of culture, culture was once again linked 
to national development:  
West Java’s Regional culture that has developed throughout history is the basic 
capital and the dominant factor in supporting the success of national development. 
(2001c, p. 5)  
Budaya Daerah Jawa Barat yang berkembang sepanjang sejarah merupakan 
modal dasar dan faktor yang dominan untuk menunjang keberhasilan 
pembangunan nasional.  
Similarities were present throughout all of the strategic plans in other policy fields 
designated as cultural. The arts program had the goal of ‘caring for and protecting the 
kinds of West Javanese art that can be passed on to the following generation’.38 The arts 
strategic plan also emphasised the arts’ role in ensuring national unity, prioritised ‘high 
value’ and ‘lofty values’39 and managing ‘negative foreign cultural influences’.40 These 
features reinforced the emphasis on ‘authentic’ indigenous forms and ignored 
contemporary or highbred art forms. The history and traditional values program was 
represented as ensuring continued national unity and protecting against foreign 
disintegrative influences (2001b, pp. 22-3). There was also a repeated emphasis regarding 
threats of extinction to cultural heritage and values (2001c, p. 2)41 and traditional 
indigenous arts (2001d, p. 2) that required state intervention and direction.  
 
An element of Disbudpar’s cultural strategic plans that deserves some attention is the 
cultural and geographic limitations of the policies. At their broadest, the limit of the 
cultural policies was West Java. However, a number of other limitations focused the 
cultural policies on a particular brand of culture linked to a particular community, 
                                                 
37 ‘Kebudayaan ... adalah perwujudan kemampuan manusia untuk menyesuaikan diri secara aktif terhadap 
lingkungan’ (2001c, p. 1).  
38 ‘Memelihara dan menjaga berbagai jenis kesenian daerah Jawa Barat agar dapat diwariskan kepada 
generasi penerus’ (Dinas Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata, 2001b, p. 19).  
39 ‘Nilai tinggi’ and ‘nilai luhur’ (Dinas Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata, 2001d, p. 1).  
40 ‘Menanggulangi pengaruh budaya asing yang negatif’ (2001d, p. 7).  
41 Cultural objects, practices and also ‘values, social norms and world view’ are considered to be threatened 




excluding other types of culture and communities. The most common limitation was an 
exclusive focus on the traditional indigenous culture and arts of West Java, excluding 
contemporary and popular culture and arts and the indigenous culture and arts of migrants 
from other countries and regions (2001c, pp. 1-5; 2001d, p. 2). When discussing the arts 
and history and traditional values programs, there was in two places a slippage between 
West Javanese culture and Sundanese culture (2001b, pp. 19,22). Although the 
Sundanese are the largest ethnic group in West Java, they are by no means the only ethnic 
group. However, the slippages indicate the ethnic community that the province most 
wanted to address. The focus on traditional culture and the arts was justified through the 
assertion that these were national cultural forms (2001b, p. 23; 2001c, p. 5), including the 
use of the phrase ‘the lofty values of a national ethnicity’42 in relation to justifying the 
protection of West Javanese art.  
 
Two alternative understandings of strategic planning for the Reform era contrast with the 
strategic plans in the cultural areas. Firstly, the Mental Framework for the Apparatus of 
the West Java Cultural Office towards the Reform Era (Kerangka Pemikiran Aparatur 
Dinas Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata Propinsi Jawa Barat ke Era Reformasi, henceforth 
Mental Framework) introduced new ideas about the role of the bureaucracy and the 
conduct of public administration (Dinas Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata, 2001a). The 
Mental Framework began by interpreting reformasi as a demand for the implementation 
of ‘good governance’, using the English term in the original. Good governance was then 
interpreted as a style of public administration that draws heavily on Western ideas and 
terminology.43 The major elements of the Mental Framework were: managing learning; 
creating change agendas; reinventing government management; and customer service. 
The first two elements were about achieving work potentials, planning and change 
management. The final two elements revolved around the term ‘customer driven 
government’ and emphasised that the purpose of the public service was to meet the needs 
of ‘customers’, not the bureaucracy (Dinas Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata, 2001a, p. 6). 
Rather than the bureaucracy providing services itself, Mental Framework advocated 
privatisation and cooperation with private companies, the introduction of market 
competition as a tool of reform and a more hands-off style of public management where 
intervention only occurs when it looks like outcomes are not going to be achieved.  
                                                 
42 ‘Nilai luhur etnis bangsa’ (2001d, p. 1).  




This neo-liberal interpretation of reformasi reflects the education and outlook of the Head 
of Disbudpar, Memet Hamden. Hamden majored in development studies at American 
University in Washington DC. In an interview in 2001, he described the role of 
Disbudpar as ‘coordinating’ and his own ambition as wanting to ‘be the best facilitator’ 
(Interview with Memet K. Hamden, 13 November 2001). The attempts to move away 
from what Hamden called a ‘top-down model’ to a neo-liberal model would involve a 
major reinterpretation that is not reflected in the strategic plans for the cultural areas 
discussed previously. A key element of the neo-liberal model is that the market is 
considered more efficient than the government when it comes to providing services 
which contrasts sharply with the New Order rationale that the state should lead cultural 
programs to ensure ordered development.  
 
Another perspective on strategic planning regarding culture can be gleaned from the 
thoughts of the arts community in West Java, as expressed in a seminar in May 2000, 
‘Archipelago/Inter-Islands: Considering the Future’ (‘Nusantara/Antar-Nusa: Menimbang 
Masa Depan’, Aritonang, 2000a). In this seminar, there were calls for greater 
participation by civil society and to build the capacity for greater participation, clean 
government, greater attention to human rights and a review of Indonesia’s place in global 
economics. Culture was invoked in two ways. First, Yasraf Amir Piliang, a lecturer from 
the Bandung Institute of Technology, argued that art should be used in the strategy of 
national reconciliation to encourage a ‘holistic’ assessment of the relationship between 
the past and future. Art and culture, according to Piliang, could be used to encourage a 
broadening of world view and a reflection on the national condition. This contrasted with 
Disbudpar’s cultural strategic planning, which was aimed at strengthening pre-existing 
values and reinforcing the place of local ethnicities in the nation. Second, filmmaker 
Garin Nugroho called for a broad cultural strategy to address the large changes and sense 
of disorientation following the events of 1998. Nugroho used a broader definition of 
culture to advocate creating new institutions with the larger aim of growing a ‘new 
society’44 through addressing five national problem areas: geopolitics, the speed of 
history, political crises, challenges of modernity and communications crises. Soon after 
this seminar, elements of the arts community were offered a chance to participate in 
developing provincial cultural policy.  
                                                 




b. The Planning Dialogue  
 
On 5-7 November 2001, Disbudpar invited many of the stakeholders in the cultural 
industries in West Java to participate in the development of a new cultural policy for 
West Java to be implemented by the new institution. The three-day conference, entitled 
Planning Dialogue for Culture and Tourism in West Java (Dialog Peta dan Agenda 
Budaya dan Pariwisata Jawa Barat, henceforth, Culture and Tourism Dialogue), divided 
the participants up into eight groups dealing with language, literature and script (two 
groups); fine and performance arts; art activities and festivals; history; traditional values; 
museums and other cultural venues; and archaeology. The Culture and Tourism Dialogue 
was considered a continuation of a series of strategic planning meetings that had taken 
place across West Java in connection with decentralisation and also a follow-up to the 
suggestions that emerged from KIBS that had taken place seven weeks before (Aritonang 
et al., 2001). The broad goals for the Culture and Tourism Dialogue, as set out in the 
Summary of Findings (Rumusan Hasil), reflected the priorities of the provincial 
government. The Culture and Tourism Dialogue was to establish an agenda for cultural 
and tourism in West Java and address the issues, concerns and potential benefits of 
combining culture and tourism.45 More specifically, the eight groups were asked to ‘map’ 
criticisms of the current policies in their area, develop solutions to these criticisms and 
use these solutions to create an agenda for their specific area (summarised in Table 5.1).  
 
The Summary of Findings includes a recurring criticism regarding the scope of cultural 
policy in West Java:  
Until now, concepts about the treatment of culture and cultural inheritance were 
sporadic and rested too much on certain institutions’ programs. In other words, 
not enough space was given for public participation, such as the scholarly 
community, the arts community, tourism, industry groups and businesses. 
(Aritonang et al., 2001, p. 12) 
Selama ini, konsep perlakuan dan pewarisan kebudayaan lebih banyak dilakukan 
secara sporadis, dan terlalu bertumpu pada program-program instansi tertentu. 
Dengan kata lain, belum banyak memberikan ruang pada partisipasi publik 
seperti masyarakat terpelajar, masyarakat kesenian, masyarakat pariwisata, 
masyarakat industri, dan usahawan.  
                                                 
45 There was some evidence in the report of concern about combining culture and tourism, which was 
expressed as combining the regulation of ‘non-profit’ activities (culture) with ‘profit’ activities (tourism) 




The most direct criticism of past cultural policy practice was on the first page of the 
report, where, drawing from Rosidi’s address at KIBS, the cultural policy of all of the 
post-independence periods is criticised as understanding culture as ‘static’, ‘pre-existing’ 
and ‘continuing its existence without a creative process’.46 Past cultural policy was 
accused of ignoring cultural change and stifling creativity.  
 
Some of the suggested changes cut across a number of different policy areas. Almost all 
of the groups called for legislative reform. The Summary of Findings called for ‘total 
change’47 of the legislation to include the fields of history, archaeology, museums and 
traditional values, where the old legislation only addressed language, literature, script and 
the arts. The Summary of Findings also called for clear sanctions, greater accommodation 
of subcultures and for the exclusion of ‘technical’ areas, such as the shaping or 
administration of institutions.48 Another suggestion that was mentioned by almost every 
group was initiatives to increase and improve education about culture in schools. There 
were multiple calls to review the cultural curriculum, increase local content and make use 
of local experts in schools. Indeed, education received more attention than tourism, which 
also cut across the different groups. Recommendations relating to tourism were 
summarised as ‘creating a mutually symbiotic relationship’49 and tended to take the form 
of meetings with the purpose of facilitating cooperation. Many groups made calls for 
increased training and human resources development, for more programs to develop 
public appreciation for culture and moves to involve the private sector in funding cultural 
activities.  
 
There were also differences between the findings of different groups. While many groups 
criticised the limited scope and activities of Disbudpar, the fine and performance arts 
group was the most critical of past policies which they considered as not addressing 
artists’ aspirations or concerns. The traditional values group had the largest number of 
criticisms regarding the dilapidated condition of traditional values, which they blamed on 
                                                 
46 ‘Statis’, ‘sudah jadi’, ‘tetap keadaannya tanpa proses kreatif’ (Aritonang et al., 2001, p. 1).  
47 ‘Diubah total’ (Aritonang et al., 2001, p. 18).  
48 In Pikiran Rakyat on 15 November 2001, a statement from the committee that wrote the report was 
published. After the call for the exclusion of ‘technical areas’ (‘hal-hal yang bersifat terlalu teknis’), the 
article clarified that shaping and administering cultural institutions (like the Arts Council that I also discuss 
in chapter six) should be passed to the ‘cultural community’ and that state-attempts to define these 
institutions were misguided (Aritonang, 2001). These statements were excluded from the report despite the 
presence of the author of the article on the report’s steering committee.  




state neglect. The recommendations regarding both history and traditional values 
incorporated previous cultural policy programs regarding documentation, research and 
also made similar criticisms regarding the negative impact of foreign cultural influences. 
The museums group had the largest focus on developing human resources and 
professional management skills for cultural institutions. Although there was a 
recommendation in the Summary of Findings that the legislation should address all ‘sub-
cultures’,50 Sundanese culture received the most attention. Although there is some 
justification for a disparity given that the population of West Java is predominantly 
Sundanese and West Java is their place of origin, there were few recommendations that 
addressed the cultures of groups considered non-indigenous. The language, literature and 
script groups were particularly focussed on Sundanese language and culture, one group 
recommending that Sundanese be taught to Chinese and Javanese in urban areas (2001, p. 
51).  
 
The Culture and Tourism Dialogue can be summarised as calling for a broadening of 
cultural policy in three ways. First, the number of different individuals involved in the 
planning process indicated broader participation in making cultural policy. Second, the 
Culture and Tourism Dialogue strongly recommended a broadening of the kinds of 
cultural practices to be addressed by cultural policy. There was a repeated request to 
include history, archaeology, museums, traditional values and the contemporary arts in 
cultural policy. Third, the range and number of activities recommended (253) were well 
beyond the smaller field of activities that were previously the focus of cultural policy in 
West Java. The criticism of past cultural policy as limited, prescriptive and not 
encouraging broader participation, although only briefly mentioned, underlies the desire 
to expand the scope of cultural policy. However, it should also be noted that some 
groups, most notably history and traditional values, retained the perspective of the New 
Order era regarding the preservation of pre-existing values, which was directly criticised 
in the Summary of Findings (Aritonang, 2001, p. 1). Although, as journalist Abdullah 
Mustappa observed,51 not many of the suggestions were new and some differed little 
from present practice, the level of access to and debate with the provincial state had the 
                                                 
50 ‘Subkultur’ (Aritonang, 2001, p. 18).  
51 Mustappa writes: ‘Everyone knows the greater part of what now has been submitted in the form of 
suggestions or recommendations has already been submitted previously’ (2000). (‘Apa yang sekarang 
disampaikan dalam bentuk usulan atau rekomendasi, semua orang tahu, sebagian besar juga sudah 
disampaikan sebelumnya.’)  
Table 5.1: Recommendations of the Different Groups at the Planning Dialogue for Culture and Tourism in West Java 





This group critiqued the literature and everyday usage of Sundanese language and called for it to be ‘resurrected’ to ‘strengthen identity and 
enrich cultural diversity’ (19). They recommended: changes to the legislation to encourage new books in and about Sundanese and other local 
languages, including dictionaries and translations; improving formal and informal Sundanese language teaching through new publications for 





This group called for ‘good and correct’ language to be encouraged. They recommended that the teaching of language and literature be 
upgraded through: formalisation of Sundanese language for education; increased funding for Sundanese language teaching; compulsory local 
language teaching in all schools; more Sundanese language competitions; facilitating Sundanese language authors’ school visits; printing 




This group began with the position that human resources in the arts were weak. This group was particularly critical of past policies as being 
insular and not representing artists’ aspirations or addressing their problems. They recommended: improving understanding and appreciation of 
the arts through researching, writing about, documenting and mapping the arts of West Java, developing an arts network, publicising West 
Javanese arts through performances and festivals and socialising art in schools; improving the legislative framework; improving human 




This group recommended that tourist industry activities which contribute to culture be developed and the group itself developed a number of 
ideas for festivals. They recommended: the legislative framework be broadened to include other areas of culture and include sanctions; human 
resources in tourism and the arts receive more training; and a series of festivals be developed including festivals for film, theatre, West 
Javanese culture (in Indonesia and overseas), for localities (regencies and municipalities) and an international percussion festival. They also 
recommended a working committee be formed to organise workshops, seminars, dialogues, festivals and to promote activities.  
History This group focussed on making ‘inherited values’ and ‘the wisdom of Sundanese history’ the basis of Sundanese society’s world view and also 
encouraging research into and writing about local and regional histories. They recommended: inventorying, documenting and ‘making functional’ 
cultural artefacts (benda cagar budaya) and their environment; ‘guidance’ (pembinaan) for local historians so that they could undertake thematic 
local histories; upgrading the history curriculum; organising a history conference; and developing historical archives.  
Traditional 
Values 
This group called for the two contradictory goals of preserving traditional values and for traditional values to be ‘transformed for conditions 
today’ (20). They recommended: promoting traditional Sundanese values; inventorying local sayings and adat; organising a forum for research 
and tradition; working through families, the mass media, education and groups to promote cultural values; encouraging appreciation for the 




This group began by noting that museums and cultural sites in West java lacked professional staff and were not appreciated by the public. They 
also noted that cultural venues lacked a legal foundation. They recommended: standardising recruitment for staff; management training; 
technical training in conservation, restoration and marketing; organising seminars; increasing cooperation between organisations through 
networking sessions; organising activities to grow public participation; and developing promotional and marketing activities.  
Archaeology This group called for increased preservation and use of archaeological assets. They began by highlighting the absence of legislation, planning, 
and training relating to archaeology. They recommended: developing a legal framework that addresses cultural artefacts; a program of research 
and development involving inventorying, cultivating and securing artefacts; the development of cultural artefacts as tourist assets, including 
training for engagement with the tourist industry.  




potential to open up new cultural policy directions and possibilities for the future.52  
 
In a highly centralised system where the central government made cultural policy and 
regional offices implemented programs, such as existed in Indonesia during the New 
Order era, centrally determined policies and directives generally took precedence over the 
differences between levels of government. However, the centralism of the New Order era 
did not prevent alternative understandings of cultural policy from proliferating at lower 
levels of government and amongst local communities. Decentralisation has increased the 
importance of local perspectives and has opened up greater possibilities for cultural 
policy perspectives that were previously ignored by the centralised administration. The 
Culture and Tourism Planning Dialogue indicates that in West Java there was a greater 
engagement with non-state groups that desired a more inclusive cultural policy when 
compared to the West Java cultural bureaucracy. Decentralisation also made the entry of 
a neo-liberal perspective on cultural policy into Disbudpar possible. Despite the greater 
inclusiveness due to decentralisation, New Order era cultural discourses remained 
influential, particularly in the cultural bureaucracy and certain cultural policy areas 
relating to history and traditional practices. In West Java, the emphasis on indigenous 
ethnic identity in cultural policy was recognisable, particularly in the strategic plans, but 
was diluted in the Culture and Tourism Planning Dialogue by the inclusion of cultural 
practices and organisations considered not ethnically aligned such as the contemporary 
arts. The example of cultural policy in West Java demonstrates that there is greater 
potential for broad participation and change in cultural policy in the Reform era than 
during the New Order era as non-state groups can more easily access and apply pressure 
to local governments and local governments in the Reform era are now free to pursue 
different cultural policy directions.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Cultural policy in Indonesia, although never homogenous, is becoming even more 
heterogeneous and plural, while still generally using the cultural discourses of the New 
                                                 
52 Yogyakarta held a one-day seminar on 16 November 2000 to discuss cultural policy as it related to the 
fine arts. The keynote speaker was the Sultan of Yogyakarta, who was also the Governor of Yogyakarta. 
Papers were also given by the Head of the Provincial Office of National Education, where the arts portfolio 
resided at the time and the Rector of the Indonesian Arts Institute, one of the premier fine arts colleges in 




Order state and being subject to the political pressures of the reform era. Unlike the 
beginnings of Guided Democracy and the New Order, where there were preferred cultural 
discourses that were soon linked with policies, the governments of the Reform era have 
not provided or adopted strong alternative cultural discourses. The most substantial 
impact on cultural practices, the end of the licensing regime for cultural events, was not a 
government initiative but a popular initiative by urban artists. One of the two most 
substantial cultural policy reforms from the national governments has been to link culture 
more closely to tourism – a highly contested move initiated during the Suharto era that 
reflects more a broader trend that began before the Reform era than policy leadership by 
the reform era governments.  
 
A more far reaching reform with greater scope for change has been the process of 
decentralisation and its partner, ethnic and regional identity politics. Sub-national levels 
of government have always interpreted the New Order regime’s cultural discourses in 
accordance with their local situations. The events of the reform era and the process of 
decentralisation have both increased the importance of differences in interpretation 
between the national government and non-national governments and provided autonomy 
that is beginning to produce greater differentiation. Additionally, local arts communities 
have more access to lower levels of government and can more easily apply pressure for 
cultural policy change. However, the regional governments have found policy innovation 
difficult and have struggled to move away from the methods and discourses of the New 
Order era. The result is a slowly increasing diversification of cultural policy rather than 
the striking transformations that characterised previous regime changes. Despite the 
speed of change, decentralisation has created a climate conducive to cultural policy 
innovation as increasing numbers of jurisdictions shape their own cultural policy. The 
drivers of change will be the rationalities through which lower-level administrations 
engage with and promote local cultural practices. Cultural policy could be driven by the 
conservative agendas of local ethnic cultural organisations or it could encourage broader 
participation using a wide variety of local cultural practices. A third possibility is that 
cultural policy may be ignored altogether.  
 
In addition to the continued market provision of culture discussed in the previous chapter, 
decentralisation has further contributed to the withering of the command model. The 




greater divergence in cultural policy implementation across Indonesia. Increasing cultural 
policy plurality renders the enforcement of a centrally-defined command culture 
impossible, although elements survive in the cultural policies of the non-national levels of 
government. The move of culture into the tourism portfolio signalled a small step towards 
a model that regulated market provision but even this step, because of the way it 
combined culture and profit, was resisted by the cultural bureaucracy and established 
cultural observers. The centralised command culture model, a feature of cultural policy 


















Nation-Wide Cultural Institutions: the Spread of the Cultural Parks 
and the Arts Councils  
The two most prominent state-affiliated arts institutions of the New Order era were the 
taman budaya (cultural parks) and the dewan kesenian (arts councils). The cultural parks 
were the product of central government planning that dates back to a Minister of 
Education and Culture Decree (Keputusan Mendikbud) in 1978. Twenty-four cultural 
parks were established between 1978 and 1994 in provinces across the archipelago and 
managed through guidelines fashioned by the Directorate of Culture. The advent of the 
Reform era substantially changed the cultural parks’ institutional location when, as part 
of the decentralisation process, the cultural parks were removed from central control and 
placed within the jurisdiction of provincial governments. The arts councils present a more 
diverse set of institutions in regards to both how they were established and the way they 
were run. Although they were based on the model of the Jakarta Arts Council (Dewan 
Kesenian Jakarta – JAC, established in 1968), there has never been a requirement to 
follow a single mode of operation. They exist at both the provincial and sub-provincial 
levels and may or may not receive state funding. The majority of the arts councils were 
established after 1992 following an initiative involving Salim Said, the then Director of 
the JAC, and the Interior Ministry that provided funding for arts councils to the provincial 
governments.  
 
This chapter examines the New Order regime’s expectations for the cultural parks and 
arts councils and their outcomes in a variety of locations across Indonesia. Three issues in 
particular are explored. First, the differing locations of the cultural parks and arts councils 
provides an opportunity to examine the diverse operation of cultural institutions during 
the New Order era. Despite the tendency towards a highly centralised mode of policy 
creation and implementation, the diversity of local power structures could produce 
outcomes far removed from the regime’s expectations. This chapter is particularly 




both inform and are shaped within the practices of institutions. Second, both institutions 
(although more so the cultural parks due to their higher degree of regulation) offer the 
opportunity to explore how the New Order regime attempted to employ indigenous ethnic 
arts in its governmental programs. Third, the cultural parks and arts councils are also 
assessed to provide greater insights into the changes that the Reform era has brought for 
cultural institutions.  
 
The time between the conceptualisation of both the cultural parks and the arts councils 
and when the institutions were built was varied and in some cases quite long. Although 
the cultural parks were conceived and legislated in 1978, the last cultural park 
constructed was in 1994. The arts councils were established in two waves. The first wave, 
initiated by artists outside Jakarta as a response to the success of the JAC in the early 
1970s, generally failed to replicate that success and were largely inactive by the 1980s. 
The second wave began in 1992 and was driven largely by the New Order government, 
although independent arts councils were also established during this time. Arts councils 
were still being established well into the Reform era (including the West Java Arts 
Council, which is studied in detail in the final two sections). The time differential 
between conceptualisation and formation (of up to 26 years in the case of the final 
cultural park) requires careful consideration when analysing governance of and within the 
cultural parks and arts councils.  
 
1. The Cultural Parks 
The cultural parks were developed in the late 1970s following the success of two cultural 
institutions that served as models. The first kind of cultural institution, the cultural centres 
(pusat kebudayaan), were encouraged by the Director-General of Culture from 1968 to 
1978, Ida Bagus Mantra. Following trips to Europe where he observed the role of 
European cultural centres in sustaining culture and the arts and encouraging tourism, 
Mantra began to orchestrate the establishment of cultural centres in provincial capitals in 
Indonesia (Yuga, 2000, pp. 43-4).1 A cultural centre was established in Bali in 1972 that 
                                                 
1 Surya Yuga, the author of the thesis, is now the Director of the Art Department in the Directorate of Art, 




was judged particularly successful at stimulating activities and attracting locals and 
tourists (Yuga, 2000, p. 44).2  
 
The other institution was the Ismail Marzuki Cultural Park (Taman Ismail Marzuki – 
TIM), that was enormously successful in the first half of the 1970s (see chapter three for 
a more detailed description and analysis). TIM, as the premier national performance 
venue, became the space of choice for national conferences and competitions managed by 
the Directorate of Culture, which worked closely with TIM’s managing body, the JAC. 
Many of the Directorate of Culture’s employees, including Mantra, attended or 
participated in its activities.3 Both TIM and the Cultural Centre in Bali were showcasing 
indigenous arts and performance styles, although TIM was better known as a venue for 
contemporary modern arts.4 TIM was also the location for the development of a new 
understanding of regional arts, which used them as a source of inspiration for new forms.5 
Both venues were regularly attracting large numbers of visitors and contributed to a 
revival of traditional art forms in the 1970s.6  
 
In TIM, artists explored indigenous cultural forms with a new-found freedom to alter and 
interpret them without regard for the political imperatives of Guided Democracy, in the 
process attracting a new audience amongst the urban middle-class youth. Keith Foulcher, 
in his analysis of the revival of the Betawi performance genre Lenong in TIM, captures 
something of this climate when he writes:  
… when modernisation came [to Lenong], it was at the hands of a new 
metropolitan culture, the great wave of confidence and rebuilding which 
characterised the period after the demise of the communist party [PKI] and the 
thinking about Indonesian culture that came to be associated with it. (2004, p. 3) 
                                                 
2 Director of the High School of Performing Arts (KOKAR), I Nyoman Sumandhi, also states that Mantra 
was behind the Bali Arts Centre (Foley & Sumandhi, 1994, p. 277), which in 1978 became the Bali 
Cultural Park. A discrepancy between Sumandi and Yuga’s accounts is the year the Cultural Centre was 
established with Sumandi stating ‘around 1976’ (1994, p. 277).  
3 Edi Sedyawati, Director-General of Culture from 1993 until 1999, was intimately involved with events at 
TIM during this time and was a member of the JAC and Chair of its Dance Board (Badan Tari). Sedyawati 
was involved with collaborations between the Directorate of Art and JAC in the 1970s.  
4 For instance, Hill writes: ‘While popular folk performances have had a place in TIM, far more 
pronounced overall have been the ‘modern’, ‘high’ cultural forms, appealing to a metropolitan elite’ 
(1993b, p. 256).  
5 Playwright and cultural commentator Putu Wijaya labelled the movement the ‘New Traditionalism’ 
(‘Tradisi Baru’) and called it the most important development in TIM (Wijaya, 1997).  
6 See Foulcher’s article on the revival of the Batawi folk form Lenong in the 1970s that was kick-started 
with ‘scaled-down and professionalised’ performances in TIM (2004, p. 24). Sedyawati attributes a revival 




As has been mentioned previously, attempts to ‘modernise’ indigenous art forms were not 
new. The source of the continuities was the shared ‘metropolitan superculture’ of 
Indonesia’s political elite and its quest for progress (McVey, 1986, pp. 27-8), of which 
TIM was unquestionably a part.  
 
Part of the attractiveness of TIM as a model for state planners lay in the ‘modernisation’ 
of indigenous performance genres. Performers in TIM rejected the promotion of political 
ideologies and messages that had occurred in Guided Democracy,7 but continued to make 
technical changes that state-planners considered desirable. The process of adapting the 
indigenous genres for stages and urban audiences has continuities with the concept of 
‘upgrading’ by state-bureaucrats that has been the target of much criticism from 
anthropologists and cultural observers (Acciaioli, 1985; Widodo, 1995; Yampolsky, 
1995). Of course, this should not overshadow the differences between Guided Democracy 
and New Order cultural policy. The rejection of the promotion of political ideologies by 
TIM’s founders was interpreted through the ideological lens of the state in the cultural 
parks. While political ideologies (such as communism and liberalism) and criticism of the 
regime’s policies were rejected, the New Order regime’s priorities were designated as 
‘modernising’ and integrated into art forms, as will become apparent when the programs 
in the cultural parks are examined. Also important was the status of TIM and the cultural 
centres. TIM self-consciously styled itself as a national performance venue,8 while the 
cultural centres were state-run provincial centres.9 They provided a showcase of the arts 
and were able to exert some control over the representations of nation and province.  
 
Mantra’s plan to build centres of artistic and cultural activity across Indonesia received 
approval from the National Planning Board (BAPENAS) on the strength of the examples 
of TIM and the Bali Cultural Centre. The cultural parks were created by Ministerial 
Decree No. 0276/0/1978 of the Minister of Education and Culture. The New Order 
regime’s support was confirmed when the cultural parks were included in the third Five 
                                                 
7 Hill notes that TIM fulfilled ‘an important ideological function in demonstrating the primacy of certain 
interpretations of culture over the vanquished LEKRA’ (1993b, p. 256).  
8 See Hill, (1993b, pp. 245-6). Sedyawati also mentioned TIM’s national status in an interview (7 
September 2001).  
9 TIM conducted many debates and seminars about national culture, some of which are collected together 
in Pembebasan Budaya-Budaya Kita (Sarjono, 1999) and Menengok Tradisi (Malaon, Malna, & Dwi, 
1986). It should be noted that in these seminars a variety of views were expressed without any one view 




Year Development Plan that began in 1979. Eleven cultural parks were officially 
established in 1978, most of which were converted cultural centres established during 
Mantra’s time as Director-General. Three more were established in the 1980s and another 
nine in the 1990s. Jakarta does not have a cultural park because it has TIM. The cultural 
parks predominantly utilised architectural styles derived from traditional houses of the 
region, reinforcing their relationship to the indigenous ethnic groups. The buildings are 
generally large, spectacular and dominated by markers of ethnicity. However, once built 
they are often poorly maintained due to the small size of the recurring budget. State-built 
buildings in quasi-traditional styles and various states of disrepair are a feature of most 
provincial capital cities.  
 
Table 6.1: Cultural Parks by Province and Year Established.  
Province Year Province Year 
Aceh 1978 Bengkulu 1982
North Sumatra 1978 Lampung 1984
West Sumatra 1978 West Java 1991
West Kalimantan  1978 Riau 1991
East Kalimantan 1978 West Nusa Tenggara 1991
North Sulawesi 1978 Central Sulawesi 1991
South Sulawesi 1978 Maluku 1991
Central Java 1978 West Papua 1991
Yogyakarta 1978 Southeast Sulawesi 1992
East Java 1978 Jambi 1993
Bali  1978 Central Kalimantan 1993
South Kalimantan 1982 East Timor 1994
 
A document that provides insights into the purposes of the cultural parks at the time they 
were established is the End of Term Memorandum (Memorandum Akhir Masa Jabatan) 
for Mantra, when he left to become the Governor of Bali in 1978. The Memorandum 
(which, despite its title, is a document of over 100 pages) discussed the purpose and 
functions of the cultural parks in two sections that emphasised slightly different elements 
of its operation. The first section, ‘Basic Policy of Cultural Development’, emphasised 
how the cultural parks provide spiritual sustenance through cultural activities (1978, p. 




parks were a ‘means of communication’ that enrich society’s information and experience 
about all cultural aspects of the nation, including national unity (1978, p. 24). Secondly, 
the cultural parks introduced different kinds of indigenous cultures to each other, 
increasing initiative and creativity for society in general and for cultural experts in 
particular who actively participate as the ‘managers, supporters and developers of 
Indonesian national culture’.10 In the second section, ‘Implementing Cultural 
Development’, the report emphasised the cultural parks’ role in developing the arts, 
rather than culture more broadly, and their role in ‘improving and cultivating society’s 
appreciation for art’.11  
 
The differences in emphasis between the sections reflect the role of the cultural parks. 
First, the cultural parks were to contribute to the evolution of a national culture that 
accorded with the Directorate of Culture’s model. Two elements of the first section tie the 
cultural parks to the broader goal of spreading a state-defined version of the national 
metropolitan superculture: it demonstrated an understanding of aesthetics that positions 
culture as a way of improving spirituality; and it reflected the Directorate’s increased 
attention to cultural heritage, in particular indigenous cultural forms. The second section 
displayed the privileged role of the arts within the cultural parks. The cultural parks’ 
programs were predominantly centred on the indigenous arts in the region where the 
cultural park was located, but with the imperative of ‘modernising’ indigenous forms.  
 
Subsequent reports and legislation indicate that the goal of the cultural parks and its 
emphasis on indigenous arts only underwent minor changes during the New Order period. 
The 1987 End of Term Memorandum of the following Director-General of Culture, 
Haryati Soebadio, indicates that the cultural parks had been incorporated into the state’s 
arts infrastructure. In the discussion of future policy directions, Soebadio stated that art, 
‘as the national Indonesian materialisation of beauty,’12 needed to be developed and 
managed in order to build national pride and unity, increase society’s appreciation of art 
and develop the creativity of artists in order to ensure prosperity in the arts. By 1987 it 
would appear that the operation of cultural parks had been aligned with national arts 
policy and the Directorate viewed as their role the implementation of national arts policy 
                                                 
10 ‘... pembina, pendukung dan pengembang kebudayaan bangsa Indonesia’ (1978, p. 24).  
11 ‘Tujuan kegiatan ini ... memberikan kesempatan untuk menumbuhkan dan membina apresiasi 
masyarakat dalam kehidupan seni’ (1978, p. 24).  




in the regions. The legislative changes of the New Order period that affected the cultural 
parks were to do with physical infrastructure and administrative structure rather than the 
parks’ function.13  
 
Unlike TIM, the cultural parks were subjected to the strictures of the Directorate of 
Culture and its command culture model. They were expected to adhere to centrally-
created guidelines regarding their operations, and they reported their activities to the 
Director of Art. The Directorate envisioned the cultural parks as a site where indigenous 
cultural forms could be articulated within its national cultural project. From this 
perspective, the cultural park buildings were a metaphor for the project as a whole. They 
were large, modern structures, built by the state, that utilised the cultural symbols and 
forms of indigenous groups, often with little regard for their original purpose or meaning. 
However, the Directorate viewed the changes it made to art forms as improvements that 
were entirely in accordance with their indigenous character, as I explore in the next 
section that discusses the different tasks and programs the Directorate allocated to the 
cultural parks.  
 
2. Programs in the Cultural Parks 
A feature of the cultural parks is the broad range of programs, activities and 
responsibilities that they have been assigned by the Directorate of Culture. In his 1978 
Memorandum, Mantra listed sixteen activities that were undertaken by the cultural parks 
(Mantra, 1978, p. 35). The number of activities increased over the New Order era. The 
Technical Instructions for the cultural parks, published in 1997, lists twenty-one tasks 
that are within the parks’ field of operations (Direktorat Kesenian, 1997). The diversity 
of activities within the cultural parks meant that they were sites where different practices 
of government that utilised the arts were situated next to each other, but, I argue, with 
common goals connected to New Order governmentality.  
 
                                                 
13 A 1982 directive from the Directorate of Culture standardised the infrastructure requirements of the 
cultural parks so that there would be parity between different regions (Pedoman Standardisasi Taman 
Budaya, Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1982). In 1991, a Ministerial Decision simplified the 
administrative structure of the parks themselves to facilitate their spread to new provinces and formally 
made the cultural parks responsible to the Director of Art rather than the Director-General of Culture 




The Three Kinds of Programs 
The 1991 Ministerial Decision gives the cultural parks four ‘functions’:  
1) Develop the quality of the arts through training.  
2) Providing cultural activities.  
3) Documenting and providing information about the arts.  
4) Administering the cultural parks.14  
Of the twenty-one activities outlined in the Technical Instructions, twenty correspond 
with at least one of the first three functions. The fourth function, ‘administering the 
cultural parks’ refers to maintenance and is not specifically addressed in the Technical 
Instructions. The activity that does not align with the first three functions is the activity of 
pengolahan that, according to the legislation, referred to the entire operation of the 
park.15 The term pengolahan in the context of the cultural parks was the task of making 
art or increasing art expertise in order to create a situation where the arts were ‘effective, 
efficient, have quality and are relevant’ for Indonesia today.16 The process of bureaucratic 
management and intervention into the arts encapsulated by the term pengolahan was 
central to the cultural parks’ operation.  
 
Table 6.2 below lists the activities of the cultural parks. Listed alongside each of the 
activities is the function to which it most closely corresponds. Training has been used to 
capture those activities which are concerned with increasing the quality of art, but does 
not include performances in front of audiences. Activities refer to programs that involve a 
public performance. There is some overlap with training because most performances are 
preceded by instruction from bureaucrats for the performers. Documentation refers to 
activities oriented towards documenting the arts, data collection and dissemination of 
information.  
 
                                                 
14 Keputusan Mendikbud No. 0221/0/1991, pasal 3. Mantra’s Memorandum also lists four functions for the 
cultural parks. The first three of both are quite similar. However, Mantra neglects to mention the 
administration of the park itself in the parks’ functions and includes the provision of ‘healthy 
entertainment’ for the community, which is arguably an element of the 1991 function of ‘providing cultural 
activities’ (1978: 35).  
15 Kepmen Dikbud Nomor 0221/0/1991 pasal 2: ‘The cultural parks have the task of implementing the 
upgrading [pengolahan] of art as an element of culture in the provinces.’ (‘Taman Budaya mempunyai 
tugas melaksanakan pengolahan seni sebagai unsur budaya di Propinsi.’) 
16 ‘Mencapai keadaan yang efektif, efisian, bermutu dan relevan dengan perkembangan zaman’ (Direktorat 
Kesenian, 1997, p. 2).  
Table 6.2: Cultural Park Activities as Specified in the Technical Instructions for the Management and Development of the Arts in the Regions 
No Activity Description Function 
1 Pengolahan Pengolahan refers to the operation of the cultural parks as a whole rather than a particular activity. It is the task of 
making art or increasing art expertise in order to create an arts dynamic that ‘is effective, efficient, has quality and 
is relevant’ to Indonesia today (2). 
 
2 Performance rehearsal A process of rehearsing performance art in order to make it ‘worthy of staging’ (3).  Training  
3 Repair and prepare works Caring for, restoring and improving the condition of an artwork.  Activities 
4 Technical guidance and 
training art workers 
Activities to enhance the capabilities and skills of people who work in the arts.  Training 
5 Translation Translation of texts (generally from local languages) into Indonesian.  Documentation 
6 Changing scripts Translating scripts of local languages into the Latin alphabet.  Documentation 
7 Art training and 
development 
Activities involving the polishing and enhancement of arts using creative ideas and a systematic organisational 
framework to bring about creative adaptation in an art form.  
Training 
8 Experimentation Introducing new ideas and mixtures into art activities or applying a system, method or technique to create an 
artwork to encourage the artistic creativity of artists.  
Activities 
9 Staging performances Presentation of art performances.  Activities 
10 Exhibitions Staging fine arts exhibitions of one or more artists of any fine arts genre.  Activities.  
11 Lectures Giving guidance and instructions to arts workers in order to ensure the survival of an art form.  Training 
12 Seminars Organising seminars to discuss problems and disseminate information about the arts.  Training 
13 Artist meetings Organising meetings between artists of the same profession to exchange ideas and knowledge.  Training  
14 Workshops Giving guidance and technical instructions regarding art works and techniques.  Training 
15 Arts libraries The cultural parks were to be centres of information for arts-related research.  Documentation 
16 Arts documentation Collecting and keeping data on the arts in the region.  Documentation 
17 Administer documentation The cultural parks were to organise and manage their documentation in order to ensure its relevance and easy 
access.  
Documentation 
18 Compilation of art works Collecting art works through donations or purchases and classifying them by type and function.  Documentation 
19 Organising documentation Making sure that the cultural parks have the tools to undertake arts documentation and storage.  Documentation 
20 Advertising activities The cultural parks were to advertise all of their arts-related activities to the public.  Activities  
21 Arts information To provide information and explanations about the arts to the public through writings, publications and recordings. Documentation 






The training function of the cultural parks had two broad goals. The first was to increase 
the capacity of artists and arts workers. For example, the task of ‘Technical guidance’ had 
as its goal ‘preparing educated and competent arts workers,’17 while ‘art training and 
development’ had the goal of forming ‘artists with creative potential’ (1997, p. 9). While 
the first goal related to altering art workers, the second goal was to shape the ‘art’ itself. 
For instance, the goal of ‘performance rehearsal’ was to produce a work of art that is ‘as 
optimal as possible, both in interpretation and in its technical production,’18 while the 
desired results of an ‘artists’ meeting’ was ‘the birth of serious art.’19  
 
The two goals of training reflected the two elements of the training regime. The first goal 
of maximising the potential of artists and arts workers was disciplinary. Training 
programs aimed to increase the capacity of artists and art workers in areas such as their 
performance skills, productivity, knowledge and creativity and also to increase technical 
skills in staging performances. Training programs were structured around a hierarchical 
relationship between the organising bureaucrats and the participants that was present in 
the technical instructions themselves. For instance, the ‘explanation’ of a ‘performance 
rehearsal’ states:  
A performance rehearsal of an art work is a process of presenting a performance 
(of dance, music, theatre, and Wayang) to reach a suitable standard for a stage, 
both in its script production and the technical capabilities of its actors. (1997, p. 3)  
Geladi pementasan karya seni adalah proses pergelaran seni pertunjukan (tari, 
musik, teater, dan pedalangan) guna mencapai tahap layak pentas, baik garapan 
naskahnya maupun kemampuan teknis pemeran-pemerannya.  
The standards were not taken from the actors, but were present within the institution. The 
bureaucrats in the cultural parks selected the performance, the artists, and, most 
importantly, set standards (of acting, technical skills and script) the performance was to 
achieve in order to be deemed suitable.20  
 
                                                 
17 ‘Menyiapkan pekerja seni yang terdidik dan memadai’ (1997, p. 5).  
18 ‘Upaya mengumpilkan karya seni seoptimal mungkin baik interpretasi maupun teknis pelaksanaannya’ 
(1997, p. 3).  
19 ‘Lahirnya karya seni yang berbobot’ (1997, p. 19).  
20 This model of training for indigenous art forms was widespread within the arts bureaucracy across 
Indonesia (Effendi, 1998; van Groenendael, 1985, pp. Ch7-8; Widodo, 1995; Yampolsky, 1995; 




The second goal referred to the characteristics that the Directorate was trying to inscribe 
within the arts through training artists or commissioning performances. The previous 
discussion provides an introduction to the Directorate’s preferred characteristics of 
indigenous arts. The ‘performance rehearsal’ aimed to change an ‘art work’ to be 
‘suitable for a stage’. It is safe to assume that the term ‘art work’ here referred to local 
community practices, given the prioritisation of the cultural parks and arts policy more 
broadly towards such practices. To call such practices ‘art works’ (karya seni) already 
positioned them within New Order era discourse of aesthetics about art and its function. 
In order to appear on the regional stage, indigenous arts were adapted to the aesthetic 
criteria that were considered appropriate. One ex-Director of a cultural park during the 
1990s stated that he would often participate in changing local practices for the stage in 
the cultural park. If a song repeated ten times, he would ‘suggest’ that it be reduced to 
five times (interview, 13/11/2001). He also held that the artists who participated in 
traditional community practices were ‘agrarian’ in outlook and ‘did not know time or 
money’ and therefore needed instruction about making their performance ‘agreeable for 
conditions today’ (interview, 13/11/2001).  
 
Other commentators have noted how the state’s cultural training regimes were geared 
towards reproducing a local version of the metropolitan national culture rather than 
providing training to strengthen indigenous arts within the local communities. The art that 
was produced was, to borrow from Philip Yampolsky, ‘neat and orderly, disciplined, 
inoffensive, attractive or impressive to look at, pleasant to listen to’ (1995, p. 712). 
Additionally, Amrih Widodo notes that training was likely to remove any elements of the 
performance considered immoral or likely to offend religious groups (1995, pp. 13-15, 
17-23).21 The spirituality and beauty of the ‘arts’ performed in the cultural parks 
corresponded to the Directorate’s requirement that indigenous arts did not contravene 
standards of taste or morality. It is also, in the case of many community practices, 
completely different from its original form. Widodo notes in relation to tayuban: ‘Once it 
had become a symbol of district identity, however, tayuban could no longer be associated 
with prostitution ... and other activities considered immoral by the state’ (1995, p. 9). The 
many references to ‘improving’ the quality of art or the skill of artists refer to this process 
                                                 
21 Widodo’s study of the transformation of Tayuban dancing in Blora, Central Java, by officials from the 
Directorate of Culture provides an account of the removal of alcohol and gifts of money previously 
associated with the ceremony and the introduction of the requirement that the female performer remain at 




of aesthetic transformation through programs (Direktorat Kesenian, 1997, pp. 
3,4,11,18,19). Similarly, Andrew Weintraub’s account of a Wayang Golek competition in 
East Java demonstrates that the changes required by the Directorate include, in addition 
to technical skills and ability to entertain, the incorporation of themes of ‘mental and 
spiritual development’, must ‘encompass information, education and entertainment that is 
healthy and useful for the masses’, correctly communicate development messages and 
use ‘good and correct’ language (2001, pp. 92-3).22  
 
The cultural discourse that underpinned the training regime within the cultural parks was 
the discourse of national development.23 ‘Development’ encapsulated a particular 
relationship between the state and society where the state leads society in order to 
‘develop’ at a faster rate. Development informed training in two ways. Firstly, training 
turned the arts into a tool to disseminate lessons about behaviour and development 
messages. The second method of assistance was more prominent in the regulations and 
was a less direct governmental method of achieving development goals: the New Order 
cultural apparatus perceived the cultural parks’ training role as making the arts ‘relevant 
with the developments of the age’.24 National art forms, which included regional arts, 
were to be made appropriate for the pastimes of a ‘developing’ national population. From 
this perspective, bureaucratic intervention is not viewed as negatively influencing 
indigenous art forms, but as improving them and updating them to remain in step with 
national development. The political implications of ‘training’ programs reside in the 
weakening of links between local arts and local communities and the strengthening of 




The cultural parks were also state-resourced performance venues that were focussed on 
the local arts of particular regions. They were particularly important as the site of state-
run arts competitions (lomba) and festivals (festival, pesta) across Indonesia. The most 
                                                 
22 Weintraub notes that the inclusion of these standards centres a particular understanding of indigenous arts 
in a region, marginalising local variations (2001, p. 93). Although performances that accord to these 
standards win competitions and achieve access to the national stage, their ‘correctness’ also divorces them 
from local audiences and can limit artistic innovation. Senior Dalang in West Java emphasise the need to 
move beyond the ‘standards’ in order to satisfy audiences outside of state-institutions (2001, pp. 96-8).  
23 Pembangunan, as was discussed in chapter three, is the Indonesian translation of ‘development’ in the 
sense of ‘development programs’ and economic or social development/growth.  




prominent event that was held in the cultural parks was Arts Week (Pekan Kesenian) 
which was held annually across Indonesia. Arts Week was usually run by the Provincial 
Cultural Office (Dinas Kebudayaan) in conjunction with the cultural parks. Its goals were 
to increase appreciation of the traditional arts, promote the revitalisation and preservation 
of traditional arts, to develop the creativity and skill of artists and, in the words of the 
Governor of West Java, to protect and care for ‘regional arts in accordance with the effort 
to develop the national arts.’25 The preparations for Arts Week began months ahead with a 
request for each regency and city to choose a group of artists from an indigenous genre to 
represent it. Either a competition was held at the city or regency level or a group was 
chosen by a committee to perform at the Arts Week festival in the provincial capital 
city.26  
 
The Arts Week was often the busiest time for the cultural parks, as they are the primary 
location of performances. The size of Arts Week celebrations differed substantially 
between provinces. The equivalent of the Arts Week in Bali, for instance, is the Bali Arts 
Festival (Pesta Kesenian Bali). It was originally called the Bali Arts Week, but changed 
its name after it was extended to a month (Foley & Sumandhi, 1994, p. 286). It 
incorporates events at night and during the day, displays of handcrafts, stalls, cooking, the 
wearing of traditional dress and also the attendance of participants from other parts of 
Indonesia and/or overseas.27 Most Arts Week celebrations tended to only involve 
performances, held at night, over the course of one week. At the end of most festivals, 
two groups were chosen to go to Jakarta to represent the province in a national Arts Week 
festival. Although the Arts Week festivities were generally the largest event held in the 
cultural parks, other festivals and competitions were held there on the instigation of local 
bureaucrats.28 The frequency of such events varied considerably between cultural parks.  
 
The ‘activities’ function of the cultural parks incorporated training into the process of 
producing festivals and performances. Yampolsky states, ‘Depdikbud’s festivals, 
competitions, and commissions are the crucial means by which it inculcates the aesthetic 
                                                 
25 ‘Kegiatan Pekan Seni ... adalah besar manfaatnya dalam rangka memelihara, mumupuk, melestarikan 
seni Budaya Daerah, selaras dengan upaya dalam mengembangkan kesenian nasional’ (Wibisana, 1983, p. 
3).  
26 See Wibisana (1983, p. 1) and Hough (2000, pp. 288-90).  
27 For a more detailed description of the Bali Arts Festival, see Hough (2000, pp. 302-10) and Foley (1994).  
28 For instance, while I was staying in Bandung, I spent a night in the West Java Cultural Park watching a 




of respectability’ (1995, p. 712). The incentives for artists to accord with the changes 
were great: the chance to perform in front of larger audiences at the provincial and 
national level, prizes, prestige and an expectation of more work due to the fame of 
‘winning’ (Hough, 2000, p. 294; Yampolsky, 1995, p. 714). While there is some merit to 
Yampolsky’s highly critical assessment of these activities, he ignores the productive 
aspects of these activities. Festivals also offer opportunities for artists to innovate and 
experiment. Kathy Foley, for instance, highlights how removing arts from their 
traditional contexts in festivals makes them a ‘significant forum for modern 
experimentation and development’ (1994, p. 276). The cultural parks to some degree 
provided a space, albeit limited by the cultural discourses of the New Order regime, for 
experimentation and creativity.  
 
A goal of ‘activities’ within the cultural parks was to provide state-sanctioned cultural 
entertainment for the local residents. ‘Providing entertainment for all of the community’29 
was a function of the cultural parks that Mantra listed when they were created in 1978. 
Two of the goals of the ‘staging performances’ activity listed within the Technical 
Instructions indicate that the role of parks as entertainment venues was continuing:  
To give opportunities to society to increase their comprehension and appreciation 
of performance arts.  
An effort to cultivate the community of performance arts fans. (Direktorat 
Kesenian, 1997, p. 11)  
Memberi kesempatan kepada masyarakat untuk meningkatkan penghayatan dan 
apresiasi di bidang seni pertunjukan.  
Sebagai upaya pembinaan masyarakat peminat seni pertunjukan.  
The parks were all constructed with stages and theatres, and the larger parks had galleries 
for fine art exhibitions. These venues accord with the qualities that were viewed as 
suitable for national culture. They were large, imposing structures that separated actors 
and audience, while providing a clear view of the performance. Such an area was far 
removed from the homes, streets and fields where many community arts were usually 
performed.  
 
The final element examined regarding the activities provided within the cultural parks is 
their role as a gateway to the national stage. In order to reach the state-run national 
festivals, a performance had to satisfy a set of conditions. A 1983 report on Arts Week in 
                                                 




West Java provides an insight into the ‘relevant criteria’ for the musical and dance 
performances that would be sent to Jakarta to represent West Java in TIM. Four criteria 
are listed:  
1) Qualities of the genre of art that was considered to increase the prospect of 
positive interest from observers, the jury and spectators;  
2) The extent to which the art is authentically West Javanese when viewed from a 
national viewpoint;  
3) The extent to which the art still contains its ambience or the spirit of traditional 
community art after there is a process of ‘training’ from peers; and  
4) The extent to which the art, and its accompanying music, is established and has 
received ‘training’.  
By the time the arts reached the national stage, they had already undergone a thorough 
process of training and vetting which had weeded out the arts viewed as immoral, lacking 
in quality or not yet developed, leaving art forms which accorded with the regime’s 
preferred cultural discourses. Sanitising ethnic arts produced representations of ethnic 
cultures that accorded with New Order notions of the place of ethnicity within the nation. 
Nowhere was this more clear than during national performances in TIM in Jakarta, where 
the arts of different regions could be seen together. National festivals provided an 
example of the regime’s construction of cultural difference. All of the arts admitted had 
been viewed in the cultural parks and chosen by agents of the state, excluding politically 




Documentation tended to only receive serious attention in the larger cultural parks, and 
even here the libraries tended to be small and with relatively few new additions besides 
the cultural parks’ own reports. Given that most of the cultural parks’ resources were 
allocated to training and activities, documentation is not discussed in detail here. The key 
goal of documentation was to preserve the indigenous arts, as an element of national 
cultural heritage, through recording it (via written description, audio or video) or, in the 
case of the visual arts, building a collection. The cultural parks were also envisaged as 
information centres for both accessing information through libraries and archives, and for 
disseminating information about the arts through articles, publications and recordings.30 
Finally, the cultural parks were also given the tasks of translating both local language 
texts to Indonesian and local language scripts to the Latin script, although I did not come 
                                                 




across any evidence that this task was carried out in any of the cultural parks I visited. 
The direction of both of these tasks was towards making local cultures accessible to all 
Indonesians and creating the possibility of inclusion within both the national metropolitan 
culture and the officially recognised regional culture.  
 
Cultural Governmentality and the Arts in the Cultural Parks 
The cultural parks were sites where ethnic indigenous arts were remade to accord with 
the New Order regime’s governmental discourses. The changes the programs sought to 
make can be identified as belonging to one of two groups. The first group, discussed 
previously in my analysis of training regimes, consisted of changes aimed at ‘developing’ 
the arts to both be appropriate to Indonesia’s advancing stage of development and to 
assist in achieving the regime’s goal of achieving a ‘developed’ society. The cultural 
discourses of the New Order era were important here in defining the features that were 
deemed ‘developed’ and therefore to be incorporated into indigenous art forms. 
Particularly important was an aesthetic discourse that applied the standards of 
contemporary urban arts (such as staging, costumes, time limits) to community arts. 
Other changes were more oriented towards assisting the development of Indonesians by 
excluding ‘immoral’ elements and incorporating development messages. These changes 
were made through putting performers through disciplinary regimes. However, the 
policies were ultimately aimed at local populations. The regime wanted to ensure that 
Indonesians partook in ‘healthy’ entertainment that would assist, rather than impede, 
national development.  
 
Second, the cultural parks attempted to regulate the relationships between ethnicity and 
the nation and between different ethnic groups. The disciplinary regime previously 
discussed was justified through the identification of indigenous arts as elements of 
national culture. Popular forms considered foreign were excluded from the cultural parks 
since they were not deemed Indonesian or local, while popular forms considered 
indigenous were included in the cultural parks’ programs. The result of inclusion was the 
incorporation of particular art forms into the official canon of regional/national arts at the 
cost of the exclusion of elements that were deemed inappropriate. The cultural parks’ 
version of ethnic arts positioned ethnicity to contribute to national goals and created 




instance, showcased the ‘unity in diversity’ of Indonesia where all ethnic groups lived 
harmoniously next to each other and had a place in national development.  
 
3. Uniformity and Diversity within the Cultural Parks 
The operation of the parks outside of the Arts Week struggled to match the expectations 
of the Directorate. The Directorate of Culture only rated five cultural parks as being of a 
good standard (dinilai baik), since they conducted one or more activities a week 
(Direktorat Kebudayaan, 1999b in Yuga, 2000, p. 6).31 The Directorate’s 
acknowledgement of differences between the operation of the cultural parks indicates that 
there is some divergence between their uniform instructions and goals and how the 
cultural parks functioned in specific locations. It could be that the highly centralised state 
had produced a diverse set of institutions despite its command culture model of operation 
and detailed instructions. The ambitious goals of the centrally-determined policy could 
not be achieved by cultural parks that were only organising one to two activities a month 
that involved the public. The major cause of the parks’ haphazard program was the 
centrally-distributed budget. According to a 1999 report, the 19 cultural parks that were 
not assessed as being of a ‘good standard’ received an average yearly recurring budget of 
Rp. 16.3 million (approx. $2 750 Australian) and an average yearly grants budget of Rp. 
10.6 million (approx. $1 800 Australian) (Direktorat Kebudayaan, 1999b in Yuga, 2000, 
p. 7).  
 
Local communities and, in particular, artists often felt alienated from the cultural parks. 
This alienation was evident even in the cultural parks that were considered to be of good 
standard, as became evident in interviews I conducted with artists and observers about the 
West Java Cultural Park (WJCP) in 2001.32 A local journalist expressed the view of many 
local artists when he said that even though activities were continuing in the WJCP, there 
were not many attendees and there was no artistic community connected with it. He said 
that the government facilities in Bandung were all isolated from the busy places and that 
the cultural bureaucracy had money and projects, but no support. (Interview 30/10/2001, 
Bandung). The issue of the WJCP’s location recurred in many of the interviews with 
                                                 
31 These are West Java, Central Java, Yogyakarta, East Java and Bali (Yuga, 2000, pp. 6-7).  
32 The interviews were conducted just after decentralisation had occurred, but took care to address the 




artists and has to a degree become a symbolic expression of the WJCP’s prioritisation of 
reaching administrative goals over engaging with local artists. Deciding on a location for 
the Cultural Park had been a long process. Five different locations were explored between 
1981 and 1991 as possibilities before the current site at the Dago Tea Rooms was chosen 
and developed. The choice of the final location at the Dago Tea House was criticised by 
many artists for being far from Bandung’s centres of activity. Deputy-Governor of West 
Java then lead a Study Team, which concluded that the Tea House was the ‘correct’ 
location and the WJCP was subsequently built.33  
 
An alternative story of the choice of location which I was told on three occasions by 
artists, two of whom were involved in the planning process, emphasises the lack of 
consultation and arbitrariness of power holders towards culture and the arts during the 
New Order era.34 The story goes that the Governor of the day liked to jog. One day, he 
jogged to the top of Dago Atas and saw the view. He then decided to place the WJCP 
there. His subordinates were scared so they followed his wishes (Interview, 24/10/2001). 
Most performances at the WJCP were of regional arts. The community of contemporary 
artists in Bandung rarely performed there and certainly not for events organised by the 
WJCP itself, which were exclusively focused on ‘traditional’ performances (Interview 
with Iyus Supriatna, Director, West Java Cultural Park, 5 October 2001).  
 
Observers and artists have voiced similar complaints about cultural parks in other 
locations. Brett Hough has noted that ‘there has been a great deal of criticism’ directed at 
the Bali Cultural Park ‘for not fulfilling its perceived role of providing a venue conducive 
for artistic expression’ (2000, p. 279) and for being ‘too bureaucratic in its operation’ 
(2000, p. 280). A more passionate criticism was made recently by Elmustian, the Director 
of the University of Riau Press. Elmustian focuses on the Riau Cultural Park’s place in 
the bureaucratic hierarchy that leads to TIM and Jakarta, which has proven difficult for 
artists from Riau to access. He states: 
                                                 
33 There were also protests by Padjadjaran University (Unpad) staff, who were renting housing on the area 
and were forced to move by the state.  





The [Riau] Cultural Park, with all of its bureaucracy, came to be seen as impeding 
artists’ ability to express themselves and ultimately was also considered an 
extension of the Centre colonising the artistic periphery in Riau. (2001, p. 754)35 
Taman Budaya dengan segala birokrasinya kemudian dianggap menyulitkan para 
seniman untuk berekspresi dan akhirnya dianggap pula tangan-tangan pusat 
menjajah wilayah periferi kesenian di Riau.  
The above criticisms underline the problems caused by the cultural parks’ preoccupation 
with the programs set by the Directorate of Culture and a subsequent lack of support from 
local arts communities.  
 
Like many of the New Order era bureaucratic institutions, the cultural parks suffered 
from corruption. An ex-Director of a cultural park in the mid-late nineties was quite open 
in an interview about fabricating reports for the Directorate of Culture in order to avoid 
the Directorate’s strict guidelines. He would run activities according to his own 
prescriptions, then submit a report that met the Directorate’s expectations. At the end of 
his time as Director, he gave each of the staff a present of money taken from his Cultural 
Park’s funds. Artists who had dealings with the cultural parks also complained about the 
cultural parks’ use of funds that should be going to artists and the arts (Interview, 
29/11/2001).  
 
Only one cultural park came close to becoming the centre of artistic activity that Mantra 
envisioned in his original plans. The Surakarta Cultural Park (SCP) is well known for its 
regular performances of indigenous arts.36 The SCP also regularly stages performances of 
contemporary arts from local and visiting Indonesian artists and occasionally artists from 
outside Indonesia. During the 1990s, the SCP staged several national festivals such as the 
Indonesian Theatre Assembly (Temu Teater Se-Indonesia), the contemporary arts festival 
Nur Gora Rupa and Reflections on the Republican Half Century (Refleksi Setengah Abad 
Republik). Its regular performance schedule and involvement in the arts in Surakarta has 
raised its standing amongst the cultural parks and its Director, Murtijono, who has been 
Director of the SCP for over twenty years, was considered a ‘star’ of the Indonesian 
cultural parks (Halim HD, personal communication, 16 December 2004).  
 
                                                 
35 Elmustian’s criticism, although made in 2001, is aimed at the Riau Cultural Park’s activities since it was 
built in 1991.  




More importantly, the SCP has been embraced by artists. Suyatna Anirun, a famous 
thespian and theatre director who resides in Bandung and has never performed in the 
WJCP, has said that the SCP feels like his ‘own house.’ (Halim HD, personal 
communication, 16 December 2004). Credit for the support from artists should go to 
Murtijono. Halim HD, an organiser and observer of the arts who resides in Surakarta, 
states that Murtijono was ‘open, accommodating and had the courage to accept 
differences in artistic perspectives’.37 Halim has related an event in the early 1980s which 
illustrates how Murtijono’s management assisted the staging of new and exciting 
contemporary art and gain the support of artists for the cultural park.  
The theatre group Dinasti wanted to perform the play ‘Beloved Statue’ and ‘Cone 
Mask’, but the police banned them and the Yogyakarta Cultural Park (YCP) 
would not consider using that theatre group, because there must be a license from 
the police. The YCP would only consider performances if there was police 
approval. ... I offered Dinasti the chance to perform in Solo. I contacted SCP. And 
Murtijono asked me for the scripts. He read them. Then, he allowed the 
performance to take place. (Halim HD, personal communication, 16 December 
2004) 
Grup teater Dinasti ingin mementaskan naskah Patung Kekasih dan Topeng 
Contong, polisi melarang. Taman Budaya Yogyakarta tidak bisa menerima grup 
teater itu, sebab perijinan harus dari polisi. Taman Budaya Yogyakarta hanya 
bisa menerima jika ada ijin polisi. ... Lalu saya tawarkan [kepada grup Dinasti] 
main di Solo. Saya kontak Taman Budaya Surakarta. Dan mas Murtijono 
meminta kepada saya naskah drama itu. Dia baca. Lalu mengijinkan pementasan 
itu.  
Dinasti’s two plays were then performed in Surakarta, Surabaya and also Malang, which 
would not have been possible without Murtijono’s initial support. The SCP did not have 
to seek licenses due to an agreement with the local police, providing a degree of 
protection from the repressive arm of the state.  
 
The success of the SCP has not been built around its attention to the centrally defined 
guidelines, which would have hampered its operation. Halim states:  
I am certain that Murtijono as the Director of the SCP made a subjective 
interpretation of the instructions from the centre. By subjective interpretation, I 
mean that the SCP’s activities would be organised only in accordance with the 
needs of the group of artists that are in Solo and are known by Murtijono, who 
indeed received much input and information from many artists in Solo and what’s 
more in other cities. (Halim HD, personal communication, 16 December 2004) 
Saya yakin bahwa mas Murtijono sebagai Kepala TBS memberikan tafsiran yang 
subyektif atas instruksi dari pusat itu. Tafsiran subyektif itu, artinya, bahwa 
                                                 
37 ‘Terbuka, akomodatif dan berani menerima perbedaan dalam perspektif kesenian’ (Halim HD, personal 




kegiatan berjalan hanya sesuai dengan kebutuhan yang ada dari kalangan 
seniman yang ada di Solo dan yang dikenal oleh mas Murtijono, yang memang 
menerima banyak masukan dan informasi dari banyak seniman di Solo maupun 
kota-kota lainnya. 
It was Murtijono’s support of the local arts community that gave the SCP the opportunity 
to be successful.  
 
Despite the uniform brief and detailed instructions from the Directorate of Culture, the 
cultural parks were not uniform in their operation. Small budgets, fabrication of reports, 
corruption and the creativity of particular directors all contributed to an array of different 
practices. In the cultural park that most successfully managed to engage with the local 
arts communities, it was ‘interpreting’ the centrally defined directives to suit local 
conditions that made the SCP’s success possible. Open criticism of the cultural parks’ 
bureaucracy is, however, a nation-wide feature at least since the 1990s. By the end of the 
New Order era, observers and artists were demanding a more autonomous operation 
connected to local community agendas rather than a nationally determined set of 
practices, thus indicating dissatisfaction with the command culture model. With this in 
mind, the decentralisation of cultural parks in the Reform era could provide further 
incentives for localised artistic engagements.  
 
4. Decentralisation and the Cultural Parks 
In January 2001 control of the cultural parks was passed from the Directorate to the 
provincial governments as part of the broader decentralisation process. The impact of 
decentralisation on the cultural parks has been varied. In some areas such as West 
Sumatra, South Sulawesi and North Sumatra, the cultural parks have collapsed and are 
now only used as venues for rehearsals. The Riau Cultural Park also is used less 
frequently; the provincial government has funded the creation of a separate arts centre 
with a broader brief, the Bandar Seni Raja Ali Haji, which is discussed further in the 
analysis of the arts councils. However, other cultural parks, including those located in 
Surakarta, West Java and East Java, have had their funding increased, since they have 
been located under the provincial governments. Funding in decentralised Indonesia is 
dependent on the relationship between the Director of the cultural park, the Director of 




the members of the provincial legislature (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah – DPRD). 
The relationships are varied and unstable.  
 
The WJCP has become more focussed on holding performances and exhibitions and 
drawing in visitors from the local community and abroad. The increased activity has 
assisted its standing amongst members of the local arts community, although it is still 
viewed as overly concerned with bureaucratic goals rather than contributing to the arts. 
Iyus Supriatna, the Director of the WJCP, has noted a slight change in performance types. 
While the WJCP was under the Directorate, there were more visiting performances from 
other areas, while the Provincial government is more focussed on art from West Java. 
Supriatna also noted that although approval now comes from the provincial government 
for the budget and yearly schedule of activities, at the end of 2001 the same Technical 
Instructions were being used and that the WJCP’s routines remain unchanged. In the 
strategic plans developed by the West Java Provincial Office for Culture and Tourism 
(Dinas Kebudayaan dan Parawisata Propinsi Jawa Barat), the WJCP was given the task 
of ‘developing culture and increasing the appreciation of society towards culture’.38 Its 
three tasks were: developing art through collaboration, revitalisation, increasing 
appreciation, increasing the creativity and capacity of artists; nurturing art through 
protecting, researching, inventorying, reconstructing and documenting art; and using art 
for education, rituals, religion, helping the economy, tourism and enriching art diversity 
(Dinas Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata, 2001e, p. 2). In summary, the role and programs of 
the WJCP has remained relatively unchanged although it is becoming more prominent as 
a performance venue.  
 
The arts community desired a change in operation, as demonstrated by their suggestions 
at a seminar to discuss the ‘repositioning’ of the WJCP following decentralisation. The 
thrust of a number of the speakers was similar to criticisms made during the New Order 
era. The most frequently mentioned reform was to minimise the ‘bureaucratic style’ of 
the WJCP39 through increasing its flexibility, increasing its networks with other arts 
institutions and artists and making strategic decisions to make the WJCP a ‘public 
                                                 
38 ‘Pengembangan kebudayaan dan peningkatan daya apresiatif masyarakat terhadap kebudayaan’ (Dinas 
Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata, 2001e, p. 1).  
39 F.X. Widaryanto, a renown choreographer and dance teacher, stated: ‘The mentality of civil servants 
must be changed in the work-ethos to reposition the WJCP’ (Maulana & Imran, 2000, p. 18). (‘Mentalitas 




possession’ (Maulana & Imran, 2000). Suggestions included privatisation, reducing the 
number of events to focus on large, popular performances, broadening the performance 
genres and making the institution independent from the provincial government.  
 
There were few signs of change in the programs and techniques of cultural parks that 
were still functioning when I conducted my fieldwork at the end of 2001. Cultural parks 
retained the practices of the New Order era despite the change in their political masters. 
Many artists I interviewed felt that attention was still directed to the goals of power 
holders rather than the arts community. However, there was evidence that change was on 
the way in some locations. The SCP had continuous support and more funding and steps 
were being taken in Bandung to consult a much wider group of stakeholders in the arts 
community in an effort to change cultural policies to address their concerns while also 
growing tourism. The WJCP, despite its continuation of New Order era practices, had 
grown in prominence in the local arts community through the increased number of 
performances and activities involving local artists.  
 
5. The Arts Councils 
An important division in the ranks of arts councils was between those that were state-
funded, who were responsible to the provincial governors for the use of their funds, and 
the arts councils that were not state-funded. Given the focus of the thesis on state-run and 
sponsored cultural institutions, my analysis is limited to the state-funded arts councils. 
The arts councils’ structure was determined in each location. Their autonomy from each 
other and the absence of tight central government control shaped a plurality of institutions 
that used the same name despite quite different aims. For this reason, the arts councils are 
assessed individually below rather than following the method used to assess the cultural 
parks, which were much more uniform in their expressed operation and goals.  
 
The rest of this section outlines the historical development of the arts councils, in 
particular the inaugural Arts Council in Jakarta (JAC), and provides the reasons for their 
spread across Indonesia in the 1990s. The JAC receives close attention because it was the 
inspiration and/or model for the subsequent arts councils and because the dynamics 
between the JAC and the provincial government provide an insight into what has 




section provides the histories of two other arts councils. The final section identifies the 
shared features and differences of the arts councils and assesses the changes of the 
Reform era.  
 
The Jakarta Arts Council 
The JAC originated from the activities of artists who were planning the establishment of 
TIM and exploring possible management structures. Following general discussion about 
the establishment of an arts centre in Jakarta, a group of seven artists40 met with 
Governor Ali Sadikin on 9 May 1968. The seven artists present (known as the formateur 
committee) were charged with choosing twenty-five members of the Cultural 
Management Board (Badan Pembina Kebudayaan), which later renamed itself the Jakarta 
Arts Council in its first meeting (Yusra, 1994, p. 28). In a decree on 7 June 1968, Sadikin 
endorsed the first JAC (D. T. Hill, 1993b, p. 246). According to Sadikin’s decree, the 
JAC was to be the ‘only artistic/cultural institution at the highest regional level for the 
territory of the special Area of the City of Jakarta’ and was responsible for the 
management of TIM.41 Its founders intended the JAC to be funded by the Jakarta 
Provincial government (Daerah Keistemewa Ibukota – DKI), while operating with a large 
degree of autonomy in an attempt to secure artistic freedom within TIM. The JAC 
consisted of six committees: music, dance, literature, fine arts, film and theatre, which 
were responsible for organising activities in their area. The June 1968 decree also called 
for the establishment of an honorary council of artists and cultural intellectuals who were 
recognised as paramount in Indonesia, called the Jakarta Academy (Akademi Jakarta). 
The Jakarta Academy was responsible for determining membership of the JAC every 
three years (which would then be inaugurated by the Governor), as well as granting 
awards and providing advice to the Governor (Wahono, 1994a, p. 44). It was to consist of 
ten members who were prominent in the fields of art and culture, displayed dedication, 
and were over forty years of age at the time of their appointment (D. T. Hill, 1993b, p. 
248; Wahono, 1994a, p. 45). The Jakarta Academy appoints its own members for life 
with the approval of the Governor.  
 
                                                 
40 These artists were: Usmar Ismail, Rudi Pirngadi, Mochtar Lubis, Asrul Sani, D. Djajakusuma, Gayus 
Siagian and Zulharmans (Yusra, 1994, p. 27).  




The concern with creative freedom reflects the ‘universal humanist’ affiliation of the 
artists who were central to TIM’s establishment and were well-represented in the JAC.42 
Taufiq Ismail, in an editorial in the literary magazine Horison, cited Sadikin’s statement 
at the opening of TIM: ‘Politics may not intervene inside this arts centre, as occurred 
during the times before the 1965 coup.’43 The notion of protecting artistic expression 
from political intervention paradoxically gave rise to exclusion from and exclusivity 
within TIM from its beginnings. Artists who had been affiliated with LEKRA were 
barred from performing (Budiman, 1969). David Hill writes that TIM tended to focus on 
‘the ‘modern’, ‘high’ cultural forms, appealing to a metropolitan elite’ (D. T. Hill, 1993b, 
p. 255) and, as explored in the first section, the indigenous arts that were performed in 
TIM had been altered in a way that appealed to this audience. TIM and the JAC were 
protecting a particular version of artistic expression and a particular group of artists.  
 
Although the JAC and the Jakarta Academy were at times subject to DKI intervention 
under Sadikin,44 in practice DKI and the two institutions generally had a good working 
relationship during Sadikin’s tenure. It was not until after Sadikin’s retirement in 1977 
that pressure between DKI and the two institutions escalated due to increased DKI 
interventions.45 Hill’s research into TIM outlines a series of standoffs during the 1980s 
over appointments to the JAC, largely because the Jakarta Academy would not submit the 
candidates that DKI requested (1993b, pp. 248-9). Additionally, two ex-ministers were 
appointed to the Jakarta Academy as a compromise by the Academy to have its JAC 
nominations accepted in 1982 (1993b, p. 249).46 It was between 1977 and 1991 that TIM 
(and the JAC) most felt the tension between artists’ aspirations for complete freedom of 
expression and the will of the interventionist state. A series of changes in the provincial 
legislation that reduced the JAC’s autonomy reflected this tension. In 1973, the JAC was 
                                                 
42 The inaugural JAC was led by Trisno Soemardjo and included Arief Budiman, Goenawan Mohamad, 
Taufiq Ismail, H.B. Jassin, who were all active in the Manikebu polemics in the late Guided Democracy 
period.  
43 ‘Politik tidak boleh intervensi ke dalam Pusat Kesenian ini, semacam waktu pra-Gestapu dulu.’ (Ismail, 
1968, in Mohamad, 1993, p. 107).  
44 This included the appointment of the Director of the Provincial Cultural Office (Dinas Kebudayaan DKI) 
to the JAC board (D. T. Hill, 1993b, p. 248) and Sadikin’s criticism of works in TIM as ‘wrong’ 
(Mohamad, 1993, p. 113).  
45 Sadikin himself calls the term of Governor Tjokropranolo the beginning of TIM’s decline. He made the 
criticism: ‘The Jakarta Government did not seek money to develop TIM but instead made TIM a tool to 
seek money’ (Chudori, 1990). (‘Pemda bukannya cari dana untuk membangun TIM, tapi itu justru 
dijadikan alat untuk mencari uang.’)  





made to consult with, and made responsible to, the Jakarta Academy for all of its 
activities. In 1986, it was made responsible to the Governor for its administration and to 
the Jakarta Academy for its artistic direction.  
 
The largest change for the JAC came in 1991 when responsibility for the management of 
TIM was taken away from the JAC and, as was mentioned in chapter three, given to the 
Jakarta Arts Foundation (Yayasan Kesenian Jakarta), which was formed in 1989 in an 
attempt to address funding shortfalls through collaboration with the private sector 
(Gondomono & Murgiyanto, 1994, p. 62; Wahono, 1994b, p. 53). TIM was effectively 
removed from the system that was designed to allow a degree of artistic freedom, and 
placed in the hands of an institution that was much more amenable to DKI direction 
(Effendi, 2001, p. 681). With the removal of its core function, the role of the JAC was 
redefined with a broader focus than activities within TIM. Sri Warso Wahono, a fine-
artist and member of the JAC from 1985-1993, writes:  
The JAC functions as an institute of arts cultivation that is shaped by the 
community of artists and is inaugurated by the Governor. ... The JAC manages all 
arts activities in society, especially in the capital city of Jakarta. (1994b, p. 53) 
DKJ berfungsi sebagai lembaga pembina kesenian yang dibentuk oleh 
masyarakat seniman dan dikukuhkan oleh Gubernur. ... DKJ mengelola seluruh 
kegiatan seni budaya di dalam masyarakat, khususnya di Ibukota Jakarta.  
The JAC was envisioned after 1991 as a tool for shaping the arts rather than the 
management body of an arts-space, and the governor was to retain control over the 
appointments process. The 1991 speech by then State Minister for Population and 
Environment Emil Salim at TIM’s 23rd anniversary celebrations highlights this change in 
perspective. Salim encouraged the JAC to ‘not situate art as art, but art activities as a 
basic element of culture in development.’47  
 
The third Indonesian Arts Councils’ Assembly in Ujung Pandang, South Sulawesi, in 
November 1992 was a pivotal point in the history of the arts councils. It was at this 
assembly that Salim Said, the Director of the JAC, successfully lobbied for the arts 
councils to be spread across Indonesia. We can get a sense of the model Said was 
advocating, and that the JAC had adopted, through the recommendations presented at the 
end of the conference. These recommendations included:  
                                                 
47 ‘Dewan Kesenian Jakarta janganlah mendudukkan seni sebagai seni, melainkan kegiatan seni sebagai 




1) That in the Broad Outline of National Policy, art is declared to be an integral part 
of the effort to increase the quality of the Indonesian people.  
2) That cultivating arts appreciation and achievement be increased in order to 
generate energy and passion to develop national pride.  
3) That a climate be developed that better encourages artists to create quality art 
(Wahono, 1994b, p. 57).  
1) Agar dalam Garis Besar Haluan Negara (GBHN), kesenian dinyatakan sebagai 
bagian yang tak terpisahkan dari upaya peningkatan kualitas manusia Indonesia.  
2) Agar pembinaan apresiasi dan prestasi seni ditingkatkan untuk membangkitkan 
semangat dan gairah membangun kebanggaan nasional.  
3) Agar dikembangkan iklim yang lebih mendorong seniman untuk menciptakan 
karya seni yang bermutu.  
The recommendations of the conference demonstrate that the arts councils had moved a 
long way from the original concerns of the JAC with freedom of artistic expression. 
Instead, the concern is with positioning the arts as a potential tool for achieving 
governmental goals of the state – improving the ‘quality of the Indonesian people’ and 
strengthening national pride. On 7 December 1992, Salim Said presented the 
recommendations of the Indonesian Arts Councils’ Assembly to Suharto (Ridwan, 2000). 
Suharto responded positively and made the observation in a speech at the end of 1992 
that every province should have an Arts Council (Elmustian, 2001, pp. 756-757). 
BAPENAS agreed to allocate funds for arts councils to the Department of Internal Affairs 
(Departemen Dalam Negri – Depdagri) which would be distributed to the provincial 
governments who in turn would supervise the establishment of the arts councils.48  
 
Suharto’s announcement in 1992 inspired the creation of a number of arts councils across 
Indonesia, including in Riau and West Sumatra. However, these were not the first arts 
councils created outside of Jakarta. Following the establishment and early success of the 
JAC in the late 1960s and early 1970s, artists began forming arts councils using their own 
initiative and often with funding from the provincial governments. The Surakarta Arts 
Council started in 1972 and two arts councils were formed in Ujung Pandang in the 
1970s: the South Sulawesi Arts Council and the Makassar Arts Council (Halim HD, 
2000). More arts councils followed the fall of Suharto in 1998, such as the Cirebon Arts 
Council, as artists took advantage of the freedom of association of the Reform era to form 
groups that could lobby for the arts in their areas.  
                                                 
48 The decision to bypass the Directorate of Culture was the cause of much friction among Bappenas, 
Depdagri and the Directorate of Culture, which was not pleased about its exclusion from a project so 
squarely in its field. However, they came to an agreement that the creation of arts councils in the provinces 




The 1993 Legislation 
The general reasons why the arts councils were attractive to the New Order regime can be 
gleaned from the 1993 directive from the Minister for Interior Affairs that executed 
Suharto’s expressed desire for every province to have an arts council.49 This brief piece 
of legislation consists of only five sections. Its primary purpose is achieved in its first 
section where the governors are informed that provinces without arts councils are to form 
them, with their membership consisting of artists, intellectuals interested in culture and 
other related parties. Payment to establish arts councils is to be made to the governor 
through the annual provincial budget allocations. It is also worth noting that the JAC is 
designated in the legislation as the official consultant on any plans to build new arts 
council facilities.  
 
The role that the regime envisioned for the arts councils is indicated in two of the 
sections. Sections two and three state:  
Guidance and development of the arts should consider characteristics of the 
region.  
Pembinaan dan pengembangan kesenian hendaklah mempertimbangkan 
karakteristik daerah.  
In the effort of guidance and development of art, the art councils should become a 
catalyser of the entire potential of art in each region.  
Dalam upaya pembinaan dan pengembangan kesenian Dewan Kesenian 
hendaknya menjadi katalisator segenap potensi kesenian di daerah masing-
masing.  
Instead of leaving the arts councils to develop whatever art is most creative or most 
popular, the state directs them to focus on the regional ‘characteristics’. The arts councils 
were to become the stimulators and regulators of the arts in the regions. Like the cultural 
parks, the arts councils were to be a part of how the state constructed regional and 
national culture. However, the actions of arts councils varied from supporting the 
regime’s vision and plans to opposing them.  
 
The Jakarta Arts Council in the Reform Era 
Following the fall of Suharto, the JAC and Jakarta Academy fell further in stature and 
had lost the last of its vigour from the 1970s. By 2002, the JAC had been languishing 
under interim management for over two years. Artists had lost faith in the management 
                                                 




and gone elsewhere and attendance levels had dropped further. The Jakarta Academy 
was, in practice, defunct. Some members had passed away and there had been no new 
appointments to fill their positions. Others were elderly and no longer actively involved. 
On 11 October 2002, a team was formed to review the activities and finances of the JAC 
(NAR, 2002a). Starting from the review, a growing movement began amongst the arts 
and cultural community to review the roles of the JAC and the Jakarta Academy. After 
public criticism from some highly regarded public individuals,50 the membership of the 
Jakarta Academy was reviewed and twenty seven members appointed, twenty of whom 
were new. The appointments included a number of prominent figures from the New 
Order period such as W.S. Rendra, Taufiq Abdullah, Goenawan Mohamad, as well as 
Sitor Situmorang, who had been imprisoned by the New Order in 1966 for his leftist 
connections (NAR, 2002b). Although the institutional structure of the Jakarta Academy 
has not changed, it now has a more critical and charismatic membership with greater 
sway in the Indonesian arts community.51 The new appointees were already lobbying for 
changes to the nominations for the new JAC, which had occurred a few months before 
the new Jakarta Academy was appointed (NAR, 2002f).52  
 
6. Other Arts Councils  
The arts councils have some shared characteristics that correspond with the JAC, 
although there is no single organisational structure. The arts councils all consist of artists 
and were formed to be advocates for the arts in particular regions. Like the JAC, most 
arts councils are divided into different sections addressing different branches of the arts. 
Arts councils also generally viewed themselves as the organisers of discussions, 
performances, festivals and other arts events, with sponsorship from the state, the private 
sector or artists themselves. Within these broad parameters there was much diversity. The 
two arts councils discussed below are chosen to demonstrate the arts councils’ variations 
in goals and operation. The Riau Arts Council demonstrates a quite different engagement 
with local politics when compared to the JAC. Secondly, the arts councils in West Java 
(two were formed simultaneously), which were established in the Reform era, provide an 
                                                 
50 See, for instance, the comments of Salim Said, widely regarded poet Sapardi Djoko Damono, cultural 
observer Mohamad Sobary, and poet critic and essayist Goenawan Mohamad (NAR, 2002c; 2002d; 2002e).  
51 Two well regarded members of the arts community, arts critic and researcher Nirwan Dewanto and poet 
Remmy Novaris, were very supportive of the new members (NAR, 2002f).  
52 Interestingly, two of the antagonists from the mid-1960s from opposite sides of the political spectrum, 




example of an ultimately failed attempt to set up an arts council. The events surrounding 
the two arts councils in West Java and the critical reflections of artists are used to explore 
the arts councils’ dynamics and perceived problems.  
 
The Riau Arts Council 
The Riau Arts Council (RAC – Dewan Kesenian Riau) has fashioned quite a different 
role for itself when compared to the JAC.53 Although there had been plans to establish an 
arts council in Riau since 1978, it was not until after Suharto’s speech that the Riau Arts 
Council was formed (Elmustian, 2001, p. 756). Following Suharto’s announcement, a 
series of meetings was held in late 1992 and early 1993 that were attended by senior 
bureaucrats in Riau from the national and provincial bureaucracy, artists and intellectuals. 
The RAC was one of four institutions that the Riau provincial government formed to 
address the concerns raised in these forums that were established in 1993.54 The model 
adopted was based on TIM and received substantial support from the governor and the 
Provincial legislature. The RAC included eight committees that were devoted to different 
streams of the arts.55  
 
While most of the senior positions in the RAC were filled by bureaucrats, including the 
post of Director, which was held by the Director of the Regional Planning Board (Kepala, 
Badan Perencanaan Daerah), the council fulfilled two important functions for the arts in 
Riau. Firstly, the RAC stimulated arts activities through providing funding for arts 
activities. From 1993, a payment of up to Rp. 250 000 was made for large performances 
which was increased to Rp. 600 000 in 1998 (Elmustian, 2001, p. 758). Secondly, the 
RAC provided a degree of protection from interference by the police, who had closely 
monitored arts performances during the New Order era. Permits for performances were 
not always granted and required a fee. The RAC provided a government-backed body 
that was regularly granted police permits and covered all costs.  
 
                                                 
53 Information is mostly taken from an article by Elmustian (2001) and from interviews conducted in 
Pekanbaru, Riau, July 2001.  
54 The others were the Riau Arts Deliberation Council (Dewan Pertimbangan Kesenian Riau), Riau 
Cultural Centre (Balai Budaya Riau) and the Riau Arts Foundation (Yayasan Kesenian Riau) (Elmustian, 
2001, p. 757).  
55 These were: literature; fine arts; music; dance; theatre; film; research and development; and promotions, 




Additionally, the regular presentation of local arts and artists contributed to a broader 
cultural movement in Riau based on ethnic Riau-Malay identity. Elmustian, Director of 
the University of Riau Press and active participant in this movement, notes that the RAC 
is one of a number of institutions that have a shared goal for the Riau Malay population:  
The institutions, which are based upon the same scenario, enrich local society by 
building self confidence, ‘moral villages’ as has occurred in several attractive 
fishing villages, moral-cultural strength, and other aspects of [Riau’s] local 
‘genius’. (2001, p. 761)  
Institusi yang dilandasi oleh senario yang sama memberdayakan masyarakat 
setempat untuk menbangkitkan percaya diri (self-confidence), moral village 
seperti berbagai pelayanan kampung yang ranggi, kekuatan moral budaya, dan 
local genius lainnya.  
This movement reached the high point of its popularity following the fall of Suharto in 
1998.56  
 
A change in position holders in 1998 coincided with a growing movement in Riau for 
increased autonomy from Jakarta. The following year, a new foundation focussed on the 
arts and culture was created by the Governor: the Raja Ali Haji Arts Centre Foundation 
(Yayasan Bandar Seni Raja Ali Haji – SERAI Foundation). The SERAI Foundation was 
responsible for building and managing a new arts centre in Pekan Baru that would 
include facilities for the RAC. In practice, the activities and staff of the RAC overlapped 
considerably with the SERAI Foundation. In 1998, artists and intellectuals were moved 
into key positions in the RAC and, not long after, into the SERAI Foundation. Al azhar, 
the Head of the Free Riau Movement (Riau Merdeka), was prominent in both institutions. 
The RAC’s activities were also altered to fit with the changed climate in the arts in Riau. 
For instance, one of its ‘significant’ programs from this time was running workshops for 
artists about ‘rereading’ old Malay texts that originated in Riau with the goal of 
reinterpreting them for contemporary times (Elmustian, 2001, p. 762).  
 
The provincial government and artists coalesced around the goal of strengthening local 
identity and self-confidence through the arts, in particular through traditional art forms. In 
contrast to the JAC, the local arts community in Riau has been generally supportive of the 
RAC’s program and agenda and continues to support the SERAI Foundation. The RAC’s 
integration into the broader cultural movement to build local identity and confidence 
                                                 
56 See Al azhar (1997a), Al azhar (1997b), and Colombijn (2003) for a discussion of the growth of the 




strengthened its relationship with both the provincial government, which has been 
fostering links with the indigenous peoples of Riau, and with local artists who are 
attracted to its advocacy of indigenous arts and artists.57  
 
The Arts Councils of West Java 
The first arts council in West Java was formed in 1968 and, after a few years with little 
activity, it disbanded (Romli HM, 2000b). Following Suharto’s 1992 speech and the 1993 
legislation, the Province of West Java began preparations for the creation of a new arts 
council, and in 1996 the legal framework was established.58 According to the legislation, 
the West Java Arts Council (WJAC) was to be shaped by and responsible to the governor 
and was focused on ‘regional’ art and culture, which was defined as ‘having roots in local 
traditions and giving features to national cultural life’.59 Although the legislation 
preceded the fall of Suharto, steps to establish the arts council were not taken until 1998. 
It is important to remain cognisant of the two-year intermission in assessing the 
legislation and the events surrounding its creation and collapse, since the early Reform 
era promised much more for independently minded artists than the late New Order 
period. The chasm between the legislation and the expectations of a large segment of the 
arts community was central to the series of events that resulted in the demise of the arts 
council.  
 
In 1998, Salim Said asked the leadership of a local arts body, the Board for Cultural 
Concerns (Badan Pertimbangan Kebudayaan – BPK) to establish an arts council in West 
Java.60 The BPK accepted and put together the Preparatory Body for Shaping the West 
Java Arts Council (Badan Persiapan Pembentukan Dewan Kesenian Jawa Barat). A 
concept of the basic structure and goals was formed, and an Artists’ Assembly 
(Musyawarah Seniman) in West Java was held on 30 March, 1999. The Assembly put in 
place regulations for running the WJAC. The WJAC was responsible to the arts 
                                                 
57 In my short time in Riau I did identify an issue of equity amongst the desires of the cultural leaders. 
Pekan Baru, the capital city of Riau, consists of forty percent Minangkabau from West Sumatra. Extensive 
affirmative action programs could marginalise the large non-indigenous segments of the population.  
58 Peraturan Daerah Tingkat 1 Jawa Barat No. 7/1996 tentang Pelestarian, Pembinaan dan 
Pengembangan Seni Budaya Daerah Jawa Barat.  
59 ‘... berakar pada tradisi daerah dan memberi corak pada kehidupan budaya Nasional’ (Perda Jawa 
Barat No. 7/1996 (1) f).  
60 In provinces that did not autonomously establish an Arts Council or have an equivalent organisation, the 





community through a three-yearly Assembly and not to the Governor, as is usually the 
case.  
 
A structure was formed at the Artists’ Assembly, and positions were filled through 
election by attendees. The majority of positions were filled by ‘modern’ artists rather than 
‘traditional’ artists (seniman daerah), who did not feel adequately represented.61 As a 
result of their feeling of exclusion from executive positions, some traditional artists 
organised a closed meeting at the restaurant in the Hotel Homan after the Assembly on 30 
March 1999. After spirited and tense discussion, the West Java Regional Arts Council 
(WJRAC) was formed by the participants. A letter was sent to the governor with fifty six 
arts related institutions backing the change. The support of most traditional artists shifted 
to the WJRAC. A point of contention was the appointment process for positions on the 
WJRAC. The appointments were made in a closed meeting without informing some of 
the appointees.62 In order to prevent dissent, many of the position-holders in the WJAC 
were offered positions in the WJRAC. The General Chair, Yusuf Affendi,63 and central 
committee were chosen privately in the Hotel Homan, although the appointments were 
meant to occur through the committee structure. The governor sided with the WJRAC, 
and the WJAC was disbanded.  
 
According to participants in the events, there were two elements to the Governor’s 
decision. Firstly, the WJRAC represented itself in its letter as standing for the indigenous 
arts in West Java and therefore in accordance with the Provincial Regulations, while the 
WJAC lacked the support of practitioners of indigenous arts (Interview with Agus Safari 
and Ari Nurtanio, 15 November 2001). The traditional artists were able to oppose the 
WJAC by taking advantage of the state’s conceptualisation of regional culture as 
described in the legislation. Secondly, the decision was a choice between two groups 
within the arts community, and the governor chose the group that was closer to 
government officials and tended to have positions in the bureaucracy. In that sense, the 
WJRAC outmanoeuvred the WJAC through its political contacts and representing itself 
as corresponding to the institution envisioned within the legislation. Both the WJRAC 
                                                 
61 A particularly sore point was that the Chairperson of the Dalangs’ Union (Persatuan Dalang), Asep 
Sunarya, was not chosen for a position. 
62 Ari Nurtanio, the Secretary IV (of four), learnt of his appointment through a letter which was sent to 
them and signed by the governor, demonstrating the WJRAC’s legitimacy (Interview, 15 November 2001).  




and the WJAC were of considerable size. The WJAC had 41 positions, including eight 
committees for various branches of the arts. The WJRAC had 87 positions, including 
thirteen committees beneath three supra-committees. The large structure reflects the 
desire for both the groups to be inclusive. According to the WJRAC’s official structure, 
the committees would consider proposals from various groups and artists and recommend 
which should receive funding to the Central Committee. However, the structure was 
never used despite the disbursement of almost all of the funds.  
 
Internal corruption crippled the WJRAC in a very public and embarrassing manner. The 
office of Affendi in the Bandung Technological Institute also doubled as the office of the 
WJRAC. Over a period of eighteen months from April 1999, almost all of the money 
(Rp. 417 785 865, approximately $90 000 AUD) was dispersed without using the 
WJRAC committee structures. Complaints were made about the conduct of the WJRAC 
throughout the year 200064 but bank reports were not produced until August 2000. On 17 
August 2000, Agus Safari, one of three treasurers of the WJRAC, wrote a letter drawing 
attention to the misappropriation of funds, criticising Affendi and highlighting the moral 
obligation of the position holders of the WJRAC. After a series of three meetings,65 the 
WJRAC was effectively ended on 19 September 2000. A report66 was produced listing 
the activities that the money went to (but not the names of those involved), although none 
of my interviewees, most of whom were active members of the arts community, could 
recollect any of the activities ever taking place. At the end of March 2001, the Provincial 
Legislature called all of the position holders to account. Yusuf Affendi did not attend. A 
small group attended. The governor was asked to account for the WJRAC, and all 
concerned were still waiting for a call from the Governor nine months later. When the 
term of the WJRAC ended in May 2001, the Governor discontinued the funding.  
 
The problems facing cultural policy were amplified in West Java by divisions within the 
arts community and within the arts councils. There was always a high level of 
                                                 
64 See Maulana (2000b). Agus Safari wrote an open letter to the position holders of the WJRAC criticising 
its operation in March 2000.  
65 A meeting was organised on 3 September 2000 where a number of position holders withdrew from their 
positions (‘Mayoritas Pengurus DKJB Mundur,’ 2000). Another meeting followed on 7 September and a 
third on 19 September. The first two meetings concluded that the short-, medium- and long-term plans were 
not realised and that the blame lay with Affendi and Faturohman. The third froze the Rp. 40 000 
(approximately $9 AUD) of the funds that were left and effectively ended the WJRAC.  
66 Laporan Penggunaan Dana Dewan Kesenian Daerah Jawa Barat. The report was produced for the 




disaffection amongst the arts community with the arts councils.67 There were also two 
opposing councils formed in opposition to the WJAC in March 1999. The West Java Arts 
Assembly (Majelis Kesenian Jawa Barat) was formed by Taufik Rahzen. A second 
protest-council was the Bandung Jeprut Arts Council (Dewan Kesenian Jeprut Bandung) 
formed by Tisna Sanjaya.68 The deeply felt diversity of artists in Bandung made the 
creation of a representative body difficult.  
 
7. Assessing the Arts Councils  
The events surrounding the arts councils in West Java opened up an opportunity for 
reflection on the role of arts councils and the state’s attempts at government. After the 
WJRAC was wound up, artists voiced their opinions in the local media, where a conflict 
was revealed between artists and the state over the role of the arts councils and cultural 
governance more generally.  
 
Pikiran Rakyat published a number of critical articles in September and October 2000 in 
response to the WJRAC’s collapse. Of particular interest are four longer opinion-style 
pieces published on 26 October 2000 for a seminar titled ‘Discussion of the Problem of 
the Arts Council’ held on the same day. The pieces were written by four prominent artists 
working in Bandung: Suyatna Anirun (a famous actor and director of Indonesian 
contemporary theatre), Benny Yohanes (a theatre director and Director of the theatre 
section at the Indonesian College for the Arts, Bandung), Saini KM (well-known poet and 
Director of the Indonesian Arts College) and Juniarso Ridwan (a poet and former 
Director of the Preparatory Body for Shaping the WJAC). All four identified the WJRAC 
as a ‘top down’ institution with little support from artists. Anirun, Ridwan and Yohanes 
went further and put forward that the institution was, in the words of Anirun, ‘a political 
accessory of power-holders’ (2000). Ridwan stated:  
The Arts Council’s presence, as we came to understand, much less than assuming 
a form as a partner of the government that gave some consideration to the arts, but 
still continued to be subordinated to the influence of power-holders. All the 
actions of the Arts Council’s position-holders had to be justified to power-holders. 
In my view, that is where power demonstrates its domination. (2000) 
                                                 
67 When the Governor held a ceremony to commemorate the beginning of the WJAC on 27 March 1999, a 
group of artists and students protested outside the opening (Imran, 2000a). 
68 Jeprut is an art form that is spontaneous, anti-order and anti-hierarchy. The purpose of the Bandung 
Jeprut Arts Council was to make the point that the arts do not need an Arts Council. The acronym for the 




Kehadiran Dewan Kesenian, sebagaimana kita maklumi, kendati menjelma 
sebagai mitra pemerintah yang memberikan berbagai pertimbangan di bidang 
kesenian, akan tetapi tetap berada pada subordinasi pengaruh penguasa. Segala 
tindak-tanduk pengurus Dewan Kesenian harus dipertanggungjawabkan kepada 
penguasa. Saya memandang, di sanalah kekuasaan menunjukkan dominasinya.  
Anirun and Ridwan called for artists to shape an independent Arts Council or similar 
institution that was autonomous from government. Yohanes made a similar call for 
independence, but based it on a modernist conception of art as having intrinsic qualities – 
creativity, flow, anti-hierarchy – that would be lost if it came into contact with a political 
power-structure (2000). Yohanes’s view of art is commonplace amongst artists in 
Bandung.69 Saini, in contrast to the other three artists, viewed the WJRAC’s role as at 
odds with role of an Arts Council (Saini KM, 2000). He viewed arts councils as advisory 
bodies that exist only to make recommendations to government, not to run programs, 
organise events or make policy. He suggested a model like the city of Mannheim where 
nine respected critics, all of whom have had over 25 years experience in the arts, 
distributed funding. He argued that confusion over the role of the Arts Council caused 
considerable problems.  
 
Indeed, the confusion over the role of both arts councils in West Java underlay the series 
of events. The national legislation clearly established the arts councils as ‘advisers’ to the 
governor and the provincial legislation confirmed this role. Power still rested in the hands 
of the governor to shape the councils and accept or reject the advice. However, a 
substantial portion of the active artists in Bandung desired, or at least said they wanted, 
an independent body that could develop arts infrastructure and plan for the future. They 
wanted the WJAC to be an advocate for artists and the arts communities with a large 
degree of autonomy. The state’s understanding of cultural governance did not envision 
the artists using the arts councils in ways that clashed with its goals.  
 
The WJRAC was able to take advantage of the difference between the state’s 
conceptualisation of culture, as defined in the arts council legislation, and the view of the 
artists in the WJAC. Particularly relevant is the definition of culture in the provincial 
legislation, which states that it should ‘have a root in local traditions and give features to 
national cultural life’. The artists of the WJAC wanted to act independently of the state’s 
                                                 
69 A number of artists voiced similar opinions in interviews I conducted in November 2001. Yohanes’s 
decision to cordon off art is itself a political decision with political consequences for arts management and 




national cultural framework and put in place structures that moved away from the 
administrative framework that was clearly present within the legislation. The WJRAC 
exploited this difference and used its closer links with the provincial bureaucracy to 
outmanoeuvre the WJAC and then, through a closed appointments process, brought some 
of the WJAC artists into the WJRAC’s structure. The WJRAC’s willingness to adopt the 
cultural discourses preferred by the bureaucracy and its ability to mobilise support from 
the governor linked the WJRAC with the state’s conception of national culture. The 
linkage with, and the sense that the WJRAC in particular was giving its approval to, the 
state’s paternalistic conceptions of national culture was at the forefront of many critiques 
of both arts councils when the WJRAC collapsed.  
 
Hill writes about TIM:  
TIM’s identity was caught between that of a free-flowing artistic community ... 
and that of a complex bureaucratic structure linked to an increasingly powerful 
and interventionist state. (D. T. Hill, 1993b, p. 247) 
The tension that Hill identifies in TIM provides an insight into an issue that was central to 
the success or failure of all of the arts councils: perceptions about the role of the arts in 
governance and governance in the arts. Following the elimination of the largest group of 
left-wing artists and the marginalisation of their perspectives on the arts and culture, a 
key issue for artists in Indonesia has been freedom of expression. The role artists have 
defined for themselves has tended towards that of providing insight from the perspective 
of unattached individuals, as can be seen from the issues identified in many of the arts 
centres discussed previously. However, the central government during the New Order era 
and continuing into the Reform era has defined the arts and artists within its cultural 
discourses that have centred on attempts to shape the attributes and behaviours of 
Indonesians in accordance with national development. The place of artists in the regime’s 
governmental discourses has often been resisted by groups of artists, as can be seen in the 
clashes surrounding the JAC and the arts councils in West Java. This was not the case in 
all locations. In the RAC, one of the most active arts council in the 1990s, artists agreed 
with the governmental programs of the provincial government that used culture as a way 
of building indigenous identity and worked hard to see them succeed.  
 
Reformasi has impacted the arts councils in two ways. Firstly, the body that oversees and 




autonomy from the state and has greater incentives to build constituencies in local 
communities through promoting local arts and culture because of decentralisation. In 
some provinces, there is more money and a larger degree of freedom in forming budgets. 
In some areas, such as Riau, new organisations have been formed that have incorporated 
the role of the arts councils. The West Sumatra Arts Council remains the most active 
organiser of festivals in the region despite low levels of funding. However, the freedom 
of provincial government also includes the freedom not to fund the arts councils, while 
either funding other bodies (as in Riau) or spending the money elsewhere.70 Secondly, the 
end of repressive measures, such as the licensing of arts events and censorship of the 
mass media, has encouraged artists to become more openly critical of government policy. 
The RAC and the SERAI Foundation could not have been as openly critical of central 
government policies before the Reform era. Criticisms of the JAC resulted in a revision 
of its role and a series of new appointments. However the changed climate has not 
automatically produced clean and active institutions, as the case of the West Java arts 
councils demonstrates.  
 
8. Conclusion 
The cultural parks and the arts councils examined in this chapter were the product of 
central initiatives and as such were formulated within the governmental discourses of the 
New Order regime. The broad purpose of both institutions as defined by the national 
government was to promote the arts in the region in ways that accorded with the 
governmental goals of the New Order regime. Both cultural institutions were concerned 
with producing art that was appropriate for the regime’s broad goal of societal 
development and the management of ethnic/regional identity. These concerns were 
particularly evident in the cultural parks, but were also evident in the arts council 
legislation and statements by political power-holders. However, the different locations of 
the cultural parks and arts councils counted against a uniform interpretation or agreement 
with the models provided by the central government. The cultural parks had differing 
fortunes and outcomes across Indonesia during the New Order era despite having a single 
master in the Directorate of Culture. The arts councils demonstrated even greater plurality 
due to their reliance on artists’ involvement and input into the institution and the 
coordinating role of provincial governments rather than the central government. The 
                                                 




regime’s version of cultural governance through this diverse plethora of institutions was 
not secured, but instead was constantly under negotiation.  
 
An important governmental issue within both the cultural parks and arts councils was 
regional identity. As representative institutions of particular regions, the cultural parks 
and arts councils had a privileged position in articulating both regional identity and the 
region’s place within the nation. The cultural parks were integral to the process of 
articulating a New Order regime-approved regional culture that fitted with its version of 
national culture. The arts councils, although not part of this network, were often 
articulated within provincial legislation that was focused on regional and national identity 
and citizenship. However, the arts communities of particular regions were often at odds 
with how the arts and the role of artists were articulated by both the provinces and the 
national government. Riau is a particularly interesting case, since the RAC articulated a 
version of ethnic identity that was in direct conflict with the desires of the New Order 
regime and Reform era governments. In other locations, artists contested the 
subordination of their concerns to the state’s concerns. Without the support of local arts 
communities, the cultural parks and arts councils were always going to struggle. It was 
only where either the institutions accorded with the desires of local arts communities, like 
the SCP and the JAC in the 1970s, or where the governmental goals of the province were 
supported by artists, like the RAC, that they were able to attract broader support.  
 
The major changes of the Reform era were the transfer of cultural policy (including the 
cultural parks to the provincial governments) to the sub-national levels of government 
and the sub-national levels of government’s greater autonomy from the central 
government. The resulting raft of changes brought about the decline of some of the 
cultural parks and arts councils, but also an increase in funding and activities in others. In 
short, the diversity that always existed between the different regions has already begun to 
intensify and new state-sponsored institutions have already been formed. However, close 
examination of the operations of the state-sponsored cultural institutions reveals the 
uncertainties of change. In 2002, the programs of many of the newly decentralised 
cultural parks remain unchanged and the cultural discourses circulating in the legislation 
and reports are generally those of the New Order era. The arts councils, due to their 
greater autonomy in their activities and programs, have responded more positively and, 






Making Local Culture National:  
Cultural Management, State Publications and Local Cultures 
As demonstrated in chapter four, the New Order regime’s cultural discourses gained 
prominence in policy at the same time as the boom in oil prices sponsored an expansion 
of state-run activities in the mid-1970s. The Directorate of Culture was assigned the task 
of converting oil money into programs that accorded with the regime’s understanding of 
national culture and its political strategies. The revenue pumped into the Directorate was 
used to run, among other things, a series of cultural research projects that produced a 
large number of publications about Indonesian culture and history. Topics covered 
included biographies of national heroes, city histories, provincial histories of the struggle 
for independence against the Dutch, customary law, traditional architecture, folklore and, 
in some more recent texts published since 1995, the impact of television, changes brought 
by foreign culture through tourism and even relations between different ethnic groups, 
which was generally a taboo topic in all media during the New Order era (Astuti, 1998/9).  
 
The texts produced by the Directorate of Culture were generated by projects within its 
different sub-directorates. For instance, the Directorate of Museums managed the 
Museum Development Project, the Language Centre managed the Library Development 
Project and the Development of Indonesian and Local Language and Literature Project, 
and so forth.1 The sub-directorate that produced by far the most texts including the texts 
that are the subject of this chapter was the Directorate of History and Traditional Values 
(Direktorat Sejarah dan Nilai-Nilai Tradisional – Ditjarahnitra). The publications of 
Ditjarahnitra follow one of two streams. The history stream published texts focussing 
largely on the revolution and national heroes. The second stream encompasses topics that 
revolve around the ‘local’ cultures of the archipelago, with each text focussing on a 
particular province. In this chapter, I focus on the second stream. Local culture is not 
                                                 
1 The Indonesian names of these projects are: Proyek Pengembangan Permuseuman; Proyek 




considered here as a domain of objects grouped together because of their own intrinsic 
features, but is instead considered to be a field of social management that shapes the 
features of objects located in that domain. After providing an overview of the cultural 
research projects’ history and administration, I analyse two texts produced by the cultural 
projects, focussing in particular on their representations of local cultures.  
 
In addition to analysing research into local culture, this chapter engages with two other 
cultural policy issues. The ‘Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature’ Theme Park (Taman Mini 
Indonesia Indah, commonly referred to as Taman Mini) has become the most important 
representation of, and most used research topic in analysing, how the New Order regime 
understood ethnicity. I use the research publications about local culture as a point of 
comparison to assess whether there were other models of cultural management with 
different constructions of ethnicity present within the New Order bureaucracy. Secondly, 
the time span of the research projects, which covers most of the New Order era and all of 
the Reform era, provides an opportunity to assess how cultural discourses altered as a 
result of the transition from the New Order to the Reform era and how the transition 
impacted the construction of local culture in the texts.  
 
The phrase kebudayaan daerah can be translated as either local culture or regional culture 
due to the two meanings of the term daerah.2 The slippage between ‘regional’ and ‘local’ 
is an interesting feature of the local culture projects. While the publications all focus on 
particular regions, the subject matter is generally much more localised cultural practices 
within the region. For this reason, I translate daerah as ‘local’ in the titles of the 
publications and the publication series.  
 
1. State-Run Cultural Research and Publications 
History 
State sponsored cultural publications preceded the New Order era. The Directorate of 
Culture’s precursor, the Cultural Office (Jawatan Kebudayaan), released a small number 
of publications during the 1950s and early 1960s.3 The amount of publications produced 
                                                 
2 A similar translation has occurred for the label of the Reform era decentralisation process, otonomi 
daerah, which has been translated as both regional autonomy and local autonomy.  
3 The earliest of these that I have come across is a 1953 publication by an anonymous author about the poet 




during the New Order era far outstripped the pre-1965 publications in both numbers of 
titles and the number of copies printed. The Directorate of Culture first began publishing 
book-length texts about regional cultures in 1972. Ten separate projects have sponsored 
cultural research and publications in Ditjarahnitra (See table 7.1 for project names and 
details). The early projects focussed on cataloguing cultural artefacts and practices. From 
the mid-1970s, the projects can be divided into two types.  
 
Firstly, a stream of projects focussing on the customs and traditions of local cultures has 
continued to the present. Beginning with the ‘Research and Recording of Local Culture 
Project’ (Proyek Penelitian dan Pencatatan Kebudayaan Daerah – P3KD), this stream 
included the largest and most widely known project, the ‘Inventorisation and 
Documentation of Local Culture Project’ (Proyek Inventarisasi dan Dokumentasi 
Kebudayaan Daerah - IDKD), the ‘Inventorisation and Management of Cultural Values 
Project’ (Proyek Inventarisasi dan Pembinaan Nilai-Nilai Budaya – P3KN), and the 
‘Study and Management of Cultural Values Project’ (Proyek Pengkajian dan Pembinaan 
Nilai-Nilai Budaya – P3NB). These projects were concurrent and had overlapping 
themes, such as folklore and customary law of various regions.4 This stream of projects 
produced the bulk of the cultural texts.  
 
I group under the second project ‘type’ all of the non-IDKD stream projects – an eclectic 
mix of projects that focus on a variety of topics. The ‘Development of Cultural Media 
Project’ (Proyek Pengembangan Media Kebudayaan – PMK) itself included an 
assortment of topics since 1975. Other projects have been focussed on the decorative arts 
and the production of photographic albums (‘Cultural Media Project’, Proyek Media 
Kebudayaan – MK), while the ‘Study and Management of Contemporary Culture 
Project’ (Proyek Pengkajian dan Pembinaan Kebudayaan Masa Kini – P3KMK) engages 
with a range of themes from contemporary life, including the impact of tourism and 
television.  
 
The local culture projects primarily, but not exclusively, produced printed manuscripts. A 
Ditjarahnitra publication lists 1373 titles that were printed between 1976 and 1991, with 
                                                 
4 I also include the ‘Research and Study of Archipelagic Culture Project’ in this stream as it was a sister 
project to IDKD. P3KN focussed on written cultural traditions, whereas IDKD focussed on oral traditions. 




Table 7.1: The Ten Local Culture Projects, their Duration and a Brief Description.  
Years Name of Project Brief Description 




Focus was on listing local cultural 
practices and cataloguing cultural 
artefacts and manuscripts.  
1975- Proyek Pengembangan 
Media Kebudayaan 
(PMK) 
A number of texts were produced in the 
seventies. Publication slowed, then 
quickened again in late 1990s. Eclectic 
mixture of texts, including pictorial 
albums. 
1976-1979 Proyek Penelitian dan 
Pencatatan Kebudayaan 
Daerah (P3KD) 
Focus was on elements of local 
cultures, such as folk law, marriage 
ceremonies and local customs.  




Continues the local cultures themes 
from P3KD. This project produced more 
texts and is better known than any of 
the other projects.  
1979-1984 Proyek Media 
Kebudayaan (MK) 
Focus was on the decorative arts. Also 
produced a number of photographic 
albums and some recordings.  
1984-1995 Proyek Penelitian dan 
Pengkajian Kebudayaan 
Nusantara (P3KN) 
Focus was on written traditions, in 
particular local language manuscripts.  
1989-1992 Proyek Inventarisasi dan 
Pembinaan Nilai-Nilai 
Budaya (IPNB) 
Continuation of local cultures themes 
from IDKD. 
1992-1995 Proyek Penelitian, 
Pengkajian dan 
Pembinaan Nilai-Nilai 
Budaya Daerah (P3NBD) 
Themes covered education, 
modernisation and economic systems. 
This project was oriented towards 
social-science themes. 
1993-  Proyek Pengkajian dan 
Pembinaan Nilai-Nilai 
Budaya (P3NB) 
Continuation of local cultures themes 
from IDKD. Includes republications of 
earlier texts.  
1995- Proyek Pengkajian dan 
Pembinaan Kebudayaan 
Masa Kini (P3KMK) 
Examines everyday contemporary 
culture. Indicates a broadening in the 
meaning of culture.  
 
small print runs of between ten and five hundred.5 However, this does not include 
research carried out by the Regional Offices (Kantor Wilayah) of the Directorate. The 
                                                 
5 The titles are listed in a publication by the Sub-Directorate of Documentation and Publication (Subdit 
Dokumentasi dan Publikasi, 1991) but the accuracy is questionable due to the poor documentation within 




Australian National Library’s Indonesian language collection has 1,817 titles in the local 
culture projects series with publication dates between 1972 and 2003 and with more texts 
likely to be collected in the future. In addition to the texts, a number of video and audio 
recordings of traditional rituals and practices were published and circulated. The local 
culture projects also funded a number of capital works projects, including the building of 
Research Centres for Studying History and Traditional Values (Gedung Balai Kajian 
Sejarah dan Nilai Tradisional), Centres of Cultural Documentation (Pusat Dokumentasi 
Kebudayaan) and Cultural Information Centres (Pusat Informasi Budaya) across the 
archipelago (Direktorat Kebudayaan, 1994, pp. 20-21).  
 
Ditjarahnitra’s publications reflect the features of two streams of writing in Indonesia. 
Firstly, the publications within the history stream are bound to what Gerry van Klinken 
labels the ‘orthodox nationalist stream’ of Indonesian history (2001a, p. 326).6 The 
second trend relates more closely to the local culture projects. In the late 1970s, a stream 
of research about Javanese culture began in Yogyakarta by Prof. Sudarsono. He labelled 
his research Javanologi and managed to procure state funding through the national 
cultural projects.7 Budhisantoso, in his capacity as Director of History and Traditional 
Values, instigated a policy of various ‘suku-ologi’ in order to balance the emphasis on 
Javanologi, although this was limited to ethnic groups with written traditions. The ‘ologi’ 
studies, including ‘Sundanologi’, ‘Batakologi’, ‘La Galigologi’ (on Bugis culture), 
‘Malayologi’ (based on writings found around Tanjung Pinang in Riau), along with 
Javanologi, were funded through ‘Research and Study of Archipelagic Culture Project’ 
(P3KN), followed by the ‘Study and Management of Cultural Values Project’ (P3NB).  
 
Resources  
Table 7.2 lists the amount of money that IDKD received each year from 1989/90 until 
1999/2000. Unfortunately, figures before 1989 were elusive due to the difficulties of 
accessing government archives of old reports. In any case, the figures can only give an 
indication of what impression the Directorate of Culture wanted to pass onto the National 
Planning Board. Budgets changed regularly under the New Order and budgeting 
                                                 
6 Particularly striking are the number of texts about heroes, which were an important element of the ‘hero’ 
phenomenon of Indonesian history writing identified by Reid (1979, pp. 292-5) and elaborated on in local 
contexts by Cunningham (1989) and Hoskins (1987).  




definitions are unclear. However, the figures do demonstrate some important information 
about the project. Until 1999/2000 the project used over 10 percent of the Directorate’s 
budget, indicating its centrality to the role of the Directorate. Also the decline in 
1999/2000 reflects its more marginal position in the new, decentralised cultural 
bureaucratic structure.  
 
Table 7.2: Funding for IDKD Stream Projects by Year (Rp. Thousand).  
Year Program Project Total Prog. as % of 
Total Funding 
References 
89/90 1,381,271 1,159,052 11,218,572 12.31 Report 89/90-
93/94 pp91, 106 
90/91 2,379,042 1,799,035 16,034,187 14.84 Ibid.  
91/92 4,176,675 3,016,500 25,874,187 16.14 Ibid. 
92/93 4,897,786 3,045,132 32,048,478 15.28 Report 94/95, p48
93/94 5,187,864 3,171,765 40,023,152 12.96 Report 94/95, p49
94/95 6,521,300 3,859,026 46,596,570 14.00 Report 94/95, p50
95/96* 7,052,292 4,160,743 58,981,723 11.96 Ibid. 
96/97* 7,052,292 4,160,743 58,981,723 11.96 Ibid. 
97/98* 7,052,292 4,160,743 58,981,723 11.96 Ibid. 
98/99 7,423,422 4,363,376 69,750,000 10.64 Report 94/95-
98/99, p14  
99/00 6,649,138 4,357,203 74,232,158 8.96 Report 99/2000, 
p41.  
Total 59,773,375 37,253,320 492,722,473 12.13  




The choice of topic and research process was, and still is, intricately tied up with the 
bureaucratic structure and policy-making system discussed in chapter four. The annual 
process begins with a meeting between the Head of Ditjarahnitra and the Heads of the 
Sub-directorates. The results of the discussion are taken to the technical team within the 
Documentation and Publication Sub-directorate who formulate the Terms of Reference 
(ToR) between May and June. The ToR are checked by Bappenas and the Directorate of 
Estimates, guaranteeing their connection to the Repelita and the 1945 Constitution, as the 




coordinators are flown to Jakarta for a meeting, after which they return to their areas and 
complete the research between June and October. The research is returned to the 
technical team whose members edit the drafts and prepare them for publication between 
November and December. Publication takes place the following year. 
 
The Directorate of Culture attempted to demonstrate through the ToR that they were 
implementing the policies outlined in the Repelita. A quick examination of the ToR for 
the planning of the ‘Rainbow of the Archipelago Series’ (Seri Pelangi Nusantara) in 
2001, which produced texts for children, reveals the priorities of the Directorate. The 
most revealing section of the ToR is the ‘Background and Problems’ section, which also 
serves as an introduction. The ToR began by connecting the Republic of Indonesia 
together with cultural diversity through the state-slogan, ‘Unity in Diversity’. It continued 
with a statement that summarised the purpose of the series:  
These days, knowledge of cultural differences and similarities between 
Indonesian ethnic communities has become important for strengthening national 
unification and unity. Knowing and having an attitude that values and respects 
differences and develops intercultural similarities needs to be constructed in the 
generation that is the future of the Indonesian nation. (Pemimpin Proyek 
Pengkajian dan Pembinaan Nilai-Nilai Budaya Jakarta, 2001, p. 1)  
Dewasa ini, pengenalan perbedaan dan persamaan budaya masyarakat suku 
bangsa akan menjadi penting dalam rangka memperkukuh persatuan dan 
kesatuan bangsa. Mengenal dan bersikap menghargai serta menghormati 
perbedaan dan mengembangkan persamaan antarbudaya perlu ditumbuhkan di 
kalangan generasi penerus bangsa Indonesia.  
A second concern in the ToR was the absence of children’s books about the diversity of 
ethnic cultures. These two concerns came together in the ‘Objective’ of the series: to 
spread information about cultural diversity in Indonesia to children in a form that is easily 
read and understood and develops knowledge and empathy about other cultures and helps 
children ‘understand and revere the meaning of the slogan of the Indonesian nation: Unity 
in Diversity’.8 Once these concerns were outlined, the ToR turned to the features of local 
cultures that were considered suitable for inclusion within the texts. These features 
included the regional environment, including natural and man-made features, histories 
(including ‘heroes’), traditional knowledge and technology, customs, cultural values such 
as folk tales for children and art, social solidarity (including ‘gotong royong’) and 
                                                 
8 ‘... anak-anak akan lebih memahami dan menghayati arti semboyan bangsa Indonesia, yaitu Bhinneka 




cultural and natural tourism (2001, pp. 1-2). Finally, the ToR listed the writing style and 
format appropriate for children’s texts.  
 
The ToR thus established the governmental goals of the series, including the national 
framing of local cultures within the texts, before the features of the local cultures were 
mentioned. The bureaucrats in the Directorate of Culture had to conform as closely as 
possible to the New Order regime’s cultural discourses in order to guarantee continued 
funding for their projects and the extra salary and prestige that came with it. The local 
culture projects constituted key programs within this structure for the Directorate of 
Culture.9 The policy system gave financial and professional incentives for the 
continuation of the local culture projects and discouraged variance from the established 
model.  
 
2. Locating Local Culture  
When discussing the New Order regime’s concepts and management of ethnic culture, 
scholars regularly invoke the image of Taman Mini. Patricia Spyer observed that when 
discussing the state’s interpretation of cultural diversity, ‘it has become almost 
perfunctory to invoke the image of Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature Park’ (1996, p. 26).10  
 
A recent study that uses Taman Mini as a representative example of the links between 
culture and governance in the New Order era is Tom Boellstorff’s article, ‘Ethnolocality’ 
(2002). Boellstorff defines ethnolocality as the ‘spatial scale where ‘ethnicity’ and 
‘locality’ presume each other to the extent that they are, in essence, a single concept’ 
(2002, p. 25). In other words, ethnolocality refers to the various indigenous Indonesian 
ethnicities – Javanese, Balinese, Torajan – that are linked to spatial locations. Boellstorff 
uses Taman Mini to illustrate how ethnolocality was instrumental to the New Order 
regime’s construction of an ‘archipelagic culture’ for Indonesians (2002, p. 32). The 
centre of Taman Mini is a reflective pool containing small artificial islands that form a 
map of Indonesia, surrounded by twenty-seven pavilions, one for each province. Each 
                                                 
9 For instance, in the report, Evaluation of the Implementation of Repelita V, the ‘Inventorisation and 
Management of Cultural Values Project’ (IPNB) was the first project mentioned in the list of ‘cardinal 
activities’ (‘Kegiatan-kegiatan kardinal’) within the Directorate of Culture (Direktorat Kebudayaan, 1994, 
p. 20).  




pavilion includes a customary house that contains arts and crafts from each province. 
Boellstorff writes:  
Taman Mini draws together ethnicity and locality so that each presupposes the 
other. Region and adat are rendered isomorphic in a spatial scale that claims the 
mantle of ethnolocal tradition but is incomprehensible outside the reworked logic 
of racial dualism, the ‘framework generated by the unifying agency of the state’ 
(Spyer, 1996, p. 31). (2002, p. 32) 
Boellstorff uses Taman Mini to demonstrate how the New Order regime contained and 
depoliticised ethnic cultures within Indonesia (2002, p. 31). To be Javanese or Batak or 
Torajan is also to be an Indonesian citizen.  
 
Greg Acciaioli’s article ‘Pavilions and Posters,’ (1996) provides a more detailed analysis 
of Taman Mini. Acciaioli writes that Taman Mini was more than an illustration of an 
ideal, but was envisioned as an educational tool for influencing Indonesian’s subjectivity. 
He writes: 
[Taman Mini] stands now and through the future as the New Order’s 
exhibitionary showcase for building citizenship, for fulfilling its project of 
constructing the subjectivity and subjection of the Indonesian citizenry. (1996, p. 
40)  
As has been argued in this thesis, Acciaioli notes that ‘cultural development’ was ‘one of 
the priorities of the New Order state’ (1996, p. 27) that shaped how ethnic culture was 
represented in Taman Mini. The core of Acciaioli’s argument is similar to Boellstorff’s 
argument that ethnicities were articulated within the framework of the Indonesian nation-
state, which he expresses through identifying a ‘purported ... basic cultural substratum of 
Indonesianness’ within Taman Mini’s representations of ethnic cultures (1996, p. 39). 
However, he provides greater detail about how different ethnicities were articulated. Four 
points in particular require greater attention here.  
 
Firstly, Acciaioli uses a number of different illustrations to demonstrate that the more 
peripheral a culture, the more likely its features are to be an ‘assemblage’ of generic traits 
considered suitably Indonesian. He demonstrates this point through analysing the location 
of the pavilions around the lake and demonstrating that the distance from the centre of the 
park coincided with the marginality of an ethnic group’s culture to the nation. Hence the 
pavilions for the provinces in Java and Bali are close while West Papua (until 2000 called 
Irian Jaya) and East Timor are given the most peripheral locations (1996, pp. 29-32). 




by examining the ‘traditional costumes’ of the different ethnic groups. The Javanese 
styles were reasonably accurate depictions, while the ‘regional style’ for West Papua 
were silk pants and blouse, well removed from the penis sheaths for which the region is 
renowned (1996, p. 35). If regional cultures varied too far from the styles of cultural 
centre, like West Papua, they were erased in Taman Mini in favour of broadly 
‘Indonesian’ generic styles (1996, p. 35).  
 
Secondly, Acciaioli notes the existence of a number of ‘children’s gardens, parks and 
museums’ around Taman Mini that were not devoted to ethnic cultures. The museums 
told the success stories of the New Order regime. They were devoted to the armed forces, 
sports, information services, oil and natural gas development, science and technology and 
communications (1996, p. 32). Acciaioli writes that celebrating the success stories of 
development emphasises how the regime provides the ‘shelter of modernity which can 
allow regional cultures to thrive, be renewed and reinvigorated’ (1996, p. 32). Thirdly, 
Acciaioli, following John Pemberton’s research, notes how Taman Mini effaces time 
through reproducing cultural symbols that are ‘more complete and more perfect’ 
(Pemberton, 1994b, p. 40) than their originals (Acciaioli, 1996, p. 40). The cultural 
symbols of Javanese and Balinese royalty that saturate the structures situated at the 
entrance to the park link the New Order regime to the traditions of the previous rulers 
(1996, pp. 33-4). Finally, Acciaioli offers a slightly different spatial scale to Boellstorff. 
While Boellstorff is careful to note that ethnolocality, as an intermediate spatial scale, 
does not necessarily correspond to an administrative area (2002, fn. 9), Acciaioli notes 
that Taman Mini tends to conflate administrative region and cultural region (1996, p. 38). 
Where ethnicities are represented as coexisting within a province, they tend to be 
attributed to a lower level of administration such as regencies (kabupaten).  
 
The local culture project texts, as another form of representation of the New Order 
regime’s models of local culture and cultural diversity, offer a point of comparison to 
Taman Mini regarding the New Order regime’s cultural management techniques. There is 
a large overlap in subject matter and both were governmental interventions into 
Indonesians’ understandings about themselves. In her research into writings about 
customs and folklore, Susan Rodgers notes that the regional identity under consideration 
(‘Angkola Batak-ness’) was ‘an ideological construct, built up in relationships with other 




parties to the conversation have been authors in the New Order state’s own investigations 
of Batak customs, through programs such as the ‘Proyek Dokumentasi dan Inventarisasi 
Kebudayaan Daerah’’ (2003, p. 135). Here we have an Indonesian example of how 
culture is ‘a historically produced surface of social regulation’ (Bennett, 1992, p. 27) that 
is contested at many levels. Whereas Rodgers’s analysis pursues how Angkola Batak 
writers have resisted colonial and New Order representations of their local culture, this 
chapter pursues a trajectory focussed on the New Order regime’s production of local 
culture and its links to governance.  
 
3. Analysis of Local Culture Project Texts  
The local culture projects cover a broad range of topics over a period of almost thirty 
years, making the choice of representative texts difficult. I have chosen the two texts 
analysed here, Marriage Law and Ceremonies in the Special Region of Aceh 
(Syamsuddin, 1978/9) and Yogya in Passing (Guritno & Setiawati, 2000), for two 
reasons. Firstly, the two texts were produced in two different periods. The Aceh text was 
the product of early New Order cultural policy and one of the first waves of texts 
sponsored by oil revenues, whereas the Yogyakarta text was produced and published 
during the Reform era. Comparing texts from two different periods opens up 
opportunities to assess the changes that have occurred since the beginning of the project 
and to assess the impact of the reform movement within an official cultural text. 
Secondly, the geographical and historical differences between the two regions raises 
interesting questions about cultural representations. Aceh is located at the North-Eastern 
tip of Indonesia and was one of the last areas incorporated by the Dutch after prolonged 
warfare. The long resistance to Dutch control has made Aceh an ‘exemplary case’ for 
Indonesian nationalist historical consciousness constructed in the Sukarno and Suharto 
eras (Reid, 2005, pp. 335-6). Since the early 1990s, Aceh has been the location for a 
military crackdown on separatist fighters. Yogyakarta, by contrast, is located in Java and 
is often represented as the cultural centre of Java. It was the location of the government of 
the Indonesian republic for much of the war of independence. Although both provinces 
are important for the nationalist imagination, their differences open up interesting points 
of comparison given the nationalist framing of the texts. I do not dispute or accept the 
accuracy of the texts’ depiction of Acehnese marriage law or life in Yogyakarta. The 




Acehnese Marriage as a National Cultural Ritual 
The series of government publications about marriage law and ceremonies was part of the 
‘Research and Recording of Local Culture Project’ (Proyek Penelitian dan Pencatatan 
Kebudayaan Daerah, P3KD). Unlike IDKD, whose primary goal in the late 1970s was to 
collect and disseminate information about local cultures that would strengthen nation 
unity and national values, P3KD’s primary goal was to collect as much information as 
possible about marriage law and ceremonies for the Department of Education and Culture 
to assist with policy development and implementation. In Marriage Law and Ceremonies 
in the Special Region of Aceh (henceforth, Marriage Law in Aceh), this goal was tied to 
strengthening nationalism:  
Marriage law and ceremonies in the region of Aceh, as an element of national 
culture, makes a contribution to securing nationalism in the younger generation. 
(Syamsuddin, 1978/9, p. 1)  
Adat dan upacara perkawinan di daerah Aceh sebagai salah satu unsur 
kebudayaan Nasional memberikan andil bagi memupuk kebangsaan Nasional 
dikalangan generasi muda.  
The method of educating the ‘younger generation’ into the nation was to record for them 
how past generations ‘developed and regulated noble values’ within their cultural 
traditions.11  
 
a. Researching Local Culture in Marriage Law and Ceremonies in the Special 
Region of Aceh 
 
In this section I explore the two most important elements of the discursive structure that 
underpins the process of articulating Acehnese marriage law and ceremonies. Firstly, I 
analyse how local culture was located within a national spatial-cultural order through 
exploring the history of adat and how it was represented in the text. Secondly, I explore 
the research methodology used in the texts and reveal its links to the Indonesian 
intellectual climate and related research trends in the late 1960s and 1970s. This form of 
research expertise was central to how knowledge about local culture was generated in the 
local culture project texts.  
 
The topic of Marriage Law in Aceh can be summarised as marriage adat. Adat is often 
translated as ‘customary law’ (Boellstorff, 2002, p. 28) and can incorporate related 
                                                 




ceremonies and practices. Although the word adat appears on almost every page of the 
text, it was never defined and its history was never interrogated. However, the term adat 
carries a long history with many links to governance. Spyer captures the complex uses 
and history of adat when she writes:  
Itself a foreign term and a derivative of the Arabic word for custom, adat, which 
applies today somewhat paradoxically to that which is held to have evaded the 
influence of time itself, clearly developed within the historical context of a 
complex interaction between Dutch hegemonic ambitions, colonial practices of 
rule (or divide and rule), foreign religions, and the political alliances that ordered 
the populations of the Malay region along religious and ethnic lines (1996, p. 28) 
The formative period for ethnolocalities was the colonial era (Gouda, 1995, pp. 43-5; 
Lev, 1985). Although fashioned by a complex group of factors, ethnolocalities were 
strengthened by the Dutch administration’s need for an organising principle that was 
larger than the village and smaller than the categories of ‘native’ and Islam (Boellstorff, 
2002, p. 30). The Dutch administration found their mode of organisation through the 
concept of ‘adat groups’ (2002, pp. 29-30). The Dutch conceived adat in legal terms as 
the traditional law of a particular area. In the decentralised Dutch system of governance, 
Indonesia was divided into adat areas with their own set of laws.12 Legal status was 
conflated with a generalised, politically expedient concept of cultural identity. Over time 
these areas became the ethnic groupings of Indonesia today.  
 
The idea of adat continued to play a role in governance in independent Indonesia as can 
be demonstrated in Marriage Law in Aceh.13 Adat was used in the text to order different 
cultures and regions within a national framework. To illustrate this point I return to a 
statement in the previous section:  
Marriage law [adat] and ceremonies in the region of Aceh, as an element of 
national culture, makes a contribution to securing nationalism in the younger 
generation. (Syamsuddin, 1978/9, p. 1)  
The statement occurred on the first page of the introduction and was made as a statement 
of fact that requires no further support or elaboration. Two points are worth noting here. 
First, the statement ties Acehnese adat to the nation: it is ‘an element of national culture’. 
Second, the statement ties particular indigenous law and ceremonies to a particular region 
which conflates region with indigenous ethnic groups. This second point was soon 
                                                 
12 Boellstorff writes: ‘Colonial rule was predicated not on a different customary law for every ‘village’, nor 
a single customary law for all ‘natives’, but upon a mediating spatial scale, formed through a drawing 
together of bloodline and place, ethnicity and locality’ (2002, p. 29).  
13 For further discussion of Adat in independent Indonesia, see Acciaioli (1985), Lev (1985), Spyer (1996), 




elaborated by dividing the province into ten administrative regions and seven ‘adat 
regions’.14 The marriage adat of five of the seven adat groups identified as indigenous to 
Aceh form the basis of the study. Each of these five adat regions was identified with an 
administrative region or regions. Thus by the end of the second page a spatial scale was 
established between nation, region and constituent adat groups.  
 
The organising principle of nation-region-ethnie was an ideal that even the text itself had 
trouble maintaining. Despite the focus on the particular ethnic groups within Aceh, the 
historical section (1978/9, pp. 24-33) wrote the history of the province, rather than the 
histories of the ethnic groups that were the subjects of the research. The demographic 
data raise more issues. Although some of the groups dominated particular regions (for 
instance, according to the text the Gayo make up 90 percent of Central Aceh), most of the 
areas were culturally plural (for instance, the Alas are 60 percent of Southeast Aceh and 
the Aneuk Jamee are 35 percent of South Aceh). In addition, migrants are a significant 
portion of the population. Batak Indonesians, for instance, made up 35 percent of 
Southeast Aceh, and the Javanese were also noted as a sizable ethnic group. However, the 
nation-region-ethnie ideal did not allow for the adat of migrant groups to be analysed and 
they were ignored in this and other local culture projects publications. Even in the text the 
cultural model was fragile.  
 
The second element of the discursive structure on which the text relied was the use of a 
particular research methodology. The research was conducted with certain 
methodological assumptions not disclosed in the text and possibly not recognised by the 
researchers. An indication of these methodological assumptions was the organisation of 
the chapters that provide details about marriage adat. The authors broke down each 
practice or ceremony into their constituent parts, recorded its symbolic meaning and 
made comparisons between the different adat groups. This research methodology was 
closely linked to the dominant trend in Indonesian cultural research in the 1970s that was 
labelled by its critics ‘culturalism’ or ‘the cultural approach’ (Heryanto, 2005, p. 76) and 
was closely related to the theory and research methods of the anthropologist 
Koentjaraningrat (Heryanto, 2005, pp. 69-71).  
 
                                                 




Koentjaraningrat, as was mentioned in chapter three, made great use of the concept of 
‘cultural value orientation’ (orientasi nilai-budaya) which he borrowed from the works of 
Clyde and Florence Kluckholm (Koentjaraningrat, 2000, pp. 27-8), who were involved in 
the functionalist movement in post-World War II American social science. According to 
Koentjaraningrat:  
A cultural value orientation system consists of concepts, which live in the natural 
thought of the largest part of a society, about the things that they must consider to 
have the most value in their lives. (Koentjaraningrat, 2000, p. 25)  
Suatu sistem nilai-budaya terdiri dari konsepsi-konsepsi, yang hidup dalam alam 
pikiran sebagian besar warga masyarakat, mengenai hal-hal yang harus mereka 
anggap amat bernilai dalam hidup.  
Cultural value orientations function as the ‘highest directive for human action’15 and, 
following Florence Kluckholm and Fred Strodbeck (1961), differed between societies 
through variations in decisions regarding universal problems (Koentjaraningrat, 2000, pp. 
29-31). Koentjaraningrat pursued a qualitative research method using formal 
questionnaires with the aim of identifying cultural value systems and recommending 
changes where they conflicted with his ideal values for national development.16 Heryanto 
writes that ‘Koentjaraningrat’s model was reproduced, albeit with methodological 
distortions depending on the practical needs of the different groups making reference to 
his model’ (2005, p. 70).17 Marriage Law in Aceh adopted a methodology that used 
quantitative surveys and description (1978/9, p. 6)18 and an official, simplified version of 
cultural value orientation, where the discovery of traditional values, and how they are 
maintained, was an object of study (1978/9, pp. 1,10).  
 
This method reflected a form of analysis that Rex Mortimer identifies as ‘comparativism’ 
in his critique of Indonesian Studies in Australia (1973, p. 105). Developed from the 
functionalist theories in American social science research and related to theories of 
political and economic development, comparativism, like the local research projects, 
                                                 
15 ‘Pedoman tertinggi bagi kelakuan manusia’ (Koentjaraningrat, 2000, p. 25).  
16 See Koentjaraningrat (1999) where he discusses his ideal cultural values for development and uses a 
table (1999, p. 375) to assess if different aspects of different Indonesian regions (with ‘Chinese’ as a 
separate category) are barriers or catalysts for development.  
17 Hadiz and Dhakidae write: ‘More than any other Indonesian anthropologist, it was [Koentjaraningrat] 
who established the parameters of anthropological concerns in Indonesia in the 1960s – which included 
‘defining’ the features of ‘an Indonesian culture’ – and therefore played a major intellectual role in the 
state-led modernisation and nation-building process’ (2005, p. 12). They also highlight Koentjaraningrat’s 
importance for the prominence of quantitative research methods in Indonesian social science research 
(2005, p. 12).  




broke down social and political systems into their constituent ‘functions’ in order to make 
comparisons based on a normative set of ideal functions (1973, p. 105). Parallels between 
‘comparativism’ and the research in the Directorate of Culture are not surprising given 
the Indonesian intellectual climate of the 1970s (Liddle, 1973; Ward, 1973, pp. 74-7)19 
before the structuralist critique of the 1980s (Heryanto, 2005). Ward notes that 
intellectuals who supported these theories were averse to investigating older indigenous 
traditions which they denigrated as impeding national development (1973, p. 79). When 
these traditions were explored in the local culture projects, the use of a ‘comparativist’ 
methodology meant that indigenous traditions were articulated within a framework that 
did not acknowledge larger social formations.20  
 
Another feature of the research methods in Marriage Law in Aceh is the absence of the 
informants in the texts. The authors only mention the names of their informants in a list 
attached to the end of the text. They do not record personal interactions between 
informants and researchers or give accounts of their experiences at particular ceremonies. 
Instead, following the North American tradition of empiricism (Hadiz & Dhakidae, 2005, 
p. 3), the authors recorded Acehnese marriage adat from the standpoint of an observer 
who impartially records practices and interprets symbols at a remove from the 
ceremonies themselves. This method accords with what Pierre Bourdieu calls 
objectivism:  
Objectivism constitutes the social world as a spectacle presented to an observer 
who takes up a ‘point of view’ on the action, who stands back so as to observe it 
and, transferring into his object the principles of his relation to the object, 
conceives of it as a totality for cognition alone, in which all interactions are 
reduced to symbolic exchanges. This point of view is the one afforded by high 
positions in the social structure. (1977, p. 96)  
Locating meaning in the exchanges allows the researchers to reify community practices 
and ignore how the practices change to address new circumstances, as well as ignoring 
their political and personal dimensions.21 Research takes the form of typology where 
marriage adat was divided into its different ceremonies and interpreted in a symbolic way 
                                                 
19 The goal of the social and political transformation promoted by leading intellectuals, particularly in the 
early 1970s, was economic and social development in line with the ‘idealised, pragmatic stability of 
American democracy’ (Ward, 1973, p. 78).  
20 The most obvious omission was class, which Hadiz and Dhakidae identify as an ‘anathema to the New 
Order’s discourse of harmony and co-operation under the aegis of a wise and benevolent state’ (2005, pp. 
18-9). 
21 Tsing mentions the ‘neutral eye/I’ of Western social science which was invoked here by Indonesian 




that ignores the relationships that create meaning. The process of classification was 
central to how the text produced Acehnese marriage adat. The visiting researcher 
interpreted data to fit within a pre-existing framework devised by the cultural bureaucrats.  
 
The adoption of a research methodology that emphasised symbolism over socio-political 
formation is an important feature of Marriage Law in Aceh. Objectivism is a version of 
what David Spurr describes as aestheticisation: ‘a certain possession of social reality 
which holds it at arm’s length and makes it into the object of beauty, horror, pleasure, and 
pity’ (1993, p. 53). Through this process, the text separates local culture from other areas 
of life as a realm that is saturated with ‘noble values’ that can be used to provide 
pedagogical lessons in behaviours and attitudes. In this sense they operated in a similar 
way as Toby Miller and George Yudice identify for museums: they were a ‘delimited 
ethical zone, a space that divides worthy and unworthy conduct’ (2002, p. 148).  
 
Marriage Law in Aceh drew on an established discourse about adat and Western research 
and writing methods to construct an awareness that local culture is an element of the 
Indonesian nation and to present its particular organisation of the text as objective and 
logical rather than subject to the political goals and preferences of the New Order 
bureaucracy. The critical reading of the texts in the next two sections explores two 
aspects of the research that are touched on by the previous discussion of research 
methodology: first, how the ‘comparativist’ typology constructed cultural difference and, 
second, the normative ideals that formed the basis of comparisons between types.  
 
b. Cultural Difference 
 
The ‘Kinds of Marriage’ section in the ‘Adat before Marriage’ chapter (1978/9, pp. 55-
85) provides an interesting example of how the five ethnic groups whose marriage law 
and ceremonies under consideration were compared in the text. The text lists six kinds of 
marriage in Aceh. These are: the ‘usual type’ (bentuk kawin biasa); elopement; polygamy 
(up to four wives); the ‘exchange of mats’ where one spouse will marry an in-law if their 
spouse dies; a ‘hanging marriage’ that involved a long engagement and was generally 




marriage’ category22 and two other variants. The practices and variants of the ethnic 
groups for each ‘type’ of marriage were listed within the sub-sections.  
 
An example of the organisation of the text is its analysis of the ‘usual type’ of marriage. 
After defining the ‘usual type’ as marriages that were undertaken in accordance within 
the parameters of Islam and the ethnic groups’ customs and stating other similarities (it 
occurs between a man and a woman and is monogamous), the text began moving 
chronologically through the different stages and listing the differences between different 
ethnic groups. The first step was the proposal from the groom’s family to the bride, 
followed by an engagement period and an exchange of dowry. The text lists the local 
language words for the engagement period and presents. The multiple listings of different 
words for what was represented as the same object is a feature of Marriage Law in Aceh.  
 
Over half the text (three of six chapters consisting of 92 of 177 pages) lists the customs 
and ceremonies of the five ethnic groups using this method. Instead of tackling these 
groups separately, the text divided then subdivides their customs and ceremonies into 
predetermined categories, then notes the differences and similarities in languages, tools, 
customs and meanings. Starting from a typology of marriage laws and ceremonies 
defined as analogous hides the assumptions that allow the laws and customs to be 
represented as analogous. Instead of locating cultural differences as elements of larger 
variations in social structure or history, small differences become the markers of the 
cultural plurality of Indonesia. This construction of cultural difference can be 
distinguished from how cultural difference has been represented within Taman Mini. 
Instead of the details of culturally marginal groups blurring, cultural differences in the 
Aceh text are articulated in detail within a framework that assumes an underlying cultural 
similarity. Cultural difference, in this location, strengthens the nation as difference 
becomes a local variation of a shared national activity. The various ethnic groups are 
articulated into the nation as Indonesia’s local cultures.  
 
Although there are differences between the Taman Mini and local culture project versions 
of state-approved cultural difference, they both are consistent with the New Order 
regime’s strategy of depoliticisation of the populace to reduce older forms of 
                                                 
22 The ‘temporary marriage’ category was for couples that have divorced three times and, according to 




identification and ‘naturalise’ the state’s preferred forms of identity. The ‘comparativist’ 
methodology, which it should be remembered was the preserve of groups that were 
averse to traditional forms of affiliation, concealed broader socio-political groupings. 
Spyer notes a similar trend of ‘depoliticisation’ in the New Order regime’s use of adat, 
which she illustrates with a familiar example. She writes:  
Since the colonial period, and in particular under the Suhartos, the domain to 
which adat is applicable has been shrinking, while adat has become increasingly 
bereft of power as it is redefined to codify highly limited aspects of ‘traditional’ 
sosiocultural life – those for instance, reflected in the emblematic silhouettes of 
the adat houses contained in [sic.] Jakarta’s Beautiful Indonesia pond. (1996, p. 
28)  
A popular interpretation of the New Order’s representation of difference is that it is 
limited to a cultural sphere that is shorn of political and historical connections. While 
Marriage Law in Aceh affirms this interpretation, it also suggests that this process was an 
element of the production of a new organisation of social and cultural life that was 
connected to the spread of a new social knowledge. Heryanto writes:  
a specific ideology about the world, truth and social knowledge had gained 
momentum from the material and immaterial conditions of the time to develop 
and become dominant in the socio-political context of the New Order. (2005, p. 
70)  
Acehnese marriage customs were represented through this process as part of the local 
culture of national citizens, who, as I explore in the next section, were subject to national 
priorities as part of the national community rather than the reproduction of pre-existing 
community structures.  
 
c. Development Priorities and Acehnese Marriage Adat  
 
In the opening chapter, the authors make the following point about marriage law and 
ceremonies in Aceh:  
In facing the current state of development, one needs to ask what extent of 
efficiency is found in the implementation of marriage laws and ceremonies in the 
region of Aceh. From this point of view, the problems that need to be explored are 
the elements that cause wastefulness from the point of view of money, time and 
what’s more human resources (1978/9, p. 4).  
Dalam menghadapi masa-masa pembangunan dewasa ini perlu diketahui, sejauh 
mana terdapat efisiensi dalam pelaksanaan adat dan upacara perkawinan di 
daerah Aceh. Sehubungan dengan itu masalah yang perlu ditinjau adalah unsur-
unsur mana yang menyebabkan pemborosan, baik dilihat dari segi pembiayaan, 




This statement draws attention to one of the core governmental principles behind the 
construction of marriage law and ceremonies as a field of cultural activity by the New 
Order bureaucracy. The cultural practices discussed in the text were held up against the 
regime’s ideal norms for the practices of everyday life as articulated in its programs for 
accelerated development. Although also underlying the categories and judgements 
discussed in the previous sections, the comparison was most clearly present within the 
final ‘analytical’ chapter and, in particular, the section about the relationship between 
marriage law and ceremonies and the state’s family planning program.  
 
The Indonesian family planning program was one of the New Order regime’s success 
stories and one of the regime’s most high profile interventions into the lives of 
Indonesians as part of its plans for accelerated development (Hull, 1994; Mackie & 
MacIntyre, 1994, p. 46; Ricklefs, 2001, p. 371). Suharto was its patron from the late 
1960s, and it received substantial resources from the state budget and from international 
sources (Hull, 1994, pp. 126-31; Newland, 2001, pp. 25-30). Marriage Law in Aceh 
discussed family planning in the section ‘The relationship between marriage law and 
ceremonies and the family planning program’. The section, as its title indicates, traced 
how marriage practices supports and hinders the state’s family planning goals. The 
section began with the statement that the family planning program was opposed to the 
local priority of having large families and Islamic ideas of leaving such planning in God’s 
hands (1978/9, p. 158). However, the text then observed that local customs were a form 
of planning that included ensuring that births do not closely follow each other. These 
practices accorded with the concepts of the family planning program, in so much as local 
customs indicated that people could take a degree of control over their fertility. Four 
practices are listed: constructing a temporary hearth to warm a mother after childbirth and 
a restricted diet; massage to stop menstruation; segregation of husbands and wives for 
nine months after the birth of a child; and a ‘child tithe’ (zakat anak) where the twelfth 
child born is given up for adoption to an elder or ulama.23  
 
The authors then considered the problem of population growth and its relationship to a 
host of different issues including education, unemployment and housing and noted that all 
of these problems influenced the ‘success of development and shape of society that is 
                                                 




strongly desired.’24 Given the importance of the goals of national development, the 
authors declared that the family planning program must be implemented. They then 
established that the principles of family planning accorded with the principles that 
underlay Acehnese marriage law and adat (1978/9, p. 162). The evidence for this 
similarity was the three goals of the Family Planning Program that were represented as 
also underlying marriage law and customs:  
1) Give marriage counselling;  
2) Give assistance/medication for sterility;  
3) Give advice/help for reducing pregnancies (1978/9, p. 162).  
1) Memberi nasihat perkawinan;  
2) Memberi pertolongan/pengobatan dalam kemandulan;  
3) Memberi nasihat/bantuan dalam menjarangkan kehamilan.  
Additional evidence was Aceh’s low rate of population growth, which was understood as 
an indication that marriage customs kept birth rates down (1978/9, p. 163). The section 
then turned to some of the inconsistencies. The desire for large families was criticised as 
not according with the principles of family planning or marriage law and customs. The 
‘openness’ of the family planning program was contrasted with the ‘guardedness’ of the 
families in the areas studied regarding contraceptive discussion and purchases – a 
difference which was attributed to traditional Acehnese society ‘not yet being able to 
receive modernisation ideas’.25 Also noted was the tendency of couples to marry whilst 
young and the continued practice of polygamy. The authors argued both of these 
practices should be discouraged and claimed they were in decline.  
 
The regime’s development goals were understood as following the same principles as 
traditional practices. In matters where elements of local culture were viewed as impeding 
the implementation of these principles, the development goals were interpreted as 
perfecting local culture. Thus, the state’s program of development was not understood in 
the text as clashing with local culture, but as completing it. This provides an insight into 
how local culture was connected to the reformist programs of the New Order regime. The 
way local culture was constructed here was normative in the sense that it made the lives 
of Indonesians amenable to the regime’s development programs. Marriage law and 
customs were articulated in the text through this normative grid that reconstructed them 
                                                 
24 ‘Mempengaruhi berhasilnya pembangunan dan wujud masyarakat yang diidam-idamkan’ (1978/9, p. 
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as practices to be encouraged or altered.26 Development goals provided the set of ideal 
practices that are conceived of as both indigenous and modern.  
 
The New Order regime’s model of cultural management is completed when all of the 
marriage law and ceremony texts from each province are placed next to each other. Each 
of the texts had the same goals, chapter headings and sub-chapter headings. The framing 
and the issues addressed are identical in each region and the focus on national unity and 
the New Order regime’s development goals are also shared. Together, these texts 
complete the articulation of local culture as part of the fabric of national life. The nation 
is divided into provinces. Each provincial region is divided into adat regions that neatly 
correspond with the administrative boundaries. Each adat region has a comparable adat 
that signifies both ethnic group and national culture and is assessed against the norms set 
out in the reformist agenda of the New Order regime. The New Order regime’s version of 
local culture is produced through such state programs and its features determined by the 
regime’s governmental strategies and goals. From this macro perspective, the cultural 
order moved Indonesians towards the attitudes and behaviours desired by the New Order 
regime.  
 
Taman Mini has its own version of an Indonesian wedding. Located on the ground floor 
of the Taman Mini museum, a large diorama depicts the wedding ceremony of a Central 
Javanese couple, attended by guests wearing the ‘traditional’ ethnic costumes 
representing the other provinces of Indonesia. Jörgan Hellman writes of the wedding:  
The wedding reception staged in Museum Indonesia is intended to represent the 
diversity of the cultural heritage in Indonesia at the same time as it promotes a 
metaphor for grasping this diversity as a unified whole. (1999, p. 52) 
This is a common metaphor used to understand how the New Order regime constructed 
plurality.27 The marriage law and ceremonies series of texts presented a slightly different 
use of ethnic culture to promote plurality, one that perhaps better accorded with the 
construction of cultural diversity across the nation and not just from the national capital. 
In the series, local culture was constructed through the discourses of archipelagic culture, 
                                                 
26 The relationship to development ideals does infer a hierarchy between groups in different texts. Tsing 
writes of state-sponsored research about an indigenous group in South Kalimantan: ‘All reports include an 
invocation of the narrative of progress and development in which the Meratus are portrayed as backward, 
illiterate, unhealthy, and disorderly’ (1993, p. 172). However, she also notes that ‘a stable structure of 
authority’ (1993, p. 173) creates an equivalence between cultures.  
27 Acciaioli draws a parallel between the ‘domestication’ of culture by the state and the use of weddings as 




national unity and modernisation in a similar way to Taman Mini and confirmed the 
awkward attempts to merge administrative and cultural area. However, it also indicated a 
more complex construction of cultural difference that, rather than blurring difference, 
incorporated it into national culture while all the time attempting to ‘perfect’ local culture 
in accordance with the state’s discourse of national unity and the goals and discourses of 
development.  
 
Yogyakarta, Cultural Heritage and the Child-Citizen 
The ‘Introducing the Cultures of the Archipelago Series’ (Seri Pengenalan Budaya 
Nusantara) was planned, written and published in 2000 as part of the Study and 
Management of Cultural Values Project (P3NB). The text analysed below, Yogya in 
Passing (Yogya Selayang Pandang, Guritno & Setiawati, 2000), was conceived in a 
political climate with striking differences to Marriage Law in Aceh. During the 
publication of the latter, the New Order was strengthening its grasp on power and 
formulating its version of governance. Yogya in Passing was published after the 
Indonesian elections of 1999 during the Wahid administration at a time when democratic 
reform held a high priority in public debate and the press had a degree of freedom of 
expression not seen since the 1950s. Despite these changes, the goals of the Introducing 
the Cultures of the Archipelago Series, as stated in the preface by Director-General of 
Culture I Gusti Nurah Anom, were very similar to those of IDKD:  
The management of Indonesian cultural values is pushed towards trying to 
inventorise and socialise Indonesian cultural values that are based on the 
Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. In relation to this, the cultural management 
programs are directed towards developing Indonesian cultural values that mirror 
noble national values in order to strengthen national character, increase self-
respect, create expressions of national pride and also further strengthen the spirit 
of unity. (Gurning & Lestariningsih, 2000, p. iii)  
Pembinaan nilai-nilai budaya Indonesia ditekankan pada usaha 
menginventarisasikan dan memasyarakatkan nilai-nilai budaya Indonesia yang 
berlandaskan Pancasila dan UUD 1945. Sehubungan dengan itu, program 
pembinaan kebudayaan diarahkan pada pengembangan nilai-nilai budaya 
Indonesia yang mencerminkan nilai-nilai luhur bangsa sehingga dapat 
memperkuat kepribadian bangsa, mempertebal rasa harga diri, memunculkan 
kebanggaan nasional serta memperkuat jiwa kesatuan.  
Although differing slightly to the goals of Marriage Law in Aceh, there are similarities in 





An important difference between the two texts is that Yogya in Passing is written for 
children. Its language is simpler and it repeatedly uses the informal personal pronoun ku 
to refer to the narrator whereas personal pronouns were absent from Marriage Law in 
Aceh that represented the authors position as objective. The narrative also varies in an 
attempt to engage its child-readers. For instance, the first chapter is written from the 
perspective of the narrator who is returning to Yogyakarta to visit grandparents. The 
following chapters vary this theme slightly as they engage with different places and 
themes (see table 7.3).  
 
Table 7.3: Narrative Structure of Chapters in Yogya in Passing  
Chapter Narrative Structure 
1 Return to Yogyakarta to visit Grandparents. Gives details of the area.  
2 Trip along Malioboro Street giving details of the sights, sounds, statues 
and some historical buildings.  
3 Discusses the building of houses in a customary regional style, listing 
the names of the tools, people involved and purposes of the rooms.  
4 Relates a story told by the narrator’s Grandmother and describes a 
traditional children’s game.  
5 Describes the Yogyakarta palace and gives the details and historical 
background on the rite of Sekaten, a festival honouring the prophet 
Mohammad’s birthday.  
6 Describes two museums and two tourist destinations.  
 
a. Whose Yogyakarta?  
 
Yogya in Passing begins with a description of Yogyakarta by a returning traveller 
(Guritno & Setiawati, 2000, p. 1). The view described is not what we would commonly 
expect from an infrequent visitor or a returning relative. The narrator notes, amongst 
other things, different methods of getting to Yogyakarta, the date the province was 
established and all of the names of its constituent regencies and their locations. The 
narrator continues by noting the percentage of land in Yogyakarta which is still forest, the 
major mountains and their heights and the names and locations of all the rivers. The 




the crest’s elements, providing an account of the city-region in accordance with the 
government’s understanding of the ‘province’.28  
 
In the second preface of Yogya in Passing, the project leader of the ‘Introducing the 
Cultures of the Archipelago Series’ writes:  
With the publication of this book, it is hoped that children’s knowledge about the 
diversity of Indonesian culture will progressively increase. Due to this, cultural 
imbalance can increasingly be addressed and the spirit of unification and unity 
can be further strengthened. (Guritno & Setiawati, 2000, pp. v-vi) 
Dengan diterbitkan buku ini diharapkan pengetahuan anak-anak tentang 
keanekaragaan budaya Indonesia semakin bertambah. Dengan demikian, 
kesenjangan budaya dapat makin dipersempit serta jiwa persatuan dan kesatuan 
dapat diperkukuh.  
In this respect, Yogya in Passing is more directly pedagogical than Marriage Law in 
Aceh. Its chapters are a series of lessons for the child-citizen about the meaning of culture 
and the kinds of relationships it establishes between different areas of life. Using 
Yogyakarta as the site for these lessons has implications for how Yogyakarta is 
represented in the text. Other characteristics of Yogyakarta, such as its diverse student 
population and important role as a centre of contemporary Indonesian art and 
performance, are absent.  
 
A similar form of representation can be found in the Yogya in Passing’s twenty-four 
illustrations. Instead of using photographs, the illustrations are water-colour pictures that 
depict various buildings, rooms and objects mentioned in the text. The illustrations focus 
on a particular object and remove surrounding details. For instance, the Gending 
Archway (2000, p. 13) is illustrated with some detail in the middle of the page. However, 
it blurs on either side of the page before disappearing completely. The foreground is also 
a blur. People and cars are absent from the picture, as are any indications of 
contemporary life, such as signs, electricity wires, roads, rubbish or surrounding houses. 
The process of separating particular objects and items from their surroundings mirrors the 
process that occurs throughout the text. The authors identify certain things as cultural 
heritage and invest them with historical and cultural meaning and significance. This 
                                                 
28 Due to events during the fight for independence, in particular the Sultan of Yogyakarta’s strong support 
of the Indonesian Republic, Yogyakarta was granted the status of ‘special region’ (Daerah Istimewa). 




process involves a choice between objects and practices based on their cultural 
significance and worth or, in other words, judgements of cultural value.  
 
The way that culture is framed in Yogya in Passing is in some respects quite similar to the 
understanding of culture within Marriage Law in Aceh. Three characteristics in particular 
indicate that some of the cultural discourses of the New Order regime remain important 
to cultural governance in the Reform era. Firstly, the text still divides the cultural sphere 
from the political sphere in the discussion of local customs and practices. The text 
emphasises, like Marriage Law in Aceh, the ‘traditional values’ contained in the customs 
and practices. Chapter four, ‘Drawing from Grandma’s Experience’, provides an example 
of how presenting the past as cultural heritage is used to identify and promote particular 
behaviours and attitudes rather than others. The chapter begins with a description of the 
location of Grandma’s village. Grandma then begins to tell a folktale about the founder of 
the village, Ki Ageng Paker, that demonstrates how the virtuous are rewarded.29 The past 
is mined here for moral lessons for Indonesian children. In the text, ‘traditional values’ 
continue to provide a model of behaviour that the government regards as ideal although 
without the strong connections to state programs, like family planning, that were in 
evidence in Marriage Law in Aceh.  
 
The second characteristic is the continued use of the nation-state-province model that 
conflates location and ethnicity. The use of this model is not as transparent as Marriage 
Law in Aceh, but two features of the text ensure it is still present. Firstly, the opening 
chapter of the text quickly establishes that the borders of the text correlate with those of 
the province. On the second page, the province is situated in Java and its size compared 
to other provinces. As was mentioned earlier, the text lists the neighbouring regencies, 
the geographical features of the province and the official provincial symbol. Secondly, all 
                                                 
29 The text relates the story as follows: back in the time of the Majapahit, Sultan Prabu owned a turtle dove 
with a beautiful call called Jaka Mangu. One day, Jaka Mangu escaped and could not be found. The Sultan 
sent out servants without success and eventually disguised himself and went looking for his dove. Jaka 
Mangu had been found by Ki Paker, who was amazed by his melody. Ki Paker refused many offers for the 
dove. The Sultan eventually tracked down Jaka Mangu and met with Ki Paker. Ki Paker, without knowing 
who the Sultan was, gave him the bird and accepted no payment. A few weeks later, Sultan Prabu sent 
many riches to Ki Paker whose wealth became renowned. The story finishes with these lines: ‘Even 
through [Ki Paker] was rich, nevertheless his behaviour remained simple and not arrogant. In his day-to-
day life, Ki Paker continued to associate with anyone. He was not selective with his friendship, [associating 
with] people from wealthy and also not wealthy families’ (2000, p. 52). (‘Meskipun [Ki Paker] sudah kaya, 
namun tingkah lakunya tetap sederhana dan tidak sombong. Dalam kehidupan sehari-hari Ki Paker tetap 





of the local customs and ceremonies in the text are those of the central Javanese and the 
buildings discussed in chapter three are traditional Javanese structures. Chapter four 
mentioned above discusses a Javanese folk-tale and game. Chapter five relates a 
customary ritual of the Sultan of Yogyakarta. Unlike Marriage Law in Aceh, there is no 
demographic breakdown of the place of birth or ethnicity of the inhabitants in the text, 
reinforcing the picture of the province of Yogyakarta as thoroughly and unambiguously 
Javanese.  
 
The third characteristic is the use of the same model of national history to frame the 
history of Yogyakarta. Although not a central feature of Marriage Law in Aceh, the 
nationalist model of Indonesian history was important in the texts produced by other 
Ditjarahnitra projects. The establishment of the orthodox perspective of Indonesian 
history has been traced by historian Anthony Reid (1979). Reid identifies the central 
elements of the ‘historical orthodoxy’ as:  
Great Hindu kingdoms bringing political unity to the archipelago, followed by 
350 years of Dutch oppression dignified by the resistance at some time or another 
of each Indonesian region and people. (1979, p. 298)  
The historical elements within the text emphasise Yogyakarta’s connections to the 
Majapahit empire, which nationalists have long used as evidence of Indonesia’s unified 
past (1979, pp. 287-92) and the nationalist struggle for independence. Grandma’s story in 
chapter four clearly draws links between local customs and Majapahit, as does the 
account of the rite of Sekaten, which is discussed in detail below. In a recent article, van 
Klinken (2001a) has recorded challenges to the historical orthodoxies of the New Order 
regime since 1998. Yogya in Passing, like Marriage Law in Aceh, belongs to the 
‘orthodox nationalist stream’ which van Klinken notes remains dominant after Suharto 
(2001a, p. 326). The challenges to this view of history that have surfaced in the Reform 
era have yet to penetrate the bureaucracy, which remains committed to the Suharto-era 
narratives.  
 
b. New Constructions of Culture 
 
Although there are a number of similarities between the Aceh and Yogya texts under 
discussion, two features in Yogya in Passing indicate that new governmental uses of 
culture have evolved in the period between the publications. The first is the way that 




the first page of the text, through the method of discussing Yogyakarta as seen ‘through 
the glass windows’30 of a bus returning to the city. Other elements of the text reinforce 
the narrator’s transient status. Malioboro Street is described as a tourist destination for 
‘both Indonesian and foreign tourists’ (2000:16). Forms of travel and the locations of bus 
terminal and train stations are routinely mentioned (2000, pp. 1,11,15-16,59). The 
buildings that the text describes in detail, such as the Gedung Agung and the Sultan of 
Yogyakarta’s palace (2000, pp. 22-8,59-68), are tourist destinations. However, the 
chapter that is most notable for its tourist theme is chapter six, ‘The Cultural Magic of the 
City’. Chapter six gives brief descriptions of two museums, including opening hours, and 
two prominent tourist destinations, Tamansari and Kota Gede. The text mentions the 
locations and origins of the areas and highlights points of historical interest. The text also 
mentions the importance of tourist guides in order to gain more knowledge about the 
Golden Carriage Museum (2000, p. 84) and notes that in Kota Gede, a region famous for 
its silverwork, that ‘tourists can see for themselves the process of making objects from 
silver.’31 
 
The text locates the reader as a visitor engaging with Indonesian cultural heritage rather 
than exploring the experiences of Yogyakartans whose lives are embedded in culture as 
was the case with earlier publications like Marriage Law in Aceh. Museums and tourist 
destinations of historical and cultural interest are placed next to folk tales, children’s 
games and palace rituals as elements of Indonesians’ cultural heritage. The text 
encourages the child-citizen to engage with cultural tourism as a way of learning lessons 
about national unity and traditional values. The moves to sanction cultural tourism as an 
acceptable way to access national cultural heritage is linked to the relocation of the 
Directorate of Culture from the Ministry of Education to the State-Ministry of Tourism 
which began in 1997.32 The administrative link established by the move has corollaries in 
the texts.  
 
The second feature of the Yogya in Passing is not as prominent as the presence of 
tourism. It involves elements of the description of Malioboro Street that do not conform 
with the character of the rest of the text. Malioboro Street is celebrated for its busyness, 
                                                 
30 ‘Dari kaca jendela’ (2000, p. 1).  
31 ‘Para wisatawan dapat melihat langsung proses pembuatan barang-barang dari perak ini’ (Guritno & 
Setiawati, 2000, p. 91).  




bustle and trade. It is ‘always dense with cars’ (2000, p. 15) along with bicycles and 
horse-drawn carts. The text emphasises different features of the street. Shops pack both 
sides of the street, and visitors are present from morning to evening. Tourists visit the 
shops and the side-walk stalls that line the road. The sounds of car-horns and horse-
hooves hitting the street ring out all day, along with street-singers playing guitar and 
singing. The authors then comment, ‘You can imagine how interesting it is, all of those 
people mixed together with their own concerns.’33 The busy street-life becomes an object 
of attention for the reader. Traffic jams and commerce are considered a cultural attribute 
of this section of the city. The street life of Malioboro can be contrasted with chapter 
three’s discussion of housing, where only two forms of traditional housing are mentioned. 
Although not a prominent or large part of the text, the brief discussion of Malioboro 
Street does indicate that the definition of local culture has at least come under pressure to 
include practices and experiences that were not previously considered part of local 
traditions, such as shopping and the noises of commerce.  
 
c. Learning within the Cultural Sphere 
 
An important element of Yogya in Passing is how it uses culture to construct 
relationships between different areas of life. For example, the discussion of the Sultan of 
Yogyakarta’s palace includes a description of a large hall that the Sultan used to pass 
down decrees that governed his Sultanate, but now is used as a museum (2000, p. 63). 
The changed status of the hall indicates that the feudal practices of the Sultan, although 
now part of Indonesia’s past, are to be appreciated in the present as cultural heritage. 
Representations of how the past relates to the present are particularly prominent and 
repeated in the text. For instance, the phrase ‘land of my ancestors’ that was prominent in 
the first chapter34 establishes Yogyakarta as a culturally relevant location whose history 
and customs the narrator is able to explore for lessons in life today.  
 
A lesson about the complexity of the relationship between past and present is the account 
of the Sekaten ceremony in chapter five (2000, pp. 67-81). Here I provide a truncated 
version of the text’s description of the event. Sekaten is the name of an old gamelan that 
                                                 
33 ‘Dapat dibayangkan betapa menariknya, semua itu berbaur dalam kepentingan masing-masing’ (Guritno 
& Setiawati, 2000, p. 16).  
34 The phrase ‘land of my ancestors’ (‘tanah leluhuruku’) is part of the title of, and is used throughout, 




is one of the palace heirlooms. On the sixth day of the third month of the Islamic 
calendar, the rite of Sekaten begins when musicians begin to play the gamelan. People 
from the area flock to the palace on hearing the music. At midnight, the gamelan is 
moved from the palace to the Agung Mosque, accompanied by a large crowd. In the 
mosque, the gamelan is played again for six days straight until Thursday night prayers. 
After the Friday afternoon prayers finish at one o’clock, the gamelan begins playing 
again. At eight o’clock, the Sultan leaves the palace and proceeds to the mosque to attend 
the celebration of the Prophet Muhammad’s birth, accompanied by crowds of people. 
Around a thousand crowd into the mosque. The sound of the gamelan is hushed as the 
Sultan enters. The Sultan indicates to the Kyai35 that he is ready, and the Kyai begins 
reading the story (riwayat) of the Prophet Muhammad, which finishes at midnight. The 
Sultan returns to the palace with the gamelan and a crowd of revellers.  
 
After relating a detailed account of the ceremony, the text turns to the history of the 
ceremony (2000, pp. 75-8). According to the text, Sekaten was present during the time of 
the Demak kingdom in the sixteenth century. During that time, a group of nine holy men 
travelled to Java to spread Islam. They are called the Wali and are still revered in Java 
today. One of the, Wali Sanga, the nine Wali was a talented musician who could play the 
gamelan. Every year, the Wali would gather together to report their activities and 
celebrate the birth of the Prophet Muhammad and one would play his gamelan that was 
named Kyai Sekati. Although this celebration was the start of Sekaten’s links with Islam, 
the authors link it to an even older ceremony from the Hindu kingdoms that preceded 
Islam. The rituals of Asmaweda and Asmaradana, which also went for seven days, were a 
time for offering up prayers and songs of praise to departed ancestors.  
 
The ritual of Sekaten provides a location where a number of different elements within the 
discourse of cultural heritage are related to each other. Yogyakarta’s history, Islam, 
Javanese culture in the form of the gamelan and Yogyakarta’s links to the pre-Islamic 
Hindu kingdoms are brought together in this one ceremony. The text’s ideal readers, 
Indonesian child-citizens, are given a lesson in the cultural complexity of their country. A 
number of legacies coexist here as elements of cultural heritage. However, the text 
emphasises two points that have the effect of establishing relationships between the 
                                                 




elements. Firstly, the text lists the goals of Sekaten as celebrating the birthday of the 
Prophet Muhammad and spreading the teachings of Islam. Islamic heritage is tied to the 
culture of Yogyakarta and the region’s Hindu past is pushed back in history. Secondly, 
the text directly addresses the relationship between Islam and local culture. The authors 
write: ‘Sekaten is proof that Islam is receptive towards local tradition and is not opposed 
to adat.’36 Sekaten provides a lesson in how Islamic and local cultural practices should 
peacefully coexist and an example of how the organisation of different spheres of life is 
an important governmental function of culture.  
 
4. Conclusion: The Continuing and Changing Construction of Local Culture  
Underlying the use of local culture, in state-sponsored cultural research and Taman Mini, 
is its use as a field of social management. The Directorate of Culture intended the local 
culture projects to educate Indonesians about their own and other indigenous ethnic 
cultures and to strengthen national unity. However, it also defined the characteristics and 
limits of local culture itself. The local culture projects constructed a sphere of life that 
imparted lessons about the nation, appropriate behaviour and morals, and cultural 
difference. Such governmental use of culture is not restricted to Indonesia. Tony Bennett 
writes:  
The concept [of culture] is caught up in and helps to constitute a normative grid 
through which the areas of social life to which it is applied are constructed as 
objects and practices to be acted upon. (1998, p. 101) 
In this sense local culture itself is a governmental concept that was used to understand 
and intervene into the lives of Indonesians, while also defining the significance and 
purpose of the objects and practices that came within its scope.  
 
While each text examined in this chapter is an intricate combination of a variety of 
discourses, the basic operation of the texts is identifiable as a form of governmental 
power that was central to cultural policy during the New Order period. It applied a 
normative grid to the practices of Indonesians in order to make their attributes and 
behaviours accord with those articulated within national development, while also 
attempting to manage the relationship between indigenous ethnic populations within the 
nation. Particularly interesting was the construction of a cultural-spatial scale across the 
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nation which, by ordering space, simultaneously incorporated some of the most intimate 
aspects of daily life, such as sexual relations, into national culture and disciplinary 
programs. Techniques of representation and the priorities of cultural management were 
more influential in shaping the representation of local culture in local culture project texts 
than the practices of local communities.  
 
The local culture projects, as a set of key programs within the Directorate of Culture, 
indicate a large degree of continuity in perspective within the national cultural 
bureaucracy despite the advent of the Reform era and substantial institutional changes. 
The similarities in the representation of local culture in the two texts, despite disparities 
in location, culture and time of publication, are striking. The nation-region-ethnie spatial 
model, including the coupling of administrative and cultural regions, remains central to 
the construction of local culture and its placement within a national framework. Also still 
present is the aestheticisation that ascribes ‘noble values’ to local cultures which allows 
them to be used for pedagogical lessons. Similarly, the advent of the reform era had little 
impact on constructions of Indonesian history within local culture project texts with the 
orthodox nationalist stream remaining unchallenged. Both texts produced a version of 
local culture preferred firstly by the New Order regime and also apparently by the 
Reform era governments. The breaks have been minor and are more connected to 
institutional change within the directorate, such as the promotion of cultural tourism and 
the change from targeting an adult audience to children, than any reconsideration of 
culture’s utility for government or the importance of culture to local communities.  
 
The similarities between Taman Mini and both of the analysed publications are 
conspicuous in both their representation of local culture and how cultural discourses are 
put to use. In all three instances, culture is cordoned off from politics and contemporary 
life and made a special sphere for the education of Indonesians. All three also accord with 
the regime’s effacement of time through the connection of traditions from previous eras 
to its political and social imperatives. The regime and its programs were ‘indigenised’ in 
TIM and the local culture projects. Finally, TIM, like the local culture projects, 
demonstrates the connection between governmental programs and the New Order 





Despite these similarities, the local culture projects indicate that there are variations in the 
regime’s construction of indigenous ethnic cultures and possibly provide a more complete 
model of how ethnic culture was understood. The major difference between Taman Mini 
and the texts is the representation of cultural difference. In the local culture projects, the 
differences between ethnic cultures are emphasised and mapped within the nation which 
contrasts to the blurring of peripheral cultures in Taman Mini. Articulation of cultural 
difference in the local culture projects divides more thoroughly and offers more 
flexibility than is the case in Taman Mini. Taman Mini’s centralisation of Javanese court 
culture, rather than being reproduced in the local culture project texts, is replaced by the 
multiple centres of local indigenous cultures across Indonesia.  
 
The local culture projects also provide a more detailed account of how the daily routines 
of indigenous ethnic culture are invested with significance and meaning because of their 
location within governmental discourses. For instance, the texts demonstrate how 
bureaucrats relied on a particular kind of research expertise in their efforts to know and 
modernise indigenous ethnic cultures. Another example is how wedding customs were 
incorporated into development programs through knowledge of the detail of the customs. 
Additionally, the local culture projects demonstrate that the characteristics and limits of 
local culture were in a constant state of revision and change. Unlike Taman Mini which 
underwent few changes since its inception, the ongoing production of texts in the local 
culture projects constantly incorporated new elements and objects into local culture. The 
introduction of cultural tourism into Java in Passing replicates Taman Mini’s own status 
as a tourist destination. Cultural tourism is not new to Indonesian cultural policy, but its 
role and visibility have grown substantially since 1998. Another new element is the 
expanded definition of culture in sections of Java in Passing and local culture project 
texts published since 1995, which indicates a broadening of objects and practices 
considered appropriate for inclusion within the category of local culture and the realm of 






This thesis is the first extended historical study of cultural policy in Indonesia and 
provides new analysis of cultural policy in the Reform era. It has identified the 
foundation of contemporary cultural policy in Indonesia in the policies of the colonial 
administration for indigenous populations and explored the different expressions of 
cultural policy through Indonesia’s modern history. While significant differences and 
changes in the features of cultural policy were identified between and across periods, 
cultural policy retained the same broad governmental function across the twentieth 
century, where it was used to shape the behaviour and attributes of subjects (culture’s 
‘civilising’ function) and to manage the relations between populations, in particular 
relations amongst indigenous ethnic populations and between those populations and the 
nation.  
 
While cultural policy emerged from liberal democracies as a form of governmental power 
capable of shaping the attributes and behaviours of self-governing subjects, its 
application in the Indonesian colonial setting had significant differences. Imperial states 
did not grant their indigenous colonial subjects the same freedoms as the subjects of 
Western states as they were assumed to possess lesser capacities. While considered to be 
on the same evolutionary path as Western populations, the racial hierarchy of colonialism 
placed indigenous Indonesians a few steps behind. Like minors, criminals and the 
mentally unwell, colonial populations were subjected to greater state control as part of the 
liberal process of ‘improvement’. The Japanese occupation dramatically reversed the 
racial hierarchy, placing Japanese culture at the top of the evolutionary ladder. While 
Dutch administrators had conceived their role as guiding a natural process of cultural 
development, the Japanese attempted to control cultural institutions and cultural 
expression. Japanese cultural policy, which was tied to wartime propaganda, had the twin 
goals of shaping East Asian subjects and contributing to the war effort. As the Pacific 
War progressed, the latter goal increasingly dominated cultural policy. A major change of 
the Japanese period was that an administration addressed indigenous populations for the 





During the Constitutional Democracy and Guided Democracy periods, a liberal model 
was initially applied where Indonesians were understood to have the capacity for 
autonomous citizenship. Later, Sukarno implemented a model drawn from his critique of 
Western liberalism and promotion of mass mobilisation, though the drive to ‘improve’ 
the population remained central. While cultural policy during Constitutional Democracy 
sought to facilitate cultural development through supporting the activities of non-
government groups and individuals, developing educational institutions and giving 
commitments to maintaining artistic freedom, the cultural policy of Guided Democracy 
was more prescriptive of styles and content. A more gradual change in the 
conceptualisation of national culture across the period is also evident. Cultural policy 
during constitutional democracy began with the premise that a new synthesis of 
Indonesian national culture would evolve for the new nation that would replace the 
different ethnic cultures. This perspective was soon challenged by the strength of ethnic 
cultures that increasingly became the focus of cultural policy. During Guided Democracy, 
ethnic cultures were sanctioned as forms of national culture, as long as they were national 
in essence. Through these changes, ethnic cultures were linked to national culture and 
included in cultural policy programs.  
 
For the thirty-two years of the New Order era, the longest period of continuous 
government since the end of colonialism, a cultural policy model was pursued that shared 
many features with colonial era policy. As in much of Southeast Asia, the New Order 
regime emphasised economic and social development in its policies and programs, while 
contrasting the spiritual and moral benefits of Indonesian cultural values to ‘decadent’ 
Western values. Once again, greater intervention and control were justified through the 
assumption that Indonesians were backward compared to ‘developed’ nations and had 
limited capacities. The imperialist ‘improvement’ of colonial populations was replaced, 
in both Indonesian and international discourse, by the imperative of ‘development’. 
Cultural policy adopted the task of preparing Indonesians for economic development and 
making Indonesian culture ‘developed’, while ‘protecting’ Indonesian cultural values – 
processes that shaped cultural practices to fit with pre-existing aesthetic and moral norms. 
The regime reshaped the cultural subject of the New Order era to accord with its method 
of political rule and development goals. In contrast to Guided Democracy, cultural policy 
discouraged themes designated as ‘political’ and encouraged appreciation of Indonesian 




with international markets, increasing concern with the penetration of Western cultural 
practices did not cause a major cultural policy review. The regime’s response was to 
strengthen its emphasis on protecting Indonesian values and negating the effect of foreign 
cultural influences. The cultural subject formulated in the first decades of the New Order 
era was not revised, but confirmed.  
 
During the New Order era, ethnic cultures became even more central to cultural policy. 
Managing the relations amongst ethnic populations and between ethnic culture and 
national culture was a priority and a justification for cultural policy. Ethnic cultures 
continued to be understood as elements of Indonesian national culture and therefore 
subject to Directorate of Culture programs that had the task of regulating national culture. 
The process of subjecting indigenous ethnic cultural practices to programs made them 
national in two senses: ethnic cultural practices were capable of teaching lessons about 
behaviours, aesthetics and morals to shape a national population and those practices 
exhibited the characteristics considered appropriate for national culture. Ethnic cultural 
forms, after undergoing this transformation, were then displayed together in national 
festivals. The sanitised plurality of these festivals encapsulated the relationship that 
ethnic populations had to each other and to the nation in cultural policy. Each ethnic 
population was constructed as harmoniously contributing to national development and 
displaying the characteristics considered appropriate for a developing nation. In contrast 
to ethnic cultural practices, contemporary cultural forms generally did not receive much 
attention from cultural policy makers.  
 
Part II of the thesis examined the operation of two sets of cultural institutions and a group 
of cultural research programs during the New Order and Reform eras. The two sets of 
case studies demonstrated the presence and effects of central control, as well as the 
diversity of cultural policy outcomes across Indonesia. The cultural parks and arts 
councils examined in chapter six verified that, despite the presence of a strong central 
state, the operation and outcomes of official New Order cultural institutions were varied 
across Indonesia. Although both types of institutions were centrally funded, they were 
active and broadly supported only where they prioritised the desires of local arts 
communities over centrally generated regulations. Local histories and priorities often 
intervened to alter centrally defined programs. The local culture research project texts did 




cultural value and therefore were pedagogic texts for the training of citizens in 
appropriate ‘Indonesian’ behaviour. The kind of knowledge that produced the texts made 
local culture in two senses: it defined a sphere of social practices and objects that were 
labelled as local culture; and it made local cultural practices knowable to the state and 
therefore amenable to state programs.  
 
This thesis also provided insights into cultural policy during the Reform era. Unlike 
previous experiences of regime change, the so-called Reform era did not herald sweeping 
reforms of governance driven by the new political power holders. A drive for democratic 
reform instigated and sustained by popular and international pressure has been 
consistently mitigated by entrenched interests that survived Suharto’s fall. More 
influential for cultural policy was the rise of ethnic identity politics and the most 
important policy initiative of the period – decentralisation. All cultural policy offices 
below the national level were decentralised and came under the control of the local 
regency, municipality or province, as did a number of other cultural institutions including 
the ‘cultural gardens’ and museums.  
 
The major direct cultural policy change of the early Reform era was, in fact, a Suharto era 
initiative that the Habibie, Wahid and Megawati administrations implemented – the 
separation of the culture portfolio from the education portfolio (these had been located 
under one ministry since 1945) and culture’s reconfiguration with tourism. Bureaucrats in 
the Directorate of Culture resisted the move to tourism and generally adhered to the 
processes and discourses of the New Order era. For instance, the analysis of the local 
culture projects demonstrated that the Directorate has not substantially revised the 
cultural discourses it employed during the New Order era, with the small exception of a 
greater recognition of cultural tourism. Greater changes have occurred outside Jakarta 
where the engagement of different localities with cultural policy has led to a plurality of 
outcomes across Indonesia, as was demonstrated by the case study of the cultural parks 
and arts councils. Despite organisational changes, New Order era cultural discourses 
generally continued to dominate decentralised cultural policy across Indonesia in 2003. 
However, there have been initiatives in the more distant, politically marginalised 
provinces, such as Riau, to move away from New Order cultural policy. These could be 





Research about Indonesian Cultural Policy  
In addition to being the first extended historical study of Indonesian cultural policy and 
utilising archival material from the 1950s and 1960s and certain key New Order cultural 
policy documents for the first time, this thesis has contributed in two other ways to 
research about cultural policy in Indonesia. First, this thesis interrogated how culture is 
articulated in governmental discourse. Understanding cultural policy and culture itself as 
a discursive formation accommodates detailed analysis of its shifting meaning and 
features. I consider social, political and economic changes in this method of analysis 
alongside technical innovation and the background of key personnel in studying the 
deployment of discourses, which shape the changing characteristics of cultural policy. 
This method considers a broad set of influences without privileging any particular 
relationship or considering any characteristic permanent.  
 
Second, the thesis can be used to assess widespread characterisations of New Order 
cultural policy. This thesis challenged representations that New Order cultural policy had 
a singular rationale imposed by the central state by analysing the variety of official 
cultural discourses that informed cultural policy and the differences between their 
deployments in different locations. New Order cultural policy is also frequently seen as 
destructive – that is, in terms of what it banned, excised or prevented. The critiques from 
the Indonesian left in particular tend to emphasise how New Order cultural policy 
negated and repressed local, working class or oppositional cultural practices. While to 
some extent confirming that critique, this thesis also focussed on cultural policy’s 
productive effects, in particular how cultural policy contributed to the shaping of 
Indonesian subjects with the capacities to participate in accelerated development, who 
would peacefully coexist with other indigenous ethnic groups and who would accept the 
regime’s claims to legitimacy. Cultural policy was powerful because it promoted and 
circulated a particular set of practices for everyday life while discouraging other 
practices. It created certain options and choices, while foreclosing others.  
 
Another characterisation of New Order national culture has been that it was a 
construction based on upper-class Javanese culture. While there was some slippage 
between national culture and Javanese and Balinese culture in Taman Mini, much more 




shaping modern Indonesian subjects and making indigenous culture appropriate for such 
a society. Even the most emblematic of Javanese art forms, wayang, was subject to 
‘development’ ideals and was made to include development messages (Sutton, 1991; van 
Groenendael, 1985). While Javanese and Balinese cultural symbols have been used as the 
emblems of New Order era national culture in Jakarta, the features of national culture in 
cultural policy have been determined primarily by its use as a tool of government, in 
particular the normative grid applied in official cultural programs.  
 
Understanding the Cultural Policies of Postcolonial Polities  
Researching postcolonial polities like Indonesia required a rethinking of the purpose of 
cultural policy which in turn required a consideration of how contemporary techniques of 
government were applied in Indonesia. Colonial cultural policy in Indonesia, as was 
explored in Part I, was an expression of the liberal rationalities of government from 
which Western cultural policy emerged, but its features differed to correspond with 
liberal understandings of, and justifications for, colonial rule.  
 
A useful framework for thinking about the continuities and breaks between different 
periods of postcolonial government and Western and postcolonial settings is considering 
cultural policy as a set of governmental techniques and technologies focussed on 
managing populations and shaping individuals’ attributes and behaviours. Undertaking 
cultural policy analysis in a postcolonial polity like Indonesia requires an appreciation of 
the varying expressions that contemporary methods of government took in non-Western 
locations. Analysing the types of populations targeted and the kinds of attributes and 
behaviours that were intended for annihilation or articulated as norms assists in divorcing 
cultural policy as a method of governance from liberal democracies and helps explore the 
forms it took in other settings. Secondly, this thesis draws attention to the importance of 
the colonial context for the features of postcolonial cultural policy, particularly during 
periods of authoritarian rule. Postcolonial governments inherited cultural policies that 
were based on a set of assumptions that although liberal in origin were not democratic. 
While colonial cultural policy was critiqued by many postcolonial governments that 
developed alternatives, it was still the basis on which postcolonial cultural policy was 
built. It also provided a model for authoritarian cultural policy which was supported by 




cultural policy breaks were made or continuities established with colonial cultural policy 
provides a starting point for cultural policy research in postcolonial settings.  
 
A Cultural Policy Research Framework for Indonesia 
Inevitably, a thesis raises some questions and possibilities that cannot be explored within 
its limits. In this final section, I reflect briefly on the possibilities of ‘doing things 
otherwise’ that can grow from Foucaultian analysis (Dean, 1999, p. 37) from a research 
perspective.  
 
One possible direction in cultural policy research is suggested in Foucault’s concept of 
biopower. Foucault defines biopower in The History of Sexuality, Volume 1 as the spread 
of ‘power over life’ (1990, p. 139) through which sexuality became an important domain 
of government. The term biopower designates ‘what brought life and its mechanisms into 
the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge/power an agent of transformation 
of human life’ (Foucault, 1990, p. 143). Cultural policy emerged in Western liberal 
democracies at the time when biopower was becoming important to governance. Cultural 
policy can be considered part of the ‘society of normalisation’ that Foucault considers a 
‘consequence of [the] development of biopower’ (1990, p. 144). Government in such a 
society is more concerned with regulatory and corrective mechanisms than with ensuring 
the continued rule of the sovereign. Biopower itself has two poles, which are parallel to 
cultural policy: one individualising at the level of the body (through disciplinary 
techniques), the other totalising at the level of the population (1990, pp. 139-40).  
 
Biopower and cultural policy begin to differ when biopower is defined as ‘a power whose 
task is to take charge of life’ (1990, p. 144). Three sets of questions arise. The first is the 
deployment of cultural knowledge, in particular knowledge related to race and ethnicity, 
where culture has been linked to a range of different policies focussing on human life. In 
this sense, cultural policy could be considered much broader than the narrow definition 
that is commonly adopted, including in this thesis. The second concerns the development 
of technologies of government that have shaped cultural policy in its narrow sense. How 
did cultural policy grow out of the milieu that was made possible by the spread of 
biopower? Questions arise regarding two issues in particular: the racial taxonomies that 




elements of biopower. The capacity to construct ethnicity is clearly a form of biopower 
where bodies are categorised and marked and populations defined and managed. The 
third concerns how cultural policy is analysed. An analysis of biopower in cultural policy 
would be located at the point where power is applied – the techniques and technologies of 
the cultural programs, the operations of cultural institutions – rather than tracing the links 
between cultural policy and political history as done in this thesis. Such research has the 
potential to reveal further connections between colonies and imperial centres through 
tracking the transfer of techniques of power.  
 
While I have focussed on official cultural policy and programs, a number of 
organisations, both foreign and domestic, have their own cultural policies and programs 
within Indonesia. These organisations provide alternative cultural policy models that can 
be contrasted to the official model and, in many cases, can demonstrate how local 
organisations have resisted or contested official cultural programs through their own 
policies and programs. The benefits of such research would be twofold. First, it would 
contribute to a more complete account of cultural policy in Indonesia. Second, it would 
challenge the limits of official cultural policy. Given the slow pace of official cultural 
policy change since the fall of Suharto, progressive cultural policy change is more likely 
to come from outside the existing official political and cultural institutions.  
 
Néstor García Canclini, in an article about contemporary cultural policy challenges, 
makes a relevant statement regarding countries, such as Indonesia, that have exalted local 
traditions in the face of economic and cultural opening:  
In spite of the political, cultural, and aesthetic qualities sometimes found in artists 
in ... localist movements, the decisive question for cultural policy is: how does 
one move on from the separatist exaltation of difference which in the long term 
perpetuates inequality and fosters discrimination, to the shared acknowledgement 
of the different and the heterogeneous in symbolic searchings capable of 
intercultural communication? (Canclini, 2000, p. 315) 
Indonesian cultural policy has for the most part been ‘localist’ – focussed on retaining the 
authenticity of Indonesian culture through tightly controlled interaction with outside 
forces. This narrow focus has created tensions with the way that culture is circulated and 
consumed in Indonesia through increasing integration with international markets. A 
reconsideration of the context of Indonesian culture in what is now a globalised system of 




problems. For instance, according to Canclini, innovation and transcultural exchange are 
essential to creativity and critical thinking in a global society (2000, p. 315). Rather than 
‘protecting’ the practitioners of traditional cultural practices from such interactions, 
would the state be better advised to assist such exchanges and provide information about 
how communities could retain as much control as possible of the representation of 
indigenous Indonesian cultures in a global environment? Such questions challenge the 
limited pluralism of official cultural policy by focussing on cultural exchange and 
innovation.  
 
All policy analysis holds the danger of confirming inequalities rather than challenging 
them. Cultural policy researchers have to choose between projects that ‘transform the 
social order ... or replicate it – a struggle between cultural policy as a transformative 
versus a functionalist sphere’ (Miller & Yudice, 2002, p. 3). After all, researchers are not 
obliged to contribute towards the efficient operation of the state, but instead choose how, 
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